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Abstract of Thesis
In this thesis the shaping ©nd the validity of Popper's ideas
on history are examined.
Chapter One. It is argued that the re ©re important
similarities between the account of scientific method which
Popper gives in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and the
view which professional historians take of the methods of
their craft. Both yield only tentative results, not certain¬
ties, because results are in both cases open so criticism.
Chapter Two. 11 is argued that Popper's ori inal advocacy
of the hypothetico-deductive model of historical explanation
has been misinterpreted by commentators who have not
considered it in the context of his critique of historicism.
Various of his arguments in this connection axe shown to be
attempts to displace doctrines associated with claims for a.
distinctive logic of historical explanation. Popper's usage
of "trivial" to characterize the laws presupposed in historical
explanations is shown to be ambiguous in a way that gives rise
to difficulties in Popper's analysis of historical explanation.
Moreover, the historian's "line of interest" need not be
restricted to ueserioing ©no explaining s ecific events, as
Po pper main tains.
Chapter Three. It is argued that one of popper's main
purposes iri proposing situational logic as an analysis of
historical explanation is to dispense with empathic under¬
stand ing in historical work. Popper does not establish this
point. Pepper's view® on situationml logic are shown, to be
quite siiail r to Collin, ;wood* a ideas on historical thinking.
It is argue..- that situational analysis as understood by Popper
cannot provi e satisfactory historical explanations without
re ort to eapathio un aera tending, anu tb; t the results 'of
ea.pat-.ic an ere tending can be preset- ted as open to criticism
and thus objective.
-or . o,>.. analysis of bis toricist, in The
o e i,„. . lila toracissa is shown not to hang together, because
the adherent of anti-naturalistic his toricisa is r ot thereby
committed to the pro-n turalls tic docti in© of historical
>rophecy oy meane of trends. Popper's attempt to connect these
two sets or doctrines is, it i arguet, a political rather
than a methodological criticism of His ,orioiaus.
Chapter Five. o_.pen's argument that the historian'must rely
on un testnule poll 6s of view to organize hi. torical accounts is
shown to r c:t on an untenable assumptions that all subsequent
historical interpretations must "fit in with" the -oil t of view
of "severely Halted" "•sources' of history"• It is argued to
the contrary 6h« t historical interpret..tion is a critical activity
in which historians are engaged in revising the traditions of
historical knowledge.
Chapter fix. Po wr is shown rot to have considered important
practical difficulties ir the way of Ms proposed method of
■ - ci; l re.orm, -iccq.,3 .1 il|1>l>lin|i v»eaki.eases are foun in
his attempt to establish analogies between his analysis of
scientific method and piecemeal social engineering. Popper's
methodological individualism is shown to rest on ethico-political
considerations which do not entail she methodology. If
methodological individualism can refer to situations, then the
- *
positi n is equivalent to a moderate methodological holism.
Introduction
I. The Concerns of this Thesis
II. Popper and the Vienna Circle
INTRODUCTION
I. The Concerns of this Thesis
Karl Popper in his best known works, The Open Society and The Poverty
°£ Historioism, takes a dim view of history! a view which is dimmer than
might be expected on the basis of the analysis of scientific method which
Popper published in the days of the Vienna Circle.1, In the first chap¬
py
ter of this thesis it is argued that the "practice of history" *, as
understood by a professional historian, bears considerable similarity to
the view of science which Popper develops in The Logic of Scientific Dis¬
covery. Certainty is not to be had in either case. The results obtained
by an active investigator, not a passive recorder of authoritative "sources
of knowledge", are always open to revision. Whether historical work can
be objective in the generalized sense in which Popper understands this
3. 4.
concept will be considered at various points in this thesis.
In The Open Society in particular, Popper sees a considerable gulf
between scientific work arid the practice of history. Schematically, the
contrast which Popper draws between science and history in this publica¬
tion may be stated in the following way; while Popper rejects the con-
1. Die Logik der Forschung(Vienna, 1934), translated as The Logic of
Scientific Discovery(London, 1959)* Hereafter cited as LSD.
2. The term history is ambiguous! it may refer either to what happened in
the past, or to what we claim to know about the past. It is sometimes
difficult to avoid this ambiguity without resort to ugly circumlocutions.
The title of G.R. Elton's recent book, The Practice of History(London, 1967)
is a clear and attractive expression of the second sense of the term
history; I find I used this same phrase in parts of this thesis written
before I read Elton's book. I shall make frequent use of this phrase in
what follows. I should like to acknowledge Elton's usage here, and use
this phrase, subsequently, without quotation marks.
3. Cf. LSD, p. 44, text and footnote added to the 1959 editioji! Popper's
conception of objectivity is discussed below, "Tjaj ■^sTlot-lo'i
4. Cf. below, TP-1&
ventionalist account of scientific theories as inadequate"*, he thinks
that there is a good deal to be said for a conventionalist view of
historical interpretations as mental creations which are "circular"
because W*-
fr\.'Vfcnvu*V e^r(.&c*>ce.
"we nan only get out, of miE—factual evperienne what we have
ourselves put Into it..." 2.
It is argued in chapter five that the contentions about historical evi¬
dence, on which Popper bases his case for the circularity of historical
interpretations, do not stand up to examination. If there is no exact
analogy to the testing of scientific theories by controlled experiments -
a prominent form of the endeavour to falsify theories which Popper thinks
refutes the conventionalist claim "that science always argues in a circle"
- historical evidence is nevertheless open to criticism, and the circular¬
ity which Popper thinks characteristic of historical interpretations does
not arise. Moreover the relation of such criticism to the traditions of
historical knowledge suggests that there is an important sense, related to
the generalized sense in which Popper understands objectivity, in which
the idea of objectivity is applicable to historical work; Popper's claim
A
that it is "inapplicable"4* is rejected, and it will be seen that he has
retracted this claim, at least in part, in some of his later writings.
In later publications, less well-known than The Open Society and The
Poverty of Historicism, Popper sees more of an analogy between history and
science, in connection with his recommendation of situational logic to
historians and social scientists."* There is, nonetheless, the problem
1. In LSD and more briefly in chapter 25, OS, sec. i(OS, II, 259-260).
Cf. below, chapter one.
In this thesis, The Open Society and its Enemies will be cited as OS;
The Poverty of Historiciam as PH. My citations of OS are from the fourth
edition (published in paperback by Routledge and Kegan Paul, I,ondon,1962);
as there are considerable differences in the pagination of the various
editions of OS, where feasible I have given further indications of where
the relevant passage is to be found: e.g. in a numbered note to a particu
lar chapter or in a numbered subsection of a chapter.
^-«T-iir_26£^25j9- 5. OS, II, 259 4. OS, II, 268
5. "Historical Explanation: An Interview" Cambridge Opinion, 28 (1962),
pp. 20-25; "Die Logik der Sozialwiasenschaften," Kolner Zeitschrift fur
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Koln, 14(1962) no.2., pp. 233-258.
Popper's ideas on situational logic in these publications are discussed
below in chapter three.
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of accounting for Popper's unflattering and inaccurate picture of history
The Open Society, which has appeared in several anthologies.J" It has
been suggested that Popper does not derive this image strictly by compari¬
son with his analysis of scientific method. An Ariadne's thread in this
puzzle is provided by Popper's concept of historicism. Although "histori-
cisra is not history""* there turn out to be some significant links between
the analysis which Popper gives of hi3toricist method and certain theories
of historical method. In The Poverty of Historicism Popper organizes his
presentation of historicist method into anti-naturalistic and pro-natural¬
istic doctrines which he says "are combined" in the "characteristic approach"
7.
of historicism. It is argued in chapter four on fiistoricism, that
historicism is not as "close-knit"'" as Popper claimss that one may con¬
sistently accept the anti-naturalistic doctrines, which closely resemble
the doctrines known as Historisraus, and reject the pro-naturalistic theory
of developmental laws in support of historical prophecy. The utility of
Popper's schema of historicist method is, then, in doubt, for he claims to
have explicated the hitherto concealed logic of historicist prophecy, to
eg
which historicista themselves have been blind.'" But representatives of
His tori sinus, such as Kickert, who subscribe to something of the anti-
naturalistic side of Popper's historicism, have been sufficiently aware of
the pro-naturalistic side to reject it.
Nonetheless, if there is no logical connection between the anti-
naturalistic and pro-naturalistic methodologies which Popper classes as
historicist, there is a certain political unity. Karl Mannheim, whom
Popper considers an arch-historicist, has suggested that, of the three
ideologies of conservatism, classical liberalism and socialism, liberalism
is the odd one out, in that the other two are based on similar social
ontologies, wherein the individual is constituted by his social relations,
1• Contemporary Philosophy, ed. J.L. Jarrett and S.N. McMurrin, (New York,
1954): The Philosophy of History in Our Time, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (New
York, 1959)? Geis_t und Gesicht der Gegenwart, ed. by Otto Molden (Zurich,
1962)
2. 03, II, 59. 3. PH, p. 3. 4. PH, p. 3. 5. PH. P.3.
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whereas liberalism is premised on a self-contained view of the individual.^*
What Popper calls holism, which turns out to be a rejection of the classi¬
cal liberal view of the individual defended by Popper, is common to both
2.
pro-naturalistic and anti-naturalistic historicism. * An important
instance of what Popper calls anti-naturalistic historicism, the doctrine
of historical method known as Historismus, was closely associated with a
x
rejection of Western Liberalism in Germany. * If the absence of a strong
liberal tradition in Germany is considered to be fundamental in the rise
of Nazism, then the influence of Historiamus could be considered a pre¬
disposing condition to Nazism. But if Popper's analysis of pro-natural¬
istic historicism pretends to be an account of Nazi totalitarianism - and
such seeras to be his intention.* - then he has misrepresented Nazism by
over-intellectualizing its for the way in which power was seized and con¬
trolled is far more important in explaining Nazism than any ideology of
historical prophecy.
Popper's critique of historicism, which has, as has been suggested, a
political rather than a logical or methodological unity, is directed against
a wider front than just Nazismj he means to expose those conceptions of
social policy which he thinks supply the slippery road to totalitarianisms,
both of the left and of the right. What is at issue for Popper is a matter
1. Karl Mannheim "Conservative Thought, Essays on Sociology and Social
Psychology ed. Paul Kecskemeti (London, 1955/7 PP* 91-94 and 112-115.
2. PH, p. 105.
5. G.G. Iggers, "The Dissolution of German Historism, " Ideas in History,
essays presented to Louis Gottschalk by his former students ed. by Richard
Herr and Harold T. Parker (Duke University Press, 1965)» P» 527-8. The
following sentence summarizes what seeras to be Iggers * argument in his
recent book, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of
Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Wesleyan University Press,
Middletown, Conn, 1968).
4. Cf. Popper's dedication of PH; also his Addendum (1961) OH, II 595-
5. P« Gardiner makes the point that Popper's attack on historicism is on
a wider front (Philosophical Quarterly IX(1959)» P» 175) *>ut he describes
this front as methodological rather than political.
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of a sound approach to social policyt Popper attempts to establish the
policy of liberal individualism, which he calls "piecemeal engineering",
as "unassailable" ", and those procedures of social reform - "Utopian''or
"holistic engineering" - which ignore its stipulations as fundamentally
2
misconceived and consequently "impossible" and, through their practi¬
cal failures, conducive to totalitarianism. Popper's consideration of
the methods of social analysis, methodological individualism versus
methodological holism, parallels his examination of approaches to social
*
policy. Following the thread of individualism, which is central to
liberalism as Popper understands it, will be seen to clarify Popper's
critique of historicism. Popper's approach to history and historicism is
as much ideological as methodological. His critique of hiatoricisra and
his harshness towards the practice of history are, it is argued, ideo¬
logically shaped; his views on historical explanation are shaped by his
criticism of methodological doctrines which he attributes to anti-natural¬
istic historicism.
In the second and third chapters, Popper's various discussions of
historical explanation are examineds his argument, in The Open Society
and The Poverty of Historicism. that historical explanation applies the
hypothetico-deductive method, and his suggestion in these works, which he
has since amplified, that "most historical explanation" "as a matter of
fact" employs situational logic.'1* It is argued that Popper's early advo¬
cacy of the hypothetico-deductive model of historical explanation is as
much critical as constructives various of his arguments in this connection
are shown to be attempts to displace doctrines associated with claims for a
distinctive logic of historical explanation. Popper's early analysis of
historical explanation is bound up with his critique of anti-naturalistic
historicism, and subsequent discussion of his early views has misrepresented
1. Popper's description of methodological individualism, PH, 157»
2. PH, p. 68.
3. See Chapter Six below.
4. 03, II, 265.
6.
them by detaching them from their context. Popper's shifting usage of
"trivial" to characterize the laws presupposed in historical explanations
is examined« the two main senses in which he uses this terra are shown not
to be equivalent, and Popper's treatment of thera as if they were is shown
to lead to weaknesses in his account of historical explanation.
It is suggested that Poppcjr limits the historian's field of interest
to describing and explaining specific events as a barrier against histori-
cist attempts to claim that past events exhibit patterns which license
historical predictions. It is argued, against Popper's limitation of the
historian's field of interest that the historian may well have an interest
in formulating and using restricted generalizations, and that this interest
does not conduce to what Popper objects to as historical prophecy.
Popper's statements on situational logic in four separate publications
are examined. In The Open Society and The Poverty of Historicism, Popper
relates situational logic to constructing models on the assumption that the
agents acted rationally, as a basis for explaining how they did in fact act}
such an assumption of rationality is shown not to be "trivial".*' It is
argued, further, that explanations of actions in terms of "the logic of the
situation" may not be related to an assumption of rationality, or pre¬
suppose unrestricted generalizations in accordance with the hypothetico-
2*
deductive model. Popper's critique of Collingwood in a later publication"*
is considered, and his advocacy of situational logic is compared with
Collingwood*s views. Lastly, the use of situational analysis in a biography
of Caesar is investigated, with a view to appraising the respective merits
of Popper and Collingwood's views, and also for the purpose of evaluating
Popper's attempt to dispense with empathic understanding in historical work.
It is suggested that Popper is not altogether successful in this latter
endeavour, and that room remains for a case to be made for empathic under¬
standing as a necessary supplement to what Popper would consider to be a
situational analysis of Caesar's actions.
1. As Popper says, 03, II, 265
2. "Historical Explanation* An Interview" Cambridge Opinion v.28(1962),
pp. 21-22.
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II. Popper and the Vienna Circle
Popper's classic work on scientific method, Die Logik der Forschung,
\
was published in Vienna in the days of the Vienna Circle *, and several of
Popper's arguments in this book are directed against the "positivists" of
the Vienna Circle2* with whom he had considerable contact. Popper has
always insisted on his differences from the Vienna Circlei he was never a
member of the Vienna Circle; he was never a disciple of Wittgenstein;
and he never accepted the touchstone of the Vienna Circle, the verification
criterion of meaning. There were, to be sure, logical positivists who
were not members in any real sense of the Vienna Circle"*; there were mem¬
bers of the Vienna Circle, such as Neurath, who were never followers of
Wittgenstein; and the verification criterion of meaning, hailed in the
early days as a modern Occam's rasor, was soon seen to be as metaphysical
as some of the ideas which it classed as meaningless.
Popper, in spite of his kinship with logical positivism, has present¬
ed himself as an original thinker in contingent contact with the Vienna
Circle.**" Others have thought Popper was considerably closer than he
1. Paul K. Feyerabend reports that
"It was Peigl's belief that an earlier publication of the Logik der
Forschung or of some other abridged version of the 'GrundproblerneDie
hogik der For3chung is an abridged version of an earlier manuscript of
Topper's, "Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie,")would have
decisively changed the history of the Vienna Circle. 'We made a mistake,'
said he, 'to choose Wittgenstein as oixr bible'. (Private communication to
Karl R. Popper)"
(P.K. Feyerabend, "Herbert Feigl: a Biographical Sketch," Mind Matter and
Method, essays in Philosophy and Science in honor of Herbert Feigl, ed. by
P.K. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell (University of "Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
1966) p. 7.)
2. See Chapter One below. 3. CR, 39-41, CR, 269
4• Cf. Joergen Joergenson's discussion of Logical Empiricism, pp. 45 ff«»
The Development of Logical Empiricism, International Encyclopedia of
Unified Science, vol. II no. 9 (Chicago, 1951).
5. CR, p. 36, 40-1, 254-5, cf. the following footnote.
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allows to the Vienna Circle: while admitting that Popper entered his
dissent strongly on certain points internal to logical positivism, they
have classed Popper as fundamentally a logical positivist with idiosyn¬
crasies. Otto Neurath described Popper's relationship to the Vienna
Circle epigrammatically: Popper was its "official opposition"** Rudolf
Carnap wrote, in his review of Die Logik der Porschung in 1935» that
"By his efforts to characterize his position clearly £Popper) is led
to overemphasize the differences between his views and those...
which are most closely allied to his...^Popper] is very close indeed
to the point of view of the Vienna Circle. In his presentation,
the differences appear much greater than they are in fact." 2.
I do not want to go into the fine points of this dispute. For the purposes
of considering Popper's ideas on history, there are three points of import¬
ance on which Popper shared the Vienna Circle's opposition to certain
doctrines prevalent in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
the claim that logic lacks autonomy and depends on psychology, or psycholo-
X
gism; the idea that the primary method of the "cultural sciences" is
Verstehen or the empathic understanding of other human beings; and the view
that, for one reason or another, a gulf separates the natural sciences from
the "cultural sciences".
1. CR, p. 269; Popper comments on this that he "was never so fortunate as
to belong to" the Circle, by which he seems to mean that since he was not
actually a member, he could not fulfil even such an official capacity as
opposition..
2. In Krkenntnis. V(l935)» PP» 290-4; cited by Ripper, CR, p. 254, where
he comments that
"This silenced me for many years....But I felt all the time that the
differences between our views were far from being imaginary..."
(CR, p. 254-55).
Carnap has recently reaffirmed his early view:
"(popper's^} basic philosophical attitude was quite similar to that of
the Circle. However, he had a tendency to overemphasize our differ¬
ences." (R. Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," Rudolf Carnap,
Library of Living Philosophers (1963)» p. 31)
3. I follow the translation of"Gfeesteswissenschaften" as "cultural sciences",
as in the recent English translation of Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure
of the World, trans. R.A. George (London, 1967)» p. 39«
9.
Popper attributes the term "paychologiam" to Husserl^", but he uses
the term rather differently from Husserl, in his discussion of the methods
of history and the social sciences, to denote the view that sociology can
2.
be reduced to social psychology ". Psychologisra, as Husserl used the term,
is a reductionist view, often associated with classical empiricism, in which
logic is considered to be a branch of psychology: the laws of logic were
empirical generalizations about the way in which people think; according to
John Stuart Mill, the principle of non-contradiction amounted to asserting
that, as a matter of fact, two contradictory propositions cannot be maintain¬
ed at the same time. Popper's shift in usage is understandable, for the
development of mathematical logic since Husserl's time corroborated the
autonomy of logic.
Psychologisra in Ilusserl's sense is analogous to Verstehen in attributing
the procedures of knowledge to human "inner life"; both doctrines make
thought and knowledge relative to persons. The assertion that there is a
method peculiar to the "cultural sciences", based on what might be loosely
described as reverberations in the knower's psyche, is considered by some
to entail a radical division between the "cultural sciences" and the natural
sciences. Popper's critical stance to the variations played on this cluster
of doctrines will be a recurrent theme in this thesis.
These three points which Popper shared with the Vienna Circle will be
seen to be of importance in delimiting Popper's approach to history and its
methods. But they do not exhaust the relevance of Popper's contact with the
Vienna Circle for his ideas on history. It has been argued that the Vienna
Circle's insistence on "scientific philosophy" limited their outlook on the
x
social sciences quite severely. Pietro Ros3i has suggested that Popper's
1. OB, II, 525, note 19 to chapter 13; the term "psychologisra" did not
originate with Husserl, but was first used by J.E. Erdraann (M. Farber, The
Foundation of Phenomenology: F.dmund Husaerl and the Quest for a Rigorous
Science of Philosophy (1943)« P* 110.)
2. OS II, 86, 90, 91, 98.
5. Pietro Rossi, Storia e storicisma nella filosofia oonteraporanea (Lerici,
Milan, i960), pp. 405-440, in a chapter entitled "Karl Popper and the neo-
positivist critique of hi.-5toricism." What followa is a close paraphrase of
Ho ssi ' s argument.
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writings on history and historicism should be evaluated with regard to the
self-imposed limitations in this respect of the Vienna Circles for Popper,
in Rossi's view, went quite fur towards overcoming these limitations.
Rossi argues that the classical doctrines of logical positivism put the
social sciences and historiography outside the scope of the Vienna Circles
only logical-linguistic considerations were permitted, and certain problems
were prohibited as nonsense. Rossi claims that the latter doctrine was a
"biased rejection" of these problems, and that the former tenet excluded the
critical instruments adequate and appropriate for these problems. The
problems of "contemporary historicism" were beyond the self-imposed limit¬
ations of Yienna Circle.''"*
Popper set aside both of these limitations, in his major contribution
to the "liberalization" of logical positivism. He rejected the verifica¬
tion criterion of meaning, and defined "the range of empirical science on
the basis of its methodological rules", rather than by logical-linguistic
considerations. Examining Popper's works on history and the social sciences
in chronological order, one can see
"the successive stages of the disengagement of logical positivism
from its original program; end the acquisition of the capacity
to handle questions which it had initially condemned, from its
own viewpoint." 2.
Rossi evaluates the extent to which Popper "liberalized" the original
programme of logical positivism, so a3 to permit an approach to the problems
of "contemporary historicism", by comparing his ideas on history and the
social sciences with those of Otto Neurath.^* Neurath's publications^* on
1. Rossi, p. 405
2. Rossi, p. 406. Rossi lists "What is Dialectic?" Mind, 1940, "The
Poverty of Historicism," Economica, 1944, and The Open Society, 1945
3. Rossi, p. 454-5
4. The three publications of Neurath's which Rossi cites were published
during and subsequent to the Vienna Circle's existence. But Neurath's
earlier publications on the concept of the "war economy" might be quite
different; for one thing, Neurath's ideas were shaped by Marxism as well
as by logical positivism - Popper (PH, p. 103) calls Neurath a historicist.
11.
the social sciences apply the standard doctrines of the Vienna Circle.
He considers sociology and psychology in terms of the unity of science and
physicalism, that is, behaviouristically: the problems end the language of
the social sciences are to be modelled strictly on physics.
Neurath'a physicalism is much more restrictive than Popper's use of
the paradigm of physicss "ethical-juridical problems", which are central
to Popper's Open Society, are eliminated by Neurath because they cannot be*'*"
formulated in terms of experimental assertions. " Popper recognizes the
distinct categories of nature and its testable theories, and of value and
its conventions; the problems of the latter category cannot be reduced to
matters soluble by the methods of the former, but it is, nevertheless,
according to Popper, important to raise these problems and to see what can
be said about their solutions, or lack of solutions, in the appropriate
terms.'"*
Neurath's reductionist approach is "directly descended from the original
position of the Vienna Circle," and his considerations of historiography and
the social sciences reflect its limitations.'* By contrast, Popper broad¬
ened the narrow outlook of logical positivism, by his critique of logical
positivism, and thus achieved a less "biased view" of the problems of history
and the social sciences.
Rossi argues that Popper's criticism of historicism does not apply to
what Rossi describes as "contemporary historicism", in which Dilthey and
Weber are seminal figures. Rather, Popper's critique is directed against
the historicism of the Romantic historical school: namely, against the re¬
duction of the social sciences to historical knowledge, and historical know¬
ledge to an intuitive understanding radically different from what occurs in
the natural sciences; and against the supposed laws of historical develop¬
ment, on which speculative philosophies of history are generally based.^*
1. Rossi, p. 434«
2. This point is not made explicitly by Rossi but it is related to his
argument.
3. Rossi, p. 435 4* Rossi, p. 422.
12.
These two sets of doctrines were the outcome of the post-Kantian develop¬
ment of idealism, in which there were "two main directions" of "interest
in human action",
"detailed concrete history on the one hand, the philosophy
of history on the other." 1.
"Contemporary historicis*," as Rossi understands it, is not a continua¬
tion of romantic historicism, which was strongly influenced by Hegel.
"Contemporary Genaan historicism" emerged in polemic against Hegel, and
against the conception of the historical world formulated by Romantic
2#
culture. * The"fundamental points of reference" for "contemporary
historicism" are the "confrontation with positivism" beginning in the
*
later nineteenth century, and the neo-critical development of Kantianism.
The aim of "contemporary German historicism" might be equated with that of
critical philosophy of history? to establish the conditions for valid
knowledge in the historical and the social sciences.^*
Popper, although he is not sufficiently aware of it, has a consider¬
able, if partial, solidarity with what Rossi calls "contemporary histori-
cism". What Popper criticizid as historicisra supports this view, Rossi
argues, for it was the romantic inheritance which the "contemporary
historicists" wished to discard.'" Popper's interest in the part played
by hypotheses in historical work can be compared to the work of Weber:
Weber went further in determining
"the particular functions which general rules and general
concepts fulfil in historical work." 6.
Popper was limited in this direction because he retained, although in a
somewhat altered form, the Vienna Circle's demand for
"a general model of scientific procedure, to which to relate,
and on the basis of which to clarify the modes of operation
of the various disciplines."
1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action 2nd edition (Glencoe,
III, 1949), p. 475
2. Rossi, pp. 14, 16. 3* Rossi, p. 14. 4* Rossi, p. 16.
3. Rossi, p. 42V- 6. Rossi, p. 433- 7» Rossi, p. 439-
13.
And furthers while Popper's "polemical posture" in The Poverty of
Historicism and The Open Society did not prevent him from putting forward
constrictive ideas partially converging with "contemporary historicism",
it did impede him from recognizing the extent of his kinship with it.1*
Rossi's interpretation of Popper's relation to the Vienna Circle is
suggestive, but not all his suggestions need be adopted. In arguing that
Popper "liberalized" the narrow outlook of the Vienna Circle with respect
to history and the social sciences, it may be that Rossi takes Popper's
utterances on his independent position vis-a-vis the Vienna Circle too
much at face value; and this relation may not explain as much of Popper's
rapprochement to "contemporary historicism" as Popper thinks it does.
That is, Rossi takes Popper's rejection of the verification criterion as
part of his contribution to the "liberalization" of logical positivism;
but it was noted above that the verification criterion and the associated
doctrine that certain problems were nonsense, were part of the early out¬
look of the Vienna Circles the verification criterion was severely modi¬
fied because it was unworkable and metaphysical.
Rossi argues for a progressive liberalization of logical positivism
in the sequence of Popper's works because, in The Open Society and its
Knemies, which was published last, in 1945» Popper shifts from a methodo¬
logical to an ideological criticism of historicism as the doctrinal
2.
foundation of "contemporary totalitarianism". * But it can be argued
that this angle of approach is in line with the Vienna Circle's objection
*
to metaphysics as a cover for noxious social doctrines.'*! hopper's
1. Rossi, p. 433» P« 439-40.
2. Rossi, p. 426. Cf. above, p. 11, note 1 for the sequence of Popper's
works which Rossi considers, and the dates of their first publications.
3. According to Philipp Prank,
"The whole original Viennese group was convinced that the elimina¬
tion of metaphysics not only was a question of a better logic but
was of great relevance for social and cultural life. They were
also convinced that the elimination of metaphysics would deprive
the groups that we call today totalitarian of their scientific
and philosophic basis and would lay bare the fact that these
groups are actually fighting for special interests of some kind."
(P.Prank, Modem Science and its Philosophy Cambridge,Mass,1949»P«34)
Otto Neurath, trained as a sociologist, and something of a Marxist, went
further along this line than did the other members of the Circle.
14.
ideas here might be viewed as a continuation of logical positivism, rather
than a "liberalization".
That the Vienna Circle took little interest in the problems of the
social sciences is indisputable. But because they were concerned with
elaborating a comprehensive scientific outlook, they could not simply
ignore the social sciences; problems of the social sciences were included
in their outline of unitary science published as Wissenschaftliche
Weitauffassung der Weiner Kreis"*. But except for Otto Neurath, the logi-
2.
cal positivists' considerations of these problems were perfunctory."*
But Neurath was a more interesting thinker than Rossi makes him appear.
Although many of his later publications attempt to carry out consistent
applications of characteristic doctrines of the Vienna Circle, such as
physicalism, his views on the social sciences do not altogether derive from
the tenets of logical positivism; they were also influenced by Neurath's
interest in Marxism which Rossi neglects, and this latter factor accounts
for certain views of Neurath'3, which were not accepted by the other members
of the Vienna Circle.
It may be also the case that Rossi misconstrues Popper's liberaliza¬
tion of logical positivism, and his partial convergence with the "contempor¬
ary historicisra" descended from Mlthey and Weber. It will be suggested
below, in considering Popper's views on historical explanation, that on
occasion he borrows the terminology of those whom Rossi calls "contemporary
historicists" in order to undermine their case.
1. Or so accounts of this publication say; I have not been able to see a
a copy of it.
2. Cf. Rudolf Carnap, "Reply to Cohen," Rudolf Carnap, p. 865 on this point
5. Cf. below, Chapter Three, sectionVI for Popper's characterization of
situational logic as a method of objective understanding (objective
Verstehen): what Popper attempts to eliminate by means of this concept
includes those conceptions of Verstehen which Mlthey and Weber would,
respectively, defend as indispensable in history and the social sciences.
(Cf. Max Weber, "The Interpretative Understanding of Social Action," in
Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. May Brodbeck
(N.Y. » 19^8)~pp. 19-33) ~ ~~ _
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And there is a further problem to do with Popper's relation to
historici ims. Rossi argues that what Popper criticizes is romanticist
historicism, from which "contemporary historicisra" is to be distinguished,
but that Popper does not recognize his solidarity with "contemporary
historicism", due to limitations in his terms of reference arising from
his links with logical positivism. But this argument will not do. If
what Popper criticizes as historicism is, as it has been unsyrapathetically
de cribed, "flogging a dead horse", why, as a philosopher, did he do so
without checking for either lack of respiration or presence of putri-
faction? I shall return to these and other questions in considering what
Popper means by historicism.
There is another limitation to Rossi's approach still to be considered;
more must be taken into account, in examining Popper's ideas on history,
than either philosophic derivations or purely philosophical concerns.
While Popper's position on empathic understanding carries on the Vienna
Circle's rejection of this notion, Popper's broader lack of sympathy for
the practice of history, insofar as it is not due simply to ignorance of
what historians are trying to do, stems, it will be argued, from the
individualism which is the central constituent of his liberalism, and this
same individualism unifies his wide-sweeping critique of historicism as
well. It will be argued that ethico-political concerns, as well as
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I. Introduction
The object in this chapter is not to consider Popper's contribution,
in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, to the philosophy of science. It
is rather to examine the ideas that Popper sets forth in his first book,
with reference to his ideas, published lcter, on history and social
philosophy. Popper's critical philosophy of history is, professedly, an
application of the epistemological and methodological ideas which he first
developed in connection with the philosophy of science; and there are
other respects in which The Logic of Scientific Discovery foreshadows and
elucidates the ideas of The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society
and its Enemies, as I hope to specify.
Thus, the argument of this chapter might be described as a super¬
ficial paradox? that the ideas which Popper develops in criticism of
traditional empiricism and logical positivism have ramifications which,
in Popper's later publications, apply to those opponents whom he convicts
of far more flagrant misdemeanours: the historicists.
A discussion of Popper's ideas from such an angle is, necessarily,
neither a comprehensive nor a systematic treatment of his ideas on the
philosophy of science; it is rather a selective and oblique study, based
on criteria which are in some sense external to Popper's first book and
the subjects treated therein.
If the genre of this exercise were considered to be intellectual
history, it might be contended that it exemplifies in parts a narrative
approach, which is expressed in narrative sentences linking Popper's later
ideas with his earlier ones: e.g. that laws of historical development,
extending to the future, suffer from many of the same difficulties as do
inductively based scientific theories. If the genre of this endeavour
is to be philosophy, its object and manner of execution might be thought
illegitimate or irrelevant; for to examine Popper's ideas on the phil¬
osophy of science in the light of his ideas on history and social phil¬
osophy is not to raise the fundamental question of the validity of either
of these sets of ideas.
But it is perhaps a narrow conception of philosophy to see ideas as
separable from their background. A more generous view would allow that
providing a context, a historical background, is a useful fringe activity,
helpful to the central concerns of philosophy. We will know better, from
what end to consider the validity of Popper's ideas on history, if we under¬
stand their historical derivation as well as their logical relations.
Popper would claim that this is a purely heuristic activity, to be rele¬
gated to the category of the psychology of knowledge, rather than that of
the more important logic of knowledge; but the exclusion of my tactics
from Popper's strict conception of epistemology does not prevent it from
being a useful activity, subsidiaiy to philosophy. I shall have more to
say on the distinction, fundamental in Popper's work on the philosophy of
science, between the logic of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge.
An identification of the view which Popper opposes, in an argument,
frequently leads to the heart of his contentions. The reason for this is
connected with Popper's conception of philosophy as a critical activity*":
in his practice, this often means that he constructs his positive proposals
in the course of criticizing doctrines which he opposes; the linkage should
be preserved, I think, in an exposition of Popper's arguments.
-£n Lofiic of Scientific Discovery, the main opposition is:
"the traditional view that empirical science starts from
perception";
"that we begin by collecting and arranging our experiences,
and so ascend the ladder of science";
and that
"perceptual experience must he the sole 'source of knowledge'
of all the empirical sciences.... Canc*} that science i3 merely
an attempt to classify and describe this perceptual knowledge,
these immediate experiences whose truth we cannot doubt...." 2.
1. Discussed below, Chapter VI.
2. LSD, pp. 97, 106, 94-
The substantial issue raised in .Stopper's book is whether perceptual
experience can be taken as the hasis for empirical science; the methodo¬
logical techniques which he opposes and proposes are associated with this
question of whether a satisfactory basis can be found for science. Popper's
contention is that neither the basis nor the conclusions of science are
definitive} rather, the methods by which they are obtained are objective.
His criticisms, and positive proposals, are based on these contentions.
It seems to me that one can be led astray, in interpreting Popper, by
the amount of space that he devotes to criticizing methodologically mis¬
conceived techniques, in that these may appear to be what is at issue.
These techniques are associated with bases: inductive logic with the
basis of perceptual experience} alleged historical laws with the anti-
naturalistic social ontology of historicism that Popper delineates in the
first part of The Poverty of Hiatoriciam.^' Reference to the basis links
the seemingly disparate topics which Popper criticizes, as I hope to show
in this instance with regard to the philosophy of science: the principle oj,
induction, the divagations of the psychology of knowledge and the verifica¬
tion criterion of meaning are all associated with taking perceptual experi¬
ence as a basis for science: conversely, Popper in rejecting such a basis,
and indeed any fixed basis for science, restricts episteraological discussion
to the logic of knowledge, and makes methodology a matter of decisions as to
conventions.
In traditional empiricism, perceptual experience is organized by means
of the principle of induction, which is, Popper thinks, one of the major
stumbling blocks of this view of empirical science; in the refurbished
empiricism of the logical positivists, the verification criterion of mean¬
ing is the principle by which empirical science is constituted. Both in¬
duction and verification, with their basis in perceptual experience, are,
Popper argues, misconceived; he recommends a falsifiability criterion of
1. The validity of Popper's connection of the technique of hiatoricist
prophecy with the anti-naturalistic basis is examined below in Chapter
Four.
*X0
demarcation, which can succeed, he claims, where the preceding failed, in
distinguishing scientific theories f metaphysical views: the latter
may he meaningful, but are certainly falsifiable, as are theories in
f"
empirical science.
It is interesting to note that Popper, in his retroactive construction
of his intellectual autobiography, says that he did not develop hia views
"originally as a criticism of Wittgenstein", but rather, independently:
"In fact I had formulated the problem of demarcation and the
falsiflability or testability criterion in the autumn of 1919»
years before Wittgenstein's views became a topic of discussion
in Vienna. (Cf. my paper 'Philosophy of Science: A Personal
Report ', now in ray Conjectures and Refutations.) This explains
why, as soon as I heard of the Circle's new verifiability
criterion of meaning, I contrasted this with my falsifiability
criterion - a criterion of demarcation designed to demarcate
systems of scientific statements from perfectly meaningful
systems of metaphysical statements." 1.
That is, Popper claims that, unlike many members of the Vienna Circle, he
was not an epigone of Wittgenstein, but an independent and original thinker.
He credits himself with conceiving his major, and most influential ideas at
the age of seventeen, in the winter of 1919-2C. In his historical note to
The Poverty of Historicism, Popper writes that
"the fundamental thesis of this book - that the belief in
historical destiny is sheer superstition, and that there can
be no prediction of the course of human history by scientific
or any other rational methods - goes back to the winter of
1919-20." 2.
The year 1919 seems to have been something of an annus mirabilis for Popper.
The context for his mental activity was the end of the Habsburg Empire.
In his essay, "Philosophy of Science: a personal report," he writes:
"After the collapse of the Austrian Empire there had been a revolution
in Austria: the air was full of revolutionary slogans and ideas, and
new and often wild theories. Among the theories which interested rae
Einstein's theory of relativity was no doubt by far the most import¬
ant. Three others were Marx's theory of history, Freud's psycho¬
analysis, and Alfred Adler's so-called 'individual psychology'.
"There was a lot of popillar nonsense talked about these theories...
...during the summer of 1919*began to feel more and more
1. LSD, p.512 2. PH, iv.
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more dissatisfied with...the Marxist theory of history,
psycho-analysis, and individual psychology; and I began
to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status.
...I felt th t £they~]... had in fact rather more in common
with primitive myths than with science...." 1.
Popper goes on to tell of an experience with Alfred Adler, which
"much impressed" him:
"Once, in 1919» I reported to him a case which to rae did not
seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty
in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings,
although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked,
I asked him how he cou^d be so sure. 'Because of my thousand¬
fold experience,' whereupon I could not help saying: 'And with
this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-
and-one-fold."' 2.
The difference which Popper discovered, between Einstein's theory of
relativity, and the pseudo-scientific theories of Marx, Adler and Preud,
is that Einstein's theory "is incompatible with certain possible results
of observation", whereas the others
"were compatible with the most divergent human behaviour, so
that it might be impossible to describe any human behaviour
that might not be claimed to be a verification of these
theories." 3.
The conclusion to which Popper came, at the age of seventeen, in the
winter of 1919-20, was that no theory was scientific by virtue of the
quantity of its confirmations; confirmations which are easily come by are
of little scientific worth. liot everything is permitted by a scientific
theory; what is crucial is that it prohibits certain events which, if
they occur, would refute the theory. Irrefutable theories are not
scientific; a scientific theory is tested by attempting to falsify or
refute it. It is falsifiability which provides the criterion of demarca¬
tion between theories which are scientific and those which are not. 4-
1. Reprinted in Conjectures and Refutations under the title, "Science:
Conjectures and Refutations", p. 34.
2. "Science: Conjectures and Refutations," CR p. 34*
3. Ibid., p. 35.
4. Ibid., p. 36-37-
a*
Popper argues that his proposal is more than a simple setting of
verification on its head. Confirmation and falsification are signi¬
ficantly asymmetricj scientific theories involve universal statements,
and these can never be deduced from singular statements, although they
may be refuted by singular statements.
One way in which Popper states this conclusion, in The Logic of
Scientific Discovery, is that scientific theories cannot be inferred by
means of the principle of induction. The principle of induction makes
just the claim which Popper has dismissed as untenable: that there is
some means whereby universal statements, such as natural laws, can emerge
from a collection of singular statements; but an apparent convergence of
the particular events described by such statements cannot be extrapolated.
In this negative result as to how valid laws may be grounded, Popper's
criticism of empiricism in The Logic of Scientific Discovery parallels
his critique of historicism in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open
Society and its Enemies in that both derive from the same insight, that
certain proposed derivations of laws are untenable.
There are further similarities between Popper's analysis of science
and the practice of history as understood by professional historians, and
these resemblances will emerge in ny exposition of some of the central
topics of The Logic of Scientific Discover,'/. I shall begin with what can
be only awkwardly described as a meta-meta-discussion of Popper's disti¬
nction between the logic of knowledge arid the psychology of knowledge.
After considering Popper's conception of methodology, I shall then exa¬
mine more specific issues: scientific theories, falsifications, causal
explanation and probability. In the last section of this chapter I shall
consider whether Popper's image of science in The Logic of Scientific Dis¬
covery is as unlike the practice of history as Popper contends in the last
chapter of The Open Society.in ii wmMm—mmb mmmtJmm
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II. The Logic of Knowledge and tne Psychology of Knowledge
The distinction which Popper draws, between the logic of knowledge
and the psychology of knowledge, is related to the substantial is;ue which,
it was argued above, is at the heart of Popper's argument in The Logic of
Scientific Discovery s whether perceptual experience is a satisfactory basis
for ompirical science; and, if it is not, how the starting point for empi¬
rical science ought to be chosen, and what the working procedures of empi¬
rical science axe.
The psychology of knowledge describes the attributes of knowledge as
seen by those who maintain that perceptual experience can provide a sound
basis for science. The logic of knowledge excludes these attributes from
the theory of knowledge relating to Popper's conception of empirical science .
Popper's view of science is that its theories, irrevocably tentative,
are tested by means of the logical relation of deduction, which is objective,
and falsified by singular existential stateraexits, statements, that is
"which assert that an observable event is occurring in a certain
individual region of space and time" 1.
by referring to observability, in basic statements, rather than to observa¬
tions, Popper argues, it is possible to avoid the subjective reference to
2.
perceptual experience which vitiates traditional empiricism. *" Empirical
science is thus both objective and tentative.
This view, according to Popner, leads away from the blind alleys,
such as the principle of induction, which the basis of perceptual experience
cannot escape. Traditional empiricism is a subjective view: its con¬
ception of knowledge refers to what Popper oonsiders to be psychological
factors, irrelevant to significant features of knowledge in empirical
science•
1. LSD, p. 103.
2. This argument is developed in more detail below, pp.
The psychology of knowledge "deals with empirical facts''^*: the pro¬
cess, often described as inspiration, whereby new ide: s are conceived; or
the subjective feeling of conviction which may motivate someone to uphold
an idea. This latter factor lies behind the plausibility of the principle
of induction: an observer, experiencing the repeated occurrence of nat¬
ural events, may become convinced that the series may be extrapolated into
the future, without any grounds for hie belief beyond his perceptual
experience . But according to Popper, empirical science is not consti¬
tuted in this fashion; an inductive inference from experience is of little
value to empirical science.
What is significant for empirical science is what Popper describes as
the logic of knowledge, which deals with the logical relations between
statements, and the consequent methods whereby hypotheses can be tested.
The psychological facets of knowledge may be relevant to the conception of
new ideas, but they play no part in the testing to which new ideas must be
subjected, if they are to be worthy of serious consideration, in empirical
science.
In the terms of Popper's distinction, Kekule's vision, while on a
London bus, of a particular chemical molecule, hitherto problematical, as
a snake biting its tail, is a fascinating empirical fact of the psychology
of knowledge, but irrelevant to the testing of the model which Kekule pro¬
posed, as a result of his vision. The more prosaic testing of Kekule's
insight relies on means within the province of the logic of knowledge.
The psychology of knowledge sheds no light on what it is that makes a
theory scientific rather than metaphysical, for the conception of a theory
is irrelevant to its category. Yet this question of demarcation, of the
criterion for distinguishing a scientific theory from a metaphysical one is
in Popper's eyes at the heart of the problem of identifying empirical sci-
2e
ence. " The logic of knowledge, unlike the psychology of knowledge, is
1. LBD, p.30; pp.30-32, for what follows.
2. LSD, p.34-9? cf. CR, p.59» 196-7, 256.
relevant to just this question: the logical relations between statements,
which are its province, provide a means for objective testing of scientific
theories. A theory is refuted if consequences deduced from it are falsi¬
fied by singular existential statements: e.g., a theory of the British
weather, if such were possible, would be refuted, if a prediction of a
clear day were deduced, and falsified by a persistant drizzle that concealed
whether the sun actually rose on the appointed day.
This difference in the respective roles of these aspects of knowledge,
psychological and logical, is what justifies, in Popper's eyes, the sharp
distinction that he draws between them, and his restriction of the theory
of knowledge, as it relates to empirical science, to the logic of knowledge.
Such a delimitation of epistemology is perhaps not so much of a taut¬
ology as Popper makes it appear, on his terms: it could be argued that the
process of conceiving new ideas - inspiration - can be approached from more
than the angle of empirical fact. A psychological theory might give a
"qualitative" description of "inspiration" which does not entail that new
ideas can be manufactured according to its recipes; if new ideas are con¬
sidered to be the result of a figurative crossing of wires, this does not
mean that one can preconceive which wires will cross fruitfully. But it
may be that Popper restricts the psychology of knowledge to empirical facts
because he thinks that the endeavour to analyse inspiration holds forth the
temptation of foolproof recipes for new ideas, which Popper thinks an un¬
pleasant impossibility.
But such considerations might be considered niggling, for Popper's
distinction appears to work fairly straightforwardly in the natural sciences.
Popper's use of it, with regard to history and the social sciences, is per¬
haps more questionable: here Popper's exclusion of the psychology of know¬
ledge leads him to relegate any re-enactment approach to human action to a
heuristic prelude of empirical research. It may be obvious that Kekule's
vision is irrelevant to the worth of his proposal for empirical science,
but it is not so clear that considering the episode of Kekule's discovery
in the history of science, it is purely heuristic to have some notion of
what it is like to see a vision of a snako biting its tail, while struggl¬
ing with a scientific problem.
Many historians and theorists of history have thought that there is a
prima facie case for including "psychological" aspects of knowledge, in
the analysis of historical knowledge. The argument is that the student
of human beings has an advantage over the student of other topics in that
the former has some experience of what it is like to be a human being**;
and, he has had, moreover, particular experiences, which apparently are
analogous to some experiences of his subjects. In comparatively prosaic
terms, these are the rudiments of an empathetic approach to comprehending
human action.^*
Popper, however, translates his distinction between the logic and the
psychology of knowledge, to history and the social sciences, without mak¬
ing much allowance for possible shifts within the new field of application,
which might affect the distinction, in ways that I have suggested above.
He extends hi3 distinction between the logic and the psychology of know¬
ledge, in his argument against the prima facie case for empathetic under¬
standing; Popper's situational logic, by eliminating "psychologism" and
allegedly related views from the analysis of human action, is an attempt
to exclude re-enactment approaches from historical explanation.'"
In proposing situational logic, Popper argues that human nature is
unsatisfactory as a basis for the social sciences, in ways that are analo¬
gous to the defects of perceptual experience as a basis for empirical
science. The results derived from both bases are subjective: perceptual
experience is the property of the observer; insight into a person's mo¬
tives is not easily made public, and this is one of the conditions of know¬
ledge, according to Popper. There is a further, perhaps looser, analogy
1. Hayek makes this contention, in The Counter-Revolution of Science,
PP. 25-35-
2. Cf. below, Chapter Three, for further discussion and illustration of
this point.
3. See Chapter Three below.
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between the defects of these two proposed bases. Neither perceptual
experience nor psychological data can provide an adequate basis for
natural or social science respectively, because in the first case the
theories of natural science transcend any collection of supporting data
drawn from perceptual experience, and in the second case, a;. will be seen
below, Popper argues that the fundamental problems of sociological theory
cannot be explained in psychological terms.1*
The extent to which Popper's later work on history is a transfer of
his ideas in The Logic of Scientific Di.-.ccvery can be seen by considering
a term which he introduces in his discussion of the psychology of knowledge:
"psychologist", the epitome of the subjective defects of the psychology of
knowledge. One fairly constant theme in Popper's analysis of scientific
knowledge is the need to eliminate psychologists? he frequently demon¬
strates that his proposals are not open to this charge.
A reconstruction of Popper's conception of psychologist, from what he
says in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, shows that it involves two major
components: first, the claim that the psychology of knowledge, investigat¬
ing the processes of conceiving new ideas, in relevant to the analysis of
scientific knowledge; second, a view of the empirical basis which is
associated with the psychology of knowledge, namely,
"The doctrine that the empirical sciences are reducible
to sense-perceptions, and thus to our experiences..." 2.
and hence that the empirical sciences are justified on the subjective
grounds of our convictions as to our experiences.
The correlation of these two doctrines is that both take as funda¬
mental, respectively, the creative processes of the thinker, and the per¬
ceptions of the observer? both are subjective: both refer to what cannot
be exhibited publicly and examined rationally.
1. See Chapter Three, below.
2. LSD, p. 93
If.
Popper's contention is that neither of these doctrines is relevant to
the epistemological analysis of science. He does not consider that the
claim to reconstruct the private, creative experiences of another person
can be valid; the impossibility of this endeavour puts its material
beyond the bounds of empirical science, whose results are to be "inter-
subjectively testable".
Very broadly, Popper extrapolates his argument against this claim, in
his rejection of empathetic understanding in the social sciences as methodo¬
logically unsound.1*
The flaw in taking perceptual experience to constitute a basis for
empirical science is a logical difficulty: experiences cannot justify
inter-subjectively valid statements, and scientific theories are composed
of such statements. That experiences cannot justify inter-subjectively
valid statements is what constitutes the problem of induction: countless
experiences of sunrises will not suffice to ensure that the sun will rise
tomorrow. The universal terms in which scientific theories are couched
cannot be pulled like rabbits out of some mysterious and fortunately
magical properties of perceptual experience.
The root problem, then, is how scientific theories are to be removed
from limbo; if they are not to be accepted dogmatically, it would seem
as if they must be justified, either by "reasoned argument, in the logical
sense" *, and to justify all statements thus would lead to an infinite
1. See the discussion of the ramifications of Popper's usage of psycho-
logism in Chapter Three, section iii in particular. In making a case
for situational logic as a method of objective understanding, Popper argues
that psychological "springs of action" must be excluded from situational
logic "on principle". Popper's argument that it is impossible to re¬
construct the private creative experiences of another person may be thought
to lend support to this principle. But this argument does not establish
the principle which Popper seems to defend, that situational logic must
dispense with psychological "springs of action" as such; for it is argued
below (Chapter Three, section vii) that there are psychological "springs of
action" whose attribution is open to inter-subjective examination.
2. LSD, p. 95.
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regress; or by perceptual experience, which on Popper's account is an
unsatisfactory basis for logical reasons.
Popper cuts this Gordian knot by asserting that we cannot ultimately
justify scientific statements, because there is no means of making them
certain for all time. We must learn to live with scientific theories as
tentative but testable: testable, rather than justifiable, and tentative,
because if theories are to be scientific, then they must be falsifiable.
This digression into the problem behind psychologism - whether the
statements of empirical science can be justified - is relevant to one of
the main theses of this Chapter. Popper's image of science, in its large
outlines, bears some similarity to the view of history which is held by
many professional historians and theorists of history as well. According
to this view, the results of historical research are always open to re¬
vision, but the procedures of historical research can be followed, and
checked, by persons other than the historian proposing an interpretation.
Perhaps the process whereby he conceived his interpretation cannot be re¬
constructed, but the question of its validity, its relation to the evidence,
can be examined. An historical interpretation is a conjecture which may
be overthrown if it is found not to jibe with the evidence.
Here the broad lines of the similarity of Popper's image of science to
the professional historian's picture of history diverge: the procedure
whereby an interpretation is falsified is not analogous, in all its details,
to the experimental testing and potential refutation of a scientific theory.
In testing a theory, an experimenter can have some control of the conditions;
he can hope to isolate a crucial factor, in order to investigate its be¬
haviour. Moreover, his experimental results are useful for the purpose of
testing scientific theories, if it is at least theoretically possible for
others to reproduce his experiments. It is difficult to see how these
conditions can be fulfilled, or even applied, to historical evidence.
But it is possible to argue that interpretations of historical evidence
are open to criticism in ways that are analogous, if not precisely similar
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to the testing of scientific theories. In the first place, not all
scientific theories are, or can be, tested by controlled experiments.
They may be tested by comparing what can be deduced from such a theory
with further evidenoe, or they may be tested by further analysis of the
evidence available to those proposing the theory; and something like
this latter mode of criticism is perhaps most frequently used in criti¬
cizing historical interpretations.^*
When historians argue that it is possible to use evidence, so to
speak, scientifically, discovering what really happened with the aid of an
untruthful or inaccurate witness, implicit in their argument is a re-
enactraent approach, a reference to experience and understanding of human
nature. In extracting the events of the past from the mouth of a mis¬
leading witness, the historian attempts to reconstruct something of his
2 •
witness's mentality, * on the basis of the available evidence, in order to
see why he said what he did, and also, what he did not say.
By this means the historian can, as he must if history is not to be
scissors-and-paste, pass beyond the literal content of the available evi¬
dence. In studying documents in this way the historian is, in a broad
*
sense, making semantical investigations* he is considering the documents
1. Of. below, Chapter Pour, on History, where the argument that historical
interpretations are not "circular" because they are open to criticism is
developed at greater length.
2. Of course, disciplines auxiliary to history are used in investigating
docunents, but the distinction may be drawn, as by C.V. Langlois and C.
Seignobos in their classic manual (introduction to The Study of History,
trans. C.G. Berry, London, 1912) between the external and internal criti¬
cism of documents* external criticism is the attempt to establish the
authenticity and provenance of a doctrine; internal criticism attempts
to determine its significance. It is the latter kind of criticism which
is relevant to ray argument.
5. It has been argued that psycho-analysis is a semantical activity in a
similar sense, and that this view undercuts the controversy as to whether
psycho-analysis is inadequate as an experimental science, employing causal
explanations. (See Charles Hycroft, "Introduction: Causes and Meaning,"
in Psycho-analysis Observed, ed. C. Hycroft(London, 1966), pp. 14ff«
3*.
as meaningful communications, and interpreting them by means of other evi¬
dence, combined with his knowledge of human nature,applied to the speci¬
fic documents at hand.
But such a conception of the use of historical evidence is hors de
coubat, if it is agreed that psychologisra, as Popper conceives it, must be
excluded from history and the social sciences, for the outcome of this
decision is to prohibit a re-enactment approach to the criticism of histo¬
rical documents. If Popper is correct in contending that references to
human nature are of little explanatory force, then it is difficult to find
grounds for any serious internal criticism of historical evidence, with a
view to conoeiving tentative interpretations open to refutation. Yet this
sort of criticism of historical evidence, founded on a knowledge of human
nature, and operating through an attempt to grasp something of the witnesses'
mentality, is accepted among historians as a legitimate enterprise, which
is open to examination.
It would seem, then that there is some similarity between Popper's
image of science, and a professional historian's view of history. Yet,
following this line of argument, it seems surprising that Popper does not
extend his positive conceptions to history and the social sciences, as read¬
ily as he doG3 his negative ones.
Flagrant faults such as psychologism appear in some conceptions of
natural science which Popper opposes, and are prevalent in the social sciences.
But historical statements are beyond the criterion of demarcation that sepa¬
rates theories of empirical science from non-empirical theories; historical
interpretations, as Popper insists in his later works, are rarely testable.
Yet, it can be argued that historical work possesses procedures of testing
and falsification which bear an analogy to those procedures in the natural
sciences, which is little looser than the analogy that Popper constructs be¬
tween psychologism in the natural and in the social sciences.
1. A historian may on occasions formulate his knowledge of human nature in
terms of generalizations, but it is argued be^fowy^ith respect to the histo¬
rical study of Julius Caesar, that not all the historian's assertions about
human nature and human beings can be brought under general laws.
#>■
It has been suggested, in the preceding pages, that Popper, in criti¬
cizing psychologists in histoiy and the social sciences, and in contending
that testability is for the most part absent from historical work, does
not extend his conceptions sufficiently to allow them to fit their new
subjects, and that these persistently narrowed^" conceptions reinforce each
other, in making history appear, in Popper's argument, to be something less
than an empirical sciences e .g., the elimination of psychologism removes
with it the grounds for criticism in the use of historical evidence. These
narrow conceptions, which provide such an apparently incisive critique, miss
the mark, for the same reasons.
III. Methodology
Methodology, according to Popper in The Poverty of Historicisra and The
Open Society, is common to both the natural and the social sciences? there
is no frontier, analogous to the demarcation between empirical science and
metaphysics, which separates the natural from the social sciences. In so
far as the latter have a valid contribution to make to knowledge, it is sub¬
ject to the same methodological requirements as in the natural sciences.
Much of what Popper writes on methodology, in The Open Society and
especially in The Poverty of Hietoricism, presupposes the conception of
p
methodology which Popper presents in The Logics of Scientific Discovery.
1. The claim that Popper's conception of psychologism is narrow might seem
ill-at-ease with my later argument (Chapter Three) that Popper uses his con¬
ception of psychologism diffusely. My later objection is that Popper de¬
fines psychologism quite precisely as the view that sociology can be re¬
duced to social psychology, but then proceeds to apply this term more loosely
to various non-reductionist uses of psychology. This looser usage is what
I have argued above is a narrow application of Popper's views on the methods
of the natural sciences.
2. LSD, p. 51.
Popper develops his view of methodology by criticizing two views to which he
is opposed? the positivist view that the natural sciences have no need of a
theory of method, and the conventionalist view that scientific theories are
no more than mental constructions of theorists. I shall argue that Conven¬
tionalism is not logically committed to all the faults which Popper ascribes
to it, and that Popper's views can be fairly characterized as a moderate Con¬
ventionalism.
One sector of the opposition, as Popper sees it, to his conception of
methodology, is the positivist, who I think can be taken to be both a tradi¬
tional positivist or a logical positivints
"The positivist dislikes the idea that there should be meaningful
problems outside the field of 'positive' empirical science -
problems to be dealt with by a genuine philosophical theory. He
dislikes the idea that there should be a genuine theory of know¬
ledge, an epistemology or a methodology." 1.
Popper sees the implications of this dispute about epistemology and methodo¬
logy as extending to the "controversial question whether philosophy exists,
2.
or has any right to exist."
Popper turns the positivist objection inside out? he argues that it
cannot be taken as primitive that empirical science is "meaningful"; to
rest on a criterion of meaning is a sterile and misleading dogma. The
proper question, says Popper, is that of demarcations what distinguishes
empirical science from metaphysics, which is meaningful in its own way.
There is no watertight characterization of empirical science obtainable from
3
"the formal or logical structure of its statements" . What can contri¬
bute to answering the question of the distinctiveness of natural science is
a theory of method; after examining the loopholes in other characterizations
of empirical science, Popper proposes thats
"empirical science should be characterized by its methods:
by our manner of dealing with scientific systems; by
what we do with them and what we do to them." 4.
1. LSD, p. 51
3. LSD, p. 50
2. LSD, p. 31
4. LSD, p. 50
The conception bears some resemblance, but only some, to pragmatic and
instrumentalist views of science. How Popper's view differs from these
can be seen in his exposition of the methods that characterize empirical
science.
In Popper's argument for the relevance of a theory of method, the
opposition earae from the claim of traditional empiricism that the method of
induction, in empirical science, was so unproblematical as to eliminate the
need for a theory of method; the tradition was maintained, in the logical
positiviats' acceptance of the verification criterion of meaning.
Once the need for a theory of method is accepted, a new opposition
appears: the Conventionalist view of methods. Popper thinks that, in a
certain sense, scientific methods have the character of conventions, but not
in the sense of the Conventionalist.
Conventionalism, in the philosophy of science, has had some notable
advocates! Poinc&re, Duhea, and Kddington."*"* The position that they have
taken starts, in Popper's summary, from doubting that the simplicity de¬
scribed by scientific laws can legitimately be imputed to the multifarious¬
ness of the world as it appears to us. The argument is similar to, but
more extreme than, Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena!
"For the conventionalist, theoretical natural science is not a
picture of nature, but merely a logical construction. It is
not the properties of the world which determine this construc¬
tion.* on the contrary it is this construction which determines
the properties of an artificial worlds a world of concepts
implicitly defined by the natural laws which we have chosen.
It is only this world of which science speaks.
"According to this conventionalist point of view, laws of
nature are not falsifiable by observation; for they are needed
to deter ine what an observation and, sore especially, what a
scientific measurement is." 2.
In some respects, Popper's view of natural science would appear to
resemble that of the Conventionalists he contends that scientific laws
1. LSD, p. 78 2. LSD, p. 79
are not, indeed cannot be, read off from nature, but must arise from bold
guesses put forward for testing by attempts to falsify their logical con¬
sequences. Yet Popper differs from the Conventionalist, as Popper portrays
him, in that Popper is closer to Kant, from whom Conventionalism may be said
to derive. For Popper,
"our guesses are guided by the unscientific, the metaphysical
...faith in laws, in regularities..."
"a faith...without which practical action is hardly conceivable". 1.
It could be argued that the Conventionalist goes beyond Popper in applying
Occam's razor to this metaphysical inheritance from Kant. But Popper's
presentation and criticism of Conventionalism is along lines different from,
and perhaps incompatible with, such an argument.
The starting point for Popper's critique of Conventionalism can be found
in his "supreme" methodological rule,
"the rule which says that the other rules of scientific procedure
must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any
statement in science against falsification." 2.
Popper's critique of Conventionalism is convincing, in so far as it indicates
specific ways in which Conventionalism conflicts with this rule.
Popper presents his critique of Conventionalism in a sequence of three
objections. First, Popper argues that the view that scientific laws are
mere conventions leads to a subjective construction of science. Second,
Popper claims that the Conventionalist seeks final certainty for science,
and lastly, Popper alleges that the Conventionalist employs ad hoc hypotheses
in his attempt to obtain definitive results. These three failings are in
marked contrast to the view of scientific method which Popper advocates,
wherein scientific work is both objective and tentative, and ad hoc hypo¬
theses are excluded by rigorous testing. Whether Conventionalism is indeed
subject to these failings will be discussed below. I shall also consider
Popper's criticisms of specific methodological items in Conventionalism,
which have repercussions in Popper's ideas on history.
The view that scientific laws are conventions does not escape the flaw
1. LSD, p. 278 2. LSD, p. 54
that characterized the view that scientific laws are based on perceptual
experience; for both views, scientific theories are, irremediably, subject¬
ively shaped; to Popper, such views are blind alleys, away from empirical
science.
According; to Popper, Conventionalism entails the view that the aim of
science is to achieve final certainty, a conception which is incompatible
with Popper's contention that the results of science are forever tentative.
To strive for final certainty seems inconsistent with a subjective basis for
scientific theories - "in the mind," in a packed phrase1* - but Popper's
objection to the supposed Conventionalist view of the aims of science is not
very convincing, for other reasons.
Popper claims that the difference between his view and that of the Con¬
ventionalist is that, for the latter, the aim of science is to obtain final
2.
certainty, whereas Popper is satisfied with severely tested tentative results.
To obtain definitive results, the Conventionalist introduces ad hoc hypo¬
theses that save his scientific theories from Herbert Spencer's tragedy - be¬
ing falsified by a fact.
Popper's argument is that the Conventionalist implements his central
quest for final certainty by means of ad hoc measures that save his theories
from the need for modification. Nevertheless it seems possible, to me, to
adopt Conventionalism as a self-contained, consistently sceptical view of
scienoe, which is coherent without need of the imputed aim of final certainty:
one could be a conventionalist and deny this latter view, for the crux of the
matter lies in the view of scientific laws as conventions, and not in the be¬
lief in final certainty. The pursuit of final certainty can be shown to be
consistent with viewing scientific theories as conventions, but it is not
entailed by this latter conception.
Conventionalism, in the outline traced by Popper, passes from doubting
1. These quotation marks do not indicate that this is a citation from Popper.
2. LSD, p.ea.
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that the simplicity of scientific laws can be an attribute of thing3 as they
exist, to implementing an aim of final certainty for empirical science; and
this seems a considerable volte-face.^* The involutions of Popper's por¬
trayal of Conventionalism are perhaps characteristic of Popper's presenta¬
tion of those doctrines that he opposes - an interesting ramification of his
critical approach - the student of Popper's ideas on history is reminded of
the insidious ways in which historici3m manifests itself in the social sci¬
ences*
Popper's objection to the conception of the aims of science which he
ascribes to Conventionalism is less cogent than his criticism of methodo¬
logical aspects of Conventionalism. The practice mentioned above, of intro¬
ducing ad hoc hypotheses to save a theory - a significant feature of Con¬
ventionalism for Popper - may be distinguished from the question of whether
such a device contributes, albeit speciously, to an aim of final certainty
for science.
The addiction to ad hoc hypotheses is chief among the "conventionalist
stratagems," against which Popper warns in The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
The "four main conventionalist stratagems" oast doubt on whether a clear-cut
distinction between falsifiable and non-falsifiable theories can be made, by
introducing ad hoc hypotheses, modifying the "so-called 'ostenaive defini¬
tions'", systematically doubting the reliability of crucial and potentially
falsifying experiments, and lastly the rather mysterious stratagem, that "in
2.
the last resort we can always cast doubt on the acumen of' the theorist."
Popper does not "claim completeness" for his list of "the four main conven¬
tionalist stratagems":
"it must be left to the investigator, especially in the fields of
sociology and psychology (the physicist may hardly need the warning)
to guard constantly against the temptation to employ new convention¬
alist stratagems - a temptation to which psycho-analysts, for instance,
often succumb." 5*
1. Although there are other instances of similar paradoxes in doctrines.
2. LSD, p. 81.
3. LSD, p. 82. Most of Popper's few mentions of the social sciences, in
LSD, are to indicate specious arguments of the conventionalist genre: e.g.,
p. 50, Popper comments with regard to conventionalist arguments of the sort
characterized above, "that similar arguments abound in the field of the
social sciences."
These arguments against the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses eluci¬
date what appears to me a compressed argument in Popper's Poverty of Histo-
ricismi
"...it is an important postulate of scientific method that we should
search for laws with an unlimited realm of validity. If we were to
admit lews that are themselves subject to change, change could never
be explained by laws. It would be the admission that change is
simply miraculous. And it would be the end of scientific progress;
for if unexpected observations were made, there would be no need to
revise our theories: the ad hoc hypothesis that the laws have changed
would 'explain' everything." 1.
Popper's argument is specifically against the notion that there can be
generalizations, confined to historical periods, operative in historical
laws? and implicitly, he is stating his case that historical explanations
presuppose generalizations of unrestricted validity, according to his hypo-
thetico-deductive model of causal explanation. ' The grounds for Popper's
objection to the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses, which are only alluded
to in this passage, can be appreciated in the light of his critique of
Conventionalism in The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
Whether an addiction to a deus ex machina in the form of ad hoc hypo¬
theses is a besetting sin of the methodology of Conventionalism is perhaps
not as clear as Popper makes it appear. In some respects, Conventionalism
appears to be something of an idealized bogey, an opponent against whose
stratagems we must defend ourselves. If Popper's image of the scientist is
*
Paustian, always striving to falsify, then it must be supplemented with
1. PH,p.lOJ Popper cites LSD, sec.79» in his note to this passage in PH.
I shall have more to say on Popper's methodological postulate of "the invari-
ance of natural laws", which he mentions in his footnote, PH,103 in the
following section on scientific theories. It seems to me that Popper's
presentation of his argument in LSD,sec.79, derives from his oritique of
Conventionalism; in particular from Popper's retention of the Kantian
faith discussed above, p.^KJS*
2. A case whioh is criticized below, Chapter Two.
3» Popper's fallibilism might be taken as a gloss on Goethe:
"es irrt der Mensch so lang' er strebt".
In particular support of Popper's Paustian view of science, the concluding
section in LSD, "The path of Science", p. 281.
"The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be right;
for it is not his possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that
makes the man of science, but his persistent and recklessly critical
quest for truth..." Cf. also the Pinal Section to this Chapter, p.52.-3
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some mention of the doctrines open to exploitation by Mephistopheles: in
this instance, the extreme version of Conventionalism, wherein the strata¬
gems of ad hoc hypotheses flourish. But there are more moderate forms of
Conventionalism, such as Popper's own view.
If Popper is les3 Conventionalist for being more Kantian*" 'nevertheless
the notion of convention cannot be eliminated from a discussion of his con¬
ception of methodology. Popper regards methodological rules as conventions,
2.
"for the most part conventions of a fairly obvious kind" * The procedures
by which they are formulated is that proposals are made, and decisions
reached on the proposals! a convention is an agreement on the proposals.
Decisions as to conventions should be supported by rational arguments in
their favour, which take the form of analyzing the "logical consequences"
7
of proposals, "to point out their fertility".^*
The key words in Popper's characterization of methodology are: proposals,
decisions, and conventions . Popper's conception of methodology and how it
involves decisions is analogous to the existentialist argument for the
necessity of choosing in a world that will not supply the answers, gratis.
Both views start from the claim that one must opt on crucial matters where
answers cannot be elicited from the surrounding world. Popper's view of
methodology might be characterized as an existentialist view without the
nausea; anxiety is needless, because rational arguments in support of
one's proposals, displace it.^"
Popper's view of methodology can be compared with what he recommends
for history. The analogy is that both represent a moderate conventionalism.
Popper argues that writing history requires selecting a preconceived point
of view from which to interpret the overwhelming mass of material; it is
inevitably somewhat arbitrary; and it is valued for the way in which it
unifies the material - for its suggestiveness and its fertility.
1. Of. p.^^5 above. 2. LSD, p.54- 3* LSD, p.38«
4. Popper reaffirms this view of the "critical method in his Addendum
to the OS, sec. 10 (OS II, 380-1)
&M0
The details of Popper's arguments in support of historical interpre¬
tations and methodological proposals as conventions differ, as do the
materials on which they are, respectively, operators. There is, however,
a considerable similarity: both methodological recommendations and histo¬
rical interpretations represent points of view, because both are proposals;
they are not intrinsic to the material on which they operate. And both are
to be appraised partly in terms of their fertility.
Moreover, the contrast between scientific theories and historical inter¬
pretations is not as sharp as Popper contends in the last chapter of The Open
Society. As I shall argue below"1*, historical interpretations are open to
criticism when they are not testable, and Popper has written subsequently
that "intersubjective criticism" is "the more general idea" of which "inter-
2.
subjective testing is merely a very important aspect."' * It is then possible
to make a better case than Popper does in The Open Society for historical
methods as being scientific, because historical work can meet the fundamental
standard of openness to criticism.
There is, then, a discrepancy between Popper's potential and actual
image of history, which needs to be explained. It may be argued that Popper
sees history in a rather harsh light because there are factors external to
philosophical argument that influence his views; historical methodology is
intertwined with social and political questions. Some of these external
factors can be traced in the evolution of his views on probability, an svolu-
*
tion which is discussed below.
1. In chapter four.
2. LSD, p. 44» added note
3. See section five of this chapter below.
■$hi
IV. Scientific Theories and Falsifiability,
with an Addendum on Causal Explanation
There is a sense in which Popper develops his ideas on scientific
theories dialectically.^"* The thesis is the naive empiricist view that
theories can he read off inductively from recurrent events in nature. The
antithesis is the Conventionalist conception of the scientist as the auto¬
nomous creator of scientific theories, rather than the faithful amanuensis
of nature, transcribing by induction.
There is also something like an internal dialectic, or paradox, in
Popper's exposition of these two views; in Inductivism, nature's scribe
produces results that are justified by subjective means; in Conventionalism,
the inventive theorist seeks a patent of final certainty for his creations.
Each of these doctrines produces, as it were, its contradictory. The diffi¬
culties cannot be resolved within the respective terms of the doctrines.
Popper's proposals offer a way out of the untenable positions reached from
Inductivist and Conventionalist premises.
Popper's dialectical criticism of Inductivism and Conventionalism pro¬
vides a backdrop for what is to the fore in The Logic of Scientific Discovery:
his exposition of what he considers to be the distinctive characteristic of
the theories of empirical science - that they are open to falsification, at
least in principle.
The difficulties with the Inductivist conception of verification have
been discussed above: it is impossible to establish what statements were to
be considered meaningful, because verifiable.Scientific theories, and indeed,
all descriptions, transcend experience, "for they contain universals, which
"cannot be correlated with any specific sense-experience.
....Universals cannot be reduced to classes of experiences;
they cannot be 'constituted'"
1. Cf. Popper's comparison of the "method of trial and error" with the
dialectical approach (*What is Dialectic?", CR, 312-315); see Chapter Six
below for another discussion of Pouper's critical approach as dialectical.
2. LSD, p. 94. 3« LSD, p. 95.
Verifiability discards the baby of scientific theories along with the bath¬
water of metaphysics.
Scientific theories cannot be based on perceptual experience; the view
that
"science is an attempt to classify and describe perceptual knowledge" 1.
is subjw&ctive and unsatisfactory. Natural laws cannot be derived by induc¬
tion, which permits only subjective assertions of belief that an observed
regularity will recur.
Popper proposes as part of the definition of natural laws that they are
"invariant with respect to space and time." 2. Scientific theories, then,
involve statements of universal scope. No conglomeration of experiences,
nor collection of particular statements, can give sufficient support to such
universal statements; the gap cannot be breached.
To speak of "protocol sentences", sentences which represent or record
experiences, as do Neurath and Carnap, does not overoome the difficulty; the
idea
"is merely a relic - a surviving memorial of the traditional
view that empirical science starts from perception." 3*
Scientific theories are statements of universal scope, which cannot be
verified by immediate experiences, or particular statements. It is, however,
a matter of logic, that a universal synthetic statement can be contradicted
4.
by a singular existential statement. This is the "asymmetry which makes
falsifiability a workable criterion of demarcation for empirical science.
The Conventionalist objection to falsifiability - that it is ambiguous -
C
has been discussed above. * Popper's answer, in brief, is that the Conven¬
tionalist objection is a Pyrrhonist attempt to throw sand in the eyes of the
1. LSD, p. 94- 2. LSD, p. 253. 3. LSD, p. 97.
4. LSD,, p. 41 s
proposal is based upon an asymraetry between verifiability and falsi¬
fiability; an asymraetry which results from the logical form of universal
statements. For these are never derivable from singular statements, but
can be contradicted by singular statements."
5. Cf. above.
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sober scientist - for Popper, a scientist tests soberly and severely, al¬
though he may conjecture wildly, and, in a figurative sense, drunkenly.
Given his criticism of traditional empiricism, summarized in the pre¬
ceding pages, it is evident that Popper must show that his conception of the
"basic statements", which can provide clear-cut falsifications of scientific
theories, is not, to use his pejorative term, psychologistic. The formal
requirement for basic statements is that they be singular existential state¬
ments,^" 'and the material requirement is that they assert
"that an observable event is occurring in a certain individual
region of space and time." 2.
The crucial point here is Popper's requirement that basic statements make
assertions about 'observable events':
"basic statements must be testable, inter-subjectively,
by 'observation'" J.
To speak of observations and perceptions in protocol sentences is "psycho¬
logical"^"; to speak of observable events need not be. In the sense in
which Popper uses it, an 'observable event*
"might just as well be replaced by 'an event involving position
and movement of macroscopic physical bodies'"
"tests involving the perception of one of our senses can, in
principle, be replaced by tests involving other senses" 5-
Observability, as Popper uses it, is a "primitive concept", "neutral"
with respect to psychologisra, mechanism or materialism; it is linked to
testability, which is not dependent on the perceptions of the particular
6
scientist performing the tests. ' In this way, the basic statements used
in falsification are free from the defect of subjectiveness, or psychologism,
which Popper found in the traditional empiricist preference for basing
science on personal observations or perceptions.
Basic statements are not, as the Inductivist believes, justified by
immediate experiences. Popper argues that they "are accepted...by a free
■7
decision" "reached in accordance with a procedure governed by rules"
1. LSD, p. 102. 2. LSD, p. 103. LSD, p. 102. 4. LSD, p. 103.
5. LSD, p. 103. 6. LSD, p. 103. 7. LSD, p. 109, 106.
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One such rule,
"of special importance...tells us that we should not accept stray basic
statements - i.e., logically disconnected ones - but that we should
accept basic statements in the course of testing theories." 1.
That is, agreement on basic statements, or acceptance of experimental
results, is "a purposeful action," "part of the application of a theoretical
system".
Decisions are reached, by agreement on basic statements, in the course
of testing theories, but it is not the case that the universal statements of
scientific theories themselves are aocepted by decisions. Popper objects
to the Conventionalist claim that scientific theories are chosen for "aesthe¬
tic motives": the simplicity of the theories. Popper's riposte is that
scientific theories are selected, not by decisions, as the Conventionalist
argues, but by survival in competition:
"We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other
theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest
to survive. This will be the one which not only has hitherto stood up
to the severest tests, but the one which is also testable in the most
rigorous way. A theory is a tool which we test by applying it, and
which we judge as to its fitness by the results of its applications." 3«
A good scicmtific theory, fit to survive, is according to Popper one
which can be severely tested; it permits attempts to falsify it from many
sides, so to apeak. A scientific theory prohibits those basic statements
which would falsify it; the more a theory prohibits, the more it i8 open
to falsification. There are more "opportunities" for a theory to be re¬
futed, the more it prohibits; for then it excludes a larger class of basic
statements, or potential falsifiers.
1. LSD, p. 106. 2. LSD, p. 106, 111.
3. LSD, p. 108. Popper's Darwinian view of the grounds for accepting one
theory in preference to another may be considered to be part of his posi-
tivist inheritance; in Ernst Mach's
"positivistic theory of knowledge...human knowledge is a biological
phenomenon, part of the history of man. Influenced by Darwin's theory
of evolution, (Mach3 conceived knowledge as a never ending process of
adjustment of thoughts to reality and to each other."
Joergen Joergenaen, The Development of Logical Empiricism
(international Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Chicago,1951)II no.9 p.7)
But Popper argues, in his conclusions to LSD, that the biological view of
science is not exhaustive. See P-365^ below.
And it is with this class of potential falsifiers that Popper links the
notion of the empirical content of a theory; for "the theory does not assert
anything about" "the class of permitted statements" - rather, the class of
basic statements, which the theory rule3 out, constitutes its empirical con¬
tent, for it is about these statements that the theory makes assertions.
The objective methods of empirical science proceed not so much in a
2
vicious circle'* as in a spiral. There is, Popper argues, no "'absolute'",
"rock-bottom" "empirical basis of objective science":
"The bold structure of (scientific] theories rises, as it were,
above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down
to any natural or 'given' base; and when we cease our attempts
to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we have
reached firm ground. We 3imply stop when we are satisfied that
they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the
time being." 3»
Addendum: Causal Explanation.
The best-known and most explicit instance of the way in which Popper's
ideas on history derive from his philosophy of science, as first worked out
in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, is Popper'3 original analysis of
historical explanation in The Open Society and The Poverty of Historicisra.
In these latter works Popper argues that historical explanation follows,
with some small peculiarities, the procedures of causal explanation common
to all the empirical sciences. This contention, as well as the associated
questions of how historians should or do explain, have come under much dis¬
cussion in the years since Popper first published The Open Society and The
Poverty of Historicism; and Popper's original position has been one point
of departure, both for its advocates and its opponents.
1. LSD, pp. 112-113
2. As Popper says the proposals of Conventionalism do:
"A certain school of philosophers of scientific method have
concluded...that science always argues in a circle " OS, 11,259
3. LSD, III.
yz-Hfo
Popper, in introducing his model of historical explanation, in The
Open Society and The Poverty of Historicism, refers to a passage on causal
explanation in The ho,Tie of Scientific "Discovery:
"To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement
which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more
universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the ini¬
tial conditions. For example, we can say that we have given a
causal explanation of the breaking of a certain piece of thread if
we have found that the thread has a tensile strength of 1 lb. and
that a weight of 2 lbs. was put on it. If we analyse this causal
explanation we shall find several constituent parts. On the one
hand there is the hypothesis: 'Whenever a thread is loaded with a
weight exceeding that which characterizes the tensile strength of
the thread, then it will break'; a statement which has the character
of a universal law of nature. On the other hand we have singular
statements (in this case two) which apply only to the specific event
in question: 'The weight characteristic for this thread is 1 lb.',
and 'The weight put on this thread was 2 lbs.'
"We have thus two different kinds of statement, both of which are
necessary ingredients of a complete causal explanation. They are
(l) universal statementst i.e., hypotheses of the character of
natural laws, and (2) singular statements, which apply to the speci¬
fic event in question and which I shall call 'initial conditions'.
It is from universal statements in conjunction with initicil condi¬
tions that we deduce the singular statement, 'This thread will break1*.
We call this statement a specific or singular prediction.
"The initial conditions describe what is usually called the
'cause' of the event in question...." 1.
An account of how Popper characterizes the constituents of causal
explanation, universal lows, and singular or basic statements, has been given
in the preceding discussion of scientific theories and falsifiability.
The other major point about causal explanation, according to Popper, is that
it has the same structure as a prediction, which is that of a deduction:
deduction, in a causal explanation or a prediction, depends on the logical
relations between ideas; it is, then, within the province of the logic of
knowledge. The consequences of this structural similarity between
explanation and prediction are of some importance in the working out
1. LSD,pp.59-60. Popper cites this passage in a slightly different
translation, in OS (chap 25, sec.11: II, 262) and paraphrases it quite
closely in PH (122-12J).
of Popper's ideas on history and will he discussed below in connection
with his model of historical explanation and his remarks on the impossi¬
bility of predicting the future.**
In the discussion of historical explanation subsequent to Popper's
publication of The Open Society and The Poverty of Ilistoriciam, one possible
alteration, suggested by C.G. Henpel, was that statistical laws might re¬
place universal statements, in some explanations. As will appear from the
following discussion of Popper's views on probability, he would be likely
to object to such a proposal.
2 •
Probability statements, according to Popper, are not falsifiable
for they cannot be refuted by a single instance. The universal statements
used in oausal explanation must be falsifiable, it would appear, if the r „
a Wa V o\
explanation is to hold water; for if " n-ingto might T^fntu +v»o
premise of an explanation, how are we to be sure that it is not just that-
instance* tha-t we are trying to explain, with the aid of the law, to which
the law does not apply.
1. In Chapter Two, Sec. II, pt. 3* "The Symmetry Thesis".
2. Though Popper argues that physicist can use probability statements as
falsifiable statements, when dealing with a number of events, for they can
decide on standards for a typical segment of a probability sequence, and
then determine whether the set of events meets this standard (LSD, p.204)
But clearly, this license cannot be extended to an historian explaining a
single event.
V. Probability
Popper's ideas on probability, as originally discussed and later anno¬
tated in The bogie of Scientific Discovery, give some interesting indications
of the evolution of his views, which are relevant to a consideration of his
ideas on history. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper has a lengthy
and involved discussion of probability, of which I shall not consider the
finer points. The gist of it is that Popper is defending a frequency
interpretation of probability, against various interpretations of probability,
such as that of Keynes, to which Popper objects, as either subjective, or
requiring a metaphysical theory of indeterminacy in the nature of things*
"a metaphysical idea that events are, or are not,
determined in themselves" 1.
The frequency interpretation, which Popper advocates, has the advantage of
objectivity: it views probabilities as describing the frequencies with which
an event occurs, within a sequence.
Popper's argument here is in some respects analogous to his rejection
of perceptual experience as a hasis for empirical science, because it is sub¬
jective? and to his attempt to characterize the procedures of empirical sci¬
ence in a way that shows how they are objective.
Popper remarks that he has changed his views on probability more than
on any other topic in The Logic of Scientific Discovery: from the frequency
interpretation which he advocates there, to what he now calls a propensity
interpretation, which is, as he says in a footnote added in the 1959 edition:
"a new objective interpretation, very closely related to the
frequency interpretation, but differing from it even in its
mathematical formalism." 2.
An associated change in Popper's ideas is in his attitude to metaphysi¬
cal idea, mentioned above, of a built-in determinacy or indeterminacy in
1. LSD, p. 206; cf. p. 212, for the same thought.
2. LSD, p. 149.
nature. The metaphysical view that Popper dismissed, when writing The
Logic of Scientific Discovery in the early 1950's, he i3
"now anxious to recommend, because it seems to me to open new
vistas, to suggest the resolution of serious difficulties,
and to be, perhaps, time." 1.
"I do not now object to the view that an event may hang in the
balance, and I even believe that probability theory can best
be interpreted as a theory of the propensities of events to
turn out one way or another. ...But I should still object
to the view that probability theory must be so interpreted.
That is to say, I regard the propensity interpretation as a
conjecture about the structure of the world." 2.
"While Popper does not employ his metaphysical convictions to support
his methodological or political proposals , in reasoned argument, it appears
that he considers these convictions to be in some sense prerequisite for
practical action.^* It may be that this change in Popper's attitude to the
metaphysical doctrine of indeterminacy i3 linked with his advocacy of liber-
tarianisra; that positing an indeterminacy in the nature of things supports
metaphysical arguments for free will; and it may be that Popper'3 interest
in voluntarism and associated ideas was increased by his fiery arguments in
The Open society and The Poverty of Historicism against certain theories of
historical determinism, and by the events which stimulated Popper to write
these works.
That is, it might be conjectured that there is a certain amount of
reciprocal Influence of Popper's ideas on history on his philosophy of sci¬
ence and that this is one important factor to be considered in examining the
evolution of his philosophical views: that there is a congruence between
these two aspects of his thought which is not wholly due to his ideas on
prehistory being derivative from and dependent on his philosophy of science.
1. LSD, 1959 footnote, p. 206. 2. LSD, 1959 footnote, p. 212.
5. Cf. Popper's arguments against sociologi3a (OS, II, 209; chap 23:
"All these considerations are entirely independent of the metaphysical
'problem of free will'"
4. cf. p.35 above.
VI. The Logic of Scientific Discovery
and
The Logic of Historical Inquiry-
Popper, in working out his methodological proposals for empirical
science, comes to the conclusion that
"The demand for scientific objectivity snakes it inevitable that
every scientific statement must remain tentative for ever." 1.
This view is comparable to that which aany historians take of their craft:
the results of critical examination of evidence, reached by rigorous attention
to certain canons, can never escape the possibility, and perhaps the necessity,
for future revision.
The requirements of science, according to Popper, bear some resemblance
to the conditions of historiography. A science, writes Popper,
"needs points of view, and theoretical problems" 2.
The experimental work of a scientist is a "purposeful activity", guided by
these points of view and theoretical problems.
A scientist is not, as in the stereotype of traditional empiricism,
merely the amanuensis of nature, recording instances of experience which con¬
vey inherent chunks of theory. Rather, the scientist is "active"^*:
experience is not given, but made, and it is in this sense that experience is
a "method"^*, the method of the empirical sciences.
Popper's image of science is strikingly similar to a widely accepted
view of the historian's craft, which has been formulated in the course of re¬
vising a previous conception analogous to traditional empiricism's view of
science. The historian is not a passive scribe of the immutable past, which
awaited his coming in documents and other evidence; the past is not given,
but must be grasped in terms of points of view, as Popper himself emphasizes,
C
and problems, as Lord Acton proclaimed a good while back. The historian
1. LSD, p. 280 2. LSD, p. 106
3. LSD, p. 280 4. LSD, title of section 5, p. 39
5. As Popper now argues, cf. below Chapter Three, section V.
does not transcribe, but actively constructs, and, as it were, invents the
past. Facts are not ready-mades as Carl Becker once wrote, sceptically
and provocatively, a historical fact is what you think it is: evidence is
perhaps as much a matter of method in history, as experience is, in Popper's
view of science.
Comparing Popper's view of science with this current view of history -
in both, conclusions are eternally tentative - a reversal of classical posi¬
tivism is apparent. Traditionally, positivism attempted to emulate empiri¬
cal science in other fields, in order to attain a like certainty of results5
it might be contended that the positivist wanted to copy the objective pro¬
cedures of science, merely as a means to such certainty! that the value of
objectivity, for the positivist, was instrumental.
In Popper's view, it is one of the conditions of scientific objectivity
that its results be tentative, for objective methods cannot impart certainty
to their results. In comparing Popper's view of the results of science,
theories,with the historian's view of his conclusions, interpretations of
past events, this question of objectivity may seem to throw a spanner into
the works. It qualifies, while not refuting, the contention that, on the
basis of Popper's philosophy of science, as in The Logic of Scientific Dis¬
covery, it is possible to construct a more positive account of history than
Popper does, in his later works. The problem of objectivity is not, I think,
sufficient in itself to account for the unflattering picture which Popper
draws of history: many historians consider that their work possesses a
sturdy scaffolding in objective procedures, which are "inter-subjectively
testable".'''* But these objective items of method are not, as was noted pre¬
viously, strictly analogous to the scientific methods that Popper describes.
Whereas scientific theories are in principle testable, historical interpre¬
tations are, as I shall argue below, not circular as Popper alleges because
they are open to criticism, and Popper has recently described "intersubject-
ive testing" as a special case of "the more general idea" of "intersubjective
2
criticism" * However, historical criticism and intersubjectively acceptable
1. pp. above 2. LSD, p. 94«
historical work in general involves erapathic understanding, as has been
suggested above and will be argued below, * and there is no room in Popper's
methodological views for empathic understanding as a scientific activity.
The comparison of Popper's image of science with history can be ex¬
tended, then, but will not reach to include a rigorous interpretation of the
unity of scientific method.
But science, in Popper's eyes, is something more than the well-constru¬
cted scaffolding, on which the preceding comparison was based; it is more
than a matter of the survival of fit theories. The Darwinian view discussed
above * is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive. In his conclusions to The
Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper puts forward what might be described
as a Paustian view of science, with its eternally tentative results, as a
quest without grails
"The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be right,
for it is not his possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth,
that makes the man of science, but his persistent and recklessly
critical quest for truth.
"Has our attitude, then, to be one of resignation? Have we to
say that science can fulfil only its biological task; that it can,
at best, merely prove its mettle in practical applications which
may corroborate it? Are its intellectual problems insoluble?
I do not think so. Science never pursues the illusory aim of
making its answers final, or even probable. Its advance is,
rather, towards the infinite yet attainable aim of ever dis¬
covering new, deeper, and more general problems, and of subjecting
its ever tentative answers to ever renewed and ever more rigorous
tests." 5*
The first part of this passage, and Popper's fallibilist view in general,
4.
has been described as a gloss on Goethet
" es irrt der Mensch so lang' er strebt" 5*
15^,3° \ qVH
1. Cf. pp.^%TH above and Chapter Three below, pp.
2. above 3« LSD, p. 281 4. p.^L footnote "3*
5. Meineck*.claims to derive his Historismus, with its leading conceptions
of individuality and process, from Goethe, who appears to be a matrix for
almost every idea.
The latter part, where Popper sets limits on a Darwinian view of science,
inherited from Ernst Mach, night be compared with Nietzsche, who was also
concerned with the repercussions of Darwinism on human activity and
achievement; and this comparison suggests the basis of the analogy of
Popper's view of science with existentialism.
s*
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I. Popper's Analysis of the Logic of Historical Explanation
as Part of his Critique of Historicism
Popper has subsequently said of the ensuing discussion of the theory
of historical explanation with which his and Herapel's names are associated
that, in effect, a mountain has been made out of a molehill:
"Heally, I found the discussions which centred round my remarks
on the question of the background of [historical explanations^
in universal laws so bad that I didn't even answer my critics." 1.
Popper makes this statement in an interview which has been published with
the proviso that it is to be considered "a conversational treatment" and
2.
not "a formal statement" of Popper's views} ' it is, nonetheless, Popper's
"first public answer" to the "critics" of his views on historical explana¬
tion, in which he argues that his "theory of historical explanation" is
concerned with situational analysis or situational logic, which he had
"described...briefly both in The Poverty of Historiciam and in The Open
Society," and which he now say3 is
"far removed from what people have been discussing - namely,
the completely uninteresting, though logically valid, claims
about universal laws." 5.
The discussion "centred on" his "remarks" about the hypothetico-
deductive structure of historical explanation has, in Popper's opinion,
misrepresented his analysis of historical explanation. The logical "back¬
ground*^. of historical explanations is the same as that of all explana¬
tions s
"laws are implicitly assumed and taken for granted in every
explanation" 5*
However the laws which are presupposed
"are not what interests us in a historical explanation, and they
are certainly not characteristic of historical explanations." 6.
1. K.R. Popper, "Historical Explanation: an Interview" (Replies to questions
by Michael Tanner, John Dunn and Alistair Young), Cambridge Opinion
v. 20(1959) PP> 20-25; hereafter cited as HE.
2. HE, p. 21 3. HE, p. 22 4. HE, p. 22 5. HE, p. 21 6. HE, p. 21 .
<*&(*
Popper had, in hi3 original remarks about historical explanation,
distinguished between logical and serai-pragmatic considerations. Such
universal laws as historical explanations presuppose are not in the histo¬
rian's "line of interest" which is with particular events, not generaliza¬
tions. Moreover, auch laws as historical explanations require are, for
i
m
the most part, "trivial" * What is "characteristic", indeed, the "main
feature of historical explanation", Popper now says, is situational logic
or situational analysis. What situational logic involves will be discussed
in the second he If of tfca-e chapter* 2 .
Although this interview with Popper might seem to license a restriction
of the following consideration of Popper's views on historical explanation
to situational logic, to do so would, I think, misrepresent these view.s.
Popper's dismissal of the discussion of the covering-law theory deserves
some attention. Although he now describes the logical background of histo¬
rical explanations in the universal laws as "completely uninteresting"2.
at the time when he wrote The Open Society and The Poverty of Historiciam,
he found these points of sufficient importance to develop them at some
length. We can, I think, gloss Popper's dismissal of the discussion of
the logic of historical explanation: where this discussion fell down was
in neglecting the purposes for which Popper made his points about the logi¬
cal background of historical explanations in universal laws.
As I shall often have occasion to stress in the following pages,
Popper's arguments rarely deal with topics in isolation; they are, rather,
functional. In the present instance, Popper's views on the logic of
historical explanation are meant to steer clear of the Scylls and Charybidis
of what he calls historicism; they are meant to displace fallacious doct¬
rines about the practice of history that he attributes to anti-naturalistic
and pro-naturalistic historicisra respectively.
1. OS, II, 263-5; PH, p. 145
2. HE, p. 22. This passage has already been cited at gre tor length,
p*5* above.
it*
The purpose of Popper's analysis is, first, to establish that there
is no distinctive logic of historical explanation, as has been claimed by
theories of historical methods which Popper thinks are associated with
anti-naturalistic historicism;'1'* on the contrary the logical structure of
historical explanation does not according to Popper differ from that of
scientific explanation. Secondly Popper's aim is to bring out the limit¬
ations on the use of theories in historical work, in order to show th-1
there can be no objective patterns in history. Popper argues that the
theories presupposed in explaining particular events provide only a local
structure so to speak, and that the selection and overall organization of
historical evidence cannot be guided by testable and therefore objective
theories.' * Hence it is not possible to establish an overarching theore¬
tical organization of historical facts which can license assertions about
the meaning of particular historical events in the way that a testable
scientific theory licenses assertions about the significance of those
natural events which come within its scope. If Popper has correctly
indicated the limitations on the use of theories in the "practice of history",
then it is not possible to make objective assertions about the meaning of
the past or about that of particular tirne-span3 in the past, and predictions
of the future course of history cannot be based on extrapolating patterns of
past events.
Popper's explication of his analysis of the logical background of
historical explanations proceeds by showing the limitations of the consider¬
ations by which a case was made for a distinctive logic of historical
explanation. This case can be summarized in terms of three contentions.' *
It will be seen that Popper does not reject the items in this case as com¬
pletely unfounded. Rather, he argues that when rightly stated, their
1. See chapter four on historicism for the connection of what is known
in German as Historisaus with what Popper calls anti-n turalistic hiatoricism.
2. See chapter five, "Popper on History".
3. Here I follow Rudolph H. Weingartner*s exposition in "Historical
Explanation", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (N.Y.I967) IV
pp. 7-8, but I order the three contentions he presents differently.
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force is not what the advocates of & distinctive logic of historical
explanations require? these contentions indicate some of the peculiarities
of historical explanation, but they do not establish that such explanations
possess a distinctive logic.
There ia, first, a prima facie argument against the possibility of
there being causal laws valid for all of human history. The immense vari¬
ations in the conditions and mode3 of human life exhibit d throughout human
history, preclude or would seem to, there being any constant conjunctions of
importance, on which universally valid causal laws might be baaed. Human
nature is not fixed but is heterogeneous throughout human history; conse¬
quently there can be no unlfonsitie3 holding for all history, as scientific
laws hold for all nature.
The argument that the logic of historical explanation must differ from
that of scientific explanation, is one that Popper attributes to historicism
in the more general form that the methods for the study of social life cannot
be those of the natural science, because, it is alleged, there neither are
nor can be laws of any significance valid throughout human history.^"* It
will be seen that Popper does not attempt to show that there are any signi¬
ficant uniformities valid for all history, but he denies that the lack of
such laws affects the logic of historical explanation.
The distinctiveness of the historian's subject matter, by contrast with
that of the natural scientist, may be even more strikingly formulated. The
previous argument against there being universally valid causal laws appli¬
cable to human history is compatible with the possibility of there being
uniformities of limited but not universal validity applying to human history.
But this might be denied: in support of the case for a distinctive logic of
historical explanation it was also maintained that generalization at any
level was irrelevant to the historian's pursuit because he sought to appre¬
hend unique particulars or historical individuals, which generalizing methods
could only deform. For this pursuit scientific methods are hors de jeu and
1. FH, p. 5-7.
intuitive methods of apprehension de rigour. Historical phenomena were
alleged to be distinctive on account of their uniqueness and consequently
required distinctive procedures on the part of the historian to apprehend
and explain.
It is perhaps difficult to appreciate the force which this argument
was once thought to have because the standard criticism of it has become
quite familiar in connection with the development and defence of the hypo-
thetico-deductive model of historical explanation. Poooer argues that the
historian's interest in particular events does not mean that he can apprehend
such events in their actual uniqueness; and moreover, that this character¬
istic interest on the part of the historian does not affect the logical
foundations of historical explanation.1*
A further argument for a distinctive logic of historical explanation
2.
iaay, but need not be, linked with the preceding two. * Regardless of whether
it is denied that there are any significant uniformities persisting through¬
out history, or even any limited uniformities at all, it is argued that if
there were causal laws applying to history they could not provide what is
requisite for historical explanations? what makes the historical activities
of human beings a subject for explanation is not a matter of causal laws but
of the aims, motives and intentions of the historical agents. Consequently,
it is argued, historical explanation presupposes that the historian has
grasped the aims, motives or intentions of the agents, and that this appre¬
hension requires a means akin to re-enacting their actions, the method of
empathic understanding.
Bmpathic understanding represents a different emphasis on Verstehen
than the intuitive understanding mentioned in connection with the claim
that the historian can apprehend historical events in their uniqueness.
Both these claims were made in connection with doctrines of Verstehen.
They are best considered separately as they rest on different foundations
and are not of the sarae seriousness. Popper, as we shall see, disposes
1. See below, p. 2. Weingartner, op. cit. pp. 7-8*
quite simply of the claira that the historian can apprehend historical events
as unique by intuition; it is shown to rest on a logical impossibility."*
The claim that the explanation of human action presupposes erapathie under¬
standing is more substantial, and Popper's theory of situational logic is
meant to establish that enpathic understanding is not required to explain
past human actions: that aims and intentions can be explained in terms of
their appropriateness to the agent's situation.
The case for empathic understanding might be put in an extreme or in a
moderate form. It might be argued that causal explanation is completely
irrelevant to historical explanation, or that the former may be involved
in, but does not suffice for, historical explanation. Thus it might be
argued that historical explanation has an utterly distinctive logic, or that
the logic of historical explanation includes indispensable elements which
distinguish it from scientific explanation. In both variants, the complete
or the partial distinctiveness of historical explanation is due to the histo-
j
rians concern with explaining past human actions.
Neither form of this case, as was noted above, prejudges either whether
there are uniformities in history, of universal or limited validity, or
whether historical phenomena are unique and can be apprehended in their
uniqueness, as was claimed by the second argument. The last argument is
concerned with certain characteristic features of historical phenomena - that
they involve human action - which are alleged to shape the logic of histo¬
rical explanation. It is with these arguments in mind, alleged to support
or to establish the case for a distinctive logic of historical explanation,
that Popper defends his contention that an adequate historical explanation
has the same logical background as causal explanation of a particular event
in the natural sciences. Popper's approach to the problem of historical
explanation is critical, in that he is concerned to show that these three
contentions do not have the force that the advocates of a distinctive logic
of historical explanation have claimed; they refer to peculiarities of
1. See below, p.
historical explanations which do not amount to logical differences. In
effect, what Popper says is that if the idiosyncrasies of historical explana¬
tion, to which these argusents refer, are accurately described they do not
detract fro® the case which Popper defends, for the unity of scientific
methods that if a set of statements is considered to provide a historical
explanation, then the logical background of these statements does not differ
from that of a scientific explanation of a particular event.
Popper's analysis of historical explanation is meant to accommodate both
the non-logical peculiarities of historical explanation and the logical stric¬
ture which it shares with all scientific explanations. How successful Popper
is in realizing this aim will be considered in the following pages.
I shall consider Popper's handling of the several arguments in support
of a distinctive logic of historical explanation in a somewhat different order
from that in which they were presented, which was meant to bring out the logi¬
cal relations between these arguments; in partic\ilar, that the case for em-
pathic understanding as requisite for historical explanation could be made
independently of either or both of the other arguments. The most consider¬
able arguments for a distinctive- logic of historical explanation, which
Popper takes most seriously, are based on the contention that historical
explanation must deal with human action. He develops situational logic,
particularly in his later and lens accessible writings, with a view to show¬
ing that empathic understanding, or re-enactment, is not part of the method
of historical explanation. Popper's attempt to show that the method of
historical explanation can dispense with Verstehen in the sense of einpathie
understanding will be a persistent theme in this chapter.
The claim that historical phenomena are unique and the inference that
the historian must employ distinctive methods of apprehension and explanation
are easily countered. Popper argues that the uniqueness of historical
phenomena in no wise distinguishes them from the phenomena which the natural
scientist may study, describe or wish to explain. That natural phenomena
exist uniquely in time and space has no more effect on the logic of scienti¬
fic explanation than the similar existence of historical events has on the
logic of historical explanation. All particulars exist uniquely, but there
is no field of knowledge which is privileged to apprehend the particulars
of its subject matter as unique. The reasons for this limitation on what
we can know are logical; the argument is central to Popper's considerations
on the methods of history and the social sciences."1* It is not possible to
know everything about any unique particular, because the features of any
particular which constitute its whole uniqueness can never be exhausted by
2
observation or description.4"* Popper illustrates this contention with an
3infinite series of descriptions of a hird, which can never be completed.
All knowledge must be of abstract aspects of the unique particulars consid¬
ered. We cannot describe any particular, whether it be a. rock or a human
being, in its whole uniqueness. Any particular can only he described in
terms of characteristics which it shares with other particulars all of which
exist uniquely, but of which we can only know abstract aspects.
Thus, insofar as the argument for Verstehen is that historical explana¬
tion involves intuitive understanding, in the sense of the historian appre¬
hending historical particulars as unique "wholes", the argument is unfounded.^*
But Popper does not restrict himself to dismissing this claim for intuitive
understanding; he also gives reasons why the mistaken notion that the
historian apprehends historical particulars as unique wholes should have
1. See chapters four and five below
2. PH, 77-78 and OS, II, 245
In a footnote on PH, 77
4. Max Weber, in arguing for Yerstehen as a distinctive and hazardous method
of the social sciences, disavows this view. He remarks, with special refer¬
ence to historical explanationt "When it is said that history seeks to under¬
stand the concrete reality of an 'event' in its individuality causally, what
is obviously not meant by this...is that it is to...explain causally the
concrete reality of an event in the totality of its individual qualities.
To do the latter would be not only actually impossible, it would also be a
task which is meaningless in principle."
(Max Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans, and ed. by
E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (The Free Press, New York,1949) p.169."
Cited by C.G. Herapel, "Explanatory Incompleteness", in Reading in the
Philosophy of the Social Sciences. ed. May Brodbeck (New York,19?>8), p.409
seemed plausible. * The plausibility of this claim does not come about
because the historian has a privileged access to the way particulars exist
uniquely. It is an effect of the* historian's characteristic direction of
interest in specific events. Nonetheless it is a misrepresentation of tho
logical "background" to this "line of interest" *to claim that the historian
can know such specific events as unique wholes, for it has been seen that
knowledge of particulars in their full uniqueness is impossible.
There is nevertheless, Popper allows, a sense in which a historian may
"describe interesting happenings in their peculiarity or uniqueness"
in that he may "include aspects" of such happenings v/hich he
"does not attempt to explain causally, such as the 'accidental'
concurrence of causally unrelated events." 3*
But the sense in which historical events may be described as unique does not
by stipulation, impinge upon the logic of historical explanation? rather,
it may supplement causal explanation wherein singular events are "considered
as typical".^* Moreover, the sense in which the historian can legitimately
describe historical events as unique is quite different from the doctrine
that Popper criticises, that the historian can, by intuitive understanding,
apprehend historical phenomena in their whole uniqueness? a doctrine that
was alleged to support the claim that the historian employed distinctive
methods of procedure.
Popper uses these results to restate the once popular distinction
between the nomothetic or generalizing sciences and idiographic or
1. 03, II, 263-4? HI, SO? PH, 143-7
2. The term and the phraee in quotation marks come, respectively, from




individualizing disciplines."* The nomothetic sciences are concerned
chiefly with theories or generalizations| particular facts are considered
only insofar as such facts have a bearing on the status of theories. The
ideographic disciplines - history in short - aro concerned with singular
events. As has been seen, particular facts cannot be known in their whole
uniqueness; they can be described as unique only in the sense discussed
above. Theories and generalizations are used in history only as a meuns
of describing and explaining particular facts, and Popper claims that the
historian uses theories as means to these ends implicitly.
Popper views this demarcation of "specific" interests as imposing quite
strict limit3 on the historian, as will be seen in considering Popper's
theory of historical explanation as presented in The Poverty of Historicism
2 ' ~ ™ -
and The Open Society:
" from our point of view, there can be no historical laws.
Generalization belongs simply to a different line of interest,
sharply to he distinguished from that interest in specific events
and their causal explanation which in the business of history.
Those who are interested in laws must turn to the generalizing
sciences (for example, to sociology)." 3»
Popper, an we shall nee, uses his reformulation of the idiographic view of
history to argue that historical prophecy is impossible.
Popper maintains that the contrasts between theoretical science and
history do not reflect distinctive logical structures, but rather divergent
directions of interest. In support of this contention, Popper presents
1. Popper works with a tripartite refinement of this distinction into
theoretical, applied and historical sciences, which respectively propose
and tent theories, predict specific events, or describe and explain singu¬
lar events. (OS, II, 263—4) dee below, pp. fiz^XiPor a further discussion
of the specific interests of these kinds of sciences in connection with
the several uses of the hypothetico-deductive method.
2. The limitations which the historian's characteristic direction of interest
impose on him are markedly stricter than are any corresponding limitations
for the theoretician, so that the historian's position docc not quite
parallel that of the theoretician. Cf. below p.
3. OS, II, 264
4. Gf. below, p.1*e-*n^y
the logical structure which he claims is used to implement an interest in
the status of theories, as well as interests in predicting events, or in
describing and explaining singular, specific event.*? a theoretical science
such as physics, an applied science such as engineering, and history all
rely on the hypothetico-deductive method, whose uses for these three
directions of interest constitute, Popper says, the unity of scientific
method.
The logical distinction to be drawn, Popper says, is not, as suggested
between historical and scientific explanation as different- in kind, but
between the explanation of a regularity and that of a specific event.
These two species of explanation are partly similar as well as partly dis¬
similar. In working out this distinction, Popper amends a confusion in
Mill's account of explanation in a way that makes clecr the logical require¬
ments for adequate explanations, and also exhibits the confusion on which
historicist claims to prophecy are based. Although the historian's
characteristic concerns lead him to want to explain particular events, such
explanations are not his exclusive prerogative, but rather one instance of
the species of causal explanation, which may be used in natural sciences as
well: as with "the evolutionary hypothesis"
II. Explanation and the Hypothetico-Do&uctive Method of Science
1. The Two Kinds of Explanation and the Importance of their Differences
Popper argues that a necessary condition for the adequacy of historical
explanation, a3 of causal explanation in science generally, is the proper
deployment of laws of unrestricted validity. A causal explanation of a
specific event means: "deducing a statement describing this event" from one
or more universal laws in conjunction with "initial conditions" or "specific
1. PH, 106-108, 115-116, 126-7.
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statements pertaining to the special case in question".1* Inhere Kill's
account of causal explanation was "not precise enough" was in failing to
distinguish clearly between the universal laws and the initial conditions,
both of which are required for a causal explanation. * The initial condi¬
tions, together with the relevant universal laws, constitute the explanane
or explanatory apparatus from which the explanandun or statement describing
the event in question is deduced in a satisfactory causal explanation.
Popper illustrates this analysis with a "causal analysis of the break-
ing of a certain thread"! the thread was overloaded with a weight of two
pounds whan it could only support a weight of one pound. The point of
Popper's example is to illustrate the sharp distinction between the two
kinds of constituents of the causal explanation of a specific event. The
relevant universal laws assert that threads have tensile strengths corres¬
ponding to their structures such that, if a thread, is loaded beyond its
characteristic weight, it will break. The initial conditions specify the
weight put on a thread of a certain structure. The specified structure of
the thread is linked to its characteristic weight by applying the previously
mentioned universal laws? and the load put on the thread, specified by the
initial conditions, exceeded the characteristic weight thus determined;
this is the causal explanation of its breaking.
It is customary to call the initial conditions the cause of the event
in question, but Popper points out that this phrasing is elliptic? the
initial conditions can be said to be the cause of the event only relative
to the universal laws employed in the explanation. This usage has been
fostered by a common feature of causal explanations. It is "very often"
the case th&t the universal laws employed in causal explanation
"are...so trivial...that as a rule we take them for granted
instead of making conscious use of them." 4.
1 . PH, 122-5; 09, II, 262 2. PH, 122, 125
5* PH, 122-5, "a near-quotation", Popper aays, from The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, sec.l2(pp.59-6o)• Popper uses the same example i ■ his discussion
of causal explanations, in OS, II, 262.
4. PH, 124.
It will be seen, subsequently, that Popper's theory of historical explana¬
tion, as he first stated it, turns on this common characteristic of causal
explanations.
The explanation of a regularity does not quite parallel that of a
specific event, and the differences between these two kinds of explanation
demolish historicist hopes of prophesying the future from alleged histo¬
rical laws which turn out to be trends, or singular historical statements.**
Were the analogy between these two kinds of explanation complete, then the
explanation of a regularity would be deduced from a conbination of general
laws with
"certain special conditions which correspond to the initial conditions
but which are not singular, and refer to a certain kind of situation" 2.
But the analysis proposed by analogy does not work.
In explaining a 'singular specific event' the "specific statements per¬
taining to the special case in hand" are part of the premises of the explana¬
tion, or the explanans; in explaining a regularity, the conditions for its
validity must be included in the formulation that is deduced from universal
laws of greater generality - for if these conditions were omitted, the re¬
sult would be a contradiction rather than an explanation. Consequently,
the formulation of the regularity which is thus explained is explained un¬
conditionally, which is not the case with causal explanations of "singular
specific events" which are relative to the two kinds of constituents in the
explanans.
This last point is crucial both in Popper's critique of the historicist's
prophetic use of trends, as well as in his discussion of the historian's
procedures of explanation. In the first instance, the dependence of trends
upon initial conditions is neglected, invalidating the historicist claims to
extrapolate trends as if they were explained regularities; and in the second,
the general laws, with respect to which initial conditions are causes, are,
can and, Popper insists, must be taken for granted by the historian.
1. PH, 124-15 ); PH, 115 2. PH, 125.
The force of Popper's analysis of the "two main cases"**of explanation,
in the context of The Poverty of Historicism, is to make clear the confusion
on which historicist hopes of prophecy are based. Trends - singular exist¬
ential statements describing concrete sequences of events - cannot, however
they are formulated, be deduced from combinations of universal laws alone
because they also depend on initial conditions. Thus, explained trends do
not hold unconditionally or universally as do explained regularities; and
consequently trends cannot be extrapolated unconditionally into the future,
in making a prophecy, for the continuation of a trend requires the persist¬
ence of the initial conditions on which it depends.
Some further remarks on the requirements for adequate explanations are
in order. Popper mentions, in The Poverty of Historicism, two material
conditions required for the scientific acceptability of an explanation,
namely that:
"the universal laws be well tested and corroborated, and...we have
also some independent evidence in favour of the cause, i.e., of
the initial conditions." 2.
Whether historians can provide acceptable explanations given the first of
these material conditions and given that Popper insists that the historian's
x
interest is directed and perhaps restricted to particular events will be
discussed below.The dilemma is this: Popper's restriction of the
historian's "line of interest" to specific events would seem to imply that
the historian cannot concern himself with the status of the laws which his
explanations presuppose. If the relevant laws are trivial, as Popper
claims, the historian's situation may not be problematic; but if the
triviality of the laws is questioned, then the historian's explanations nay
be characteristically dubious.
The material conditions for scientifically acceptable explanations, in
conjunction with the formal requirement of unrestricted validity for scienti-
<VVJL
fic laws, a?e Popper's safeguards against ad hoc, or circular, explanations:
1. PH, 122 2. HI, 124
5. eg. PH, 143; OS, II, 264 and note Y to chap. 25(03,11,364)
4. Cf pp. 0.-^3
"..•it is an important postulate of scientific method that we
should search for laws with an unlimited realm of validity.
If we were to admit laws that are themselves subject to
change, change could never be explained by laws. It would
be the admission that change is simply miraculous, and it
would be the end of scientific progress; for if unexpected
observations were made, there would be no need to revise our
theories; the ad hoc hypothesis that the laws have changed
would •explain' everything"
"These arguments hold for the social sciences no less than
for the natural sciences." 1.
Popper's argument is directed against the conventionalist view according
to which scientific laws are no more than mental constructions. Conven¬
tionalism would seem to license salvaging such constructions, in the face
of "unexpected observations", by adding qualifications and restrictions.
But it is difficult to see why Popper insists on the unrestricted valid¬
ity of hypotheses aa the only safeguard against this evasion o£ falsi¬
fication. Restricted generalizations are no more vulnerable to this man¬
oeuvre than are hypotheses of unrestricted validity, for if the conditions
under which the former hold are made clear, then ad hoc additions to such
generalizations in the face of falsifying evidence can be recognised as
such. Popper's argument does not establish that, if we wish to preserve
the honorific title of law for statements of unrestricted validity, re¬
stricted generalizations cannot be considered law-like; the preceding
argument has shown that to say that generalizations are of limited valid¬
ity is not the same thing as saying that such hypotheses are "subject to
change" at will.
2.
In a later publication, "The Aim of Science",'Popper discusses at
some length the requirements for satisfactory explanations. First, the
*
explicans must "logically entail the expJicandum".J But this condition
1. PH, 105
2. "The Aim of Science", Ratio, l(l957)» PP« 24-36; hereafter cited as
"Aim".
3. "Aim", p. 24.
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alone will not "exclude" circular or ad hoc explanations where "the only
evidence for the explicans is the explicandum itself". * To prevent an
explicans from being ad hoc in this sense it is necessary that it have
"testable consequences which are different from the explanandura"; these
2•
Popper describes as "independent evidence in its favour". But these
conditions are still not sufficient to "characterize a satisfactory and
independently testable explanation"t
"Only if we require that explanations make use of universal state¬
ments or laws of nature (supplemented by initial conditions) can
we make some progress towards realizing the idea of independent
or non-ad hoc, explanations. For universal laws may be state¬
ments with a rich content, so that they may be independently
tested everywhere, and at all times. Thus if they are used as
explanations, they may not be ad hoc because they nay allow us
to interpret the explicandum as an instance of a reproducible
effect. All this is only true, however, if we confine our¬
selves to universal laws which are testable, that is to say,
falsifiable." 3.
To summarize Popper's reqtiireraents: for a given explanation to be in fact
acceptable, the relevant laws must be "well-tested and corroborated" as
well as of unrestricted validity; and there must also be "independent
evidence" as well for the initial conditions, which are hypothetical
statements without the generality of laws.
Popper's argument is that the laws used in acceptable scientific ex¬
planations must be of unrestricted validity so that, in any explanatory use
of these laws, it will be possible in principle to find "independent evi¬
dence", in the 3ense in which Popper uses the tern, in favour of these laws,
and thus debar ad hoc explanations. What Popper states as a logical con¬
dition for the acceptability of scientific explanations - that the relevant
1. "Aim", p.25. That "the only evidence for the explicans is the explic¬
andum itself" is a charge that Dray makes against Popper's strictly uni¬
versal laws in historical explanations; they are "gross" generalizations
with a single actual instance. (W. Dray "Professor Child on Neoposi-
tivism and History", Journal of Philosophy 59(4) (1962), p. 105;
a criticism of A. Child'3 "Thoughts on the Historiology of ITeopositivism",
Journal of Philosophy 57 (i960) 665-74.
2. "Aim", p. 25, 24. 3. "Aim", p. 25-26.
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laws be of unrestricted validity - depends actually on the practice of
inter-subjective testing and criticism which constitutes scientific object¬
ivity in popper's viewt for testing rather than logical form is required
to safeguard against "gross" generalizations of a single instance masquer¬
ading as "universal statements or la?m of nature". But if inter-subject-
ive testing and criticism of the relevant laws is the fundamental condition
for acceptable explanations, then historical explanations relying on
generalizations of restricted validity may also be acceptable explanations.
To ensure that the relevant generalization is not ad hoc or a "gross"
generalization of a single instance, it would be sufficient to require that
it be testable in the neighborhood, so to speak, of the event to be explain¬
ed: over a span of time and for approximately the social setting in which
the event in question occurred.
The relation of Popper's contention that acceptable explanation requires
laws of unrestricted validity to one argument In support of a distinctive
logic of historical explanation - that there are no significant uniformities
valid for all of human history - will be discussed below. Popper in effect
admits the substance of this argument, that there are no regularities in
hunan history which are both significant and universally valid, but he main¬
tains that this circumstance does not impinge upon the logic of historical
explanations. The laws which historical explanations presuppose are both
universally valid, and trivial, in the sense of being uninteresting to both
the theoretician and the historian. Of course, not all the laws used in
historical explanation need be in any sense historical laws, so to speak:
in the explanation Popper gives of the death of Giordano Bruno, the relevant
2.
universal law, "that all living things die when exposed to intense heat",
is drawn from common-sense scientific knowledge.
1. Cf. Bray's objection, mentioned above,
2. PH, p. 145.
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2. Explanation» One of the Several Uses of the
Hypothetico-Deductive Method
A consideration of the implications of the partial parallel "between
the "two main cases" of explanation does not exhaust the ramifications of
the logical "background" of historical explanation. Both kinds of explana¬
tion, according to Popper, employ, often implicitly in the case of causal
explanation, the hypothetico-dedxictive method? a. statement is explained by
1.
being deduced from an explanans which includes theories or hypotheses.
Explanation, of regularities or of specific events, is but one of the several
uses to which the hypothetico-deductive method can be put. The constituents
and logical structure in predicting specific events and in testing scientific
2.
theories are the same as in causal explanation."*
In making predictions, the initial conditions and the universal laws are
known and interest is directed towards what can be deduced from their com¬
bination as a prognosis? this use of scientific theories is characteristic
of the applied sciences such as engineering. In testing theories, the ini¬
tial conditions are known and certain specific events have occurred? the
issue is whether these specific events are those forbidden by the theory
which is being tested: that is, whether statements of these events contra¬
dict what can be deduced from the theory in conjunction with the known ini¬
tial conditions; if this is the case, the occurrence of these events falsi¬
fies the theory in question. Such a problem is the characteristic conoern
of the theoretical sciences, natural and social, in which theories are pro¬
posed and tested for their scientific status.
Thus the several directions of scientific investigation all employ the
hypothetico-deductive procedure. In the various uses described above, two
of its three kinds of constituents - initial conditions, universal laws and
1. The point of this rather loose formulation is to indicate that the
hypothetico-deductive method is common to both sorts of explanation.
2. 03, II, 26} and PH, 133» for what follows in the next two paragraphs.
specific events - are considered determinate, and the third constituent,
which is considered problematic, is investigated by bringing the other two
to bear on it through the hypothetico-deductive apparatus. The use made of
the hypothetico-deductive procedure depends on the interest which its user
has, arising from the problems at hand.
The logical structure of scientific procedure is the same in all its
uses. It is the common logical structure in implementing the various pur¬
poses of scientific activity that Popper describes as the unity of scientific
method. There is, he argues, no gap in this respect between the natural
and the social sciences} the method of procedure in both is hypothetico-
deductive: hypotheses are formulated, and tested through attempts to fal¬
sify them; those falsified are out of the running and the survivors are
tentatively considered to be additions to scientific knowledge, and of course
always open to further testing1.' The theories thus selected can be applied:
predictions may be derived or specific events explained by the use of these
theories in conjunction with the appropriate initial conditions.
The apparent idiosyncrasies attributed to the social sciences do not,
Popper argues, impinge upon his analysis of the logical structure of proced¬
ure common to both natural and social sciences.
Some of the supposed peculiarities, such as the alleged reliance of the
social sciences on a method of intuitive understanding, are heuristic and
irrelevant to what constitutes scientific knowledge in the natural and the
social sciences. Popper argues that the use of intuition is not exclusive
to the disciplines that study nan, for the physicist may also feel that he
has an intuitive understanding of what atoms are like, but that such a feel¬
ing does not entitle hira to claim that he knows what the structure of the
atom is} the same argument applies to the intuitions of the social scientist
1. The method of the theoretical social sciences, as of the theoretical
natural sciences, PH, 153-137} of* above, chapter one section IV, for
another discussion of Popper's views on hypotheses.
2. PH, 135, 137; note 44(2) to chapter II, OS, II, 19?.
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The only methodological difference"1'* which Popper admits between tho natural
and the social sciences is the rationality of the agents which affects the
subject matter of the latter? and Popper argues that this feature of social
life simplifies its study by comparison with the task of the natural scien¬
tist.
The different directions of interest in using the hypothetico-deductive
procedure, in what is tested and in what is predicted, are characteristic of
the theoretical and applied sciences respectively. The distinction which
Popper draws here does not infringe upon the unity of scientific method, but
amplifies it. Testing theories, in theoretical science, is a means toward
an ends discovering theories of greater generality which explain accepted
theories. Scientific activity is purposeful, according to Popper; and it
is a theme of some of Popper's more recent publications, that the aim of
2.
science is to explain in the sense just explicated. * Explanation thus can
be considered to be the primary use of scientific theories, for the pre¬
dictions sought in the applied sciences presuppose the results obtained in
the theoretical sciences.
1. That Popper's views about the difficulties of prediction commit him to
another distinctive methodological feature in the social sciences will be
argued below,
2. Popper says that "the aim of science" is explanation in the sense of
"discovery, of progressing to deeper layers of explanation" ("Aim", p.34);
cf. also CR. p.61, p.63, p.222; cf. also some of the notes added to the
1959 English translation of Logik der Forachung;
"...the theorist is interested in explanation as such, that is to 3ay,
in testable explanatory theories! applications and predictions
interest him only for theoretical reasons - because they may be used
as tests of theories." added note, p.59* LSD.
"1 consider the theorist's interest in explanation - that is, in
discovering explanatory theories - as irreducible to the practical
technological interest in the deduction of predictions. The theo¬
rist's interest in predictions, on the other hand, is explicable as
due to his interest in the problem whether his theories are true;
or in other words, as due to his interest in testing his theories -
in trying to find out whether they cannot be sho^n to be false."
added note p.61, LSD.
5. The Symmetry Thesis
Subsequent critical discussion of the hypothetico-deductive model of
historical explanation has made much of the alleged "symmetry" between causal
explanation and prediction** It is sometimes argued that the hypothetico-
deductive schema requires of a satisfactory scientific explanation that, had
the relevant data been available beforehand, the explanatory apparatus could
have been used to predict the event explained, prior to its occurrence. As
Hempel has put its
" an explanation of a particular event is not fully adequate
unless its explanana, if taken account of in time, could
have served as a basis for predicting the event in question." 2.
It is interesting to note that Popper does not state the symmetry thesis in
this form. Popper's claim is that the hypothetico-deductive apparatus is
Kulti-purpoaei usable for the triad of problems which are of scientific
interest. Explanation, prediction and testing each place different emphases
on the logical structure of the hypothetico-deductive schema. Thus Popper
maintains that explanation and prediction are structurally identical and
qualifies this claim by reference to what might be described as semi-pragmatic
considerations 1 to the differing emphases on this logical structure in its
various uses, and to the relative importance of its uses in the scientific
enterprise. The ubiquity of this logical structure in its different
emphases is what Popper means by the unity of scientific method: that the
several uses of the hypothetico-deductive apparatus cover the range of pro¬
blems whioh concern the scientist.
For Popper either to accept or to reject the symmetry thesis raises
difficulties for his theory of historical explanation, as I shall argue below.
1. The symmetry thesis has been criticized by Israel Scheffler, The Anatomy
of Inquiry (New York, 1963), pp. 43-46, and also by Michael Scriven,
"Explanations, Predictions and Laws" Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
<>f Science, III ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis, 1962;
pp. 1?6-190.
2. C.G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History", Aspects of
Scientific Explanation, p. 249
If Popper accepts the symmetry thesis as applying to his theory of histo¬
rical explanation, then historical prediction would he possible; were
Popper to deny that the symmetry thesis applies to historical explanation
would be to admit at least one difference between the methods of the nat¬
ural sciences and those of history and the social sciences.
If Popper were to maintain the symmetry thesis, his theory of histo¬
rical explanation would lead to what he would consider to be historiciat
views. If the symmetry thesis were applicable to historical explanation
it would mean that, in some caae3, the explanans might have been isolated
prior to the event and the event predicted; predictions of the future would
be possible which were neither uselessly vague nor hopelessly trivial -
Popper's objections to those historical predictions which he does not reject
on logical grounds. Nor would the claim that historical explanations rely
on laws that are trivial, in a sense still to be clarified, entail that the
explanations themselves would be trivial nor, if the symmetry thesis is held
to apply, need the corresponding predictions be trivial. If Popper
wished to maintain the symmetry thesis but to pxit historical explanation be¬
yond its reach so as to avoid prediction of the future he would be forced to
maintain that there is some sort of complexity in social life which makes it
impossible to isolate the explanans prior to an event's occurrence so as to
predict it. Since it is possible to predict natural events in this manner,
this argument resembles the argument from social complexity, used by the
historicist and explicitly rejected by Popper,*'to support the claim that
history and the social sciences require methods differing in kind from those
of the natural sciences. Popper, as has been seen, thinks that, on the
contrary, there is a amplifying factor, that "human beings. • .act.. .more or
less rationally" which applies to the study of social life.
However, it will be seen that Popper also thinks that there is a
peculiar kind of complexity in social life, due to the "uncertainty of the




plan social life. * Reference to the "uncertainty of the human factor"
would he a substantive reason for Popper to hold that the symmetry thesis
does not apply to historical prediction.* But there seems to be no way to
distinguish Popper's point of defence from his characterisation of part of
the historiciat doctrine that the sociologist must deal with complexities
which do not face the natural scientistt
"..•a complexity due to the fact that social life...presupposes
the mental life of individuals". J.
For whatever else the "uncertainty of the human factor" involves, it cer¬
tainly involves "the mental life of individuals."
Thus it might be that Popper would argue that the symmetry thesis is
not relevant to his theory of historical explanation, because all historical
explanation must be essentially incomplete in that the uncertain human factor
1. See chapter five belowj it is also the reason for the unavailability
of methodological individualism.




cannot be explained." * If this is the case, then there is a distinctive
methodological feature here which does not hold for the natural sciences:
for the symmetry thesis must apply to the uses of explanation and predic¬
tion in the theoretical sciences if the soundness of theories is to be
tested. It might be that Popper would argue that the "uncertainty of
the human factor" has more impact on social prediction, with regard to
social engineering, than it does on historical explanation: that the
1. I.C. Jarvie, The Revolution in Anthropology (London, 1964) p.151, says
"...explanations of human behaviour in terms of the logic of the
situation, however, al?/ays fall short of a complete account because
they cannot eliminate the human factor. They can only go so far,
they cannot do more than leave the human element open? if we re¬
construct the situational logic of an event we still do not account
for it happening; in an emergency quick thinking might or might not
save the day; whether it will or not is a prediction beyond our
reach. Two people, identically situationed, act differently because:
one is a Christian, the other not; one thinks quickly, the other
slowly; one always does the obvious, the other never does the obvious,
and so on. Any theory which eliminated this human element would be
explaining human thought and will, and any explanation of human
thought would be an explanation of itself; i.e. it would explain too
much."
Jarvie's final argument seems to me to be related to the contention
that new discoveries cannot be predicted, but it does not, I think, prove
as much as he thinks it does; one may explain past events which involve
"human thought and will" without explaining human thought and will in
general.
Jarvie's point that explanations in terras of situational logic "still
do not account" for "an event happening" is interesting, in view of Hempel's
critique of Dray's theory of rational explanation on the grounds that an
adequate explanation must provide evidence for the occurrence of the event
explained, which requires, Hempel argues, a covering law, because the "evalu¬
ative or appraising principle of action" which Dray describes
"affords groimds for believing that it would have been rational for A
to do x (in a situation of kind C); but not for believing that A did
in fact do x."
If situational logic is not to account for the occurrence of events,
then this is to renounce one of the best arguments for the covering law
theory of explanation.
(Carl 0. Hempel, "Rational Action", Proceedings and addresses of the
Americal Philosophical Association, 1961-2, v. J'j, p. 12-13.
deficiencies of social prediction in this respect are more marked than
those of historical explanation - and this is, of course, to deny that the
symmetry thesis is applicable to historical and social explanation. In
any case, given that Popper insists on the close relationship between
theory and practice, the "uncertainty of the human factor" constitutes a
methodological difference between the social and the natural sciences?
more so than the "element of rationality" in "social situations" which
Popper misleadingly describes as resulting in a distinctive methodological
feature of the social sciences."''*
But what is the force of this argurasnt from the "uncertainty of the
human factor" against the symmetry thesis applying to historical explana¬
tion? It is clearly not the case, as Popper extravagantly asserts at one
point, that
2.
"everything is possible in human affairs"
so that social prediction would seem to be out of the queation. There
are, as Popper says elsewhere, regularities in social life which impose
3.
limitations on what can be done.'* There would then seem to be a prima
facie possibility that the symmetry thesis might apply to historical
explanations which refer to regularities such as these, which even the
"uncertainty of the human factor" cannot overcome; and such predictions
may well be important. Popper1s reference to the "uncertainty of the
human factor" is not enough to dispose of either the possibility of social
prediction or of the symmetry thesis applying to historical explanation in
some cases. _
(wCTT
1. PH, 140-141; cf. below ' for a discussion of this point.
2. OS, II, 197
"Indeed, it is necessary to recognise as one of the principles of any
unprejudiced view of politics that everything is possible in human
affairs..."
3. OS, I, 67, note 9 to chapter 5 03, I, 2J6 and HI 61-63. Popper speaks
of "Social regularities which impose limitations upon what can be achieved
by institutions". The "sociological laws" which refer to these regulari¬
ties can be considered "natural laws of social life" and they are like the
laws of nature in that
"every natural law can be expressed by asserting
that such and such a thing cannot happen." PH, p. 61.
Nonetheless, it seems that Popper must accept the lesser evil of an
argument for the complexity of social life which is not distinguishable
from some of what he says about historicist arguments of this genre, if
he is to argue that the symmetry thesis is in general inapplicable to
historical explanation, and thus to reject certain doctrines which he
thinks constitute the central threat posed by historicisra. By his insist¬
ence on"the uncertainty of the human factor", Popper denies the very possi¬
bility of historical determinism, "The uncertainty of the human factor"
is, moreover, Popper's basis for arguing that certain theories of social
policy which he associates with hiatoricisn, which he calls variously
collectivist planning and Utopian engineering, are impossible."1'
The preceding considerations have several consequences. If Popuer
is to maintain his critique of historicism, then he cannot accept that the
symmetry thesis applies to his theory of historical explanation, and the
difficulty here reflects on Popper's notion of historicism, rather than on
the symmetry thesis: his rejection of social prediction is, as has been
seen, too sweeping. Popoer cannot adhere to the symmetry thesis if he is
to defend the central points of his critique of historicism - demonstrating
that his theory of historical explanation is shaped by his critique of
historicism. That Popper would deny that the symmetry thesis applies to
historical explanation, by an argument about the complexity of social life
which is indistinguishable from a doctrine of anti-naturalistic historicism,
in order to reject certain doctrines that ht? attributes to pro-naturalistic
historicism, raises questions about the coherence of the collection of doc¬
trines which he calls historicism. Because he must reject the symmetry
thesis to maintain his critique of historical prophecy, he is forced to
take a position which entails that there are significant methodological
differences between the natural and the social sciences, even though he
sometimes suggests that denial of the unity of scientific method is equi¬
valent to historicismt the symmetry thesis must apply to the theoretical
sciences if the procedure of testing theories is to be sound, and must not
1. Cf. below, chapter six for a disc ssion of these points.
apply to historical explanation because history and the social sciences
investigate human actions which can never be completely explained or fully
prodioted .i*
III. Historical Explanation as Presupposing
the Hypothetico-Deductive Model
Investigation of the ramifications of the logical structure of causal
explanation has led far from the problem at hand which has to do with how
well Popper's theory applies to actual historical explanation. It is not
self-evident that historians, whose interest Popper says is focussed on
2.
"actual, singular or specific events"
do, in explaining such events, make use of the hypothetico-deductive method
common to the several directions of scientific inqiairy. All three uses of
the hypothetico-deductive method refer to theories, for one thing, and
there is little or no use of theory in evidence in much historiography.
How, then, is Popper's account of the logic of explanation and its relation
to the hypothetico-deductive method of science to be reconciled with the
usual appearance of history? Popper argues that most historical explana¬
tions refer tacitly to the logical "background" of causal explanations in
universal laws. His arguments that historical explanations make implicit
use of the hypothetico-deductive method are convergent.
One suggestion which Popper put forward in connection with the example
discussed above, of the causal explanation of the breaking of a thread, he
amplifies into a full-scale characterization of historical explanations
namely, that the universal laws employed in causal explanation
"are very often so trivial (as in our example) that as a mile we
take thera for granted instead of making conscious use of them"
1. If, Popper says, "human rationality" is "to survive" {FH, p.158)
of. chapter six. PH, P»147
5. PH, p. 124; Cf.above pp.'^® ; it is worth noting that Popper does not
make this point in his discussion of causal explanation in The Logic of
Scientific Discovery,sec. 12, pp.59-60.
'.'/hat camouflages the historian's use of the hypothetico-deductive
apparatus, in giving adequate explanations, is that such laws as historical
explanations presuppose are trivial and uninteresting, both to the historian
and to the theoretician. Consequently the historian can take these laws
for granted in explaining specific events, and concentrate on the initial
conditions which are logically causes only relative to some universal laws.
Popper makes several claims about the historian's use of laws in historical
explanation! that the historian does, can and must take laws for granted
in explaining specific events, because the laws which his explanations pre¬
suppose are trivial; neither of theoretical interest nor of concern to the
historian* The historian's direction of interest is supported by non-
logical *features of the laws which his explanations presuppose.
One such "trivial general law" of which "moat historical explanation
makes tacit use" is
"that sane persons as a rule act more or less rationally."
Expl&nat.ion^which presuppose "this kind of first approximation," in con¬
junction with
"the initial conditions describing personal interests, aims and
other situational factors such as the information available to
the persons concerned"
2.
make use of what Popper calls the "logic of the situation".
1. The Triviality of the Laws Presupposed in
Historical Explanations
Popper relies on his characterization of the theories used in histo¬
rical explanation as trivial in several connections. First, to counter
one of the arguments brought in support of the claims for a distinctive
logic of historical explanation. It was argued that the logic of histo¬
rical explanation could not be like that of scientific explanation for
material reasons; because the history of man reveals him to be a chameleon
1. Cf. below pp^ for an argument that the triviality of the relevant
laws must be a non-logical characteristic.
2. OS, II, 265, cf. below chapter three.
through and through. Consequently there can be no significant causal
connections valid throughout huuan history."* Popper, as has been seen,
insists that the hypothetico-deductive method usejflaws of unrestricted
2
validity as the only safeguard against manoeuvres to evade falsification.*
In countering this argument for a distinctive logic of historical explana¬
tion, Popper agrees that there may be no generalizations of any significance
which are valid for all of human history but he maintains that this con¬
tention does not support the claim that historical explanation has a dis¬
tinctive logic, for adequate historical explanations presuppose only triv¬
ial general laws. That historical explanation requires only trivial laws
means that the appearance of historical explanations is deceiving! the
relevant laws can he, and are, taken for granted in explaining particular
events because of their triviality. Causal explanations of specific events
which do not interest historians, as well as explanations of events which do,
usually make tacit use of generalizations familiar to common sense . Con¬
sequently, no logical distinction can be drawn between historical and sci¬
entific explanation; and more generally the logical structure of historical
explanation ia the same as in all causal explanation, prediction and in
testing theories.
Secondly Popper uses the triviality of the theories employed in histo¬
rical work to argue against a contention that he attributes to pro-natural¬
istic historicisn; namely that an objective patterning or theoretical
organization of historical materials can be established which will license
statements about the meaning of the past and perhaps that of the future.
Popper argues in connection with his characterization of the historian's
"line of interest" that the historian's only use of theories is to take them
for granted in explaining specific events, where he directs his attention to
the initial conditions. The sole use of theories in historical work is,
Popper implies, as implicit premises in historical explanations, and because
these theories are trivial
x
"they are...totally unable to bring order into the subject matter"
1. of. above pp 2. cf. above, pp. 3. OS, II, 264
&21
These theories cannot fulfil the "selective and unifying" function that
scientific theories do: theories can be used in the generalizing sciences
to provide objective foci for the "point of view" or problem which, accord-
lug to Popper's "searchlight theory" *of knowledge, is required to organize
a wieldy selection for investigation from the inexhaustible materials avail¬
able :
"...all scientific descriptions of facts...always depend on theories..."
"...the theories or universal laws of generalizing science introduce
unity as well as a 'point of view'; they create, for every general¬
izing science, its problems, and its centres of interest as well as
of research, of logical construction and of presentation."
"But in history...the host of trivial uninteresting laws we use are
taken for granted; they are practically without interest, and
totally unable to bring order into the subject matter."
"...those universal laws which historical explanation uses provide no
selective and unifying principle, no 'point of view' for history." 2.
Consequently, those organizing conceptions which are necessary, according
to Popper's "searchlight" theory of knowledge, to make sense of the chaos of
a
historical material cannot be objectively delineated by means of theories.
If there are no testable theories available for organizing the multifarious
facts of history, then this tells against historicist claims to discern the
shape end meaning of history, for no objective patterning of history can be
established. This argument, that there is no basis for hietoricist prophecy
in any objective pattern of the past, is the converse side, so to speak, of
Popper1e qualified acceptance of one of the contentions alleged to support
the case for a distinctive logic of historical explanation: Popper, as has
been seen, agrees that there may be no significant uniformities valid
throughout history, but denies that this circumstance affects the logic of
historical explanation. And Popper uses just this contention, that there
are no powerful theories which apply to all of history, to argue against the
very enterprise of historical prophecy. Thus the triviality of the theories
1. 03, II, 260 2. OS, II, 260; OS, II, 264l OS, II, 265-
3. Cf. chapter five for a discussion of Popper's ideas on points of view
in historical work.
used in historical work cuts both ways, against anti-naturalistic and pro-
naturalistic historicisrai against there being a distinctive logic of
historical explanation, and against there being any objective pattern of
the past.**
Lastly, in arguing for situational logic and against psychologism -
2.
the attempt to explain social events solely in terras of social psychology
and also, in this context, an undue emphasis on psychological factors in
explanation - Popper asserts that the
"'psychological' part of the explanation is very often trivial,
as compared with the detailed determination of...action by what
we may call the logic of the situation." 5.
Hence Popper recommends concentrating on explaining
"actions...in terms of the situation in which they oocur"^*
on the grounds that the "psychological part" of the explanation can be
minimized or even neglected on account of its triviality and, as will be
discussed below, for other reasons as well.
But there is nothing to distinguish explanations presupposing trivial
psychological generalizations from any other historical explanation in
which the relevant generalizations, of all kinds - sociological or common-
sense science - are taken for granted on account of their triviality.
More particularly, it was seen above that Popper also describes the general
law presupposed in situational logic as trivial: "that sane persons as a
rule act more or less rationally". It is not only the psychological
generalizations presupposed in historical explanation which are trivial,
1. Neither this particular argument nor either of the other two arguments
mentioned for a distinctive logic of historical explanation, commit their
adherjant§ to a belief in pro-naturalistio historicist prophecy. See chap¬
ter three on historiciara for a discussion of the logical relation between
pro-naturalistic and anti-naturalistic historicism.
2. OS, II, 80. 3. OS, II, 97. 4. OS, II, 97.
5. It can be argued that the "trivial" "'psychological' part" of the
explanation Popper mentions (OS, II, 97) presupposes a psychological
generalization to the effect that men act in accordance with an instinct
of self-preservation, or so as to avoid pain.
according to Popper's theories, but all generalisations so used. Con¬
sequently, this particular argument of Popper's does not give grounds for
minimizing or dispensing with the '"psychological' part" of explanations in
favour of detailed consideration of the situation except in so far as histo¬
rians generally take trivial laws for granted in explaining and concentrate
on the initial conditions. Popper's recommendation that we turn our
attention to the situation may not exclude psychological generalizations
from having an explanatory function, if we follow his theory of historical
explanation, for it may be the case that the initial conditions in the
explanans - featurns of the situation - are causes only relative to some
trivial psychological generalizations. If we accept1. Popper's arguments
about the triviality of the laws presupposed in historical explanation, the
historian may neglect such psychological generalizations but they are logi¬
cally necessary to the explanation. This use of triviality, then, does not
take Popper very far in combatting psychologism as he defends situational
logic. Popper does bring other arguments against psyohologism, with refer-
2.
ence to situational logic, which are discussed below;*"* perhaps the main
point in Popper's discussion of situational logic in "Me Logik der Sozial-
wissenschaften" is an attempt to establish that situational logic can and
must dispense with psychological terms in explanation. The force of this
particular agrument was discussed here to illustrate Popper's use of the
term "trivial" in analysing historical explanation, which seems to me to be
at times opportunistic.
What then of Popper's use of "trivial" to characterise the calibre of
the laws presupposed in historical explanations? It has been seen that
severs! of Popper's arguments depend on this point. After considering what
is to be made of Popper's usage of the term "trivial", for which several
interpretations have been proposed, I shall, in the course of this chapter,
give two arguients for thinking that Popper makes a sophistical use of this
notion.
1. Reasons for not accepting these arguments are given below, ppv - ,
2. Cf. Chapter
52^
To summarize these arguments* in general, if sociological generaliz¬
ations are trivial in the sense of being obvious to common sense it does
not follow that a historian can safely take them for granted in explaining
particular events. It is not the case that such comaon-sensical sociolo¬
gical generalizations are of no theoretical interest. Moreover, Popper's
contention that the historian does not take an interest in the theoretical
part of his explanations yields a paradoxical conclusion to Popper's theory
of historical explanations that although historical explanations must fulfil
certain formal requirements, which include presupposing universal laws, in
order to be explanatioxis - because the historian's line of interest is,
according to Popper, restricted to specific events - he can, qua historian,
have no guarantee that his explanations will be materially aoundj because
he is debarred, in Popper's view, from taking an interest in the status of
^ #
the generalizations which his explanations logically require.
With regard to the "trivial general law" on which situational logic
is based, there are cases in which several conflicting answers may be given
as to what a rational action is, in certain situations} the ambiguity of
the notion of rationality is clear-cut in a restricted class of cases.
More generally, the assumption of rationality is not altogether trivial
either in the sense of being unimportant or uninteresting. Further, if we
consider what is involved in the characterization of rationality which
Popper suggests with regard to situational logic - that a rational action is
one that is in accordance with the logic of the situation,"* or less tauto-
logously, one that is appropriate to the situation - it will be seen that
some explanations which satisfy this criterion may not involve universal
laws, as Popper says the hypothetico-deductive method must} and the be¬
haviour which is explained as appropriate to the situation may not be ration¬
al in any usual sense. Thus, what situational logic presupposes may be
neither trivial, nor a general law, nor even "an element of rationality" in
1. Of. below pp. I"3"'**'"
2. OS, II, 97, for this characterization of rational behaviour.
"social situations". It may however also be the case that Popper does
not now insist on these points, for there is no mention of the assumption,
or "trivial general law", of rationality, in his later discussions of situ¬
ational logic.1*
To return to Popper's use of "trivial" to characterize the laws pre¬
supposed in historical explanation. The triviality of these laws must be
a non-logical characteristic, for if it were a matter of logic, a distinc¬
tion between those uses of the hypothetico-deductive method which employ
trivial theories, and those which employ non-trivial theories, would be in
order. And such a distinction might in turn provide an opening for claims
that historical explanation has a distinctive logic, in spite of Popper's
contention that causal explanation of particular events "very often" relies
on trivial lawss for we cannot be sure in advance that we might not be
interested in a specific event whose explanation refers to initial conditions
that are its causes relative to some non-trivial laws. But this is only
to say that the triviality of the laws presupposed in historical explanation
.must be a non-logical characteristic which is nevertheless of importance in
methodology.
Several interpretations have been proposed for Popper's usage of "tri¬
vial" to characterize the law3 presupposed in historical explanations.
First, that the laws are tautologies or matters of definition. * This
interpretation might be supported by Popper's reference to theories being
"I
"in the main" "implicit" in the historian's terminology"'* But this
interpretation would make the triviality of the laws a logical character¬
istic, and reasons have been given above for thinking that Popper might not
want to accept this interpretation.
1. Of. below chapter three pp. us
2. W. Bray, "Professor Child on Neopositivi3m and History," Journal of
Philosophy, 59(4)(1962), pp •100-6 distinguishes this and the following
two interpretations of Popper's usage. He claims that Arthur Child
("Thoughts on the Hiatoriology of Neopositivism," Journal of Philosophy,
57(1960) pp.665-74) argues, incorrectly according to Dray, for the first
interpretation.
5. PH, p. 145.
IS*?
Second, the laws are matters of common-sense, part of "common knowledge",
1
and there is textual evidence to support this interpretation. * Third,
the candidate laws for historical explanations are trivial as laws - "gross"
2.
generalizations of a specific event which have a single actual instance.'**
There is a fourth possible interpretation: that Popper uses trivial to
indicate that such laws are "uninteresting" in a rather strong sense:
that they are of no concern to the theoretician, with the corollary that
the historian can take such laws for granted.
Dray argues that although Popper intends the laws to be trivial in
the second sense of being "common knowledge", the outcome of the "covering
law" theory of historical explanation in practice is that the laws used are
trivial in the third sense, of being "gross generalizations" of the particu¬
lar event explained. It is the relation between the second and fourth
senses of trivial, in Popper's arguments, that will be discussed in what
follows, the question being whether, if the laws are matters of common-sense
knowledge, they are also of no concern to the theoretician.
One example Popper gives of the laws used in historical explanation
suggests that he intends the laws to be understood as trivial in the second
sense of being matters of "common knowledge". Thus
"If we say that the cause of the death of Giordano Bruno was being
burnt at the stake, we do not need to mention the universal law
that all living things die when exposed to intense heat. But
such a law was tacitly assumed in our causal explanation." 3«
In a series of examples, however, Popper argues that the relevant laws are
trivial in the fourth sense of being uninteresting to the theoretician,
because they are trivial in the second sense of being matters of common-
sense knowledge:
"If we explain, for example, the first division of Poland in 1772
by pointing out that it could not possibly resist the combined
power of Russia, Prussia and Austria, then we are tacitly using
some trivial universal law such as: 'If of two armies which are
about equally well armed and led, one has a tremendous superiority
1. PH, p. 145- 2. W.H. Dray, op.cit., p.105. 5. PH, p.145.
in men, then the other never wins'...Such a law might be described
as a law of the sociology of military power; but it is too trivial
ever to raise a serious problem for the students of sociology, or
to arouse their attention. Or if we explain Caesar's decision to
cross the Rubicon by his ambition and energy, say, then we are using
some very trivial psychological generalizations which would hardly
ever arouse the attention of a psychologist." 1.
Popper's argument that the historian's customary practice of explanation
presupposes the hypothetico-deductive model requires that these laws be
trivial in the fourth sense indicated aboves for Popper insists that be¬
cause such laws give no concern to the theoretician, the historian does,
can and must take them for granted in his explanations. Thus Popper's
analysis of historical explanation relies on both these senses of "trivial":
that the laws used in historical explanation are matters of common-sense and
that they do not draw the attention of the theoretician.
Popper seems to assume that these two senses of "trivial" are, if not
equivalent, at least closely related, for he shifts in the course of his
argument from the former sense to the latter: because the laws relevant to
historical explanation are matters of common sense, they are uninteresting
and can be taken for granted. I shall argue that Popper's sliding use of
"trivial" on which such in his arguments depends, is untenable because
there are generalizations which are trivial in the former sense which are
not trivial in the latter sense. This weakness in Popper's argument has
several consequences. One is that the historian cannot, qua historian,
provide explanations which meet all the standards that Popper lays down
for scientifically acceptable explanations; Popper's theory of histo¬
rical explanation, in conjunction with his views on the historian's
characteristic "line of interest", leads to the conclusion that although
historical explanations must have the logical background of all causal
1. OS, II, 264-5» With regard to Popper's first example, a student of
military history might argue that it makes a difference in the application
of such a law, whether the smaller army is attacking or defending it9 own
territory. With regard to the second examples whether this example in¬
volves a psychological generalization or a dispositional statement about
one person, namely Caesar, which does not derive from a general law will
be discussed below in chapter three pp. with reference to the
use of situational logic. °
explanations to be explanations, they cannot satisfy the material require¬
ments for acceptable explanations. This paradoxical result is due to
Popper's insistence on his rigid demarcation of the historian's "line of
interest".
The two senses of trivial fall apart because generalizations may seem
obvious to common sense without being valid? and this circumstance can
account, favourably, for the proliferation of sociological publications.
There is an example in the literature of sociology which neatly rebuts the
standard criticism that sociology deploys masses of data in more or less
scientific formations, merely to reach conclusions which are matters of
common-sense knowledge. A review of a study of American soldiers in the
Second World War lists a number of platitudes about the behaviour of men in
wartime, chiefly in relation to their social background, such as:
"1. Better educated men showed more psycho-neurotic symptoms than
those with less education. (The mental instability of the
intellectual as compared with the more passive psychology of the
man-in-the-street has often been commented on.)
2. Men from rural backgrounds were usually in better spirits than
soldiers with city backgrounds. (After all, they are more
accustomed to hardships.)
5. Southern soldiers were better able to stand the climate of the
hot South Sea Islands than Northern soldiers (of course, Southerners
are more accustomed to hot weather)
4. White privates were more eager to become non-coms than Negroes.
(The lack of ambition among Negroes is almost proverbial).
5. Southern Negroes preferred Southern to Northern white officers,
(isn't it well known that Southern whites have a more fatherly
attitude towards their 'darkies'?)
6. As long as the fighting contimed, men were more eager to be
returned to the States than they were after the German surrender.
(You cannot blame people for not wanting to be killed.)'* 1.
A gullible reader might find his previous assumptions confirmed in this
list - but, the author continues - these truisms wore refuted, not corro¬
borated, in the course of the study. The correlations uncovered between
background and behaviour reversed those posited by common sense.
1. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The American Soldier - an Expository Review,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, v. 13 (1949)» P*
-3^.4p-
This example is generally used to argue that although sociological
conclusions nay be cosmonsensical, they are not simply platitudes restated
in jargon# * The purpose of the sociological apparatus is, rather, to
determine which platitudes are falsified as a matter of fact, and thus to
select the as yet unfalsified platitudes as conclusions of research} a
procedure which accords with Popper's views on the method common to the
natural and the social sciences.
In the present context, this example of the testing of truisms suggests
that if the historian follows Popper's recommendation that the trivial laws
which his explanations presuppose are no concern of his, he is not likely
to provide satisfactory explanations. The trivial laws which his explana¬
tions presuppose are, for the most part, matters of common-sense knowledge,
and coanon-sense generalizations are not always reliable in empirical ques¬
tions to do with social life, as the above example indicates: such general¬
izations are not trivial in the sense of being uninteresting to the theore¬
tician.
If the historian takes the relevant laws for granted in explaining,
as Popper claims, and if one of the material requirements for a satisfactory
explanation is, as Popper says, that the relevant universal laws be "well
tested and carroborated", then the historian who provides Popperite explana¬
tions is in a fix. As a raatter of course, the historian may not supply
satisfactory explanations, and this is not because he does not exhibit or
my not even be aware of the appropriate logical apparatus, but because the
laws which suit his purposes and which he treats as unproblematical, are
1. Laxarfeld, op. cit., p.379-500 criticises the "argument...that surveys
only put into complicated form observations which are already obvious to
everyone", as follows:
"If we had mentioned the actual results of the investigation first,
the reader would have labelled these 'obvious' also. Obviously
something is wrong with the entire argument of 'obviousness'. It
should really be turned on its head. Since every kind of human
reaction is conceivable, it is of great importance to know which
reactions actually oocur most frequently and under what conditions;
only then will a more advanced social science develop."
unreliable for material reasons. Given the persistently critical tenor
of Popper's remarks on the standards of knowledge attainable in the prac¬
tice of history, it is surprising that he does not make explicit this
implication of his views: that even if the historian does satisfy the
formal requirements for providing satisfactory explanations, he is more
than likely not to satisfy the material requirements. Historical explana¬
tions may be chronically unsound even if their logical "background" has the
form of scientific method, because generalizations may be trivial in the
sense of being common knowledge without being trivial in the sense of being
"uninteresting" and of no concern to the theoretician.
But Popper does not merely assert that the historian does not, as a
matter of fact, concern himself with the laws which his explanations pre¬
suppose; Popper says that the historian can disregard these laws. Thi3
is a peculiar piece of prescriptive methodology: an invitation to the
historian to provide satisfactory explanations by carefree reliance on
questionable generalizations from common sense .
2. Popper's Characterization
of the Historian's "Line of Interest"
The root of the difficulty discussed above lies in Popper's rigid
demarcation of the historian's "line of interest":
"Generalization belongs simply to a different line of interest,
sharply to be distinguished from that interest in specific events
and their causal explanation which is the business of history.
Those who are interested in laws must turn to the generalizing
science (for example, to sociology)." 1.
It is worth noting that the theoretician's "line of interest" is not as
restricted as the historian's: the theoretician may have no interest in
the causal explanation of specific events as such, but only as a means to
testing his conjectures, but to test hypotheses, he must use causal explana¬
tions which are scientifically acceptable, for otherwise his results might
1. OS, II, 264.
be discarded as inconclusive, and he could not be said to have tested a
hypothesis. Thus the demarcations of the historian's and the theore¬
tician's respective "lines of interest" are not quite parallel.
Popper might argue for this inequality on epistenological grounds,
for he maintains that theory or conjecture is logically prior to the observ¬
ation or apprehension of particulars. This is his "searchlight theory" of
knowledge, which he opposes to contrasts with the "bucket theory of mind"
of classical empiricism.3"*
Moreover, the logical structure of theories is such that they transcend
any collection of supporting data: a theory applies to all instances of the
kind specified, not jxist to those collections of instances compiled by
experimenters. It is on these epistemological grounds that Popper rejects
induction as confused: scientific theories cannot be generalizations from
a collection of instances because this procedure omits just what makes such
theories powerful, which is their transcendance of any limited collection of
instancesj they apply to the future as well as the past.
Popper's argument from epistemology is sufficient to invalidate any
claim on the part of the historian to theorize inductively on the basis of
an investigation of the specific events which are his "line of interest".
iVhat debars the historian from conjecturing, as a Popperite scientist would,
seems to be Popper's insistence on a rigid demarcation between the historical
and the theoretical sciences. Popper insists that generalization is radi¬
cally different from the historian's characteristic interest in specific
events because, I think, he wants to leave no openings for what he calls
historicierai both the claim criticized, and called Hiatorisraus by Carl
Menger, that the basis of the social sciences is in the historical outlook
2.
from which theories derive? " and also those claims to prophesy the future
1. On these two theories, 03, II, 213-214 and OS, II, 260.
2. Carl Menger, Problems of Economics and Sociology (a translation of TJnter-
suchungen &ber die Methode der Sozialwissensehaften und der Politischen
Bkonomie inobeaondere) ed. and with an introduction by Louis Schneider, trans,
by Francis J. Nook (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 19&3) Cf.FH 35-34,
39-41, 45, 50, 03. I, 7, OS, II 37 and OS II 319 note 2 to chapter 13.
on the basis of past evidence, which Popper also decries as historicist.
Popper, then, prohibits the historian from theorizing because he considers
that theories claiming to be historically based have been historicist;
and this is his reason for reaffirming, or perhaps reatating^the distinc¬
tion between nomothetic and ideographic disciplines, and assigning history
strictly to the latter.
The grounds on which Popper justifies his prohibition of theorizing to
the professional historian are Popper's considerations as to the limitations
of historical evidences the historian cannot conjecture and attempt to re¬
fute his conjectures, because in general historical evidence will not pro-
vide tests for hypotheses. * Because the paradigm of scientific experi¬
ments does not fit, Popper neglects the claims that can be made for a criti¬
cal approach to historical evidence. Popper'3 chief argument against using
historical evidence to teat hypotheses is that because the* limited histo¬
rical sources x*ecord events from the witness's point of view they can rarely
be tested by further evidence, or even criticized, and must be taken at face
value. But it will be seen in chapter fein1 that this argument does not
stand up to examination: that it is possible to criticize a historical
source just because the informant recorded events from a point of view which
he did not apply with complete consistency. Nor is historical evidence as
1. Cf. chapter five below where these arguments are developed more fully.
2. Popper seems by now to have modified his views on this point; cf. the
discussion of the objectivity of situational logic Tseiov.' o.gd in chapters<<Vvaa-
four, Gf. also CR, p.2J, where Popper says in criticism of the observation-
aliat programme of asking for the sources of knowledge, that historical work
is an exception to its general untenability:
"Testing an historical assertion always means going back to
sources; but not, as a rule, to the reports of eyewitnesses."
"Clearly no historian will accept the evidence of documents un¬
critically. There are problems of genuineness, there are pro¬
blems of bia3, and there are also such problems as the recon¬
struction of earlier sources."
"On the Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance", CR, p.23.
But in allowing that a historian can criticise documents, Popper has, I
think, withdrawn the basis of his earlier argument that most historical
interpretations must be circular.
limited as Poppei' suggests. Historians use more than written documents,
and not all the written documents they use are characterized by points of
view in the sense that Popper describes.
Popper, in arguing that historical theories are generally unteatable,
assumes that the relevant historical evidence is finite and has already been
discovered; this same belief led Lord Acton to assert optimistically,
seventy odd years ago, that it was then possible to write definitive history.
But new evidence may be discovered in almost all fields of history? and the
use of the historian's critical techniques may put a new face on evidence
already discovered, by showing its significance to be different from what
has been thought. And in some fields of history the available evidence i3
immense, and difficult for any one historian or perhaps even a team of histo¬
rians to exhaust; so that Popper's claim that
"in history.. .the facts at our disposal are often severely limited"'''*
seems sadly inappropriate.
Thus historical evidence is not as unsuitable for testing hypotheses
as Popper contended in The Open Society; its limitations, by comparison
with that segment of scientific evidence which is gained by controlled
experiments, need not constitute an insuperable barrier to generalizing on
the part of the historian, should he care to do so.
Moreover, recourse to controlled experiments is not a sine qua non for
testing hypotheses, for astronomical and geological hypotheses may be tested
by observations. Popper's later defence of situational logic as a method
which the historian can use, which consists of hypotheses that are "in
principle, objectively testable" indicates that he may not still insist on
the points that he expounded earlier as to the limitations of historical
2
evidence.
But even if Popper's case against historical evidence does not stand
up to examination and has not, so to speak, stood up to the test of time,
1. 03, II, 26b 2. Cf. chapter five.
in that Popper seems to have modified his views on this point, Popper
might still be correct in characterizing the historian'a interest as
directed towards, and indeed restricted to, specific events and in claiming
that s
"Generalization belongs simply to a different line of interest,
sharply to be distinguished from that interest in specific events
and their causal explanation which is the business of history" 1.
For even if the resources were available to the historian for generalizing,
in the shape of suitable evidence for testing his conjectures, he still
? •
might not care to do so. Certainly the historian is a bonsumer" * of
theories formulated and tested in other disciplines; and hia use of such
theories is in general to bring them to boar upon specific events. Popper,
as has been seen, characterizes the historian's use of universal laws as for
the most part, "implicit", "tacit" or unconscious; universal laws are an
implicit but logically necessary constituent of the historian's causal
explanations of specific events: and sociological theories and socio¬
logical models are "Implicit in ^the historian'a] terminology"
It has been argued by Joynt and Rescher that the historian may also be
a "producer"''* of restricted generalization. I should like to consider
what such limited generalizations are like, and the uses to which the
historian nay put them, as indicating that, contrary to Popper's state¬
ments, the historian may have an interest in generalizing. Popper would,
I think, probably raise some objections to the enterprise described by Joynt
and Rescher, but I think that these objections can be met.
Joynt and Rescher characterize restricted generalizations as
1. OS, II, 264.
2. Carey 3« Joynt and TJicholas Rescher, "The Problem of Uniqueness in
History", History and Theory, vol. I no.2, p.158; hereafter cited as
Joynt and Rescher, "Uniqueness".
J. PH, 147; the kind of models which are "implicit in {[the historian's}
terminology" are discussed below in chapter three in connection with situa¬
tional logic, and also in chapter six, in connection with methodological
individualism.
tfrfVl
"'law-like' statements limited in applicability by explicit
or oblique use of proper names (or places, periods of time,
systems of technology, or the like..." 1.
As an example of such generalizations they offer the statements
"In the seafights of sailing vessels in the period of 1653-1805
(that is, from the battle of Texel to that of Trafalgar),
large formations were too cumbersome for effectual control as
3ingle units"
Such statements are not simply summations of particular events; they are
lawlike in that they imply that if the relevant conditions, e.g., of naval
warfare, were "reinstated", then the same tactics would again be applicable.^*
But such generalizations are limited and not universally valid, in that their
applicability depends on "the fulfilment of conditions" "which could but can¬
not reasonably be expected to recur" because
"such limited generalizations are rooted in transitory
regularities deriving from the existence of temporally
restricted technological or institutional patterns". 4»
It falls to the historian to formulate such restricted generalizations
just because the scientist, although he could do so, has nothing to gain from
formulating limited generalizations rather than the universal laws "which are
the main focus of his interest". By contrast, the historian has an
interest in just such generalizations for explanatory purposes, for which
6.
universal laws do not suffice; * his interest is reinforced by the limit-
7.
ations of the data available to him, * Rescher and Joynt say that the
historian's interest in such generalizations is as part of his "explanatory
mission and...focus upon specific particulars; * but there are two uses, I
think, which the historian may make of such restricted generalisations,
1. C.B. Joynt and Nicholas Rescher, "On Explanation in History", Mind N.S.
68(1959), p.388; hereafter cited as Joynt and Rescher, "Explanation".
2. Joynt and Readier, "Uniqueness", p.156.
3. Joynt and Rescher, "Explanation", p.J84-5» &nd "Uniqueness", p.'156-7.
Joynt and Kescher say in "Uniqueness", p.156-7, that such generalizations
"exert counterfactual force"
4. Joynt and Rescher, "Explanation", p.585 and "Uniqueness", p.156-7-
5. Joynt and Rescher, "Uniqueness", p.158 and "Explanation", p.585.
6. Joynt and Rescher, "Explanation", pp.387-580.
7. Joynt and Rescher, "Explanation", p.385-
8. Joynt and Rescher, "Uniqueness", p.158.
which should be distinguished. He may of course use then to exolain
specific events, and he may also use them to characterise the "temporally
restricted technological or institutional patterns" characteristic of
historical periods. Such patterns are in a sense particular, large-scale
facta, but they are patterns as well} and the historian's interest in them
is in part because they give rise to transitory regularities relevant to
explaining men's actions throughout the period for which they are valid.
And if the preceding argument is valid, then historians do have an interest
in formulating and testing such restricted generalizations.
Such "transitory regularities" help to specify the "problem situation
of a period" which is Popper's suggestion for making sense of "the puzzling
fact that there are such things as historical periods." Moreover, such
limited generalizations may be involved in the "situational analysis"
2.
which Popper now thinks is "the main feature of historical explanation". *
-££—Ihlt- Im'l pwint is vr>lid}-their. Situational logic may not presuppose the
hypothetico-deductive model as Popper has defended it, for then: explanations
in terms of situational logic may not involve laws of unrestricted validity.
The remarks which Popper makes in The Poverty of Historicism, and in
some of his writings on scientific methodology, suggest that he would pro¬
bably raise two objections to Rescher and Joynt's argument. Popper's
several arguments for generalizations being of unrestricted validity have
been considered above; it has been suggested that Popper's attempt to guard
against the threat of conventionalism does not require that restricted
generalizations mu3t be rejected as unsound because they are vulnerable to
manoeuvres to discount falsifying evidence by adding ad hoc qualifications.
The raent; 1 constructions which are scientific laws, in the conventionalist
view, may be open to ad hoc augmentation in this evasive and unscientific
way, but such restricted generalizations a3 Rescher and Joynt propose are
based on "institutional and technological patterns" whioii are not simply
mental creations but matters open to objective investigation. Moreover,
1. Popper, HE, p.22.
2. HE, p.21; cf. below chapter three pfr
4£i°°
the safeguard against ad hoo qualifications, as has been argued above,1*
does not rest on formal requirements such as unrestricted validity but on
the institutions oi scientific objectivity: of inter-subjective testing and
criticism. If the restrictions are indicated under which such generaliz¬
ations hold, then ad hoc supplementations can be recognised as such, and
generalizations of this kind, do not suffer from the defects of scientific,
theories as understood by conventionalism.
Second, Popper would probably contend that such statements as Rescher
and Joynt describe state what he calls trendss for they depend on certain
"initial conditions" which specify the circumstances under which the re¬
stricted generalizations apply. Popper says he has no objection to the use
of trends, if the dependence of trends on "initial conditions" is recognized;
his "quarrel" is with historiciste who project such trends unconditionally
into the future as historical prophecies.^* And clearly such restricted
generalizations as Rescher and Joynt analyse, by stipulation, cannot be
extrapolated unconditionally into the future, because they refer to "tempor¬
ally restricted technological and institutional patterns"; they are not,
then, liable to the misuses of historicist prophecy.
But elsewhere Popper characterizes "a statement asserting the existence
of a trend" as "existential":
"a singular historical statement, not a universal law".'**
And this characterization cannot be reconciled with Rescher and Joynt's
analysis of the force of restricted generalizations. According to Popper,
"historical hypotheses are, as a rule, not universal but
singular statements about one individual event, or a
number of such events". 4«
Such generalizations as Rescher and Joynt describe are not singular state¬
ments; they are law-like and "exert counter-factual force". The example
considered above does not merely summarize salient features of successful
tactics in the sea-bnttles fought between 1653 and 1805, it. asserts that
1. Cf. above, pp.*®25*""10 2. PH, 128-9.
3. PH, 110. 4. PH, 10?.
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"for example, that had Vileneuve Issued from Cadis some days earlier
or later he would all th^- same have encountered difficulty in the
management of the great allied battle fleet of over thirty sail of
the line, and yielson's stratagem of dividing his force into two
virtually independent units under prearranged plans would have
facilitated effective management equally well as at Trafalgar". 1.
Thus, this restricted generalisation is "law-like" in that it has the
characteristic which Popper ascribes to scientific laws, of transcending
any particular collection, even though it does not have the unrestricted
validity which Popper- argues that scientific laws must have to fulfil the
explanatory "aim of science". Consequently, such hypotheses cannot be
singular statements oven if they cannot qua!1fy as scientific lawe in Popper's
eyes.
The historian's interest in formulating restricted generalizations ouch
as these makes it necessary to correct Popper's characterization of the
historian's "line of interest" which has been seen to raise difficulties in
the theory of historical explanation which it was meant to support. The
historian's interest is not, as Popper claims, only in specific events. he
is also interested in describing the "institutional or technological patterns"
characteristic of historical periods, in terms of restricted generalizations,
which have law-like force and which are not untestable "points of view".
Moreover, this use by the historian of restricted generalizations suggests
that there is an important respect in which the distinction between an
interact in generalization and in specific events may not be as sharp as
Popper contends, in his analysis of the pre-suppositions of historical explana¬
tion. For restricted generalizations, and descriptions and explanations of
specific events may be interwoven, so to apeak, in historical writing, for the
purpos ; of characterizing periods in the past.
Although the historian has not been transformed into a theoretician on
a par with the physicist, as some reformers have desired, the several func¬
tions of restricted generalizations in historical work suggest that the histo¬
rian has more than the purely idiographic interest to which Popper restricted
him.
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Chapter Three. Situational Logic
I. Introduction
Much of the discussion of the Popper-Herapel theory of historical
explanation has hsen concerned with whether the proposed model can be
applied in actual historical explanation. Popper's reaction to this
discussion is, as has been seen, disparaging. One reason for this, I
have suggested, is the turn taken by the subsequent discussions insofar
as it referred to Popper's views on historical explanation, it misconstrued
his purposes in proposing the analysis he did of historical explanations:
Popper's purposes were largely critical rather than constructive. In dis¬
cussing historical explanation in The Poverty of Hiatoricism and The Open
Society Popper was concerned to combat views that he associated with histo-
ricisms first that the methods of history and the social sciences differ
in kind from those of the natural sciences; and second, that knowledge of
the past can provide a basis for saying what the future will be like. But
the analysis of historical explanation which Popper gives, in pursuit of
his critical purposes, is not altogether satisfactory as an account of
historical explanation.
My criticisms of Popper's analysis have centred on Popper's usages of
trivial, by which he attempted to reconcile the historian's characteristic
direction of interest in specific events with his implicit use of the
hypothetico-deductive method in giving explanations of such events; and on
Popper's restriction of the historian's "line of interest" to specific
events and their causal explanation, a restriction from which Popper argued
that historical laws are a contradiction in terms."''" The contentions on
which Popper relied to counter doctrines he attributed to historicisrath&s
led to his defending a model of historical explanation which is not satis¬
factory. Popper says as much in the above-mentioned interview on historical
1. OS, II, 264
"For from our point of view, there can be no historical laws. General¬
ization belongs simply to a different line of interest, sharply to be
distinguished from that interest in specific events and their causal
explanation which is the business of history."
ipt
explanations that this model does not give an adequate account of histo¬
rical explanation, but that his theory of situational logic does just that.
Situational logic, which Popper considers to be the issue of his theory
of historical explanation, is undoubtedly relevant to a large and important
class of historical explanations. It has the considerable merit of stress¬
ing the importance of objective conditions for explaining the actions of
people in the past."''* Whether such objective conditions, as Popper under¬
stands them, exhaust the aspects of historical situations whioh are relevant
to historical explanations is another matter: it might be argued that some
notion of the agent's view of the situation is also required, and that
empathic understanding is involved in situational analysis and thus in histo¬
rical explanation. As we shall see, Popper defends his theory of situation¬
al logic from these objections by insisting that the ostensibly psychological
aspects of action which are relevant to its explanation, can and must be de-
2
scribed in terms of objective features of the situation. * 'Whether Popper's
answer is satisfactory can best be determined by considering situational
logic.
That objective conditions must be considered for historical explanations
to be adequate is an important point, but it is not sufficient to establish
that situational logic as Popper presents it is an adequate theory of histo¬
rical explanation. Before considering in detail what Popper has said about
situational logic, I shall indicate several critical and positive methodo¬
logical points, in connection with which Popper presents situational logic;
for Popper's discussions of situational logic will seem opaque if no mention
is made of the purposes for which he proposes and defends it. Then, with
reference to how situational logic works in practice, I shall consider whe¬
ther it succeeds in eliminating what Popper criticizes and maintaining what
he defends.
1. Gf. W.B. Gallie's discussion of Popper's situational logic, Philosophy
and the Historical Understanding (London, I964) p.HB.
"Failure to see what the objective possibilities were in a given histo¬
rical situation is probably the commonest cause of miscalculating or
for failing entirely to appreciate the intentions and plans of the agents
involved."
2. See section V below, pp.S^Fj IS®
it> s
Although Popper's purposes in proposing and defending situational
logic can be distinguished as critical and constructive, his critical and
constructive points turn out to be closely related. One class of problems
is raised by the relation of situational logic to other methodological doc¬
trines to which Popper is oommitted: methodological individualism and the
hypothetico-deductive method, whose various and ubiquitous uses constitute
the unity of scientific method. A second problem is the success of Popper's
attempt to establish, by means of situational logic, that there is no need,
nor indeed any place, for erapathic or intuitive understanding in history and
the social sciences. Popper makes this attempt partly through his critique
of one of the several associations which psychologism has, in his usage?
namely, the use of psychology in historical and social explanations.
Popper links his recommendation of situational logic with methodo¬
logical individualism? the relations between these two doctrines is examined
in chapter below. The "zero method" of constructing models, from
which situational logic derives - that is, the constriction of models on the
assumption that "the individuals concerned" acted rationally - clearly pre¬
supposes that such models are individualistic. The models of "political
situations" and "social movements", which Popper recommends to social sci¬
entists and historians, are to be models constructed and analysed "in terms
" '•
of individuals, of their attitudes, expectations, relations, etc.... The
upshot of this combination of methodological individualism and. situational
logic is, according to Popper, that insofar as sociological theory refers
to social collectives, it makes use of
"abstract models constructed to interpret certain selected
relations between individuals." 2.
This result disposes of two linked doctrines of historicisra? methodological
essentialism, or the belief that social collectives really exist and there¬
fore have essences; and the belief that these essences can be grasped by
intuition.
Beet—the -preceding analyoio has only skimmed tho Ditrfacrr; his tui icirs-ta
1. PH, 136, 149. 2. PH, 140; cf. PH, 136, 149- 5. PH. 136; cf Below
PP.°lW
\p<°
But the preceding analysis has only skimmed, the surface. Historicists
put forward such untenable doctrines as methodological essentialism and
intuitive understanding due to their understandable - and indeed justifi¬
able dissatisfaction with history as it is practised."'' " Popper thinks that
there are grounds, but perhaps not those which the historicist defends, for
a dissatisfaction with history a3 it stands; situational logic, according
to Popper, is part of a sensible answer to the historicist's demand for a
reform of history, and it is also part of Popper's solution for the defects
of history which give rise to this dissatisfaction.
A recurrent bogey in Popper's presentation of situational logic is
psychologism. It will be seen that Popper uses this term with associations
beyond its literal reference. He is against what he says psychologism
stands for: the attempt to explain social events solely in terras of social
psychology. But his objections to psychologisra are also directed against
claims for empathic understanding, as well as against the more general claim
that history and the social sciences, because they deal with human action,
require methods that are distinctive, because their subject matter must be
apprehended by subjective means. Popper, as will be seen, argues that
these fields have "an entirely objective method" at their disposal, situa-
2.
tional logicjwhich suffices for their purposes.'*
•That is, the reverse aide of Popper's attempt to combat what he calls
psychologisra ig his claim that situational logic is objective. In the main,
Popper gives two related, but not equivalent, characterizations of what he
means by "objeotive": a statement is objective if it is in principle test-
able;^" and a statement is objective if inter-subjective agreement can be
1. PH, 140-150
2. In "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften," KBlner Zeitachrift fftr Sozio-
logie und Sozlalpaychologie, 14(1962) Theses 25 and 2$, pp.246-7; hereafter
cited as LSW.
3. E.O. in HE, p.21; also L3D, p.44> cf. the next footnote.
reached on it.x* If a statement in in principle testable, it is possible
to reach intersubjective agreement on it, but intersubjective agreement can
be reached on logical truths which cannot be tested in any real sense; thus
Popper's second characterization of objectivity in terms of the possibility
of reaching- intereubjactive agreement is more comprehensive 'than is his
characterization of objectivity in terms of the possibility, in principle,
of testing the relevant statements.
Whether situational logic in use can satisfy either or both of these
standards will be considered below. In chapter four below It ia suggested
that if the historian is as limited, by his reliance on sources organized by
untestable points of view as Popper has argued in the last chapter of The
Open Society, then it is difficult to see how the historian can use situa¬
tional logic if it is objective in the first sense, as Popper claims in his
interview on historical explanation. In other words, Popper's later defence
of situational logic is inconsistent with his earlier critique of history.
These two conflicting arguments do have some connection in that both are
directed against doctrines which Popper attributes to the influence of what
he calls historicism on history and the social sciences. Popper's critique
of historical evidence is meant to show that no objective patterns can be
established in past events, from which predictions could be made; and
Popper defends situational logic as a method of objective understanding in
an attempt to 9how that there is no need for empathic understanding in
history and the social sciences. But this connection is, I think, rather
flimsy; for it is argued in the chapter on historicisra below, thafc an anti-
naturalistic historicist may subscribe to any of several doctrines of empha-
thic or intuitive understanding without being committed to the pro-naturalistic
Is This is Popper's effective criterion for the objectivity of situational
logic, LOW, p.247. In a note, added in 1959 to LSD, p.44, Popper says that
he has "since generalized" the first characterization of objectivity cited
above
"inter-subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the
more general idea of inter-subjective criticism,or...of...mutual
rational control by critical discussion..."
Popper's effective criterion of objectivity, noted above, derives from this
more general idea, in that if a statement withstands intersubjective criti¬
cism it is then intersubjectively acceptable.
2. Cf. the preceding footnote.
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belief in objective patterns of history which license predictions.
A point related to whether situational logic is objective in the 3ense
that "everything about it is, in principle ... testable*'^ * is whether situa¬
tional logic makes implicit use of the hypothetico-deduetive method. In
The Open Society Popper presents situational logic as a special case of the
hypothetico-aeductive model of historical explanation in which the "trivial
general law" "tacitly assumeJcQ" is that
2,
"sane persons as a rule act more or less rationally".
Popper presents situational logic, in The Poverty of Historlcisrn, as related
to the "zero method" of constructing models on a similar assumption; and
the technique of constructing models in general, he argues, is an instance
of hypcthetico-deductive method. In the later interview on historical
explanation, Popper's description of situational logic as "far removed" from
x
the hypothetico-deductive model of historical explanation'* would seem, on
the face of it, to be a retraction of his earlier presentation of situational
logic as a particular case of this model. It might be argued, amid contro¬
versy, that explanations in terms of the agents' reasons, which, it would
seem, must certainly enter situational logic at some point are in some way
fundamentally different from explanations in terms of causes. Whether
Popper would agree to this point, and whether this is what he means in saying
that situational logic is "far removed" from the hypothetico-deductive model
of causal explanation, remains to be seen. Again, the relation of situa¬
tional logic to the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation is a question
to be settled by investigating how situational logic, as Popper understands
it, is used in historical explanation.
My presentation of situational logic will be composite, drawing on what
Popper says in four publications. Popper, in discussing the logic of histo¬
rical explanation in The Open Society and The Poverty of Historioism, mentions
situational logic as an instance of the hypothetico-deductivo model which is
much used in historical explanation; a special case which
1. HE, p.21. 2. OS, II, 265 3. HE, p. 22.
fp*
"tacitly assumes, as a kind of first approximation,
the trivial general law that sane persons as a rule
act more or less rationally." 1.
That is, Popper argues that the xxse, by "the best historians", of situa-
2.
tional logic supports hi© contention that actual historical explanation
presuppose® the hypothetico-deductive model. In addition to his refer¬
ences to situational logic in the course of arguing that there is no dis¬
tinctive logic of historical explanation, Popper gives some indications
in these two works of what he thinks situational logic involves.
In two later publications, the interview on historical explanation
mentioned, above, and a lecture on "Die Logik der Sozialwisaenschaften",
Popper returns to the topic of situational logic. Nearly fifteen and
nearly twenty years separate the first publications of The Open Oociety
an(* The Poverty of Historicisra from that of the interview and that of "Die
Logik der Socialwissenschaften", respectively, and there are some notable
differences in what Popper has to say about situational logic in these later
works. He now says that situ*tional logic is "far removed" from hypothetico-
deductive model of historical explanation, whereas earlier, he had presented
situational logic as a special case of this model. The assumption of ration¬
ality on the part of the actors, which was a prominent point in his presenta¬
tion of situational logic in The Poverty of Historiciaa and The Open Society,
is not mentioned explicitly in his later publications. Lastly, the conflict
of Popper's characterization of situational logic as an objective techniqxie
of historical explanation, with his earlier critique of historical evidence,
has already been mentioned.
Nonetheless, the major difficulties that I see in Popper's conception
of situational logic do not arise from his saying different things about it
at different times. Some of these difficulties come from the relations of
situational logic to Popper's other methodological stipulations mentioned
abovei whether situational logic will in practice preserve methodological
3
individualism as Popper defends the latter''j and whether paychologism can
1. 03, II, 265 2. PH, 149 3* See below, chapter
he excLuded if situational logic in to provide adequate historical explana¬
tions,"''* A related difficulty is due to Popper's consistent attempt to
establish that the historian can dispense with esipathio understanding "by
relying on that method of "objective understanding" which Popper describes
as situational logic. The conflict of the objectivity of situational logic
with Popper's denial of objectivity to the practice of history becomes pro¬
nounced through Popper's more explicit development of the purposes for which
he first introduced situational logic as a major item in the methodology of
the social sciences.
II. Situational Logic in The Poverty of Historicism.
It was noted above that Popper wrote in The Open Society that historians,
in explaining, make most use of one particular assumption, in conjunction
with describing the "initial conditions" or situation of the event to be ex¬
plained: namely, "the trivial general law that sane people as a rule act
2
more or less rationally""* The logic of this kind of explanation can best
be explicated at the level of sociological theory, and it is for this reason
that some of Popper's remarks in The Poverty of Historicism provide a more
direct approach to the central points about situational logic than do his
commenta in The Open Society.
Situational logic derives from a particular case of a technique which
is more widely used in the social sciences, Popper says, than is commonly
recognised! namely, the use of models. Since he argues that historians
make tacit use of sociological theory, among other things, in their work,
this feature of the social sciences clearly redounds on history. The use
of models in the social sciences, Popper says, supports his contention that
1. See below, section VI 2. OS, II, 265
§ii
the methods of the sooial sciences do not differ in any fundamental respect
from those of the natural sciences, since the construction of
"certain models...in order to explain certain experiences -
a familiar theoretical method in the natural sciences -
...is part of the method of explanation by way of
reduction, or deduction from hypotheses" 1.
In fact, moat of the objects of the social soiences are just such theoretical
cons true tioxis.
"Even 'the war' or 'the army' are abstract concept;}, strange
as this may sound to some. What is concrete is the many
who are killed; or the men and women in uniform, etc." 2.
This result demolishes two connected historicist doctrines: methodological
essentialism, and the doctrine that history and the social sciences require
intuitive methods to apprehend their objects. Methodological essentialisra
is the mistaken belief that such theoretical models arc "concrete tilings"f
essences "either within or behind the changing observable events". J.
Popper has argued, in connection with hie presentation of historioism,
that methodological essentialisra "is closely related, to" the doctrine that
intuitive understanding is a distinctive method required in the social sci-
Hi,
ences: ' for the essences mistakenly thought to be implicated in the objects
of the social sciences can be apprehended only by intuition. Thus, by
iraking clear how extensively models or theoretical constructions are used
in the social sciences, Popper has refuted two characteristic doctrines of
anti-naturalistic historicism offered in support of the claim that the
social sciences require distinctive methods.
Per polemical purposes, I think, Popper presents the "zero method" of
constructing models as the only "difference" between the methods of the
natural and those of the social sciences which is not just a difference
"of degree"-5* This allegedly distinctive method consists in
1. PH, 135. 2. PH, 135
3. PH, 136. Popper says that the common difficulties in recognising such
theoretical constructions as models "explains" methodological esaentialisra:
that they are models "destroys" it.
4. PH, 31 • 5. HI, 141.
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"constructing a model on the assumption of complete rationality
(and perhaps also on the assumption of the possession of complete
information) on the part of all the individuals concerned, and of
estimating the deviation of the actual behaviour from the model
behaviour, using- the latter as a kind of zero co-ordinate.
Clearly if the method of constructing models in the social sciences is
itself hypothetioo-deductive and, as Popper has said, "a familiar theore-
J* 2
tioal method in the natural sciences,^'* then the construction of models on
a particular assumption cannot involve a method which is different in kindt
it can only be a special technique, & particular application of the method
which Popper claims is common to the natural and the social sciences, the
hypothetioo-deduotive method.'* l'he reason for Popper's choice of phrase in
presenting "the method of logical or rational construction" as "perhaps the
most important difference" between the methods of the natural and the social
sciences is, I think, the following. One argument often brought In support
of the claim that hi3tory and the social sciences require m thods different
in kind from those of the natural sciences is that their subject matter is
considered to be far more complicated than that of the natural sciences
because the former study human beings:
"in sociology we are faced with...a complexity due to the fact
that social life is a natural phenomenon that presupposes the
mental life of individuals..."
It has been seen, above, that this argument is one that Popper ascribes to
anti-naturalistic historicisni - although his argument against large-scale
social planning based on social predictions relies on indistinguishable
G
considerations - and that the argument from complexity has been used to
back the claim that the logic of historical explanation must be different in
kind from that of scientific explanation. Popper argues that the zero
method of constructing models is particularly useful in the social sciences
just foeoause there is an important respect in which
"social science is less complicated than physics, tanrQ...
concrete sooial situations are in general less complicated
than concrete physical situations. For in most social
1. PH, 141.
4. FH, 12.
2. PH, 135? of. above pirf
5. Cf. above P1^
-IC^I
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situations, if not in ail, there is an element of rationality.
Admittedly, human beings hardly over act quite rationally
(i.e. as they would if they could make the optimal use of all
available information for the attainment of whatever ends they
may have), but they act, none the less, more or less rationally?
and this makes it possible to construct comparatively simple
models of their actioii3 and inter-actions, and to use these
models as approximations." 1.
Thus Popper argues that the comparative complexities of the natural and the
social sciences are the reverse of what has been claimed in the arguments
for distinctive methods in the latter. The "zero method" of constructing
models relies on the relatively less complex character of social life; it
indicates a methodological difference between the natural and the social
sciences only in the sense that it is a "comparatively simple" case of the
methods which they have in common. It is, I think, indicative of the
concerns with which Popper develops situational logic that he uses this
conception to argue against various claims that investigation of the subject
matter of the social sciences requires special techniques of understanding
as part of the methods of these disciplines. The claim that social pheno¬
mena have essences which can only he grasped by intuition is easily dis¬
missed, as has been seen. The claim that empathio understanding is nec¬
essary to explain rjen'3 motives and aims is more serious, and it is to this
contention that Popper returns in his later discussions of situational logic.
Although Popper argues that many characteristic historiciet doctrines
are based on misunderstandings, he allows that nonetheless "there are some
sound elements in historicisra" which are largely due to the historicist*s
dissatisfaction with the established view of history
2.
"merely as the story of great tyrants and great generals".
1. PH, 140-1
2. PH, p.l4B-9; cf. chapter 2^, OS, e.g. OS, II, 270, where Popper casti¬
gates the equation of history with "the history of power politics" on the
grounds that the latter
"is nothing but the history of international crime and mass murder".
lVi
Thus, "historicism answers a real need.","* for what, has been taken to
be "the history of power politics"'1'"is, Popper argues in the last chapter of
The Open Society, a history of infamy. Popper objects to this view of history
on moral grounds; the historicist considers concentration on the heroes in
history to be narrow and superficial, and argues for a reform of history by
"a sociology which plays the role of a theoretical history, or a
theory of historical development... [an<3 the historicist ideaqf
'periods'; of the 'spirit' or 'style' of an age; of irres^rte
historical tendencies; of movements which captivate the minds of
individuals and which surge on like a flood, driving, rather than
being drivezi by, individual men." 3*
But these suggested reforms do not, Popper argues, attack the moral problem
of the history of political power - they disguise and preserve this view of
history which Popper wants to expose and destroy."'
Popper offers his proposal of situational logic as part of a sensible
answer to the historicist's "demand for a reform of history" Popper's
arguments here are for the most part obscure, but the points which follow
are ones on whicn, I think, Popper would insist. If situational logic is
applied, history is seen to be more than a bare account of the actions of
individual men such as political leaders - "the story of great tyrants and
great generals" to which historicists "rightly object" - for men such as
these acted in situations, which were shaped by the "decisions and actions
of countless unknown individuals" Thus the heroes of history did not
influence events as much as has been mistakenly thought; their actions can
be explained, rather, in terms of the "logic of the situation". Popper
would insist, however, that no political leader who did bad things could be
absolved or justified on the grounds that he was a victim of his situation,
for situational logic is not, in Popper's view, deterministic.
Popper's presentation of situational logic in The Poverty of Historicism
is rather allusive. The "zero method" of constructing models seems to be
presupposed, in accordance with Popper's theory of historical explanation as
1. PK, p. 148. 2. OS, II, 270. 3. FH, p.147-8.
4. Cf» OS, II, 269-80, 30c. iv, in chapter 25, "Has History Any Meaning?";
cf. also section VIII, chapter four below.
5. PH, p. 147. 6. PH, p.148.
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prescribed in The Poverty of illstoricism and The Open Society, and attention
is concentrated on what Popper calls "the logic of events", for "the detailed
determination of...action by...the logic of the situation".* As an example
of the "use, more or less unconsciously, of this conception" by "the best
historians" Popper instances Tolstoy
"when he describes how it was not decision but 'necessity' which made
the Russian army yield Moscow without a fight and withdraw to places
where it could find food." 2.
3.
There are noti laws of plans operative in "the logic of events" and Popper
would undoubtedly hold that such an explanation is not deterministic. The
"logic of events" results from "the decisions and actions of countless
individuals" which cannot themselves be determined because of the "uncertainty
of the human factor",and consequently there can be no overall determinism.
There are no supra-individual forces at work, for insofar as institutions and
other allegedly collective entities influence or shape events, they are to be
recognised as "theoretical constructions" and analysed "in terms of indivi-
5»duals... Thus, according to Popper, the use of situational logic demolishes
yet another hiatoricist doctrine, that of historical determinism. Popper's
argument to this effect is obscure, and I have filled it in with his charac¬
teristic doctrines, but the point, that situational logic is not deterministic,
is one on which he would, I think, insist.
The other major items in Popper's counter-proposal are that historical
interpretations be recognised as no more than antestable points of view and
g
not, as is one of the "cardinal errors" of historioism, * as theories which
are testable and for that reason objective. Popper also recommends "some-
7
thing like an analysis of social movements" in terras of models* that is,
"oar individualistic and institutionaliatio models of such collective
entities as nations, or governments, or markets...by models of
political situations as well as of social movements such as scientific
and industrial progress." 0.
1. OS, II, 97 2. PH, 149.
3. PH, 148: cf. Popper's argument, OS, II, 85 that "no kind of determinism"
is "a necessary assumption of scientific method".
4. PH, 14d» PH, 69 and PH, 158. 5. PH, 135-6 6. PH, 151
7. Popper is indefinite as to whether such an analysis is "a part of"
situational logio or "beyond" it (PH, 149)
8. PH, 149.
uc,
Popper says further that
"...these models may then he used "by hiotori&ns, partly like the
other models, and partly for the purpose of explanation, along
with the other universal laws they use." 1.
That is, a historian "uses" such "'models' provided by sociological ana-
2.
lysis" "usually unconsciously" "as implicit in his terminology" * although
the example of Tolstoy shows that a historian may evoke the numerous and
anonymous individuals who constituted such a theoretical construction as
the Russian army in the war of 1012 - or he takes such models for granted
in explaining specific events.
The first part of Popper's proposal appears to resemble the fashionable
and faailiai* suggestion that historians should make a greater Tise of the
social sciences, but it is difficult to see how Popper can reconcile such a
reform with his restriction of the historian's "line of interest" to specific
events; for if the historian can take no interest in generalizing, how can
he recognize that the sociological models which he takes for granted are
"theoretical constructions" and not, reprehensibly, mistake them for "concrete
things"? How is the historian to discriminate in his practice, between
his use of those models of political situations and social movements of which
Popper approves, and an avoidance of stioh hietoriciet notions as "the 'spirit*
or 'style' of an age",other than by rote? If Popper is to maintain his
earlier characterisation of the historian's "line of interest", then his
proposed reform in response to the historioist's dissatisfaction must, it
would seem, stop short of affecting the historian's practice, and then Popper
has not answered the historicist's demand for a reform of history.
1. PK, 149.
4. PH, 147.
2. PR, 145 5. PH. 155-6 L ^
5- Which has been criticized above, of. po.
1**
III. Situational Logic in The Open Society
In The Open Society. Popper indicates several sources for situational
logic:
"The analysis of situations, the situational logic, plays a very
important part in social life as well as in the social sciences.
It is, in i'acx, the method of economic analysis" 1.
The method of economic analysis to which Popper refers is what P.A. von
Hayek calls pure economic theory: "the logic of choice".^* Rut this
method is not limited to economics:
"As to an example outside economies, I refer to the 'logic of power'
which we may use in order to explain the moves of power politics
as well as the working of certain political institutions." 3.
P opper thinks that this method is applicable in all the social sciences.
It is significant that economic analysis is paradigmatic for situa¬
tional logic, for Popper says on several occasions that considers econo-
4*
mics to be the only social science free from historicism; and he uses situa¬
tions,! logic in several connections to refute doctrines that he attributes
to historicism. The social sciences are thus to be freed from their histo-
ricist yoke by a general application of the method of that social science,
economics, which does not auffer from historicism.
1. OS, II, 97» Cf. 03, I, 315, note 63 to chapter 10.
3. 08, II, 97. W.B. Gallic (Philonophy and the Historical Understand!rig,
p.119) comments on Popper's derivation of situational logic from "the
method of economic analysis" that
"Popper cites certain parts of economics as illustrations
of this methods but it aeotas to me that historians have
always employed something like it, although, of course, in
a rough and qualitative way."
It seems to me, both that Popper has acknowledged Gallie's point (cf.
the passage PH, 149 cited in this note), and that his theory of histo¬
rical explanation as expounded in The Poverty of Historioiam and The
Open 3ocjety, whatever its defects, allows Popper to combine the viev;
that situational logic dex-ives from the methods of economics with the
view that
"the best historians have often made use, more or less
unconsciously, of this conception." PH, 149«
4. E.g. PH, 2, P1I, 5b; cf. OS, II, 29.
If*
One illustration of the use of situational logf>; which Popper mentions
in The Open Society is from Marx, and this choice of example may seem para¬
doxical in the light of Popper's presentation of Marx as one of the chief
progenitors of historicism. Marx, in Popper's view, combines doctrines of
the "purest historicism"^"'with methodological ideas, such as that of un¬
intended consequences, which Popper shares. The point which Popper praises
2.
in Marx's use of "'the logic of the class situation'" "is a major theme in
his discussion of situational logic in The Open Society and in his two later
publications on this subject. The point which Popper praises in Marx's use
2.
of '"the logic of the class situation'" "is a major theme in his discussion
of situational logic in The Open Society and in his two later piiblications
on this subject. It is that situational logic is an objective method of
social analysis. Popper approves of Marx's use of
"class interest as an institutional or objective social situation"^
because
"wherever ^Marx^makes serious use of anything like class interest,
he always means a thing within the realm of autonomous sociology,
and not a psychological category. He means a thing, a situation,
and not a state of mind, a thought, or a feeling of being interested
in a thing. It is simply that thing or that social institution or
situation which is advantageous to a class ." 4«
The economic determinism ot "economic historicism"J*that Marx connects with
his use of class interest is, in Popper's opinion, one of the "exaggerations"'*
in Marx's use of situational logic. Popper must hold, to be consistent with
his libertarian views, that the technique of situational logic does not im¬
ply determinism. It is nonetheless interesting that the two examples he
1. Popper, OS, II, 84, speaks of the Marxist method as the "purest histo-
ricism"; if he means by this the method of Marxism, then this is not quite
the same as Marx's method; however on several occasions he characterizes
some of Marx's doctrines as historicist, e.g. OS, II, 135-6; PH, 8, he
describes Marx as "a famous historicist".
2. OS, II, 11?. 3. OS, II, 112. 4. OS, II, 111-112.
3. 03, II, 133 6. OS, II, 117.
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gives, in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society of users of situa¬
tional logic, Tolstoy and Marx, both subscribed to historical determinism;
and that they used what Popper recognizes as situational logic tc present
deterministic historical and social analyses.
The point which Popper praises in Marx's use of situational logic, that
class interest is "not a psychological category" but an "objective social
situation","1"*is one to which he had alluded in The Poverty of Historicisa,
where he wrote that
"In passing I should like to mention that neither the principle
of methodological individualism, not that of the zero method of
constructing rational models, implies in my opinion the adoption
of a psychological method . On the contrary, I believe that these
principles can be combined with the view that the social sciences
are comparatively independent of psychological assumptions, and
that psychology can be treated, not as the basis of all social
sciences, but as one social science among others". 2.
In chapter 14 of The Open Society, to which he refers in a footnote to the
passage cited above, Popper takes this argument much furthers not only is
it the case that situational logic is "independent of psychological assump¬
tions" as he maintained in The Poverty of Historicism, but also the explana-
toiy force of situational logic helps to demonstrate that "at least a very
important part" of sociology nust be 'autonomous" in the sense that
"it is impossible...to reduce a sociology to a psychological or
behaviouristic analysis of our actions." 3*
It has been noted above'^* that Popper characterizes psychologism as a
reductionist view,
5 ®
"that sociology must in principle be reducible to social psychology",
but he also associated this terra with explanations in psychological terms
which are not reductionist. In his most recent discussion of situational
1. 03, II, 112.
2. FH, 142; cf. PH, 158
"The 'zero method' of constructing rational models is not a psychological
but rather a logical method."
3. OS, II, 90. 4. Cf. pp.4t>t
5. 03, IT, 88, cf. OS, II, 89, 90 for similar characterizations.
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logic, Popper argues that sociology is autonomous in two senses, which he
seems to distinguish but which turn out to be related? first that socio¬
logy is "very extensively independent of psychology", and that the converse
does not hold true because psychology "presupposes social concepts";
secondly, Popper says that sociology is also autonomous in the sense that it
can make use of a method of "objective understanding", which is situational
logic."L" In connection with this second sense in which sociology is autono¬
mous, Popper argues that all apparently psychological elements in an explana¬
tion such as motives are to be "converted" into situational terms, which are
"objectively appropriate" to the agent's situation; and also that what
Popper describes as "psychologic&l-characterological hypotheses" cannot meet
obligatory standards of being "open to rational and empirical criticism and
2.
improvement".
In The Open Society there is a suggestion of a similar criticism in
Popper's dismissal of the "'psychological' part" of an explanation of human
actions as "very often trivial...as compared with" the situational component.
But Popper follows this passage with a warning that his "arguments against
psychologism should not be misunderstood" as a complete dismissal of psycho-^
logy, but rather, as directed against the reductionist programme of psycho-
logismi^* a programme which Popper thinks must issue in historioism, for
the explanation of "all regularities in social life" in terms of psycho¬
logical factors alone requires that origins be found for the features of
social life in
"human nature and...human psychology as they existed prior to our
society" 5 «
That psychologism "fails to understand the main task of the social sciences"
"of analysing the unintended social repercussions of intentional human
actions" is, in Popper's opinion, "the most important criticism of psycho-
6
logiam".* Popper uses the argument that a complete reduction of human
1. LSW, theses XXII and XXIII, pp. 245-6; thesis XXV, pp. 246-7- ~
2. LSW, thesis XXV; Popper's argument is discussed below, pp.
5. 03, II, 97 4. OS, II, 97. 5- OS, II, 92-95; cf. OS, II, 98.
6. 03, II, 94-95.
In¬
actions to psychological terms is impossible, in conjunction with two other
arguments against psychologisra in his discussion of situational logic.
"Continuing this argument against psychologism we may say that
our actions are to a very large extent explicable in terms of
the situation in which they occur. Of course, they are never
fully explicable in terms of the situation alone; an explana¬
tion of the way in which a nan, when crossing the street, dodges
the cars which move on it may go beyond the situation, and may
refer to his motives, to an 'instinct' of self-preservation, or
to his wish to avoid pain, etc. But this 'psychological' part
of the explanation is very often trivial, as compared with the
detailed determination of his action by what we may call the
logic of the situation; and besides, it is impossible to in¬
clude all psychological factors in the description of the
situation." 1.
The argument that the '"psychological' part" of the explanation is trivial
by comparison with the situational component has been considered above in
connection with Popper's treatment of trivial, and also in connection with
Popper's treatment of psychologism in connection with an attempt to minimize
or even eliminate the "'psychological' part" in explanation of human actions .
The importance of such a part in historical explanations of such actions as
Caesar's decision to cross the Rubicon will become clearer in considering an
2 ,
example of a historian' use of situational analysis. * The last argument
in this passage, that "no description of the situation" can "include all
psychological factors" clearly applies to the non-psychological factors of
the situation as well, and consequently gives no grounds for preferring the
latter to the former in an explanation.
Popper is, I think, correct in arguing that the reductionist programme
of psychologisa is untenable, but his further arguments for minimizing or
eliminating the "'psychological• part" of the explanation, in favour of
«
situational analysis, do not carry much weight. Nontheleas, it is this
/-
second point which will turn out to be the chief issue in Popper's later
discussion of situational logic in "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften
For situational logic to be a method of "objective understanding" requires,
according to Popper, that ostensibly psychological "springs of action" in
1. OS, II, 97. 2. OS, II, 265; cf. section VI below.
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an explanation be replaced by "situational springs of action", for these
latter are in principle testable whereas the former are not "open to
criticism", criticism being possible where testing is not, even in prin¬
ciple. Popper's reason for this stipulation is, as has been suggested
above and as will become clearer in the sequel, that he wants to leave no
openings for erapathic understanding.
One last point which Popper makes is to guard against what might seem
to be an opening for psychologism:
"The method of applying a situational logic to the social sciences
is not based on any psychological assumption concerning the ration¬
ality (or otherwise) of 'human nature'. On the contrary: when we
speak of 'rational behaviour' or of 'irrational behaviour' then we
mean behaviour which is, or which is not, in accordance with the
logic of that situation. In fact, the psychological analysis of
an action in terms of it3 (rational or irrational) motives pre¬
supposes - as has been pointed out by Max Weber - that we have
previously developed some standard of what is to be considered
as rational in the situation in question." 1.
What Popper says in the last phrase deserves some attention: what are the
criteria for determining "what is to be considered as rational" in a given
situation? The answer to this question is clearly relevant to the question
whether situational logic is objective, as Pepper claims in his most recent
discussion: if it is not always possible to reach inter-subjective agree¬
ment on what constitutes a rational action in some situations, as I shall
argue, then in some cases not everything about situational logic is object-
ive in the primary sense in which Popper vises the term. * Moreover, if
standards of rationality refer to the norms and institutional patterns of
a particular society or culture, then the hypothetico-deductive form of
explanation may not be the appropriate model for situational logic. I
shall argue for both these points in more detail in the next section.
1. OS, II, 97 2. Cf. above pp.^ 1
12}.
III. The Assumption of Rationality-
It is worth noting that Popper, in his later discussions of situational
logic^puts stress on features of situational logic other than the assumption
of rationality, on which explanations in terras of situational logic rely,
according to what Popper says in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open
Society. If Popper does refer, in his later writings, to the assumption
of rationality which was central to his discussions of situational logic
in The Poverty of Historiciaa and The Open Society, then he does so obliquely ,
as in saying that actions are explained, in terms of situational logic, when
they are shown to be objectively appropriate to the situation in which they
occurred; this notion is reminiscent of Popper's characterization of a
rational action in The Open Society just cited. However, Popper unpacks
the notion of an action which is "objectively appropriate" to the situation
in somewhat different terras from that of the action being rational.
Consequently it is appropriate to examine the assumption of rationality
at this point . That the assumption of rationality on which situational
logic proceeds, according to Popper's earlier writings, is not "trivial" as
Popper suggests, has been demonstrated by work in decision theory subsequent
to Popper's first publications on situational logic. J.W.N. Watkins argues
that the discovery
"that there may be decision problems whose solutions cannot be
calculated" 1.
reinforces Popper's critique of determinism; it provides a further argument,
2
less forceful than Popper's argument from the growth of knowledge, for
1. J.W.N. Watkins, "Decision and Belief," "Decision Making BBC Publications,
1967» P* *5* Hereafter cited as Watkins, "Decision".
2. In the preface to PH, v-vi.
\2i.
"the conclusion that the future history of mankind is essentially
unpredictable" 1.
2
Although what W&tkins describes as the "big hole" in decision theory, *the
insolubility of certain decision problems, can be argued to be in line with
one of Popper's fundamental doctrines with regard to the philosophy of
history, his libertarianism, non^heless, the light cast by decision theory
on
*
"the paradoxes which reside in the very notion of a rational decision"
shows that Popper's characterization of the general law presupposed by situa¬
tional logic as "trivial is untenable.
"Recent work in decision theory has shown that there is no simple
coherent set of principles capable of precise statement which
correspond to naive ideas of rationality. Just as research in
this century in the foundations of mathematics has shown that
we do not yet know exactly what mathematics is, so the work in
decision theory shows that we do not yet understand what we mean
by rationality. Even in highly restricted circumstances it turns
out to be extremely difficult to characterize in a nonparadoxical
fashion a rational choice among alternative courses of action." 4*
John Milnor, in "Games Against Nature",
"proposes nine criteria that any acceptable principle of decision
should satisfy. He goes on to show that none of the standard
decision principles projjosed satisfy all nine. More generally,
his results, like those of Russell's paradox for the foundations
of set theory, yield an impossibility theorem and show that the
naive theory of rationality, like the naive theory of sets,
cannot easily be systematically reconstructed." 5*
1. Watkins, "Decision", p.l6. Watkins argument is tha.t
"...the future history of mankind is essentially unpredictable...
^because} human decisions collectively shape historical events...
(and} it is sometimes impossible for a decision-maker to calculate
an optimum solution for his decision-problem...where this is the
case, it will normally be impossible for a would-be predictor to
predict the decision - there may be occasional exceptions to this,
but the exceptions cannot become the rule. Hence at least some
of the factors which will shape future events are unpredictable;
hence the future history of mankind is unpredictable..." p.l6.
2. Watkins, "Decision," p.l6.
3. Anatol Kapoport, "International Relations and Game Theory," Decision
Making, BBC Publications, , p.91» Hereafter cited as Rapoport,"Game Theory".
4. Patrick Suppes, "Decision Theory" Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), II, 510
5. P. Suppes, op.cit. II, 312; Minor's article can be found in two antho¬
logies: Decision Processes, ed. Robert M Thrall, Clyde H. Coombs and Robert
L. Davis (N.Y.1954), PP*59-59, and Game Theory and Related Approaches to
Social Behaviour, ed. Martin Shubik (N.Y., I964), pp. 120-131*
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The arguments by which thi3 result is reached are highly technical.
However, an example given by Anatol Rapoport brings out 3ome of the diffi¬
culties which have been uncovered in the notion of a rational decision, and
which bear on the kinds of problems which may arise in this line for histo¬
rical explanation?
"The paradoxes which reside in the very notion of a 'rational decision'
...are not apparent in situations where there is only one decision¬
maker, for in those instances a rational decision in the sense of
maxiraizing one's utility (or expected utility) is at least conceiv¬
able, given sufficient knowledge about the facts of the case.
Likewise, in situations where there are exactly two decision-makers,
whose interests are diametrically opposed, a rational decision can
still be defined as that which extracts the most benefit at the
expense of the opponent. However, once these situations are trans¬
cended, for example, in cases where the interests of the decision¬
makers a,re partly opposed and partly coincident, and also in situa¬
tions where more than two decision-makers are involved, the very
concent of rational decision becomes riddled with contradictions." 1.
Either or both of these features may occur in historical situations; and the
difficulties which they raise for the assumption of rationality which situa¬
tional logic seems to presuppose cannot, I think, be swept under the carpet
of the "uncertainty of the human factor" or the ubiquity of "unintended
consequences" in social life: because they impinge upon the soundness of
explaining actions in terms of models constructed on the assumption of
rationality on the part of the actors.
"A simple situation of the first kind is seen in the Balance of
Terrors between two nuclear powers. Suppose it is in the interest
of both powers to dismantle their nuclear establishments. A decision
to do so cannot be rationalized on the grounds of self-interest. For
should the opponent disarm, it is more advantageous to remain armed
(because of the intimidating power of nuclear monopoly). Should
the opponent remain armed, one must remain armed in order to avoid
being intimidated. Thus it is in the interest of each power to
remain armed regardless of the state of the other. This conclusion
contradicts our original assumption that it is to the advantage of
both powers to disarm. The contradiction arises from the circum¬
stance that the interests of the two 'players' are in this case only
partially, not diametrically, opposed." 2.
This example can be transposed into s problem for historical explanation.
1. Rapoport, "Game Theory," p.91- 2. Rapoport, "Game Theory," pp.91-92.
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Suppose that the second power had chosen not to disarm. This course of
action is not rational^hypothesis; it goes to make up the situation in
which the first power acted. As for the state of information of the first
power, which is also part of its situation in Poprer's views suppose that
the first power did not, at the time of- action, have knowledge of the second
power's decision, but that it did have professed experts at predicting what
the second power would do. Different experts might of course disagree in
their predictions of what the second power would do, leaving the government
of the first power without a single authoritative prediction. These points
then describe the salient features of the situation in which the first power
acted. If it chose to disarm, as historicans with hindsight we can say that
this action was not rational, as the second power remained armed and the first
power had thus put itself at a disadvantage; and the historia,n can point to
those experts who argued that the second power would remain amed. This
example assumes that the decision of the first power to disarm was in some
sense irrevocable; if the second power were to implement its decision to
remain armed in secrecy, or by refusing inspections, so that the first power
was left somewhat in the dark concerning the armaments of the second power,
then a decision to disarm on the part of the first power would be irrevocable.
If the government of the first power had chosen to act on the advice of those
experts who predicted that the second power would not disarm, and the first
power had not disarmed, then, by hypothesis, its action was not rational.
Whatever action the first power had chosen to take in the situation as de¬
scribed, it could not be described as rational. The "big hole" or, perhaps
the swamp, in decision theory then tells against Popper's early character¬
ization of situational logic in terms of a "trivial" assumption of rational¬
ity.
As for Popper's second characterization of rational behaviour as in
accordance with the logic of the situation in which it occurs, it can I
think be argued that there are examples of behaviour which satisfy this
criterion but whose explanation does not involve general laws. In the
example which I shall consider, of the potlatch ceremony among the Kwakiutl
Indians on the Northwest coast of America,"''* it is difficult to see how the
1. Ruth .Benedict, Patterns of Culture (London, 1935)
1^
behaviour described, which conforms to the logic of the social situation,
X •
is rational 'in anything like the usual sense of the term.
The Kwakiutl Indians live in an area of considerable natural resources
and have far more material possessions than do many other "primitive"
peoples. The status of a man in the Kwakiutl culture depends on how he
gives away or destroys his possessions. No man can receive a gift without
returning to its donor twice what he was given; should he fail to do so,
he would lose face. Thus a chief could shame a rival by giving him more
than he could return with the appropriate interest . A chief could also
try to shame a rival, hot by giving him anything but by destroying more
possessions than the rival could afford to, in the ceremony called the
2 •
potlatch# * Prime commodities for destruction in a potlatch were candle-
*
fish oil or copper, the latter being extremely valuable.^* Once a chief
had given a potlatch, his rival had to seek to outdo him. There were,
however, cultural checks on this practice in that a chief could not overdo
his destruction of property "to the utter impoverishment" of his people.^*
To put on a potlatch, then, can be said to be in accordance with the
logic of the social situation under certain circumstances. Yet it is
difficult to see how it could be described as rational behaviour. This
point is connected with the form which the explanation of such behaviour
takes. Behaviour can be said to be rational if it would be done by any
sane person in the relevant circumstances, and this is not quite equivalent
to explaining behaviour as what would be done by any person who accepts the
norms of a society in which the relevant circumstances occur."
1. Benedict, op. cit., p.159
2. Benedict, op. cit., p. 159-140.
5. Benedict, op. cit. pp. 140-1.
5. Peter Winch has argued ("Understanding a Primitive Society," American
Philosophical Quarterly, v.I, pp. 507-524, 19&4) that there can be no
neutral assessment of such practices as witchcraft as rational or irrational.
Such practices as witchcraft or a potlatch must be understood as part of a
way of life.
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To be sure, an analogy might be drawn between the potiatch ceremony
and what Thorstein Veblen described as conspicuous consumption in American
society1'but if it is assumed that a general law could be found from which
these two patterns of social behaviour could be derived then it would, I
think, have to be a psychological generalization about human natures about
human preferences for conspicuous display of their worldly goods rather than
consumption for use, if their basic needs are satisfied. Popper, as has
been seen, does not think much of the explanatory force of such psycho¬
logical generalizations in comparison,
"with the detailed determination of...action by...the logic of
the situation..." 2.
In his later writings Popper is even more severe on the use of psychology
in explaining action. Thus it seems that Popper might not be happy that
this use of situational logic presupposes a psychological generalization, if
it is assumed that it can be filled out in accordance with the hypothetico-
deductive model. Nor does the suggested psychological generalization
approximate the allegedly "trivial general law" that "sane" men "act more or
less rationally." A.
Moreover, I think that the attempt to derive both the American pattern
of conspicuous consumption described by Veblen and the potiatch ceremony of
the Kwakiutl Indians from such a general law must be nugatory. The two
patterns of behaviour are connected by an analogy resting on our experience
of human nature, and not by a common derivation from a general law. Nor
does the assumption that there is such a general law rather than an analogy
add anything to the proposed explanation of the potlatoh ceremony in terms
of the pattern of culture of the Kwakiutl Indians.
1. Benedict suggests such an analogy, p.136s
"The manipulation of wealth on the North-West Coast is clearly enough
in many ways a parody on our own economic arrangements."
2. OS, II, 97.
3. Of. section V below on situational logic in "Pie Logik der Sozialwissen-
schaften". P.3. Chsttopadhyaya, in a thesis written under Popper's direction
(individuals and Societies; a methodological inquiry Allied Publishers, Bombay,
1967) has said (p.55) that Popner, in defending individualism "did not accord
dua recognition to psychology in the study of society."
4. os, 11, 263.
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If we consider one of Popper's later characterizations of situational
logic, the criterion he gives for the objectivity of a situational analysis
can be satisfied in the case at hand without calling on unrestricted general¬
izations or Popoer's "trivial general law" about rationality in particular.
Popper states this criterion in "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften" in the
following ways "to be sure I have other aims and other theories" than the
agent whose action I am trying to explain but my analysis provides "object¬
ive understanding" of hia action if
"had I been in his situation, analyzed thus and so - wherein the
situation includes aims and state of knowledge - then I would
have, and so would you have also, acted in such a way." 1.
In the interview on historical explanation Popper makes the same point?
"suppose that I do in fact feel that I understand what Caesar did,
and why he did it...I must now formulate my theory, test it, and
then say to someone else, 'You try to become Caesar. Do you
think that you could become a different Caesar?' And I must
try to find whether his Caesar is not as good as, or better than,
nine." 2.
That is, Popper holds that a situational analysis is objective if inter-
subjective agreements oan be reached on the acceptability of the explanation.
In a situational explanation of the potlatch ceremony of the Kwakiutl
Indians, what is involved is a recognition of the relevant social norms.
Popper's criterioxi can be applied: if I were in a social situation where
these norms applied, and if you were also, then you would act as these norms
prescribe on the pain of shame. But in this instance, as in nany others to
1. LSW, p. 247. 2. HE, p.22.
J. Chattopadhyaya, op.oit. p. 104-107, aays in effect that situational logic
explains actions in terms of social norma, in arguing that 'situational
logic is not logic by courtesy".
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act in accordance with social norms may not be rational behaviour.1"'
Thus the use of situational logic in historical explanations may
not involve either universally valid generalizations or contructing models
on the assumption of the rationality of the actors, em assumption which has
been seen to be deeply problematical, and not "trivial".
I?. Situational Logic in the Interview on Historical
"Explanation; Popper and Collingwood.
Popper, in the interview on historical explanation, characterizes
situational logio as objective in the sense that "everything about it is,
in principle objectively testable":
"As a rule, the historian tries to reconstruct the situation in
such a way, that the aims or plans of action of the various people
involved form part of the situation as well as their knowledge, and
especially the difficulties or problems with which they '-vera con¬
fronted. He tries to present this situation in such a way that
the historical explicandun - the event which the historian wishes
to explain - follows from the description of the situation if wo
assume that everybody involved acted in accordance with those plans,
nil rn >■» ■ »i— ... mmm-m . win £'.*** ».i »■.'« 'V»n .—'n. i n.«m —I—— ■ i ' I I II * M. I II < i .. . i . i ... w. ill iiiin. n — » I i . I 111 ■ M ■■ J..' ■ n «—* '
or intentions, or interests, and with that knowledge which formed
part of the situation."
"I have called a historical explanation which proceeds in this
way one which uses the method of 'situational logic'". 2.
1. Cf. Benedict, 0£. cit., p. 160
"The segment of human behaviour which the ^Kwakiutl have} marked out to
institutionalize in its culture is one which is sufficiently close to
the attitudes of our own culture to be intelligible and we have a
definite vocabulary with which to discuss it. The megalomaniac
paranoid trend i3 a definite danger in our society. It faces us with
a choice of possible attitudes. One is to brand it as abnormal and
reprehensible, and it is the attitude we have chosen in our civiliza¬
tion. The other extreme is to make it the essential attribute of
ideal man, and this is the solution in the culture of the North-West
Coast."
2. HE, p. 21.
Popper maintains that if the historian adopts this procedure, then
"we can in principle teat whether this was, or waa not, the
situation in which the various people found themselves." 1.
For Popper to hold that statements about historical situations are "in
principle, objectively testable" is incompatible with his earlier argument,
fJ"e hpen Society, that historical interpretations are generally untestable
due to the limitations of historical evidence.^*
Popper says that "the objective reconstruction of the situation" can
he tested because
"if we find new evidence, then it should be possible for cur
reconstruction to be refuted." 3«
It was on the grounds that new evidence was rarely forthcoming^* that Popper
argued, in The Open Society, that most historical interpretations must be
t\'d-
oircular. I have argued, in chapter below, that historical interpre¬
tations of limited evidence need not be circular because they can be criti¬
cised, if not tested, without further evidence.
Reconstructions of situations are in principle testable because they
consist of hypotheses from which statements may be deduced which can be
tested by comparison with the available evidences
"Very important in history are those reconstructions from which
we deduce the existence of new evidence, on the grounds, say,
that no man would have acted in such a way without also, say,
writing such and such a letter." 5•
1. HE, p. 21. £
2. Cf. OR, chapter 25, discussed in chapter feonr below
3. HE, p.22.
4. Cf. 03, II, 265s
"...the so-called •sources' of history only record such facts as
appeared sufficiently interesting to record, so that the sources
will, as a rule, contain only facts that fit in with a pre¬
conceived theory. And since no further facts are available, it
will not, as a rule, be possible to test that or any other
subsequent theory." (underlining mine).
5. HE, p.21, It is interesting to note in view of Popper's arguments
against psychology and the use of psychology in explanations (discussed
PP. that this particular deduction seems to rely on a
psychological generalization.
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Of course such an argument may hang in the air because the appropriate
evidence may just not be there. For this reason Popper might be better
to say that there is always the possibility of testing the reconstruction
of a situation by discovering new evidence? but this is not the same thing
as saying that such reconstructions are testable in principle. Such re¬
constructions can also be criticised in terms of the use made of the avail¬
able evidence, if no further evidence is forthcoming; such criticism
involves general knowledge of human nature applied to the problem of what
actions would be appropriate in a given situation. It is by this kind of
argument that a historian's reconstruction of a situation is criticized,
and appraised for its objectivity in the sense of inter-subjective accepta¬
bility - the possibility of discovering new evidence as a way of testing
historical work takes second place to these procedures which are more
commonly used by historians than Popper recognizes.^*
Popper's defence of situational logic as objective, in this interview,
indicates that Popper now thinks that the historian's work is more like that
of the scientist than he thought when he first wrote The Open Society and
The Poverty of I-Ii3toricisra.
"By proposing solutions and counter-solutions, and critically
discussing them, both historian and scientist test explanations,
in order to find out which are the beet explanations. It is the
competition between the various possible explanations which pro¬
duces the best results - in complete analogy with science." 2.
Popper, in his earlier discussions of historical explanation, did not say
that historians had ways of testing proposed explanations; and it was
argued above that Popper's understanding of the idiographio character of
historiography debarred the historien from investigating one aspect of the
5 ♦
soundness of historical explanations.
Popper now seems to think that historians do not commonly recognize
the similarity between their work and that of scientists; for Popper argues
1. Of .^cj^arrc^ j-easr below. 2. HE, p. 22.
3. fn * contmiRert with the liability to thoroughgoing testing which for Popper
constitutes the objectivity of scientific theories.
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that if the procedures of situational logic are adopted, an important
distinction is possible which is often neglected by historians:
"historians often make the attempt to understand the situation
intuitively. They fail to distinguish between this intuitive
attempt and the fact that they have on the basis of this intuitive
attempt, to put forward a theory - an objective analysis which
could be tested." 1.
Col ling-wood'3 mistake, his "subjectivism"^'according to Popper,
reflects this common confusion on the part of historians.
"According to Collingwood, I must become Caesar, and if 1" really
put n^'self in Caesar's skin then I'll know for certain what
Caesar did and why, and I'll understand his situation. I think
this ie a very dangerous teaching because it is subjective and
dogmatic." J.
.Colling-wood thought that what I consider to be the first or
second preparatox?/ step was the last step. Suppose I do in
fact feel that I understand what Caesar did, and why he did it.
Collingwood believed that this would make my theory true. But
he is wrong in this belief. I must now formulate my theory,
test it, and then say to someono else, 'You try to become Caesar.
Do you think that you could become a different Caesar?' And I
must try to find whether his Caesar is not as good as, or better
than mine. This doesn't imply relativism, of course, it means
that the competing theories must he weighed against each other.
It is not enough to try to understand Caesar intuitively. That
is only the beginning. Only after that do we really start." 4«
Popper represents Collingwood in the light of what Alan Donagan has
called the "received interpretation";
"that Collingwood held that historians 'grasp past thoughts',
'ascertain historical data', or 'verify historical theses' by
a non-inferential intuitive penetration through the evidence to
the thought 'inside' the actions that produced it." 5»
In arguing that this interpretation misrepresents Collingwood, Donagan has
pointed out that Collingwood, in spite of "ambiguous evidence" and "asides"
in his posthumously published Idea of History, held
"a thoroughly inferential and non-intuitive theory of historical
verification. 6.
1. HE, p. 22. 2. HE, p, 21. % HE, p. 21. 4. HE, p. 22.
5. Alan Donagan, "The Verification of Historical Theses," Philosophical
Quartcrly VI (1956), p.193 and p.195.
6. Donagan, op. cit., p.196; Donagan discusses the "ambiguous evidence and
"asides" mentioned above, p. 201 ff.
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"Few commentstors have recognised either that Collingwood ack¬
nowledged that imaginative reconstruction of past thoughts are
corrigible and, in a sense, hypothetical5 or that he rejected
the view that an historian who succeeds in re-thinking a past
thought aust intuitively know that he has done so." 1»
Donagan thinks tnat Ooliingv/ood *s essays on "The Historical Imagination"
and on "Historical evidence" present the heart of this inferential theory
of historical verifications
"History has this in common with every other science: that the
historian is not allowed to claim any single piece of knowledge,
except where he can justify his claim by exhibiting it to himself
in the first place, and secondly to any one else who is both able
and willing to follow his demonstration, the grounds upon which it
is based. This is what is meant, above, by describing history as
inferential. The knowledge in virtue of which a man is a historian
is a knowledge of what evidence at his disposal proves about certain
event:;." 2.
3.
If this openness to criticism is an indispensable component of historical
thinking, in Collingwood's view - and I think Donagan is correct to argue
that it is - then there seems to be little or no difference between Popper
and Collingwood on this points that the account which the historian con¬
structs of past events must be open to criticism.
There is a point of importance which Popper's dismissal of Collingwood
as mistakenly "subjective and dogmatic" misrepresents: this point can be
brought out by considering an example which Popper also uses, of Julius
Caesar, which will be considered in more detail below. Donagan argues
that Collingwood's view was
"that to re-think the thoughts which led Caesar to cross the
Rubicon would imply reconstructing Caesar's situation, not
that to reconstruct that situation would be a means of re¬
thinking those thoughts. He repudiated the idea that actions
or their situations can be reconstructed without considering
1. Donagan, op. cit., p. 200
2. E.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, 194-6) P» 292; hereafter
cited as Collingwood, IH; this passage is cited and discussed by Donagan,
op. cit., p.195-6.
3. In the passage following the above citation (Collingwood, IH, p.252)
Collingwood contrasts the attitude described above, which he attributes
to a critic, with that of a sceptic, who is unwilling to follow such
a demonstration.
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their inner sides Caesar's situation cannot be ascertained
independently of what he and others thought about it." 1.
Although defenders of Popper sometimes suggest that the sound part of
Col ling-wood's ideas is covered by Popper's theory of situational logic,
it can be argued that, to the contrary, Collingwood clarified a point
which is obscurely presented in one characterization Popper has given of
situational logic.
"It is most important to see that all the people in a situation,
are acting in a problem-situations historical situations are
problem-situations. Thus we must distinguish between the
historian's problem which is to explain certain historical
events and the problems of the people who are the actors on
the historical stage. Understanding their problems is really
understanding the historical situation. A man is a good
historian to the extent to which he shows why these were the
problems of the people who acted." 2.
As an example of how the historian handles his proble , Popper instances
"the history of science" as
"a particularly good field for studying historical explanations.
Because here the actor - the scientist - was confronted with
particular scientific questions, we know very clearly what his
problems were. To describe his situation one describes the
scientific theories of the time - and why they did not satisfy
this particular scientist* Here we have a very simple example
of situational analysis, or situation, logic." 5«
Popper'3 characterization of the historian's subject matter is almost
indistinguishable from one given by Collingwood. Collingwood gives two
descriptions of the reflective acts which he considers to be the subject
1. The pptssage cited is from Donagan, op. cit.p.206? the argument is
pp.205-206. A relevant passage which Donagan argues (p.205-6)
"illustrates" Collingwood's view of "what historians try to achieve, not
how they achieve it" is
"So the historian of politics or warfare, presented with an
account of certain actions done by Julius Caesar, tries to
understand these actions, that is, to discover what thoughts
in Caesar's mind determined him to do them. This implies
envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood,
and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the
situation and the possible ways of dealing with it."
Collingvrood, IH, p.215.
2. HL, p. 22. J. HE, p. 2P.
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matter of history; these two descriptions bring out, respectively the
practical and the contemplative forms which reflective acts may take.
First, Collingwood saya that the historian studies purposive acts such
as a politician's implementation, and perhaps modification, of hi3 policy,
or the intentions of a military commander as revealed by the record of his
acts;'1" secondly, with respect to intellectual activity, Collingwood says
that the historian must identify the thinker's problem and reconstruct its
2.
solution. Collingwood's characteristic example of reflective acts as
problem-solving are from philosophy, eg. Plato; and Popper's example of a
problem-situation is, characteristically, from science. cine important
point which Collingwood makes in this connection in his observation that,
in practice, the most difficult part of historical work is to identify the
thinker's problem, but that to do so is prerequisite to the historian's
being able to "judge the success" of his reconstruction of its solution:
to reconstruct a "problem-situation" from the available evidence can be a
considerable task, even in the "simple" case of scientific work.''*
Comparing the passages cited above, there seems to be little difference
between Popper and Collingwood's respective views of the historian's task.
Popper's characterization of situational logic as investigating the problem-
situations of historical agents fits in with some of his other remarks on
situational logic: the description of the situation, as Popper notes in
both this interview and in "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften,"'"includes
the information which the historical agents had at their disposal. If the
information is taken to constitute a problem, then the agent's finding a
testable solution to this problem can be understood as objectively appro¬
priate to his situation: it is something like this that Popper means by
1. Collingwood, IH, p.309-510. 2. Collingwood, IH, p. 312-314.
3. Popper, judging from his presentation of this point, does not recognize
the difficulty of this enterprise; Popper consistently underestimates the
intellectual difficulties of historical work. (Cf . chapter belww)
4» Also parenthetically in his discussion of the "zero method" in PH,
above f
I
saying that scientific theories are objective. If a philosopher suggests
an approach to a problem which is open to criticism, then such a suggestion
%
would meet Popper's standards for philosophic discourse, '* and it would also
be in what is perhaps a looser sense, objectively appropriate to the philo¬
sopher's situation.
But if these kinds of examples are what Popper understands by situational
logic, then there seems to be no difference between his and Collingwood's
view of the historian's activity, and Popper's criticisms of Collingwood's
"teaching" as "subjective" and "dogmatic" is wrong; for ferreting out the
problem of a historical agent and the way in which he solved it can meet
Popper's standards for explaining actions as objectively appropriate to the
given situation. Moreover, Popper's description of Collingwood's views as
dealing only with "the first or second preparatory step" is, I think, mis¬
leading. For the historian to present an agent's problem and solution to
that problem, he mist reconstruct that problems the historian must, for
example, follow the reasoning employed in a scientific theory in order to
see whether it provides a testable solution to the problem at hand. If he
is successful in doing this, he can give an account of the historical situa¬
tion which is objective in a sense acceptable to Popper. If historical
situations are problem-situations, then Popper is also misleading on a re¬
lated point: in saying that historians often do no more than "make an attempt
to understand the situation intuitively" for if the historian can identify
the situation as a problem situation, he has gone beyond merely understanding
the situation "intuitively".
The agreement between Popper and Collingwood, that historian's proceed
"w*
by identifying problems and reconstructing their solutions on the basis of
historical evidence covers only one kind, of historical explanation. A histo¬
rian may also wish to explain, a3 Popper says,
"why these were the problems of the people who acted";
he may wish to explain why the "common problem situation" of a period was
just thar. Collingwood's theory of historical explanation docs not seem to
allow for this kind of explanation, which might refer to social factors or
1. Cf. the discussion of objectivity, as Popper understands it, above, pp.
social structures, rather than to "reflective acts" which can only he the
acts of individuals. Popper's emphasis on situations which are social, as
well as on problems, would seem, if it is considered apart from Popper's
other methodological stipulations, to allow for this kind of inquiry: for
one my investigate why a particular problem situation was characteristic
of a period - "why these were the problems of the people who acted" - as well
as the attempts made to solve or to handle the characteristic problems.
But the doctrine of methodological individualism, in the rigorous form in
which Popper defends it, requires that references to social collectives or
social structures in describing a situation, be understood as referring to
theoretical constructions which designate the actions of countless individuals
and the unintended consequences of these actions. Whether this stipulation
is a necessary or a fruitful addition to the analysis of social situations
will be considered below, in chapterHere it can be said in brief
that Popper's situational logic, on its own, provides openings for kinds of
historical explanations other than the re-working of problems of individuals
discussed above, but that Popper's doctrine of methodological individualism
may hinder such approaches.
xt Situational Logic in "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften"
Some of the ideas and arguments about situational logic which Popper
presents in his lecture, "Die Logik der Soziaiwidsenschaften" have already
been mentioned in discussing Popper's earlier statements on situational
logic: such as his argument against paychologism as reduction!sin on the
grounds that psychology "presupposes social concepts" and more specifically
that the psychology of learning and psychoanalysis require such "obviously
social categories" as "(a) imitation (b) speech (c) family" whereas a central
concept in sociology, that of unintended consequences, is "psychologically
inexplicable""*"", and also his puzzling doctrine that situational logic as
1. ISW, Theses XXII and XXIII# p. 245-6.
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a method of "objective understanding" requires that "psychological springs
of actions" be eliminated from explanations "on principle" and replaced
"with situational elements".^"*
In this lecture Popper reaffirms his view that there is no fundamental
difference between the methods of the natural and the social sciences. The
structure of this talk is characteristic of Popper's thought. He begins
with general epistemological theses which he subsequently applies to the
social sciences. A theory of knowledge must do justice to the different
important aspects of our knowledge! our knowledge of the world is amazing,
2 •
and "our ignorance is limitless and sobering.""* "Science or knowledge"
3.
starts not from "observation or collection of data but from problems."
Popper's "chief thesis" concerns the method of the social sciences,
which is that of the natural sciences; "a critical continuation of the method
of trial and error" by "thoroughly testing attempts to solve their problems".
It is prerequisite to such testing that the attempted solutions be "access¬
ible to factual criticism", that is to falsification. Those attempted
solutions which "withstand criticism" are accepted "provisionally". It is
the "objectivity of the critical method" which constitutes the "so-called
objectivity of science*"
"the logical auxiliaries of criticism - the category of logical
contradiction - are objective." 4*
a
Deductive logic is "a theory of rational criticism" because it makes
possible attempts
"to show that unacceptable consequences can be deduced from the
assertion which is to be criticized". 6.
One of the reasons why we work with theories in the sciences is that they
are deductive systems and thus
1.LSW, Thesis XXV, p.24b-7. I have translated Moraente, as in psychologische
Moraente or Situationsmoinente (cf. thesis XXV cited in full below pp.3%|t<'
as "springs of action"; this seems to me to be the closest Kngiish equi¬
valent I can think of for what Popper covers by his usage of Momente.
2. LSW, Summary of theses I-III, p. 233« 3» LSW, Thesis IV, p. 234.
4. All the citations in this paragraph are from thesis VI, LSW, p.235.
5. To which Popper devotes theses XV-XVIII, LSW.
6. LSW, Thesis XVIII, p.243.
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"open to rational criticism through their consequences." 1.
Popper devotes the remainder of his lecture to
"further theses on the theory of knowledge peculiar tc the social
sciences," 2.
theses which are in part familiar as themes discussed in his earlier wait¬
ings: e.g. that the redxxctionist doctrine of psychologism is untenable for
the reasons mentioned above.
In connection with these theses Popper argues that sociology is auto¬
nomous in two senses which turn out, I think, to be closely related. The
first sense in which sociology is autonomous is a reversal of the claims of
psychologies as reductionism: "to explain society entirely psychologically"
is impossible, because the psychological terms used wil] themselves pre¬
suppose social concepts, so that psychology is "dependent" on sociology and
not the reverse; and also because unintended consequences can never be
explained in purely psychological terras. Thus
"sociology is autonomous in the sense that it can and must
be very extensively independent of psychology" 3»
Popper makes explicit the context in which he presents the "second
sense" in which "sociology is autonomous": that there is "an entirely
objective method" of understanding - Popper uses the term Veratehen here -
derived from
"logical investigation of the methods of political economy...
which is applicable to all the social sciences" 4.
That situational logic, which is the "method of objective understanding"
mentioned, is based on the method of economic analysis, is a point which
Popper has made before in The Open Society. 5«
The connection of the "second sense" in which sociology is autonomous
with the first is through Popper's association of the reductionist doctrine
1. The othex* reason is that
"a theory or deductive system is an attempt at explanation and thus
an attempt to solve a scientific problem".
Both citations are from LSW, thesis XIX, p.243; on the second reason, cf.
Popoer on explanation as the "aim of science", discussed in chapter two,
pp.
2. Thesis XXI-XXVI, p. 245-7. 3* Thesis XXIII, p.245.
4. Thesis XXV, p.246 5« Cf« above pp.4Tll1-
of psychologism with the use of psychology as a partial but not necessarily
a complete explanation. As in The Open Society Popper juxtaposes his
criticisms of these two doctrines. He argues, in "Die Logik der Sozial-
wissenschaften", that
"A social science of objective understanding can be developed
independently of all subjective or psychological ideas. It
consists in an adequate analysis of the situation of the acting
persons, so as to explain the action from the situation, without
further psychological aids. The objective 'understanding'
(^'Verstehen*^ is that we see that the action was objectively
appropriate to the situation. In other words, the situation
is extensively analysed 30 that what first appear to be psycho¬
logical springs of action (Mbmente), for example, wishes, motives,
memories and associations, are converted into situational springs
of action (pituationsmomente}. A man with such and such wishes
becomes, then, a man to whose situation it is appropriate that he
objectively is equipped with such and such theories or information.
Thus it is possible for us to understand his actions in the
objective sense, so that we can say: indeed I have other aims and
other theories (than for example Charlemagne); but had I been in
his situation, analyzed thus and so - wherein the situation
includes aims and state of knowledge - then I would have, and so
would you have also, acted in such a way. The method of situa¬
tional analysis is therefore an individualistic method, but not
a psychological one, because it excludes psychological springs of
action on principle, and replaces them with objective situational
elements. ...explanations by situational logic are rational,
theoretical reconstructions...over-simplified, and over schema¬
tized and thus in general false. However...they can...be good
approximations to the truth - and even better than other corri¬
gible (tlberprttfbar} explanations.... Above all, sitxiational
analyses are open to rational and empirical criticism and improve¬
ment. We can, for example, find a letter which shows that the
information which Charlemagne had at his disposal was entirely
different from that which we had assumed in our analysis. In
contrast to this, psychological-characterological hypotheses are
hardly ever open to criticism" 1.
To describe such a method as this as one of understanding or Ver9tehen
may seem a strange usage, in the light of the previous uses of this term.
Popper's choice of terminology here can be compared with his earlier descri¬
ption of situational logic, in The Poverty of Historicism, as a method
1. LSW, Thesis XXV, pp.246-7. I have cited this thesis in full, because of
its importance as Popper's most recent statement on situational logic; also
it is not as well-known as Popper's remarks in PH and OS.
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peculiar to the social sciencess it is a case of borrowing the language
of his opponents to counter their case. Popper's aim, in characterizing
situational logic as a method of "objective understanding" because it ful¬
fils certain stipulations, is an attempt to show that empathies understand¬
ing has no part to play in the methods of the social sciences, and thus to
put the established notion of Verstehen on its head. Although Popper
argues for his prohibition of psychological factors on the "principle" that
they are not "open to criticism" and thus lack the prerequisite for scienti¬
fic statements, his prohibition actually derives, I think, from his attempt
to exclude empathy from the method of understanding. 1 shall argue that
this is indeed the case in examining his ostensible argument, in the next
paragraph but one.
Although Popper introduces situational logic in this lecture as a method
applicable in all the social sciences, the little he says to illustrate the
U3e of situational logic indicates that he considers it to be a method for
the historian as well; in the interview on historical explanation, he pre¬
sented situational logic as "the main feature of historical explanation".
In this lecture Popper refers to Charlemagne, a figure more studied by the
historian than the social scientist, to illustrate how situational analysis
provides objective understanding. The example he gives of improving a
situational analysis is by finding new evidence on historical events: a
hypothetical letter bearing on "the knowledge which Charlemagne had at his
disposal". This example is similar to that which he gave in the interview
on historical explanation to show that situational logic is "in principle,
objectively testable".
The principle on which Popper says he excludes psychological factors from
situational analysis seems to be that such analyses can be 3aid to be object¬
ive only if they are couched in terms that "are open to rational and empirical
criticism and improvement". Situational logic provides "objective under¬
standing" because it is open to criticism and improvement and can thus
satisfy these canons of the "objectivity of the critical method" which Popper
discussed earlier in this lecture; Popper seems to think that, by contrast,
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what he calls "psychological-characterological hypotheses" cannot meet this
standard. Although some statements by psychologists may be vaporous,
psychological statements are not .intrinsically impervious tc criticism;
little is required in the way of argument to show that Popper's contention is
untenable. Popper's position might be interpreted as representing an animus
against psychology, * but there is, I think, more to his prohibition of
psychological factors than prejudice. Popper wants to exclude psychological
statements because such statements, in historiography at least, provide grounds
for a case for empathic understanding. It has beon argued that some explana¬
tions of historical actions are incomplete if they do not convey a notion of
the agent's character; and that the agent's character cannot be grasped with-
out the use of empathic understanding on the part of the historian. " The
force of this argument can best be appreciated by considering an example.
I shall argue that in some cases at least situational analysis cannot
p rovide an adequate explanation without some mention of psychological factors,
or "psychological-eharaeterological hypotheses"; and that these indispens¬
able psychological components of explanation cannot be translated into what
Popper considers to be "situational elements" or statements of what is object¬
ively appropriate to the situation. Nevertheless, such psychological state¬
ments as the historian may need to make in order to provide adequate explana¬
tions may be open to criticism, so that Popper's "principle" for prohibiting
such statements does not apply. My argument will be based on considering an
example of historiographies! use of situational analysis which is also rele¬
vant to appraising the respective merits of the differing positions of Popper
and Collingwood on historical explanation: the recently translated biography
1. Cf. "Science: Conjectures and Refutations", CR, p.35t where Popper reports
a "personal experience" with Alfred Adler when the latter interpreted " a
case which did not seem to (Popper^ particularly Adlerian" in the light of
Adler's "theory of inferiority feelings".
Popper's harshness towards the use of psychology in explanations is
reminiscent of Collingwood's rather unfair criticism of Dilthey on similar
grounds, III, 171-5.
2. R. Weingartner, attributes this argument to the case for empathic under¬
standing "Historical Explanation", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul
Edwards (New York, 1967) IV, p.7.
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of Caesar by Matthias Gelzer"" which is apposite for such an appraisal, as
both Popper and Collin wood use Caesar to illustrate their respective views.
VI. Situational Logic in Uses The Case of Julius Caesar.
Michael Hurst,"* in reviewing this book, has pointed out that Gelzer
employs a situational approach. Geizer's argument is that Caesar achieved
what he did because he recognized the "implications" of the contemporary
political situation, to which many of his opponents were blinds that the
political structure and constitution of the Roman Republic were no longer
adequate for the Empire which had been built
"The old constitutional structure, suited to the needs of a city state,
had not surprisingly proved inadequate for coping with the government
of an ever-growing empire and control over numerous allies and enemies.
As a class the Roman aristocracy failed to grasp the implications of
the situation and attempted a mere continuation of the past. One
section, the Optimates or 3oni, sought to retain oligarchy in full
force; the other, dubbed Popitlares, wished to extend citizenship
rights in and out of Rome, but failed to think out any clear long-
term ideas as to how the wishes of an extended electorate could
operate effectively at a distance when decisions requiring its
attention were made by a glorified town meeting in Rome itself. The
great factor making for a violent solution to the whole fundamental
problem was the development of private armies... Overall, whether
Optimates or Populares held temporary sway, the trend was towards a
species of licensed anarchy - a trend hardly affected by periodic bouts
of conservative dictatorship."
Gelzer uses a situational approach to do more than draw the setting of
Caesar's career in broad outlines!
"One of the finest features of this bock is the careful presentation
of how the various situations facing Caesar were made. 'without a due
stress upon causation the main threads of the story would become
1. Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, translated by Peter
Heedham from the 6th edition (Tat edition 1921) (Oxford Blackwell, 1968).
<f. Michael llurst, "Hail Caesar", review of Gelzer, on. cit., Scotsman
.Veekend Review, 16th March, 1963, p. 155 the following two citations are
taken from Hurst's review.
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completely lost. Just how Caesar built up influence in Rome and
was elected to office; just how he went to Transpadania and into
Gaul; just how his military skill and ability to swing an array
against his political opponents fsicj; just how he first needed,
acquired and coped with mighty allies; and just how he overcame
defections and managed the great military contest with Pompey -
all emerge with crystal clarity".
Michael hurst's praise of Geizer's use of a situational approach lends
support to Popper's contention that historians should and do employ aitua-
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tional analysis. * Consideration of Gelzer's argument also bears out
Popper's claim that the historian explains by showing how, in this instance,
Caesar's actions were "objectively appropriate to the situation"; for Popper
considers the information at the agent's disposal to be part of his situation:
and this would include Caesar's recognition of the objective possibilities
and limitations of the Roman situation, to which many of his contemporaries
and opponents were blind. Gelzer's analysis is, as both Poprer and Colling-
wood say their proposals are, objective in the sense that it is "open to
rational and empirical criticism and improvement", in Popper's phrase, and
in the related sense which Col ling-wood defends, that the inferences on which
the explanation relies can be publicly demonstrated. Again, in corrobora¬
tion of a point which both Popper and Oollingwood make, but of which Colling-
2.
wood provides the better analysis; Gelser, in his use of a situational
approach, presents Caesar as faced with problems or problem-situations, and
Gelzer views Caesar's actions as confronting these problem:?: the large pro¬
blem was, as has been noted, what was to be done about the established poli¬
tical framework of the Republic which could not cope with the realities of
the Empire.
The issue remains: whether Popper's account of situational logic
covers what is involved in Gelzer's use of a situational approach as a histo¬
rical explanation of Caesar's actions. One question which such an approach
to Caesar raises, and which requires an answer if a situational approach is
to provide an adequate explanation, is why Caesar was able to see and exploit
1. Eg. ?H, 149 and HE, 21-22. 2. Of. above pp. 3S-7
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the possibilities of the situation to which so many of the other public
figures in Roman life were blind. Gelzer characterizes Caesar as a states-
nan and also a genius, but he uses these terns only to describe Caesar's
ability to take advantage of the situation and to explain his success at
doing so. * Thus, if it is said that Caesar was a statesman, and all
statesmen have the ability to grasp and exploit present circumstances as
well as that of leading their "contemporaries in new directions" and thus
2.
creating "new circumstances" "and that this is what is meant by character¬
izing: someone as a statesman - than I do not think that such an argument would
constitute a historical explanation of Caesar's success, although it seems in
some respects to conform to the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation:
the relevant generalization is a definition.
Gelzer does, I think, succeed in explaining Caesar's ability to see and
exploit the objective possibilities of the situation. His explanation rests
on the picture he gives of Caesar's character. He describes Caesar as,
fundamentally, a bold person, and it is by a "psychological-characterological
hypothesis" along these lines that a situational explanation of Caesar's
actions must be completed. To consider a specific incident cited ty Popper,
it was his boldness as much as "his ambition and energy" as Popper says which
led him to cross the Rubicon'''* And the extravagance for which Caesar was
notorious in the early part of his career is, I think, another facet of his
boldness'1* Because of his boldness, Caesar was not bound by old ideas and
was able to recognise that the established political framework of the
Republic was not adequate for the political situation of the Empire.
1. Gelzer, Caesar, p.l, p.123: cf. p.95«
2. A paraphrase of Gelzer's characterization, p.l.
"Two distinct qualities characterize a statesman. One is a quick grasp
of and prompt reaction to the circurasta ces with which he is faced:
this can serve the needs of the moment by allowing to take account of
existing trends with a clear head. The second, and nobler, is creative
political ability, which can lead the statesman's contemporaries in new
directions and itself create new circumstances".
3. According to Gelzer (Caesar, p.193) Caesar said
"'let the dice fly high"... (quoting a half-'line of his favourite Greek
poet, Menander), as he crossed the Rubicon..." Gelzer presents Caesar's
undertaking "this great gamble" as a bold decision, in which Caesar'3
recognition of his own energy and ambition gave him confidence (cf.pp.193-
4)5 Popper suggests his explanation, 03, II, 265 •
4. Gelzer, Caesar, pp. 30-32.
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The hypothesis that Caesar could appreciate and take advantage of the
situation, because of his boldness, does not seem to be convertible into
the situational terns which Popper thinks acceptable in explanations.^*
This hypothesis is not equivalent to saying that Caesar's behaviour was
objectively appropriate to the situation arising from the disparity between
the outdated political structure of the Republic and the requirements of
the Empire which had been won. It can be said that Caesar's boldness led
him to act in ways that were "objectively appropriate" to the situation,
because his actions were based on a more accurate comprehension of the
situation as it was: his "definition of the situation" was not, aa 'was the
case with most other Roman political figures of his day, distorted by view-
2.
ing it in terms of outdated ideas. * But this analysis does not exhaust
the content of what is being asserted, which goes beyond what Popper considers
to be situational factors: objective conditions, the information which the
agents had at their disposal, and purposes which are objectively appropriate
to the agent's situation. What i3 being said is about Caesar as a person,
which is needed to explain why Caesar acted in ways that were "objectively
appropriate to the situation".
1. Even with the proviso suggested by Chattopadhyaya^(p.lOS)
"that an explanatory historical situation may consist of elements
which are not temporally continuous and spatially contiguous".
2. "Definition of the situation" is a term introduced by W.I. Thomas in
about 1918. I agree with Alan Donagan that if situational logic is to give
an adequate account of historical explanations, then it must include such a
notion:
"...what a man does depends on the situation as he thinks it to be,
rather than the situstion as it is".
Alan Donagan, "Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered"
History and Theory, Vol IV (1964) p.18.
I do not think that Popper's inclusion, as "situational elements", of the
information at the agent's disposal, or of the agent's aims which were
"objectively appropriate" to his situation can be considered to amount to
such a notion. For actions may be based on a definition of the situation
which includes factors other than those "objective" situational elements.
And actions which are completely out of tune with the objective possibilities
of their situation may misfire, but they may also be historically important;
and their explanation may require grasping the agent's definition of the
situatiox:, rather than how his actions were, or were not, "objectively
appropriate" to his situation.
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Popper's schema of situational logic, then, cannot accommodate a
"psyohological-oharac terologica'l hypothesis" which is necessary in this
case and I think more generally, if the use of a situational approach is
not to raise further questions in the course of providing a partial explana¬
tion.
Although such a hypothesis does not conform to Popper's stipulations,
it also cannot be excluded on the grounds that Popper gives for rejecting
statements &3 inadraissable to situational analysis if the latter is to be
objective. Surely if a historian says that Caesar was able to 3ee the
objective possibilities, indeed necessities, of the Roman political situa¬
tion, to which so many other of his contemporaries were blind, because of
his boldness which enabled him to see through and discard outmoded ideas,
then the historian's judgment can be appraised in terms of his use of the
evidence. Such a hypothesis, although it may be described as "psycho-
logioal-oharaoterologicalis open to "rational and empirical criticism
and improvement". Although an acceptable use of evidence is one condition
which such a hypothesis can and must meet, there is another condition which
must be fulfilled to formulate such a hypothesis as part of a situational
explanation.'1"
What is being asserted is not a general law to the effect that boldr,es3
in a politician is prerequisite for his discarding outdated ideas which
conceal the realities of the situation. Comforting truisms of this order
may be mouthed, but they do not perform the requisite explanatory function.
Rather, the disposition of boldness is attributed to the historical indivi¬
dual, Caesar, and before a historian can make such an attribution he must,
I think, be able to substantiate his judgment from his own experience of
human nature. The historian need not be as "war-like" as Genghis Khan in
order to appreciate what aspects of the latter'a character affected t3]iaped)
his historically important actions,^* but equally a historian or a critic
1. Cf. W.H. Dray, laws and Explanation in Kin tor:/ (Oxford, 1957) p.128
2. J.W.N. Watkins uses the example of Genghis Khan in criticism of Hayek's
views on empathy, in "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation," British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science v. 2(1952), pp. 38-39*
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who is defective, so to speak, in his experience of human nature nay be
unable to appreciate some of the judgments which an adequate situational
explanation may require. Women, lacking the experience which most men
had as schoolboys of fighting, may have as a consequence, certain defi¬
ciencies in their understanding of military history and perhaps also of
political in-fighting. It is in this sense that empathic understanding
is required to construct an adequate situational explanation? and, as
has been said earlier, those statements which may be described as broadly
psychological, and to which Popper raises untenable objections, make the
need for such empathic understanding clear; and it is for this reason
rather than on the grounds of his avowed principles that Popper seeks,
throughout his discussions of situational logic, to eliminate such state¬
ments from historical explanations.
If historically important actions can be explained in terms of how
sane men act, as a general rule, or in terms of their divergence from a
model of what a rational action would be in the circumstances, or as
objectively appropriate to situations which can be objectively analysed,
then the historian has no need for eapathic understanding? but limita¬
tions to all these criteria have been canvassed above.And if, as
has been argued, a situational approach, as Popper delineates it, raises
questions in the course of providing partial explanations, then there is
an opening for the case that an exercise of emphatic understanding is a
2 .
logical condition for providing adequate situational explanations; an
attempt has been made above to outline just such a case. Nor is such an
exercise of empathic understanding a matter of untastable intuitions, for
in appraising the historian's judgments, appeal may be made both to the
available evidence and to that experience of human nature common to the
historian and his critical colleagues; one may hope for criticism also
from a lay audience on this latter basis as well.
1. Cf. above, pp.»lS-\H?
2. W.H. Dray, op. cit., p.128
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Although similarities have been noted above, between Popper and
Collingwood's respective views of historical explanation, it was also
observed that these views dealt with only one of several kinds of histo¬
rical explanation. It was suggested, further, that Popper's views hint
at, and nay perhaps impede investigation of, the social conditions which
may be brought in to explain historical actions in their situations;
whereas Collingwood's concentration on reflective acts does not seem to
allow for this latter kind of approach to historical explanation. Popper's
theory of situational logic, then, suffers from two kinds of limitations!
as will be seen, Popper's stipulations as to the investigation of the social
conditions of actions may not be altogether fruitful; * and his prohibition
of psychological hypotheses from situational logic has the result that this
approach raises questions in the course of constructing explanations within
the terius that Popper allows.
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I. Anti-Naturaliatic and Pro-Naturalistic Historicism
Historicism is a linchpin in Popper's thought on history and the social
sciences. Popper thinks that much is awry in these disciplines, due to
what he calls historicism. Historicism provides the focus for Popper's
criticism of history and tlie social sciences, and for his recommendations
of methodological reforms in these disciplines. Popper's ideas on histo¬
rical explanation, as well as his proposals for historiography*"', are meant
to replace doctrines which he criticizes and attributes to histericiara.
Thus, what Popper opposes and what he advocates are correlated through his
concept of historicism.
Historicism, as Popper understands it, is an intricate interlocking of
doctrines which issues in claims, which Popper thinks illfounded, to pro¬
phesy the future from certain configurations of historical events: namely,
alleged developmental laws which turn out to he no more than historical
trends. Popper thinks that many of the fallacious arguments in support of
the prophetic ends of historicism refer to what are alleged to be distinct-
2.
ively historical methods,"* uniquely applicable to the study of social life.
Popper's central discussion of historicism, The Poverty of Historicism,
z
#
is an enigmatic book. To modify Poprier's characteristic metaphor, the
reader may well feel that he is obliquely positioned with respect to some
sharp searchlight which casts dearly delineated shadows of some indeter¬
minate objects: the formal lucidity of Popper's presentation does not
suffice to identify historicisra; the recital of doctrines does not pin down
1. Popper's ideas on historical explanation are discussed above, in Chapters
Two and Three? Popper's proposals for historiography are considered in
Chapter Five.
2. On historicism as historical methods OS, I, 23; 03, I, 75; OS, I, 290;
OS, II, 7; OS, II, 37: OS, II, 87; OS, II, 106: OS, II, 319 (note 2(2)
to chapter 13); cf. OS, II, 59> where Popper says, in connection with his
critique of Hegel, that historicism is not history; PH, 34; PH, 45! PH, 5°J
"What is Dialectics", CR, p.353«
3. His "searchlight theoi'y of science" (03,11, 26o). Cf. also his discussion
of historical interpretations as searchlights, OS, II, 268-9 (chap.25 end of
sec. iii).
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their exponents. The ideas that Popper ascribes to these mysterious, and
for the most part nameless, historicists seem on the face of it to be a
mixed kettle of fish. And there are difficulties, both in reconciling
Popper's analytic treatment of historicism with his examples of arch-
historicists, Plato, Hegel and Marx,^'and also, by extension, in finding
further examples to support Popper's claim that the social sciences are
permeated by historicism.
Some critics have argued that historicism is little more than a com-
2.
posite of Popper's prejudices! " that what Popper presents and criticizes
in The Poverty of Historicism is not a "subtle" and coherent method which,
by intricate means, issues in prophecies, but rather a ragbag of doctrines
which Popper dislikes. As the starting point for historicism, Popper cari-
4.
catures something very much like Historismus, or the "German Idea of History"
a view of historical and cultural studies prevalent in Germany in the nine¬
teenth and early twentieth centuries, according to which the methods of the
natural sciences, theoretical and experimental, were inapplicable to the
study of historical and cultural phenomena if the distinctively human
character of such phenomena was to be apprehended? the subject matter of
1. That Plato is not a historicist in Popper's sense is argued by W.H. Walsh
in "Plato and the Philosophy of History; History and Theory in the Republic",
History and Theory 11(1962), 5-16. A comparison of Popper's schema of
historicism inPH, with the views of Hegel and Marx is sketched below,
3ec. iv (p.
2. A position congenial to such blatant Marxists as James Petras("Popperism:
the Scarcity of Reason", Science and Society,1966 50(l)s 1-10)? taken also
by such a sophisticated Marxist as Herbert Marcuse ("Notes on the Problem of
Historical Laws", Partisan Review, 1959» 26: 117-129, especially p.125, 126-9)
and also by a less committed critic, W.H. Walsh (review of The Poverty of
Historicism, Philosophy 55(1960), 558»)
5. PH, vii (preface).
4. George G. Iggers, "The Dissolution of German Historisra," Ideas in History,
essays presented to Louis Gottschalk by his former students, edited by
Richard Herr and Harold T. Parker (Duke Univ. Press, Durham N.C., 1965)
pp. 288-529.
"When we speak of historian or of the 'German idea of history' in this papei
we are speaking of the main tradition of German historiography and historical
thought that followed Wilhelra von Humboldt and Ranke and that emerged in the
revolt against the Enlightenment doctrine of natural law", (p.289).
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these disciplines enjoined its own mode of appreciation. Popper argues
that the apparatus of historicist prophecy presupposes these claims for a
distinctive historical method. The alleged connection between the appara¬
tus of historicist prophecy and the claims for a distinctive historical
method, which to Popper's thinking has been overlooked, may seem at best
forced, and may well be at odds with logic.
If the critics' contention is not without substance, and Popper's
analysis of historicism is based on prejudices rather than logic, then
Popper's claim of "something like scientific status" for his analysis of
historicist method in The Poverty of Historicism "is seriously undermined,
if not confuted. If some of the links that Popper finds between the various
doctrines he calls historicist are matters of opinion and not of logic, as I
shall argue, then Popper's case for the emergence of historicist prophecy
from the premises of Historisnus does not meet his own criteria for the
objectivity, or intersubjective testability, of scientific results. For
then one must agree with some of Popper's opinions which buttress his argu¬
ment, at the expense of logic, in order to accept some of the connections
that he finds between historicist doctrines. For a doctrinal analysis to
be scientific, as Popper understands science, it cannot hinge upon an untest-
able point of view; it is because of just such dependence on untestable
points of view that Popper argues, in the nuch anthologized last chapter of
The Open Society and its Enemies, that historical interpretations cannot
convey objective representations of the past. A doctrinal analysis of a
scientific ilk trust rest on objective connections of ideas which may he
acknowledged without any commitments other than to logic.
In The Poverty of Historicism, Popper presents historicisra as a pur¬
portedly coherent method that obtains historical prophecies from trends or
developmental laws of history, backed up by certain distinctive methods for
1. 03, I, 3. Popper writes that "the systematic analysis of historicism"
which can only refer to The Poverty of Historicism, "aims at something like
scientific status".
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the study of society. Popper does not approach historicism by starting
from what actual historioists have held, but rather, by constructing a
schema of the arguments to which a consistent historicist ought to sub¬
scribe if he acknowledges the logical implications of his claim that
historians or sociologists can prophesy the future from historical trends.
If Popper is to make good his claim that he has worked out the best possible
case for the "subtle logic" of historicist prophecy, prior to exposing
historicism as untenable, * then he must show how anti-naturalistic histo¬
ricism, a view that the methods of the social sciences differ from those of
the natural sciences, is logically connected with the view that it is the
cardinal task of the social sciences to prophesy. Some of the doctrines
which Popper classes under anti-naturalistic historicisn - such as the
futility of experiments in studying society, the complexity of social life,
and the subjective character of social and historical knowledge - have been
held by reputable historians and philosophers, concerned to defend the
distinctive features of historical knowledge from the dominant model of the
2 m
natural sciences. * The logic of Popper's presentation of historicism
seems to be that, if one subscribes to a sufficient number of the anti-
naturalistic doctrines, one is then logically committed to historical pro¬
phecy on the basis of trends. If this is the case, then the aforementioned
historians and philosophers were unwittingly committed to historicist pro¬
phecies which they did not make and sometimes denied that it was possible to
make. But what Popper offers in the way of logical links between the anti-
naturalistic position and the historicist prophecy are tenuous when they are
not untenable .
The backbone for Popper's presentation of a "well-considered"^*case for
historicist prophecy, as the task of the social sciences, is the distinction
1. PH, vii, and p.3.
2. Recently G. Kitson Clark (The Critical Historian, London, 1967) 19-31
has maintained the first two of the above mentioned doctrines, in a contrast
of history with science.
3. PH, p.3.
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he draws between pro-naturalistic and anti-naturalistic approaches to
questions of method in the social sciences. Popper classifies the
"schools of thought interested in the methods of" the social sciences
"according to their views on the applicability of the
methods of physics...as pro-naturalistic or as anti-
naturalistic } labelling them '♦pro-naturalistic1 or
•positive• if they favour the application of the
methods of physics to the social sciences, and
•anti-naturalistic' or •negative' if they oppose
the use of these methods". 1.
In support of the point of view represented by this distinction, Popper
argues that the methods of physics constitute a much misunderstood para¬
digm for scientific knowledge in all disciplines.
The "characteristic approach" of historicism, says Popper, combines
2.
both kinds of approaches, anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic. * Thus
a consistent case for historicist prophecy, according to Popper, involves
a shifting attitude to the methods of physics. How, then, does Popper
account for the coherence of historicist method if it combines two such
antithetical attitudes to the methods of physics as the anti-naturalistic
and the pro-naturalistic? The consistent arguments which Popper provides
for historicism seem to be based on an initial inconsistency.
Maurice Mandelbaura has argued that the purport of Popper's distinction
is to draw attention to a common methodological principle shared by pro-
naturalistic and anti-naturalistic approaches alike: attempts to establish
developmental laws, and attempts to view historical events in terms of
unique processes both employ a genetic approach in explaining and evaluat¬
ing past events. Mandelbaum writes:
"As Popper's distinction makes clear, in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century, forms of what
has been termed 'naturalism' have closely resembled
anti-naturalistic theories with regard to their
presuppositions about the relation of historical
change to the explanation of events...What is
1. PH, p. 2. 2. Pil, p. 5 .
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presupposed in all explanations and evaluations
of past events (is^ that each event is to be
understood by viewing' it in terras of a larger
process of which it was a phase, or in which it
played a part; and that only through understanding
the nature of this process can one fully understand
or evaluate concrete events l'" 1.
Thus Mandelbaum argues that one outcome of Popper's discussion of histo-
ricism is to exhibit an analogy between positivistic and anti-positivistic
views of historical change. While this may well be what Popper's dis¬
cussion achieves, it seems to me that Popper wants to demonstrate a rather
different and more problematical points that anti-naturalistic and pro-
naturalistic historicisia are linked by more than analogous views of the
import of historical processes; that these doctrines are logically com¬
plementary.
Popper argues that the anti-naturalistic doctrines are logically re¬
quired to support the pro-naturalistic case for prophecy. And more start-
lingly, the drift of his presentation is that the anti-naturalistic histo-
ricist, by holding that the methods appropriate to the study of human
affairs involve an individualizing, genetic approach, and are legitimately
1. "Historicism", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards,
(N.Y. and London, 19^7). IV, 2J.
Compare P.A. Hayek (The Counter-Revolution of Science, pappr-back ed.
Free Press, 1964)» p.67»
.historicism...is used in two different and in some
respect opposite and yet frequently confused senses:
for the older view which justly contrasted the specific
task of the historian with that of the scientist
and which denied the possibility of a theoretical
science of history, and for the later view which
on the contrary, affirms that history is the only
road which can lead to a theoretical science
of social phenomena. However great is the contrast
between these two views sometimes called 'historioism'
if we take them in their extreme forms, they have
yet enough in common to have made possible a gradual
and almost unperceived transition from the
historical method of the historian to the scientistic
historicism which attempts to make history a 'science'
v and the only science of social phenomena".
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distinct from the methods of the natural sciences, is thereby logically
committed to the pro-naturalistic view that historicist prophecy is the
cardinal task of the social sciences. Thus Popper is claiming that an
anti-naturalistic historicist shares more than a rather general methodo¬
logical principle with the pro-naturalistic historicist} the way in which
the anti-naturalist implements this principle logically commits him to pro-
naturalistic prophesy.
In Mandelbaum's interpretation, Popper's distinction is more inno¬
cuous than what I havo suggested. The grounds for construing Popper as
maintaining that anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic historicism are
logically connected in the way I have sketched are in textual evidence and
in Popper's usage of the term "historicism".
It would be careless and it might be misleading to call Popper's
account of "historicism" a definition. Popper nowhere speaks of defining
"historicism", because he objects to the plenitude of essences that he thinks
the customary uncritical use of definitions, for which he blames Aristotle,
generates. In a sound usage of terms, as in the natural sciences, Popper
says that there are no such illegitimate ontological implications. Words
are introduced because they are "useful" or "convenient" "to describe how
things behave". * Popper intends his usage of "historicism" to be in line
with the scientific procedure of definition, not the malpractice due to
Aristotle, as can be seen from the qualifications with which Popper introduces
the terms
"...I have deliberately chosen the somewhat unfamiliar
label 'historicism'. By introducing it I hope I
shall avoid merely verbal quibblest for nobody, I
hope, will be tempted to question whether any of the
arguments here discussed really or properly or
essentially belong to historicism, or what the word
'historioism' really or properly or essentially means". 2.
1. PH, p.29 2. PH, 3-4.
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That is, Popper warns against imputing an essence, as in an Aristotelian
definition, to historicism.
The convenience and utility of the term"historicism" must be that
the various doctrines thus catalogued are not disparate or unrelated, but
take their place in the "logic" of historicism. Thus, to establish that
historicism is well defined, meeting the criteria he gives for scientific
definitions, Popper must show that its anti-naturalistic and pro-natural¬
istic aspects are logically connected. If these two sets of doctrines are
merely compatible, rather than necessarily connected, or worse still, are
incompatible, then Popper has not made good his claim to have constructed
a'Vrell-considered and close-knit" case for historicism.
Popper writes of his presentation of historicism that he has
"triod to present historicism as a well-considered
and close-knit philosophy...I have not hesitated
to construct arguments in its support which have
never, to my knowledge, been brought forward by
historicists themselves...I have tried to perfect
a theory which has often been put forward, but perhaps
never in a fully developed form". 1.
Popper is claiming, in other words, to have constructed the best possible
case for historicism by logical means? supplying the presuppositions of
certain arguments and eliciting the consequenoes of these arguments.
More specifically, Popper writes that
"In analysing historicism, I found that it needs
what I now call methodological essentialism} i.e.
I saw that the typical arguments in favour of
essentialism are bound up with historicism..." 2.
Popper introduces essentialism as part of his elaboration of the histo-
ricist case; and the same may be said more generally of his approach to
anti-naturalistic historicism. Thus Popper's claim is that the anti-
naturalistic and pro-naturalisticvhonstitute a logical nexus.
A
1. PH, p.5 2. OS, I, 216, note 30 to chap. 3.
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There are several instances in The Poverty of Historicism where Popper
says quite explicitly that the anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic
doctrines cohere in the method of historicist prophecy.'*'* He argues that
the "central historicist doctrine" of evolutionary laws or historical trends
interweaves both kinds of doctrines. Moreover, one can detect in Popper's
presentation of certain doctrines the underpinnings for his allegation that
the anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic doctrines are conjoined in histo¬
ricism. For example, intuitive understanding may start from an "imagina¬
tive reconstruction" of purposeful activities, but a logical realization of
the fullest understanding of social events requires the framework of
1. E.G. PH, 5 (cited above, p. and PH, 55-36s
"Although historicism is fundamentally anti-naturalistic it is by no
means opposed to the idea that there is a common element in the
methods of the physical and social sciences. This may be due to
the fact that historicists as a rule adopt the view (which I fully
share) that sociology, like physics, is a branch of knowledge which
aims, at the same time, to be theoretical and empirical ...It follows
that certain methods - prediction with the help of laws, and the
testing of laws by observation - must be common to physics and
sociology.
"I fully agree with this view, in spite of the fact that I
consider it to be one of the basic assumptions of historicism. But
I do not agree with the more detailed development of this view which
leads to a number of ideas which...involve other assumptions, namely
the anti-naturalistic doctrines of historicism; and more especially,
the doctrine of historical laws or trends."
What Popper says, PH, 105-106
"The doctrines of historicism which I have called
'pro-naturalistio' have much in common with its
anti-naturalistic doctrines. They are, for example
influenced by holistic thinking and they spring from
a misunderstanding of the methods of the natxiral
sciences....(they also share) a view of society moving
a series of periods..."
might be thought to support Mandelbaum's interpretation of the relationship
between pro-naturali3tic and anti-naturalistic historicism. But if the
"central historicist doctrine" of "laws of evolution" unites both kinds of
doctrines (PH, 36» 41-42, 45)» then they are more than analogous and they
nust be logically connected.
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historical trends, that framework which is implicated in historicist pro¬
phesy. The elaboration of the anti-naturalistic position, in Popper's
view, commits the adherent to pro-naturalistic historicism and prophecy.
Although Popper presents some sort of a case for connecting the pro-
naturalistic and anti-naturalistic ideas of historicism in a coherent
methodology, it is nonetheless difficult to see how an adherent of some of
the anti-naturalistic doctrines is thereby committed to a belief in ascer¬
taining the future direction of history from trends. This question is
more than academic, so to speak, because what Popper describes as anti-
naturalistic historicism so closely resembles Historismusi"'"" a cluster of
ideas on history and its methods which was in formation in the earlier part
of the nineteenth century, and which was much debated and disputed from the
appearance of Nietzsche's essay on The Use and Abuse of History in 1874
to the publication of Meinecke's Die cXcb. Historismus in 1956.
One characteristic claim of Historismus was that the methods of the
historical or cultural studies (Geisteswissenschaften), for which history
was paradigmatic, were distinct from those of the natural sciences. Various
cases were made, coming under Historismus, for distinctive methods in histo¬
rical studies. It was said that the historian studied supra-personal, con¬
crete individuals, recalcitrant to the generalizing approach of the natural
sciencess they were realized in process or development, and consequently
were to be apprehended by an individualizing and genetic approaoh. A some¬
what different argument held that historical phenomena involved man and his
mental or spiritual life, which was embodied in social artifacts: thus the
characteristic features of social and cultural phenomena could not be grasped
by the methods of science, but required a special approach. Such emphases
on the distinctively historical character of social phenomena were associated
with theories of the historical constitution of knowledge of these phenomena.
Popper's argument would lead us to believe that a consistent advocate
of Historisraus is, perhaps unwittingly, logically committed to a belief in
1. Cf. p. above.
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historical prophecy. If Popper is correct in arguing that anyone who
subscribes to a sufficient number of the anti-naturalistic doctrines of
hiatoricisrii must consequently adhere to historical prophecy, then he has
reached a startling result which would be disavowed by most if not all
representatives of Historismus, who would argue that the significant feat¬
ures of history which distinguish it from the natural sciences make attempts
at historical prophecy irrelevant if not self-contradictory.
In The Poverty of Historicisn, Popper does not mention Historismus as
an instance of anti-na.turalistio historicism. He names few names through¬
out his presentation of anti-naturalistic historicism. " He draws a dis¬
tinction, which seems to me rather fragile, between "the somewhat unfamiliar
label historicism", which he deliberately chose "to avoid .merely verbal
quibbles", and historism, which may be a transliteration of Historismus.
Historicism, aD Popper analyses it, is a doctrine with manifold ramifications.
Historism, which "mist not" "be confused with what I call historicism" is
"a theory which emphasizes the historical dependence
of our opinions"
or
"a general p rinciple of the historical determination
of all thought..." 2.
The difficulty with Popper's distinction is that some of the doctrines
which Popper attributes to historicism, such as the shaping of social life
by historical periods, would also seem to imply a similar historical rela¬
tivism, as might the historicity of social life, involved in the pro-
naturalistic doctrine that the social sciences are "nothing but history":*
Historiem undeniably suggests Historismus, which has elements in common
with what Popper calls historicism.
1 . PK, 5-34. Marx is called "a famous historicist" on page 8 and names
of essentialists appear in the section on methodological essentialism.
2. OS, II, 208;PHp.l7i OS, II, 208{ OS, II, 255.
3. PH, p.455 "social science is nothing but history".
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There is, moreover, clearcut evidence that Popper recognized some
reference to Hiatorismus in his discussion of anti-naturalistic historicism
in The Poverty of ilis toricism. In a review published shortly after the
first appearance of "The Poverty of Historic ism" in Economical * Popper
considered a book on the subject of Historisaus: The Growth of German
2,
Historiciam by Friedrich Kngei-Janosi. * In this book, Kngel-Janosi dis¬
cussed the historiographical ideas of such figures as Herder, Wilhelm von
Humboldt, Niebuhr, Ranke, Hegel and Marx, who were major figures in the
X
formation of the "German Idea of History"' * Popper writes that
"by 'historicism' the author ^Engel-Janosj understands
an attitude of philosophy which is 'centred around
history', which looks upon 'most spheres of
intellectual life as permeated by history', and
which makes history 'the magistra, if not of
active life, at least to a great extent of
theoretical life!..,I have no quarrel with
his definition since I have used the term in
a similar sense". 4«
Thus the connection of anti-naturalistic historicism with Historismus is
inescapable, permitting names to be supplied which were lacking in Popper's
presentation of anti-naturalistic historicism: representatives of Histo-
rismus are among the anti-naturalistic historicists, and the acuity of
Popper's construal of historiciras can be gauged by examples. Popper's
acknowledgement of Historisnms as historicist requires, I think, that he
withdraw his disjunction of historiciifim and historisra, because the claim
that knowledge depends on its historical context, which Popper attempted
to dissociate from his usage of historicism, is an aspect of Historismus.
But Historismus is relevant to more than this fine point of Popper's
1. "The Poverty of Historicism" was published, in Economics, in three parts
(vol. xx,11, p.44» no. 42; vol.11, 1949» no. 43 nnd vol.12,1945, no.46)5
Popper's review of Engel-Janosi's book appeared in Economics v.12 (1945)*
2. John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,
Series LXII, no. 2 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1944)•
3. Georg Iggers' phrase, see above, p. 1S3, notet
4. "The Growth of German Historicisra," Economica 12(1945)» P» 259»
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analysis. It can be used to test whether the drift of Popper's argument,
in connecting pro-naturalistic and anti-natxsralistic hiatoricisra, is
correct or misguided. If actual representatives of Hintorismus remain
within the anti-naturalistic ideas and do not draw the conclusions which
Popper maintains these premises entail, Popper might argue, albeit implau¬
sibly, that these thinkers have not recognised the logical consequences of
their tenets. But if some representatives of Hi3torisraus maintain that
their premises preclude certain ideas - namely, the historical or develop¬
mental laws which Popper says are logically connected with these premises -
then Popper's arguments and the arguments of Hiatorisaus must be compared
and examined, to see which of these conflicting positions is the logical
consequence of the anti-naturalistic views.
II. A Summary of Popper's Analysis
Popper presents his case for the coherence of anti-naturalistic and
pro-naturalistic Mstoriciaa by developing an idea that clearly alludes to
ifarxt namely, that those laws of social life which resemble scientific laws
in making assertions about uniformities, are in the end unlike scientific
laws because there are no significant social uniformities which "persist"
beyond the confines of a single historical period. * Such social laws as
2.
the "economic laws of the feudal period..." appertain only to particular
historical periods, and not to the -whole span of history. Popper thus
allocates to anti-naturalistic historicism the argument that because all
significant social uniformities are restricted to particular historical
periods, sociologists cannot formulate universally valid generalizations
along the lines of scientific theories.
As Popper develops the anti-naturalistic position, further obstacles
1. PH, 6-8. 2. PH, p.5-6, an evident allusion to Marx.
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appear to applying scientific procedures to the study of social life: use¬
ful sooial experiments are out of the question, and there can be no exact
social predictions with which to pin down the future."*' Moreover, social
groups are wholes, inaccessible to analysis by the atomistic procedures of
2
the physical sciences. * Scientific methods cannot be applied to social
life, due to the complexity of the latter by comparison with natures arti¬
ficially isolated experiments are out of the question, and more importantly,
"social life...presupposes the mental life of
individuals". 3*
This characteristic and distinctive feature of social phenomena accounts for
the lack of long-term uniformities in social life, and has further conse-
quencies: there can be no "real repetition"^* in social life because any
social event has some impact, however small, on the mental life of the persons
absorbed in social life, with the consequence that no event can be an exact
c
repetition, because its precedents have left residues. Social phenomena
6
are thus characterised by "intrinsic" novelty. * Social phenomena nuBt be
1. The reasons Popper gives for these points are not immediately relevant to
my argument. They are, in brief: social experiments are of limited
applicability for the same reason as social uniformities are of limited scops:
because a change in historical period rescinds all statements as to the
characteristics of social life. Thus social experiments, were they possible,
would only be applicable to a particular period. Experiments conducted in
artificial isolation, in imitation of science cannot be relevant to sooial
life as it is. Experiments in the thick of things are distorted by interested
motives, such as a desire for political success.
If a social prediction ia made, it is in principle possible for those
whom it affects either to learn of the prediction or to reproduce it, and then,
on the basis of their foreknowledge, to act so as to falsify the predicted
results.
2. Holism is discussed in chapter six, "Social Policy and Social Concepts".
3. PH, p.12. 4. PH, p.10.
5. PH, 9-10. The resultant novelty of social phenomena would seem to imply,
not that social uniformities cannot be universally valid but must be restricted
to periods, but that there can be no real social uniformities, even restricted,
in social life. Popper does not take account of this point, with conse¬
quences, as I shall argue, for the alleged coherence of his analysis of
historicism.
6. PH, p. 10.
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appraised qualitatively, not quantitively: they must be understood in
terms of purpose and meaning, which rule out causal explanation, as in
physics. The sociologist thus relies on intuitive understanding, to appre¬
hend social phenomena for what they are. Social phenomena undergo per¬
vasive change and for criteria by which to identify what persists of such
transformed social entities, the social scientist must intuit their essences:
a procedure which contrasts with the approach of the natural scientist, who
is not concerned with essences but with "how things behave"**
The pro-naturalistic historicist argues that in spite of, indeed because
of, such obstacles as the anti-naturalist stresses to simple analogies be¬
tween the natural and the social sciences, there is a fundamental similarity
between the two sets of disciplines, in that both aim at making predictions:
the social sciences exploit the differences noted by the anti-naturalist in
pursuit of this common aim. The distinctive features of the social sciences,
noted by the anti-naturalist, can be subsumed under procedures analogous to
those of some of the natural sciences: thus the social sciences have a share
in the techniques of prediction. Astronomy exemplifies the parallels be¬
tween sociological prediction and prediction in the natural sciences. Al¬
though the inexactitude of social predictions, on aocount of their reper¬
cussions, actual and potential, make them useless in the short-run, the
importance of long-term predictions, says the pro-naturalist, can well out-
2.
weigh their inexactitude. " Although social experiments are, for the most
part, futile where they are not impossible, sociology, the pro-naturalistic
historicist continues, has nonetheless an empirical basis, which is obser¬
vational rather than experimental: namely, history.^*
As in physics and astronomy, so in sociology "the general case" is con¬
sidered: both issue in dynamics, or the explanation of changes in terms of
A
forces. '* The lack of long-term social uniformities is not an insuperable
obstacle to formulating a theory of social dynamics. The pro-naturalistic
case for the possibility in principle of such a theory starts from the anti-
naturalistic contention that there are no social uniformities "invariably
1. PH, p.29. 2. PH, pp.35-38. 3. PH, PP.38-39. 4. FK, pp.39-41.
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valid through space and time".1* Thus "real social laws", if they are to
"apply to the whole of human history" cannot be based on those social uni¬
formities which are necessarily restricted to single periods:
"Thus the only universally valid laws of
society must be the laws which link up
the successive periods. They must be
laws of historical development which
determine the transition fi*om one period
to another. This is what historicists
mean by saying that the only real laws
of sociology are historical laws." 2.
The remainder of Popper*s presentation of pro-naturalistic historicism
is an exegesis of the consequences of the historicist combination of pro-
naturalistic and anti-naturalistic ideas in the theory of historical trends.
Because the historicist insists that social experiments are futile, what he
says about prediction as the aim of sociology must, says Popper, be inter¬
preted as an insistence that the social sciences prophesy developments beyond
our control. Popper derives this construal of historicist prediction from
the historicist's rejection of social experiments as futile. Experiments
permit us to calculate the results of certain actions and thus to react
constructively in situations where experimental knowledge can be applied.
We can thus predict our course of action. To reject experiments as futile
entails that such constructive action and constructive prediction are im¬
possible. Acquiescence is the only option. Thus the historicistfs denial
of the possibility of social experiments implies that he believes social
events can only be prophesied as beyond our capabilities to prevent or react
constructively upon.
Thus, rather than pursue the will-o-the-wisp of social planning, initia¬
ting and carrying through significant modifications in social life - a com¬
pletely misconceived enterprise in the eyes of the historicist - the histo¬
ricist recommends interpretation of history as the most positive form of
1. PH, p.41.
2. PH, p.41.
3. Which Popper calls "technological prediction"
PH, p. 43.
4. PH, 42-46.
action under the limitations he has discerned: "by interpretation of history
he means apprising oneself and others of the developments which the future
has in store.1"
Sociology, as understood by the historioi3t, is through and through
historical. Hot only is its empirical basis "nothing but" history, but the
theory of propheoy by means of developmental laws 13 historical, because
these laws are historical laws. Sociology, then, is a "theoretical history",
devoted to discovering the "general trends underlying social developments",
to which we may at best adjust if we are aware of thera, but which we can do
little to control. The best part of action is to prophesy what is inevit-
2
able, and to acquiesce in it. Thus the full-blown historicist.
III. Historicism and Historismus
A consistent and well-developed case for historicist prophecy, accord¬
ing to Popper, would appear to rest on a paradoxical combination of ideas:
the historicist begins by denying the applicability of certain scientific
methods to the study of social life, and finishes by adopting methods which
he claims parallel those of the natural sciences, in procedures and in re¬
sults. Popper claims to softenthis paradox, in his criticism of histo¬
ricism, by exposing the pro-naturalistic doctrines of historicism to be
based on misunderstandings of the methods of physics. Moreover, somewhat
differently, Popper suggests that the pro-naturalistic historicist's pro¬
fessions of solidarity with science should not be taken at face-value, for
1. PH, 49-52 2. PH, 45-46
lbs
behind them lie anti-naturalistic assumptions.""
What Popper calls the pro-naturalistic doctrines of historicism are,
X think, pseudo-naturalistic or speciously naturalistic, not because, as
Popper argues in his critique, they are based on misunderstandings of the
methods of physics, but because, in Popper's presentation, these alleged
applications of the methods of physics turn out to presuppose anti-natural¬
istic ideas!
"the more detailed development of [pro-naturalistic
historicisraj involve {sj[ other assumptions, namely
the anti-naturalistic doctrines; and more
especially, the doctrine of historical trends". 2.
Popper's argument for the interlacing of nnti-naturalistic and pro-natural¬
istic ideas, in historiciszn, is that the central historicist doctrine of
historical trends or developmental laws derives from inverting the claim,
which Popper attributes to anti-naturalistic historicisa, that there are
no universally valid sociological generalizations, but only generalizations
restricted to periodo, because there are no significant long-term uniformi¬
ties in social life .
Popper does not support his case for the concatenation of pro-natural¬
istic and anti-naturalistic doctrines in the "characteristic approach" of
historicism, by exhibiting the workings of this combination in the case of
1. PH, p. 36* Thus the outcome of Popper's discussion of hietoricism may
be to show his fundamental distinction between pro-naturalistic and anti-
naturalistic approaches to questions of methods to be superficial, for
Popper's distinction, as he apjjlies it, appears to be based on what
methodologists say about their proposals, which may be at odds with the
actual character of their proposals. That is, Popper calls part of
historicism pro-naturalistic because its adherents profess solidarity with
the methods of science, even though they rely on anti-naturalistic doctrines .
If Popper's distinction is not superficial, then it is only an artificial






Through lack of germane examples, Popper's
case lor the coherence of the doctrines that he calls "historicism" hangs
in the air; Popper's omission of such examples accounts in part for the
enigmatic quality of The Poverty of Historicism.
Do the connections which Popper proposes between the anti-naturalistic
and pro-naturalistic doctrines stand up to examination? I shall argue that
some of the doctrines which Popper presents in support of his chosen start¬
ing point for anti-naturalistic historicisra - the limitations of social
uniformities and of corresponding generalizations - are in fact incompatible
with this point. Moreover, these incompatible doctrines are not excres¬
cences on anti-naturaliatic historicism, but on the contrary, its centre.
To compound the difficulties in Popper's case, the claims for developmental
laws are also incompatible with the heart of anti-naturalistic historicism.
Moreover, the claims for historical or developmental laws are not inextric¬
ably bound up with the assertion of limited social uniformities, as Popper
suggests; they are at best weakly connected with this latter idea, in that
they are not incompatible with it. These claims are at most an option but
not an obligation for the adherent of limited uniformities and restricted
generalizations. Thus Popper's historicisra does not coheret it decomposes
because the doctrine of intrinsic social novelty and its amplification is
incompatible with even limited social uniformities, and because the crucial
connection between such uniformities and developmental laws is not as "close-
knit" as Popper's case requires.
The several points of weakness which I shall consider in Popper's case
for the logical connections between the various historicist doctrines are
relevant to the concrete issue raised above: whether adherents of Histor-
ismua, and anti-naturalistic views of historical and sociological methods
more generally, are logically if unwittingly committed to a belief in pro¬
phecy by means of trends. Or to put the point more strikingly, whether
1. See below, section IV (p. ,, on whether Hegel and Marx are
historicist3 in the sense of Popper's schema in The Poverty of Ilistoricism.
one must agree to Popper's view that there are no major methodological
idiosyncrasies in history and the social sciences.^* or fall into histor¬
icism} that the unity of scientific method, applied to history and the
social sciences, is the only escape from historicism.
Popper, in his choice of a starting point for presenting historicism,
alludes to Marx's idea that the laws of economics are peculiar to each epoch.
The argument which Popper says i3 brought in support of this claim is that
if there are no significant social uniformities which persist beyond the con¬
fines of a social period, as the anti-naturalistic historicist claims, then
the validity of aqjr generalization based on such uniformities must be re¬
stricted. As scientific theories are valid without condition or time or
space, social laws thus turn out to be rather different from scientific laws.
In allegedly developing this case for the limitations of social uniform¬
ities and of the corresponding laws, Popper covers a wide range of objections
against applying methods analogous to those of the natural sciences in the
study of social life. The connection of some of these doctrines with the
restricted scope of social uniformities may be tenuous, or worse. Marx
might not have acknowledged these ideas as necessary to substantiate his
restriction of various laws of economics to particular historical epochs.
Further, if the anti-naturalistic position which Popper presents is
taken seriously, it would seem to debar those developmental laws which Popper
elicits from the historicist conviction that all social uniformities are re¬
stricted to historical periods, as well as precluding limited generalizations
based on restricted uniformities. Laws of either kind are impossible on
some of the premises which Popper attributes to anti-naturalistic historicism,
ana wnich are central to this view. If there can be no "real repetition" in
history, positing any uniformities whatsoever is incompatible with the
1. Situational logic, as Popper conceives it, is not altogether a deviation
from scientific methods for Popper claims that it is objective. Cf. chapter
three above.
"intrinsic" novelty of historical phenomena. Consequently, there can he
no generalizations about these phenomena, even restricted to periods.
The argument of "intrinsic" novelty, which Popper attributes to the
anti-naturalistic historicist, is akin to the claims made in Historismus for
the uniqueness or individuality of historical phenomena. Popper says that
the historicist claim that social experiments cannot be reproduced because
there is no "real repetition" in social life, derives from the intrinsic
novelty or uniqueness of historical phenomena, which is in turn due to their
"presupposting} the mental life of individuals".1" In the arguments for the
distinctive character of the historical sciences, the individuality or uni¬
queness of historical phenomena was brought to the fore; it was sometimes
said that the historical sciences required a distinctive approach, irreduc¬
ible to scientific methods, to apprehend individuality in phenomena inter¬
woven with mental life. Individuality could be grasped by an idographic
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approach, but not by a nomothetic or generalizing approach.
Thus, some of the doctrines that Popper attributes to anti-naturalistic
historicisrn, which have correlates in llistorismus, are incompatible with the
starting point which Popper chooses for his presentation of anti-naturalistic
historicisms namely that those social laws which are based on uniformities,
and thus analogous to the laws of the natural sciences, are unlike the laws
of the natural sciences in being restricted to periods. The argument with
which Popper provides the historicist, about the novelty of social phenomena,
entails that such phenomena are unique; or, in the terminology usual to
Historismus, social entities are supra-personal individuals. '* If histo¬
rical phenomena are consistently novel, or unique, there can be no actual
uniformity among; such individual phenomena. Generalizations based on uniform¬
ities would be distortions. Thus the doctrine of intrinsic novelty implies
that generalization is irrelevant to the characteristic features of social
phenomena.
1. PH, p.12.
2. See Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science p.216 (note 64 to Parti)
on this terminology.
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This contradiction in Popper's presentation of historicism cannot be
put right. Matters cannot be amended by dropping the troublesome doctrine
of the "intrinsic" novelty of social phenomena from the catalogue of anti-
naturalistic doctrines, for this concept cannot be neatly excised. It is
because social phenomena involve "the mental life of individuals" that
these phenomena are intrinsically novel . This same characteristic feature
accounts for their complexity, as well as the impossibility of exact social
prediction*? for this reason also intuitive understanding, and not causal
explanation, is the appropriate method for apprehending such phenomena.
In short, central to anti-naturalistic historicism is the claim that
because the historian or social scientist studies hu man action, he cannot
apply the methods of the natural sciences. The central issues of the anti-
naturalistic position revolve around the claim that there is something dis¬
tinctive about human action which removes it from the ken of the natural
sciences. The proposal to exempt human action from the procedures of the
natural sciences i3 an interesting problem, of considerable importance for
the philosophy of history. Popper, in criticizing historicism, does not
consider this issue systematically, on its merits and demerits, of which it
has both, but only indirectly. First, Popper claims that such a view
issues .in the doctrine of intuitive understanding, a doctrine which Popper
presents as though its logical working out requires the doctrine of histo¬
rical trends? and then discards its more innocent forms as untestable and
thus no more tiian a heuristic aid and not a method of acquiring knowledge.'''"
Secondly, Popper connects these claims for a distinctive treatment of human
action with the pro-naturalistic doctrine of historical trends and histo-
ricist prophecy, in arguing that anti-naturalistic historicism is logically
connected with pro-naturalistic historicism, and then, by implication, re¬
jects these claims on the grounds of their alleged associations.
But if the anti-naturalistic case for the distinctiveness of human
action means that social phenomena are intrinsically novel, as is implied
1. PH, 20-25.
in what Popper says about its claims for the impossibility of "real repi-
tion" in history because of interference from human consciousness, then the
anti-naturalistic position is incompatible with the two steps by which
Popper derives the machinery for historicist prophesy: the limitation of
social uniformities and. of corresponding generalizations to historical
periods, and. the theoretical possibility, not incompatible with the previous
step, that the only laws valid throughout history are developmental laws,
linking periods.
If the historicist holds, as Popper alleges, that each new period of
history is "intrinsically" different from any other, which is tantamount to
saying that historical periods are unique,"'"* then the
"laws of historical development which determine
the transition from one period to another" 2.
and which are
"the only universally valid laws of society" 3«
must relate to unique configurations, namely, intrinsically different periods.
If historical periods are unique, as the anti-naturalistic historicist
alleges, then this would seem to preclude developmental laws which would
determine the emergence of such unique periods. The superiority of such
developmental laws over restricted generalizations, based on limited uniform¬
ities, is supposed to be that these developmental laws are valid throughout
history. The customary notion of a universally valid law is that it states
what will happen in all cases of a specified sort; the historicist's uni¬
versally valid developmental law must, by assumption, state what will happen
in what can only be a singular instance .
But perhaps such developmental laws are meant to be closer to the para¬
digm of Marxian historical laws, which state that in the history of any
society, the same sequence of epochs, feudal, capitalist and communist will
inexorably occur, with social uniformities and the corresponding laws re¬
stricted to each such epoch. To reconcile the uniqueness of historical
1. PH, p. 10. 2. PH, p. 41. 3. PH, p. 41.
epochs with overarching developmental laws, it might be claimed, although
rather implausibly, that each instance of such epochs will be intrinsically
different from all other instances of the same general type . But here the
anti-naturalistic historicist can argue that his premises have not committed
him to accepting suoh a view; rather, on the contrary, they command him to
reject it*
The anti-naturalist can maintain, consistent with his premises, that
insofar as any historical period is intrinsically novel, it cannot be assimi¬
lated to any typology. Because historical periods as well as all social
phenomena are intrinsically novel, on the anti-naturalistic premises, each
suoh period is unique. Hence a statement about the emergence of such periods
cannot have the generality of a luw> for if it is to describe the emergence
of a novel period in respect of its novelty, it cannot apply to more than one
such period.
In addition, since historical periods are authentically novel, they
cannot be forecast in advance of their emergence. For to say that a pheno¬
menon is intrinsically novel is to say that it could not have been predicted,
and it is incompatible with the intrinsic novelty of such a phenomenon to
say that it could have been predicted in advance of its occurrence. 'insofar
as prevision of historical periods is possible, it must overlook their novel¬
ty. The pro-naturalist has not shown how it is possible to predict intrinsi¬
cally novel historical periods, for to do so would be contradictory.
There can be no universally valid developmental laws determining the
emergence of authentically novel historical periods, for such laws cannot be
universally valid in any usual sense, if the emergent periods are authenti¬
cally novel and thus unique. Nor can the emergence of these novel periods
1. Popper does not say that the pro-naturalistic historicist claims the
"sweep and the significance" (PH,p. 37) of his long-term forecasts is that
they predict intrinsically novel historical periods. To say this would lay
bare the difficulty in Popper's connection of anti-naturalistic hiatoricism
with pro-naturalistic historicism.
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be governed by any lawa, for such laws would make it possible to predict
the emergence of such periods in advance of their occurrence, and novelty
cannot be predicted and remain authentic novelty. If there were develop¬
mental laws which governed the transition to intrinsically novel historical
periods, but did not determine the intrinsic novelty of these periods, then
there would be the problem of the way in which the intrinsic novelty of histo¬
rical periods is characteristic of then. It would be disregarded in pre¬
dictions of these periods by developmental laws, which would imply that it
is not intrinsic to the periods. To be sure, what is novel about such histo¬
rical periods need not be novel in all aspects* for then history would be a
series of apocalypses. But if the pro-naturalist is to predict historical
periods as delineated by anti-naturalistic historicism, my contention i3
that such predictions will not be of much use unless they can predict the
intrinsic novelty of such periods, and it has been argued that novelty can¬
not be predicted, for if it could be, it would not then be novel.
If historical periods are governed by developmental laws, then their
novelty turns out to be spurious and not intrinsic. Truly novel historical
periods thus preclude analysis by developmental laws. The anti-naturalistic
historicist, in insisting on the intrinsic novelty of each and every histo¬
rical period, waives all developmental laws governing their emergence, as
well as denying the possibility of any significant social uniformities within
periods.
Thus the anti-naturalistic historicist is faithful to his premises in
rejecting the developmental laws proposed by the pro-naturalistic historicist,
on the grounds that such laws are incompatible with the characterization of
social and historical phenomena given by the anti-naturalist. Popper does
not supply any actual instance of the combination of pro-naturalistic and
anti-naturalistic historicism in the doctrine of historical trends,'*" nor
could he find any such example that could not be convicted of inconsistency
for holding that the emergence of intrinsically novel historical periods is
1. Gf. below, sec. IV.
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governed by developmental lawa. Anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic
historiclsm are incompatible; they do not form a coherent set of doctrines.
This point may be reinforced by the example of Rickert, a theoretician
of Historismuo whose ideas on the distinctive features of historical con¬
ceptualization are a more nuanced presentation of some of the ideas which
Popper attributes to anti-naturalistic historicism. Rickert held that
laws of all kinds, employed in the scientific approach, required abstract¬
ing from the concrete individuality of phenomena; a generalizing procedure
was, he thought, antithetical to historical conceptualization, which attended
to the particular, the unique, the individual.^'*
"Historical evolution means not simply motion, nor
change, but a change which is unique and is
important on account of its uniqueness...A change
that is historical must not only be unique, one
that has never appeared before and can never appear
again in our world, but it must be important on
account of its newness." 2.
Although Rickert thought it possible to consider social phenomena from a
generalizing, or "natural science point of view", and thus
"to formulate the laws of social evolution
these laws are not historical lawa. An historical
law, a law of what happened once and cannot happen
again, is a contradictio in adjecto." 3.
The crux of Rickert's argument is that because historical phenomena are
conceived as unique individuals, generalization, required for formulating
laws, is precluded. Thus by a slightly different argument than that out¬
lined above, a representative of the Historismus, which Popper has acknow¬
ledged as an instance of anti-naturalistic historicism, denies that these
views commit him to a belief in developmental laws and asserts that these
same views are indeed incompatible with such laws.
1. H. Rickert, Science and History (1962)
2. P.M. Pling, "Historical Synthesis", American Historical Review v.9 (no.l)
(October, 1903) p. 17* This essay presents Rickert's Grenzen der
naturwissenBohaftlichen Begriffsbildung to an American audience.
3. Fling, op. cit, p. 20.
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The anti-naturalistic historicist might consistently continue his
criticism of the pro-naturalistic doctrines, to which Popper claims he is
logically committed, by saying that the pro-naturalistic historicist pro¬
ceeds overly generally, overlooking specific contentions upheld by the anti-
naturalist, to the detriment of the case for developmental laws in history.
The pro-naturalist makes statements which are acceptable only hypothetically,
and then proceeds as if these statements were established categorically.
For instance, the anti-naturalist has exhibited grounds for thinking that
social predictions cannot be precise, because of their repercussions, actual
and potential. The pro-natar&list has only assarted that, over the long
run, the inaccuracy of such predictions, which he describes more favourably
as vagueness, can be compensated by their significance. Such a notion of
compensation begs questions: the case for the significance of vague, or
inexact, social predictions rests on the claim that the emergence of histo¬
rical periods is governed by developmental laws. But this latter contention
is only a theoretical possibility, compatible with the claim that social uni¬
formities and corresponding laws are of restricted scope, but incompatible
with the intrinsic novelty which the anti-naturalist attributes to historical
phenomena in general, and historical periods in particular.
The weak link in Popper's concatenation of pro-naturalistic and anti-
naturalistic historicism is that the assertion that all significant social
uniformities are confined to historical periods gives no grounds for think¬
ing that overarching developmental laws, linking periods, exist. All Pop¬
per's argument shows is that such developmental laws are not in principle
incompatible with restricted uniformities; he does not establish that one
is committed to a belief in the existence of 3uch laws through asserting
that all significant social uniformities are restricted to periods. The
claim for restricted uniformities implies that developmental laws linking
periods are possible in principle, but it gives no grounds for thinking such
laws do in fact exist. The connection of pro-naturalistic historicism with
the starting point of anti-naturalistic historicism is not "close-knit";
tnere is no bond.
The theoretical possibility of such developmental laws, valid through¬
out history, while it may be in principle compatible with social uniformities
restricted to historical periods, is incompatible with the amplification of
the anti-naturalistic position which Popper presents. This latter position,
as has been argued, conflicts as well with claims for the existence of signi¬
ficant social uniformities, whether restricted to periods or not.
Popper does not reconcile the central historicist claim for trends or
developmental laws, with the anti-naturalistic contentions, nor can he do so.
His case for linking anti-naturslistic historicism with the pro-naturalistic
doctrines falls apart; it rests on the rather weak basis of compatibility
with, not derivation from, restricted uniformities: compatibility, that is,
with a doctrine which is itself incompatible with the body of anti-natural¬
istic ideas. Popper has not established a bond between the anti-natural¬
istic doctrines related to Hiotorismus, and the not altogether convincing
steps by which he obtains the machinery of developmental laws for prophecy.
If the collection of doctrines which Popper calls historicism are mutually
inconsistent, it is difficult to see how it can be thought convenient or
useful to cover them by a common name.
What may occur in the .formation of Popper's ideas on historicism is that
two aspects of his thought are juxtaposed: Popper's criticism of Historisraus
may be similar, if not related to an objection raised by the Yienna Circle
to certain ideas current in German philosophy. Contemporary German philo¬
sophy then took for granted a radical distinction between historical know¬
ledge and scientific knowledge, the plausibility of which was largely due to
its support by Historismus; the Vienna Circle stood for the unity of all
knowledge in science. Popper conflates this point of agreement with the
Yienna Circle with certain other doctrines that he thinks constitute dis¬
creditable uses of history: large-scale social planning, historical pro¬
phecy, and Nazism. Why Popper should think these lines of thought related
is considered in the next section but one, on "Popper's hintoricism and his
Liberalism1'.
XV. Hegel and Marx as Historicists.
The preceding discussion, in concentrating on Popper's analysis of
historicism in The Poverty of Historicism, has negleoted his supplementary
study of historicism, The Open Society and its Enemies, a book based on
Popper's collection of "material to illustrate (the} development of histori¬
cism," which he wrote to drive home the dangers of the "habit of historical
prophecy.""*'* Popper intended his two studies of historicism, which are in
different modes, to be complementary, but there are some considerable con¬
trasts in Popper's presentation of historicism in these two books. In The
Poverty of Historicism Popper presented historicism as a "close-knit philo-
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sophy" - a claim which has been disputed, in the preceding pages. In The
Open Society, Popper describes historicism as "a loosely connected set of
3
ideas". It seems difficult to account for this difference in Popper's
characterizations of historicism solely in terms of the different genres of
these books. Popper's claim of "something like scientific status"^* for his
analysis of historicism in The Poverty of Historicism has been considered
C
above. He makes no such claims for his approach to historicism in The Open
Societys
"it cannot give more than a personal point of view".^*
7.
That is, it is a historical interpretation, as Popper understands this notion.
Popper's historical interpretation of historicism ceni^^s on an examina¬
tion of the ideas of certain intellectual heroes of Western civilization
whom he thinks must be exposed as arch-historicistss ohief among these are
8
Plato, Hegel and Marx. * The accuracy of Popper's presentation of Plato and
Hegel has been
1. OS, I, 3? Os, I, 4- 2. PH, p. 3. 3. OS, I, 8. 4. OS, I, 3*
5. Cf. above, p.3_4< 6. OS, I, 3»
7. Cf. chapter 25 OS, discussed in Chapter Five, below.
8. Marx's ideas, in Popper's view, are not always historicist (of. below p.'ST )>
but he fathered the Marxist method whioh Popper considers to be the "purest
historioism". OS, II, 84.
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disputed;'1' * and the justice of Popper's characterization of Plato as a
historicist has also been criticized. * In this section I shall consider
whether Popper's analysis of historicism in The Poverty of Historicism,
into pro-naturalistic and anti-naturalistic components, fits the two figures
whom he considers to be the founding fathers of modern historicism, Hegel
and Marx. The problem is whether their respective ideas on history do in
fact combine "both kinds of doctrines.
Hegel, as is well-known, denied that he had any intent to predict the
future; philosophy could not shed light on history beyond the present. If
Hegel renounced what Popper considers to be central to historicism, histo¬
rical prophecy, was this because Hegel was blind to the commitments in which
his philosophy of history involved him? If Hegel subscribed to some, but
not all^of the doctrines which Popper allocates to anti-naturalistic histo¬
ricism, Popper, as we have seen, might argue that this is no barrier to
Hegel's being committed to full-blown historicism, for Popper claims to have
filled in the lacunae in the historicist methodology.^* But if Hegel's
approach to the philosophy of history does not commit him to historicist
prophecy, as I shall argue, then Popper's reasons for classifying Hegel as
a historicist need to be examined . I shall argue that Popper considers
Hegel to be a historicist on account of the latter's "holism": which turns
1. Ronald B. Levison, In Defence of Plato; Richard Robinson, "Dr. Popper's
Defence of Democracy", Philosophical Review, v.6o(l95l)> 487-507; Walter
Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and its Method", Philosophical Review, v. 6o(l95l)
459-86, revised and enlarged version in The Owl and the Nightingale (London,
I960; a British edition of Prom Shakespeare to Existentialism, Boston, 1959)
chapters vii-viii.
Popper has also recently been accused of misrepresenting Marx as well, by
Maurice Cornforth, in The Open Philosophy and the Open Society, a Reply to
Dr. Karl Popper's Refutations of Marxism (London, 1968), but I think that
Cornforth's presentation of Marx is also open to question on some points.
2. W.H. Walsh, "Plato and the Philosophy of History: History and Theory
in the Republic", History and Theory, 11(1962), 5-16.
5. PH, p. 3.
4. PH, p. 3.
out to be a view of individuals and their relationships with social entities
which Popper rejects in the name of methodological individualism.
Hegel held that the methods of the natural sciences were not adequate
for the philosophical investigation of history. Hegel's methodological
views are professedly anti-naturalistic in Popper's sense; his methodology
includes some, but not all of the doctrines that Popper considers in his
elaboration of anti-naturalistic historiciam. In Hegel's view, the salient
characteristics of each epoch are peculiar to it, so that there could be no
significant social uniformities valid throughout history. furthermore,
Hegel held that the significance of any particular event derived from the
historical processes of which it was part, so that Hegel's approach seems to
exemplify what Popper describes as the "third variant of the method of in¬
tuitive understanding", that
".♦.to understand the meaning or significance of a social event,
more is required than an analysis of its genesis, effects, and
situational value. Over and above such analysis, it is
necessary to analyse objective, underlying historical trends
and tendencies...prevailing at the period in question, and to
analyse the contribution of the event in question to the
historical process by which such trends become manifest". 1.
But Hegel was a stern critic of intuitionist views, and he also held that
understanding was inferior to reason: understanding might suffice for the
natural sciences, but the philosophical investigation of history required
reason. Consequently Popper's name for this doctrine seems peculiarly in¬
appropriate as a description of Hegel's views; it might be said that Hegel
thought that the philosophy of history pursued the ends of the third variant
of intuitive understanding, but could not do so by means of understanding,
and did not require intuitive means of apprehension to do so.
Lastly, Hegel held that social collectives were something more than
"mere aggregates of persons", and that social entities manifested themselves
in historical development. Hegel, then, was a holist and rejected what
Popper calls methodological nominalism and methodological individualism as
inadequate for the philosophical investigation of history.
1. PH, p.22. 2. PH, p.17.
Hegel's philosophical position, then was anti-naturalistic. As he
subscribed to the view that history develops in specifiable ways, he was a
historicist as well. Was he then committed to pro-naturalistic historicism,
and more specifically, to the doctrine which he denied that he held, of
historical prophecy? For Hegel, the significance of events is to be deter¬
mined by considering their place in historical developments? his aporoach
might be described, in later terminology, as one of colligation.^* But
Hegel did not think it was possible to predict the future by extrapolating
the developments which he discerned in past events, even though he did think
that such developments constituted objective patterns of history; Hegel held
2.
what Popper considers to be a historicist view of historical interpretations,
that they could reveal the objective "meaning" of history.
It might be argued that Hegel's various statements about historical
necessity committed him to historicist prophecy, despite his denials. But
if Hegel held that past events had to happen as they did, he is still not,
as he says, committed to the belief that he knows what will happen in the
future. Moreover, it has been suggested that "contingency...bulks large in
fkegel'sj account" of history."'* A case has been made for Hegel's description
of historical events as necessary aa being, in some important cases, "non-
deterministic". The rise of Caesar was not, in Hegel's view, necessary in
the sense of being predictable, although the collapse of the Roman Republic
was, "conditions being what they were":
"But would the state be saved? Only if there was a Caesar to do what
was required - and if he would do it. What was required was, of
course, 'necessary'? but only in the sense of being necessary for
the salvation of the state - and for the continued development of
history in the direction of increasing freedom. The latter is
something which, in Hegel's account, is never guaranteed." 4.
1. A term applied to historiography by W.H. Walsh, in Philosophy of History;
an Introduction (London, 1951, 1958), and modified and improved in W.H. Walsh,
"Colligatory Concepts in History", Studies in the Nature and Teaching of
History, ed. W.H. Burston and B. Thompson (London, 196?)
2. 03, II, 269 (chapter 25, see. iii)
5« W.H. Bray, Philosophy of History (Prentice-Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.
1964), p. 74.
4. Bray, ££. cit., p.75»
It has been suggested above"'''that a historian might argue that the Roman
Republic could not survive on the basis of a situational analysis; thus
Hegel's interpretation in this case does not go beyond what a historian is
licensed to assert, on the basis of a situational analysis of the evidence.
A case for Hegel's view of history as deterministic and for his being a
historical prophet, despite his denials, is at best open to question. Al¬
though Hegel subscribed to something of the anti-naturalistic position -
sufficient to have helped to foster the development of Historismus - he was
not committed to historicist prophecy by means of the machinery of pro-
naturalistic historicism.
Why, then, does Popper maintain that Hegel was a historicist, when Hegel
could and did disavow that his philosophy of history committed him to pre¬
dicting the future? Popper does not make the best of cases for his claim,
in his chapter on Hegel in The Open Society. He gives most space to expross-
2
ing his mistaken belief that Hegel's views were politically motivated.
Although Hegel could reject historicist prophecy, which Popper considers
the culmination of historicism, Hegel was a historicist in a sense that Popper
finds objectionable, in that Hegel held that history develops in specifiable
ways. The pattern which Hegel thought was to be found in the past was the
development of the consciousness of freedom. Hegel held that world-histo¬
rical individuals were able to act in accordance with the salient develop¬
ments of their time: that they had practical knowledge of how history was
developing. It is because Hegel thought history had a meaning in the supra-
individual process of the development of the consciousness of freedom that
Popper can consider him to be a historicist.
1. Chapter Three, p-'ti-
2. Chapter 12, OS, "Hegel and the New Tribalism", passim, OS, II, 26-80.
That Popper misrepresented Hegel has been shown by Kaufmann, o£. cit.
Popper, in answer to the critics of his chapter on Hegel, has argued that his
"attitude" to Hegel's philosophy rests on his appraisal of its contribution
to "totalitarian modes of thought". (OS, II, 393-9)•
The crux of Popper's objections to Hegel as a historicist lies, I think,
in the latter'o ethical theories and. the conception of the individual which
these involve: that the individual ia not self-contained, as Popper insists,
but is shaped by his participation in various social "wholes" or collective
entities of the society in whioh he is a member. The opposition between
these two views of the individual, that of Popper, and that of Hegel, further
developed by Bradley, is fundamental to Popper's critique of historioism.^"
Hegel held that actions which are to be appraised in moral terms must be
viewed as performed by individuals within a particular social context:
individuals have certain duties because of their social positions and relations,
and a moral appraisal of their actions must start from these considerations.
Hegel developed and illustrated his contention that different societies have
distinctive institutions, so that what would be a morally appropriate action
in the circumstances of someone in one society would not be so in the circum¬
stances of another society. Hegel's views are incompatible with Popper's
insistence that "we" can work on our social situation, whatever it is, so as
to bring about the "open society". It is because Hegel is a holist, to use
Poppers catchwords, which do not convey Hegel's views altogether satisfac¬
torily, that Popper considers hira to have been a historicist; for Hegel was
not a historicist in the sense of being committed to the combination of anti-
naturalistic and pro-naturalistic doctrines which Popper presents as the fully-
developed historicist methodology in The Poverty of Historicism.
Marx, by contrast with Hegel's anti-naturalistic views, held that his
method was naturalistic, and thought that he could make valid historical pre¬
dictions. Popper does not condemn Marx's methodology out of hand. Although
some of Marx's ideas were developed into that "purest historicism...Marxist
2
method" , others can be salvaged: Marx's use of situational logic and of the
notion of unintended consequences are, according to Popper, independent of
his historicism. The bearing of Marx's ideas on Popper's analysis of hist¬
oricism in The Poverty of Historicism is the following: insofar as Marx
claimed his naturalistic method could yield historical predictions, did this
1. Cf. below, Chapter Six. 2 . OS, II, 84.
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claim, which Popper considers to be characteristic of pro-naturalistic
historicisxn presuppose, as Popper argues it does,^* the anti-naturalistic
doctrines of historicism? Did Marx's naturalistic method conceal his
commitment to the anti-naturalistic methodology of historicism?
Marx subscribed to the doctrine which Popper uses to introduce his
discussion of anti-naturalistic historicism! that there are no significant
social uniformities valid throughout history. The iron law of capitalism
was limited to the epoch of capitalism and would be annulled by the coming
of a new epoch. But Marx would not have thought that this doctrine comm¬
itted him to an anti-naturalistic view of historical method? nor did it
commit him to the anti-naturalistic methodology that Popper delineates, for,
as has been argued above, "*a case for limited social uniformities is incom¬
patible with the full-fledged doctrine of the intrinsic novelty of social
phenomena and the associated doctrine that such unique phenomena can only
be apprehended by intuitive understanding.
Although Marx thought that a developmental approach was required to
grasp the significance of particular historical events, and in this sense
held a view resembling what Popper calls the third variant of intuitive
understanding,he did not think that his approach involved intuitive under¬
standing; he maintained that his developmental approach to history rested
on an objective basis, of economic conditions which coxild be scientifically
investigated.^* Insofar as anti-naturalistic historicism revolves about
the view that unique historical phenomena must be apprehended by intuitive
means, this view is foreign to Marx's ideas on historical method.
Marx held that social collectives were jomething more than conglo-
1. PH, p. 35-56. 2. Cf. above pp.2.3=^ 11T-H7
3. Cf« above p. IS* with respect to Hegel.
4. Consideration of Hegel's and Marx's ideas, in relation to what Popper
calls the third variant of intuitive understanding, suggests that Popper
conflates several ideas under this heading, not all of which need involve
intuitive means of apprehension.
merates of individuals, and in this respect he may be thought to be a holist
but he would have denied that intuitive understanding, gained through histo¬
rical study, was required to apprehend the essences of such social collect¬
ives. The nature of social collectives could, in Marx's view, be deter¬
mined by historical investigation of objective conditions.
It is, then, impossible to extract the fundamental anti-naturalistic
doctrines of historicism from Marx's ideas on the method appropriate to histo¬
rical study. Marx, no more than Hegel, exemplifies Popper's analysis of
historicism in The Poverty of Historicism. The reasons for Popper consider¬
ing some of Marx's leading ideas to be historicist are evident? Marx held
that there were developmental laws of history, and that it was possible to
predict the future from the analysis he recommended of historical events.
Insofar as Marx claimed to be a historical prophet, he was a historicist in
what is the central reference of Popper's usage of this term. Moreover,
like Hegel, he held that individuals are not self-contained, but are shaped
by their participation in social processes. These contrasting views of the
individual are, as has been said, fundamental to Popper's critique of histo¬
ricism. But Marx cannot be convicted of having presupposed the anti-
naturalistic doctrines of historicism in his claims to predict the future by
means of a naturalistic method of historical investigation. Popper's ana-
1 •
lysis of the "subtle" "logic" of the "intellectual structure" of historicism
does not apply to his two chief examples of historicist thought, and an in¬
vestigation of why it does not apply has suggested some of the reasons for
Popper's connection of a variety of incompatible doctrines in his critique
of historicism.
1. Pfl, "Preface", vii.
V. Popper's Historicism and his liberalism
It was argued above that historioism binds together various strands in
Popper's ideas on history and the social sciences. However, under logical
examination the specious coherence of historicism dissolved into a conglo¬
merate of disparate, and in some respects, incompatible doctrines. An
extended case for distinctive methods in history and the social sciences,
resting on alleged requirements for the study of human action, maintains that
the intrinsic novelty, or uniqueness, of social phenomena, due to their being
human phenomena, precludes laws either about regularities or developments in
social life. Popper claims that the various lines of historicist thought
are interwovdn in the doctrine of historical trends, but the derivation he
proposes for this doctrine does not support his claim, but only the markedly
weaker assertion that developmental laws or historical trends are not incom¬
patible with social uniformities of restricted validity; and adherence to
the latter does not entail the former.
Logically, historicism falls apart into at least three sets of ideas.
First,n the anti-naturalistic case for a distinctive approach to social pheno¬
mena, because they involve human action and are consequently unique. Second,
the claim which, if it is not vacuous, is incompatible with the preceding:
that there are no significant social uniformities which are not restricted to
historical periods. The last point, that there are developmental laws which
determine the transitions between historical periods, is only compatible with,
but is not entailed by the second claim, about the limitation of significant
social uniformities to historical periods, and is incompatible with the first
claim, of the novelty or uniqueness of social phenomena. That social uni¬
formities are limited in validity to historical periods implies that if
social laws of universal validity exist, then they are developmental laws,
determining the transitions between historical periods, but it does not imply
that social laws of universal validity exist. It is possible to hold that
all significant social uniformities, and corresponding generalizations, are
restricted to periods, and also to hold that there are no universally valid
social laws; the claim for developmental laws is not ineuntoent upon the ad¬
herent of restricted uniformities - it is, rather, optional.
The logical fission of historicism would seem to impair its usefulness
as a colligation of Popper's thought. If historicism ia not to prove a red
herring in analyzing Popper's ideas on history and the social sciences, then
we must investigate for alogical connections between the various hiatoricist
doctrines, which may serve to correlate, under the rubric of historicism,
what Popper criticizes and what he advocates.
The purport of Popper's critique of historicism may be elicited through
a comparison with the approach of the arch-historicist in The Poverty of
Historicis®, Popper's late colleague at LSE, Karl Mannheim. Although
Popper and Mannheim recommend antithetical social philosophies, their argu¬
ments are isomorphic. In their works, stimulated by the second World War
and the circumstances that had led up to it, both were concerned with the
threat of totalitarianism, especially from Nazi Germany. Mannheim argued
that the weakness of liberalism in its lack of social planning conduced to
totalitarianism; ^he emergence of a totalitarian state in Germany attested
to this tragic flaw of liberalism; such disasters could be prevented only
by replacing the laissez-faire society of the liberal ideal by democratic,
large-scale planning. Thus Mannheim recommended large-scale planning as an
antidote to totalitarianism.
In Popper's argument, the error and its restitution are reversely identi¬
fied. For Popper, the danger of large-scale planning is that it invites
totalitarianism; thus he recommends liberalism with its safeguards against
overreaching- social policies. Collectivist planning is then for Popper the
slippery road to totalitarianism; classical liberalism, with its respect for
the integrity of the individual, the only defence against the dangers augured
by Nazi Germany: of society going back to the cage, as Popper sometimes says.
popper's defence of liberalism supplies what logic cannot: Popper's
grounds for colligating a variety of doctrines, at odds with liberalism, as
historicism, or the intellectual preconditions of totalitarian$$m.
1?t>
There is some reason to think that what Popper offers is not terribly-
useful as an analysis of these ideas. The political propositions associated
with some of the various hiotoricist doctrines my exhibit a degree of con-
gruity, but the more disengaged propositions of the several historicisras are
in conflict. That is, Historiamus, to which Popper's anti-naturalistic
historicism refers, may agree with large-scale planning in being eollectivist:
in denying that discrete actions of individuals can achieve the optimum of
social welfare. But the underpinning which Popper ascribes to large-scale
planning, namely developmental laws, and the arguments for the distinctive
method of history, resting on the intrinsic novelty or uniqueness of human
particulars, are logically incompatible.
Popper's analysis of historicism is shaped by his liberal point of view
for the same reasons as it is isomorphic to Mannheim's analysis of Nazism.
Hitler's Third Heich, says Popper, has laid bare the logical consequences of
the system of ideas that he calls historicism: namely claims for the feasi¬
bility of large-scale planning, on the grounds that its results can be fore¬
seen by means of prophecies from developmental laws; claims which Popper
links under nistoiicism with a collection of arguments alleging that the
methods for obtaining historical knowledge are unlike those of the natural
sciences. Attempts to undermine or to replace classical liberalism by argu¬
ments from the historicist armoury have been revealed by the horrendous
events of Nazism for what they are: fallacies of immense political and social
consequence. Recent experience, argues Popper, has given the lie to those
political doctrines alleged to supersede classical liberalism. Classical
liberalism, renovated by means of analogies from the methods of physics,
is a more than adequate guide in social and political matters of contemporary
life, as well as supplying an answer to the associated question of the
methodology appropriate to the social sciences.
1. Herbert Marcuse ("The Problem of Historical Laws", Partisan Review,
26(1959) pp.117-129, especially 126-9) makes much of Popper's PH as a
restatement of "some of the philosophical foundations of classical
liberalism" on a methodological plane. I think it can be argued that
Popper's references to scientific method in this connexion are meant
to renovate liberalism.
A defence of such a restatement of liberalism underlies Popper's pre¬
sentation of historicism as well as his critique thereof. In the last
chapter, on holisrasand individualisras, I shall argue that Popper's liberal¬
ism affects the very categories in which he considers matters of social
policy; there I shall contend that Popper's various statements and anal¬
yses of holism can only be appreciated as complementary to his individual-
isms, political, methodologioa.1 and ontological; and that there are serious
defects in the methodological individualism which Popper presents as a self-
1.
evident truth, " deficiencies which are due to Popper's liberalism.
Popper's analysis of historicisra is intended to support liberalism by
demonstrating that collectivist planning is logically impossible as well as
politically unworkable; that rejection of the premises of classical liberal¬
ism leads to blind alleys, not thoroughfares to the future. But Popper*3
analysis of historicism encompasses far more than large-scale planning.
What Popper calls anti-naturalistic historicism, and relates to the under¬
pinning of oollectiviat planning as premises to conclusions, is, as I have
argued, closely connected with Historismus or "the German Idea of History"
2.
as it has recently been described.
Historismus, as has recently been argued, was not a disembodied
"theory of historical cognition or development.
Prom the beginning it involved certain definite
assumptions regarding the nature of political
society." 5.
Popper's analysis of historicism is an attempt to link the intellectual
structure of Historismus with the intellectual basis for large-scale social
planning; but this will not do because there are serious dissonances between
the two sets of ideas . The aspect of Historismus which ia consonant with
"holistic" planning are the arguments the former supports for holding that
classical liberalism is sadly inadequate in matters of political and social
policy. If, in accordance with Historismus, supra-individual social enti¬
ties are considered to be of real consequence in social life,'^* then the
1. PK, p. 157. 2. Iggers, oj>. cit.p.289 Iggers,op.cit.p.327.
4. An application of "holism" as Popper characterizes it PH, 17-19 under
anti-naturaliatic historicism, which is not quite identical with what he
criticizes as holism, PH 7^-92.
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claim of liberalism that the discrete actions of autonomous individuals are
the best assurance of social welfare must seem misconceived. But this need
not be totalitarianism or Nazism in ovo. Moreover, the political collecti¬
vism of Historismus does not involve what I have argued is central to Histo-
ri3mus as a claim that the methods of history and the social sciences are
distinct from those of the natural sciences: namely that social phenomena
are intrinsically novel, or equivalently, unique, because they involve the
1 •
mental * life of human beings.
Thus Popper's association of Historismus with large-scale planning, as
preconditions of totalitarianism, indicates that Popper is concerned with
the political aspects of Historissius rather than with the grounds for its
claim that the methods of history and the social sciences are distinctive.
The difficulty in Popper's connection of Historismua with historicist pro¬
phecy supports this interpretation, that Popper's concerns are political
rather than methodological: for the connection Popper proposed is incom¬
patible with the doctrine of the intrinsic novelty of social phenomena
which, I have argued, i3 central to the case for distinctive methods. The
methodological debate is not altogether aligned with the political cast of
Popper's criticism of historicism.
Popper's critique of historicism may thus be described as ideological,
in accordance with a recent characterization of this term: Popper's concern
2.
is with "beliefs of political import about social institutions", to which
methodological issties take second place. Popper, to be sure, argues in a
line reminiscent of Marx's symbiosis of theory and practice that
1. There are difficulties associated with the word "mental", but it is also
difficult to state the claims of Historismus without some such wor4, unless
one uses the term human action which in this context is also controversial.
2. Braybrooke, "Ideology," Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards
(N.Y., 1967) I? 129-
"The loous of ideology lies in beliefs of political import
about social institutions."
yzi**
"the more fruitful debates on method are always
inspired by certain practical problems which
faoe the research worker..." 1.
that methodology, without the "incentive"of practical problems, is scholastic
in the pejorative sense.
Popper's point is acceptable only insofar as commitments on practical
issues do not introduce theoretical errors - mistakes, in other words, of an
ideological nature - and this is, as I have argued, one significant effect
of Popper's liberal beliefs on his analysis of historicism.
Popper has contrasted the genre of The Poverty of Historicism with that
of his other discussion of historioism, The Open Society and its Enemies.
"The systematic analysis of historicism
as in The Poverty of Historicism
2.
"aims at something like scientific status". "*
The Open Society, is a compendium of
"material to illustrate {the} development"
of historicisxn, represents "a personal point of view," and does not "pretend
to be scientific". If we adopt the views on historical interpretations
which Popper expresses in the last chapter of The Open Society, then the
distinction of status which Popper draws between his two different treatments
of historicism dissolves. Popper's allegedly scientific analysis of histo-
ricisra in The Poverty of Historioiam depends as much on "a personal point of
view" as does his historical illustration of the development of historicism
in The Open Society. Inaccessibility to incersubjective testing and depend¬
ence on a point of view are what make historical interpretations inadmissible
to scientific knowledge. Thus, in The Poverty of Hiatoriciam. the connections
which Popper alleges hold between the various aspects of historioism are not
logical but ideological, for some of the key doctrines which Popper associates
are incompatible. The connections derive, as I have argued, from Popper's
1. Popper, PH, p.57, of. 55-58» also OS, II, 222 end of chap. 25.
"Practice is not the enemy of theoretical knowledge but the most valuable
incentive to it".
2. OS, I, 5 5* OS, I, 5.
defence of liberalism and are not inter-subjectively testable or objectively
valid. The claims of ncientifio status for The Poverty of Historiclsm must
be rejected. If it is not a piece of ideology, it is an attempt at histo¬
rical interpretation, in the form of an abstract analysis of the rise of
Naziam.* *
Insofar as the lack of anything like Western Liberalism is held to have
contributed to the rise of Nazism, and insofar as Historlsmus is implicated
2.
in the lack of such a liberalism *, then Hiatorisraus may be considered to be
an intellectual precondition of Nazism. If this is Popper's position, that
a lack of authentic liberalism in Germany, due to the prevalence of Hiatoris¬
raus and associated collectivist ideas of social policy, explains tho rise of
Nazism, then he has stated his argument rather obscurely. But Popper's -j.
tX 9A.*' \t> Kg. yy bu.wjm-S \
rather abstractly formulated interpretation of the rise of Nazismjis certainly
seriously incomplete, for it omits social and economic conditions which many
historians would consider to be crucial; it explains the rise of Nazism
purely in terras of the consequences of ideas. Popper's interpretation
might be thought to over-intellectualize a movement which prided itself on
its opportunistic use of ideas.
But there are other limitations to Popper's analysis of historicism
which are raore germane to our present concerns than its deficiencies as a
historical interpretation of Nazism. My concern has been with its weaknesses,
not as a historical interpretation, but as a philosophical argument.
1. Or perhaps it is both historiography and ideology at once.
2. See Iggers, op. cit. pp.327-328, where he makes this point.
&-Vrrfter Jl+pVu"U^ o££er KM turn ©w \u,vttruci4*«
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It has recently been suggested that there are, in the main, two "princi¬
pal motives" for concern with the manifold activities subsumed under the term
•philosophy of history': either the hope of predicting the futxire from study
of the past, or the "desire" to contribute to understanding "the significance
of human life".'*'* Popper claims to have thoroughly discredited the former,
prophetic, motive through his critique of historicism. As for the latter
2.
motive, which is moral in a large sense ", Popper maintains, in the conclud-
3
ing chapter of The Open Society, that the methodological limitations of
historiography preclude any attempt to extract the overall significance of
human life from what we can know with respect to the past.
No history of humanity can be written, Popper argues, because there is
no archiraedean point from which all mankind's past can be considered with a
view to appraising its significance. The whole history of mankind is beyond
our grasp. Popper denies that any possible synthesis of past records can
reveal the overall significance of humn life. The use of history along
the moral lines of the second suggested motive for philosophy of history i;,
according to Popper, far more limited: it is restricted to the here-and-now;
historiography can be used instrumentally, to cast light on "problems" in the
present.
Popper maintains that these radical and sweeping conclusions about the
limited scope of historical work are derived from his analysis of historical
1. R.V. Sampson, in a review of Bruce Mazlish, The Riddle of History, in
History and Theory, vol.VI, no. 3(1967) pp. 456-458.
2. op. cit., p. 458
3. Chapter 25, "Has History any Meaning?", OS, II, 259-80. Throughout this
chapter I cite the fourth edition of The Open Society; there seem to be no
changes in this part of the OS. The relevant pages in the first ediction
of the OS for this chapter are: OS, II, 246-248, sec. i, for the necessity
of selection for knowledge, in history as in science; OS, II, 248-252,
sec. ii, on Popper*3 hypothetieo-deductive model of historical explanation;
03, II, 252-256, sec. iii, for Popper's analysis of the characteristics of
historical interpretations; and OS, II, 256-267, sec. iv, where Popper
argues from the plurality of possible interpretations that "history has no
meaning" in the sense that "a concrete history of mankind" cannot be
written.
method by the standards of empirical science. The logical impossibility
of writing a history of mankind is a consequence of his argument that, if
history is to be written at all, it must be written from a point of view.
Popper argues that all knowledge requires a "unifying" organization, in
order to select from infinite and chaotic data, and in the case of know¬
ledge about the past, this requirement is fulfilled by the historian
implementing a point of view. The points of view which the historian
requires are, Popper argues, "preconceived" and in general untestable; I
shall examine his grounds for this contention in some detail.''"" What Popper
considers to be the untestability of such points of view is of far reaching
2 •
consequence. The ideal of objectivity is "inapplicable" * to the practice
of history: a minimum condition for objective knowledge, in Popper's view;"
is that the organizing conceptions required for knowledge ptf be testable,
and knowledge about the past cannot meet this standard. Consequently,
Popper wants historians to realize that the accounts they produce of aspects
of the past must be tendentious, because the point of view required to
organize such an account will not, in general, be testable, and con equently
historical interpretations are for the most part "circular" in the sense
that any interpretations must "fit in with" sources which were '^collected in
accordance with a preconceived point of view".'**
Such points of view as historians mist adopt and implement, if they are
to practise history at all, preclude the possibility of any comprehensive or
total history of mankind. Although scientists can work with the ideal of
approaching though not attaining the truth by thoroughly testing their con¬
jectures, the historian can have no corresponding ideal of contributing to
the history of mankind. Thus Popper in effect denies that Collingwood's
"idea of history" can serve as a regulative ideal for the historian's work;
Popper rests his case on what he maintains are necessary limitations of
historical work. The way in which Popper constructs this case is the main
topic of this chapter.
1. Below, pp. Iotf-IZO 2. OS, II, 268 , loUT"*
3. As presented in Chapter twenty-five, 03 j -cgup fU , P
4. OB, II, 265, 266, 26?.
m
Popper is of course not unique in maintaining that, in order to practise
history, one must adopt a point of view. Such claims are the stock-in-trade
of historical relativism and the sociology of knowledge. Popper's character¬
ization of the points of view implemented in historiography differs in some
important respects from these latter schools of thought.^* According to
Popper, the historian must adopt and implement a "preconceived" point of view
in order to write history at all; to make the most of this limitation, the
historian should consciously adopt a point of view with a bearing on current
social or political problems, to provide the necessary organization for his
account of an aspect of the human past. The validity of Popper's conclusions
here depends on the validity of the arguments by which they are reached.
If Popper's arguments can be faulted in some respects, as I shall argue,
then the points of view required for the practice of history may not be quite as
Popper sees them. Popper's characterization of these points of view is, I
think, unacceptable. The object of this exercise is to obtain a more accurate
characterization of such points of view as historians are obliged in some sense
to adopt. I shall not attempt to survey how partisan history comes to be
written, but rather, to establish what points of view are like in what passes
for good history among its practicioners. Whether points of view or inter¬
pretations are requisite for historiography is a question to be distinguished
from whether the historian must adopt and implement a "preconceived" point of
view, bearing on current problems, in accordance with Popper's prescriptions.
The first position does not entail the latter, and conversely, to reject
Popper's position as unsound in some respects does not entail denial of the
former position.
I shall also consider whether the limitations of historiography, which
p #
Popper argues make the "idea of objectivity" "inapplicable",* are compatible
with Popper's amplification of situational logic as a technique of historical
1. These differences can be more precisely stated after examining Popper's
ideas in more detail. See below, pp. "ZT-t-tt-b
2. OS, II, 268.
explanation, in his later writings.^* The is^ue here may he stated briefly.
Popper, in his later writings, recommends situational logic to historians as
2.
well as to social scientists, because it is objective. * The objectivity
of situational logic was not mentioned in either The Open Society or The
Poverty of iiistoricisra. If "everything about" situational logic "is, in
*
principle, objectively testable", and if the historian is to be able to make
use of situational logic, then Popper may well be obliged to retract some of
the limitations which he argued earlier were inherent in the practice of
history} limitations which I shall argue are in any case untenable as they
stand.
II. Popper's Argument for the Circularity of Historical Interpretations
Popper builds up his argument that the historian must adopt and implement
a preconceived and untestable point of view, in the practice of history, by
several steps. I shall recapitulate the stages of Popper's argument and
argue that Popper's conclusion is acceptable as it stands only if Popper's
contentions about the uses of historical evidence are tenable.
Popper's contentions as to the necessary limitations on the historian's
use of evidence are crucial to his argument, and untenable. Popper obtains
his conclusion that the historian raust adopt and implement a preconceived
point of view by assuming it as a premise in his discussion of historical
evidence. Any item of historical evidence is, according to Popper, indelibly
permeated by the informant's point of view, a point of view which is in
1. Cf. below, pp.t3=ipl . Situational logic is discussed above, in Chapter
Three.
2. K.R. Popper, "Historical Explanation", an interview with Michael Tanner,
John Dunn and Alistair Young, Cambridge Opinion, v. 26(196?), p. 22, here¬
after cited as HE; also, "Die Logik der Sozialwissenachaften", KOlner
Zeitschrift fflr Soziologie 14(1962), pp. 246-7, hereafter cited as LSW.
3. Popper, HE, p. 22
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general untestable. Popper believes that the historian has for the most
part no recourse against the conditions under which evidence is presented
in historical sources. All subsequent interpretations must "fit in with"
the untestable points of view from which information is recorded in histo¬
rical sources. Popper argues that historical interpretations are in
general "oxrcular" on the grounds that the evidence contained, in historical
sources cannot in general be disentangled from the informant's point of view.
Popper's discussion of historical methods starts from certain epistemo-
]_.
logical considerations . It is not possible to recapitulate all there is
as knowledge. We cannot even know everything about any one particular
2.
thing; we can only study aspects of it. Knowledge thus presupposes
selection. Such selection cannot be random or haphazard; knowledge re¬
quires selection which also serves to organize some of the manifold aspects
of the manifold facts. Selection thus requires a point of view to provide
the necessary organization. Popper argues that these epistemological con¬
siderations, which he introduces with reference to science, apply with equal
J!
force but rather different results in the practice of history. *
"Some more or less preconceived scientific theory" is the criterion for
selection in science, from the "infinite wealth and variety of the possible
aspects of the facts of our world".Theories thus provide the organizing
points of view for scientific work. A scientist considers those aspects of
K
certain facts which "have a bearing" on that theory with which he is concerned.""
Popper's imprecise description of scientific theories as "more or less precon¬
ceived" needs a gloss. Scientific theories are preconceived in that Popper
claims that knowledge of facts is not possible without the selective focus of
some theory; Popper rejects as false the "empiricist myth of induction",
according to which bare facts can generate theories. Conjecture is pre¬
supposed in all knowledge because knowledge requires criteria of selection.
1. chap. 25, sec. I, OS, II, 259> 26l. 2. Cf. Popper on holism, PH, p.77*
5. OS, II, 261. 4. OS, II, 261. 5. OS, II, 260.
feaov
No theory can be considered scientific, in Popper's view, unless it
is possible in principle for the theory to be overthrown or falsified.
Popper maintains that, in general, historical evidence does not allow the
overthrow of those points of view which the historian requires to organize
his selection of historical evidence, with the result that these points of
view are preconceived in a rather different and stronger sense than is the
case with scientific theories. Scientific theories arc preconceived in the
sense that they are prior to any knowledge of facts, but the facts which they
bring to light may force a rejection or revision of aiy such "preconceived"
scientific theory. Popper holds that the historical interpretations, or
points of view, which are required to organize historical facts, are not,
for the most part, open to revision through confrontation with evidence in
the manner of scientific theories."''*
Popper's analysis of the logic of historical explanation, in The Poverty
of Historicism as in The Open Society, is meant to support this contrast of
historiography with science, by showing that insofar as theories are used in
historical work, they cannot provide an objective organization for the mater¬
ials. It is perhaps as much a step in his case for the limitations of histo¬
riography as a doctrine in its own right
The aim of Popper's analysis of the logic of historical explanation is
twofold. First, to establish that the historian's characteristic concern
with specific events does not entitle him to claim that he relies on dis¬
tinctive methods, set apart from the methods of the natural sciences, in order
to apprehend such historical particulars. Popper's criticism is directed at
claims for the autonomy of historical method, claims which have been fre¬
quently made in connection with the doctrine that historical particulars are
apprehended by intuitive understanding. Popper argues that adequate explana¬
tions of particular historical events presuppose general statements which are
1. Those relatively rare interpretations which Popper thinks are semi-testable
are discussed below, pp. US-?-'"J
2. Cf. above Chapter Two, for a discussion of the various functions which
Popper's advocacy of hypothetico-aeductive model of explanation serves.
0ox.
trivial. Thus the unity of scientific method, which consists in the several
uses of the hypothetico-deductive apparatus, extends to the historical sciences
which, in appearance and in actuality, are concerned with particular events,
and not with theories or generalizations, which Popper thinks constitute the
crux of the hypothetico-deductive method.
Popper's analysis of the use of laws in historical work is also meant to
establish a further point, which is instrumental in his argument that the
"idea of objectivity" is "inapplicable" to history, because the conceptions
which the historian requires to organize his materials are untestable points
of view; the untestability of such organizing conceptions means that there
is no way of deciding, other than arbitrarily, on one or another of the
plurality of possible interpretations of any given collection of historical
evidence. Popper's argument is that insofar as universal laws are used in
historical work - for the most part, as tacit presuppositions for adequate
explanations of particular events, they cannot provide a focus, or "unifying"
point of view, by which to select from the "flood" of "unrelated material"
engulfing the historians"'"*
"...our view explains why, in history, we are confronted
much more than in the generalizing sciences, with the
problems of its 'infinite subject matter'". 2.
Such trivial laws as the historian tacitly presupposes, for the most part
unconsciously, in explaining particular events
"are practically without interest, and totally
unable to bring order into the subject matter." 5*
In further support of this point, Popper argues that, in the quest for a uni¬
fying point of view,
"the attempt to follow causal chains into the remote past
would not help in the least, for every concrete effect
with which we might start has a great number of different
partial causes; that is to say, initial conditions are
very complex, and most of them have little interest for us." 4»
1. PH, p. 150, cf* OS, II, 264.
2. OS, II, 264; the phrase "infinite subject matter" is Schopenhauer's,
which Popper had previously cited, OS, II 261.
3. OS, II, 264. 4. PH, p. 130.
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Thus such universal laws as the historian uses will not provide a criterion
by which he can select from, and organize, the inexhaustible variety of
materials about the past.
Thus Popper uses his theory of historical explanation to argue that
theories, as used in historical work, will not do the necessary job of organ¬
izing the materials, as willthe theories used in scientific work:
"We see, therefore, that those universal laws which historical
explanation uses $0} provide no selective or unifying principle,
no 'point of view' for history. In a very limited sense such
a point of view may be provided by confining history to a
history of something! examples are the history of power
politics, or of economic relations, or of technology, or of
mathematics. But as a rule, we need further selective
principles, points of view which are at the same time centres
of interest." 1.
Popper's exposition of his case here ia elliptic. He does not explain why
specifying a subject is not in general sufficient to provide a "selective and
unifying principle" by which to compose an historical account. He could not
claim that some "interest" or "point of view" is necessary in addition to a
specified subject matter without begging the question, for this is what he
wants to establish.
One possible argument in support of Popper's proposed general rule,
which is consistent with what Popper has argued elsewhere, is that the subject
of a "history of something" will still possess the troublesome property of an
2.
infinite variety of facts and aspects. '* Thus some criterion in addition to
a specification of subject matter is needed in order to compose a finite and
organized account of an infinite subject.
Popper maintains that the outcome of his general rule, that a historian
*
must adopt a point of view in order to delimit and organize"'* his materials,
1. OS, II, 265. 2. I refer to Popper's criticism of holism, sec .25,PH,pp.76-78.
3. Popper's way of speaking of selective principles as unifying an account
may not be acceptable to historians who believe that presenting a unified
account would misrepresent the variety of the past, which they hope, if not
to capture, at least to suggest. It might thus be more accurate to speak o^,
organizing or constructing a coherent historical account, rather than
unifying it.
$. %•*(
is that such points of view must he "preoonceived" in a sense rather
different from that in which scientific theories are "more or less pre¬
conceived". Sot only is adherence to a selective principle or point of view
prerequisite to assembling an organized account from the infinite variety of
data - the sense in which scientific theories are preconceived - "but also,
in historiography, Popper claims that such points of view are not in general
open to revision in the light of evidence. And it is a conjecture's
liability to Herbert Spencer's tragic flaw, of being overthrown by a fact,
that constitutes for Popper its testability and empirical character.
The relation of a historical interpretation to the evidence mustered in
its support is for the most part "circular"'*due to the limitations of
historical evidence. Because historical facts
2.
"cannot be repeated or implemented at our will"
the historian has no redress against the conditions under which traces of the
past are preserved, in historical sources. Historical facts
"are often severely limited...and have been
collected in accordance with a preconceived
point of view; the so-called 'sources' of
history only record such facts as appeared
sufficiently interesting to record, so that
the sources will, as a rule, contain only facts
that fit in with a preconceived theory. And
since no further facts are available, it will
not, as a mile, be possible to test that or
any subsequent theory." 3»
Popper claims that in general there is no way of escaping the limitations
inherent in the historical records that support a given interpretation,
limitations which are also the conditions for the very existence of these
records, according to this apparent application of Popper's epistemologys
namely that the extant facts had some relevance to the point of view held
by the witness who recorded them.
1. OS, II, 266, 267. 2. OS, II, 265. 3. OS, II, 265.
yf, lof.
III. General and Specific Interpretations
How points of view are alleged to function in organizing historical
accounts needs to be more closely examined. The range of conceptions which
can function as points of view, in Popper's eyes, is vast. The variety
covered by his usage of the term 'point of view' or the term 'interpretation'
is one of the weaknesses in his theory of historiography. Popper assumes
that the whole gamut of historical interpretations function in the same way
in the relevant respects; but this is not the case. Popper makes sweeping
statements about historical interpretations which may apply at one end of the
spectrum but not at the other.
Popper gives, as examples of interpretations which are "some" of the
selective principles by which historical materials can be organized, such
"preconceived ideas" or speculative conceptions as
"what is important for history is the character
of the 'Great Men', or the 'national character',
or moral ideas, or economic conditions." 1.
Popper's description of the selective principles which such "'general
interpretations'" provide suggests that such interpretations are more charac¬
teristic of speculative philosophy of history than of the practice of history.
Hegel and Marx contended, respectively, that what mattered for history were
the "world-historical individuals" or economic conditions, and their philoso¬
phies of history seem to provide such selective principles as those to which
1. OS, II, 265; cf. PH, p.151 for more interpretations of this order;
"It is possible, for example, to interpret 'history'
as the history of class struggle, or of the struggle
of the races for supremacy, or as the history of the
struggle between the 'open' and the 'closed* society,
or as the history of scientific and industrial progress."
Another such interpretation is the "rationalist interpretation" of history,
note 61 to chap. 11(OS,II, 502-3)
I.C. Jarvie (in "Professor Paasmore on the Objectivity of History,"
Philosophy, vol.XXXV, i960, pp. 335-356) also interprets Popper's notion of
historical interpretations along these lines, as can be seen from his
examples, which are a selection of those used by Popper, cited above.
yy. i-**
Popper refers. If a historian were to write a history of Germany in the
latter part of the nineteenth centu,ry» he might argue either that the
character and activities of Bismarck were decisive in the unification of
Germany, or that, due to the prevailing economic conditions, Bismarck's
activities were superfluous. Such interpretations may appear at first
sight to instance the general principles of Hegel and Marx, but they are,
I think, logically a different kettle of fish. A historian, in asserting
that the actions of a particular individual, or economic conditions, shaped
a certain juncture of events, need not make a general statement such as
those of Hegel and Marx, and to do so would be to go beyond what the histo¬
rian's critical examination of the evidence1* licenses him to assert.
A practising historian may formulate the principle by which he marshalls
evidence as: in this case the actions of a particular individual, or
economic conditions, were decisive. This difference in formulation indi¬
cates, as I shall argue, a considerable difference between what Popper calls
"'general interpretations*" and interpretations propounded in the practice
of history.
On Popper's showing, historical interpretations may range from such
grand schemas as these "general interpretations", which Popper compares to
2.
scientific theories only to retract the comparison, * to"Specific hypo¬
theses"
"which, in the explanation of historical events play
the role of hypothetical initial conditions rather
than universal laws." J.
Sometimes such hypotheses
"can be tested fairly well and are therefore
comparable to scientific theories." 4.
1. That historians can examine evidence critically will be argued below,
and the consequences of this activity for the character of historical
points of view elicited.
2. 03, II, 26b; Hi, 151. They are comparable insofar as both scientific
theories and historical interpretations organize the respective materials,
but dissimilar with respect to testability, which gives a scientific theory
its empirical character.
3. 03, II, 266. 4. 03, II, 266.
But sometimes specific historical hypotheses, says Popper, suffer from the
same circularity which afflicts the "general interpretations" or "universal
•points of view'" mentioned above. * Popper ascribes the circularity, or
untestability, of most historical interpretations, to the characteristics of
2
historical evidence. " Popper claims that there is in general no way of
testing a historical interpretation, because it is based on a severely limited
x
set of facts, the historical sources. An interpretation "must fit in with"
the original interpretations present in the sources of the relevant evidence,
but the historian cannot test the interpretations given by his sources, be¬
cause "no further facts are available"^" beyond these sources. Thus the
circularity which Popper attributes to most historical interpretations stems
from Popper's claim that a preconceived point of view is required for the
original collection of evidence, which is all that the historian ha3 at his
disposal.
It is interesting, and perhaps significant, that in giving an overall
characterization of interpretations, ranging from "general" to "specific",
Popper starts by considering what he calls "general interpretations", which
seem to me to represent speculative philosophy of history, and applies his
analysis of these to specific interpretations. His approach might be thought
to beg the question of whether historical evidence has the same bearing' on
general and specific interpretations respectively.
In defence of their craft, historians could make two points against
Popper's case outlined above. Firstly, the many levels at which historical
interpretations function in the practice of history is not adequately de¬
scribed by Popper's schema of general and specific interpretations. Secondly,
the way in which evidence is brought to bear on the working historian's
interpretations, wherein Popper's specific interpretations may be included,
is quite different from the way in which evidence i3 marshalled to support
general interpretations in speculative philosophy of history.
1. OS, II, 266-67. 2. OS, II, 265-7. 3. OS, II, 265.
4. OS, II, 265. Popper often seems to consider the case where a historian
relies on a single source as paradigmatic.
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IV. Criticism of Popper's Views on Historical Interpretations
In arguing that the characteristics of historical evidence make most
historical interpretations circular, Popper seems to mix two considerations:
the observation that historians cannot arrange for repetitions of those past
events which relate to their interpretations, with certain dogmatic conten¬
tions to the effect that the evidence contained in any historical source is
indissolubly linked with the point of view from which it was collected,
contentions which are largely, if not entirely, independent of the comparison
with science .
The facts which have a bearing on a given historical interpretation are
limited by comparison with the facts relating to a scientific theory; the
letter are in principle infinite because of Popper's requirement that a
scientific theory be testable, whereas the former are finite, not because the
interpretation may not relate to an infinitude of past events, but because the
relevant evidence is limited to finite records.
But Popper goes on to impute limitations to historical evidence which
preclude any critical approach * to historical records. His claims as to
these limitations go beyond the observations that repetitions of events or
experiments are not possible in historical research, or that historical
evidence is limited to the traces left by the past. Popper makes the sweep¬
ing assertion that
1. In analysing historical methods, Popper seems to assume that if historical
evidence cannot be tested by the methods practicable in the theoretical sciences,
then no critical approach to historical evidence is possible. But such test¬
ing is only a special case of the critical approach, as Popper says elsewhere:
"I have since generalized this formulation of scientific objectivity; for
intersubjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the more general
idea of intersubjective criticism, or...the idea of mutual rational^c^pi^trol
by critical discussion." LSD, p.44- Cf. above, Chapter Three*,^ror a dis¬
cussion of Popper's characterizations of scientific objectivity.
"the so-called 'sources* of history...will, as a
rule, contain only fact3 that fit in with a
preconceived theory. And since no further facts
are available, it will not, as a rule, be possible
to test that or any subsequent theory." 1.
Now it is just not the case that historical sources are in general so limited
as to provide evidence only from one point of view, for there are often re¬
cords compiled by several witnesses, perhaps from differing points of view,
as to what took place at a given time and location.
It might be argued that Popper allows for this point, for he admits that
there are historical hypotheses which can be fairly well tested and are thus
comparable to scientific theories in this crucial respect, although he does
not say how such testing could be done with the limited materials available
to the historian. Moreover, such testable singular hypotheses seem to be
2.
descriptions of initial conditions, " and neither the laws presupposed in
historical explanations, nor the initial conditions can serve to organize
*
historical materials.
Popper claims that the amount of evidence relevant to any given inter¬
pretation is of a severely limited quantity. I have argued that this claim
oonfuses two considerations. The historical evidence relevant to a given
interpretation is necessarily limited by comparison to the infinite evidence
which can be produced by testing, relevant to a scientific theory. But
Popper also maintains that the evidence relevant to a particular interpreta¬
tion is not merely a finite set of records, but also that such evidence is
confined by the points of view from which it was originally collected; and
Popper seems to believe that the relevant evidence will have been collected
from a single point of view, or at most, a few points of views that histo¬
rical evidence is not merely finite, but of a low density. While there may
be interpretations of the past for which there are only a few sources, e.g.
in ancient or medieval history, there are also interpretations for which the
relevant evidence is immense; and, in general the amount of historical evi¬
dence increases considerably as we approach our own times.
1
1. OS, II, 265. 2. OS, II, 266,cf. p.lD*> above. 3. Cf. p.above.
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Popper maintains that, as a consequence of the alleged limitations of
the historical evidence for any given interpretation, the evidence must be
used literally: it must be taken as it comes from the source's mouth.
Popper asserts not only that the points of view of a given historical source
cannot be tested, but also that no critical approach^*to historical evidence
is possible, by which the facts contained in a source might be disentangled
from the point of view under which they are presented.
But is historical evidence in general limited in the way that Popper
claims? There are certainly cases where facts crucial to interpreting
accounts of past events are presented from several points of view: as is the
case with the question of who fired the first shot in the French revolution
of 1848, one of the soldiers of the government, or one of the anti-government
crowd? Identifying the incident which triggered off the 1848 revolution is
relevant to appraising the character of this revolution in France. It can
be argued that this may be done by a critical consideration of the various
conflicting reports as to what took place. If Popper admits that this can
be done, in this case, he might maintain that this particular instance does
not affect his general argument as to the limitations of historical evidence,
and classify this instance as a testable historical hypothesis. But I think
it can be maintained that this is a case where there is evidence available,
recorded from opposed points of view, on an issue crucial to a specific inter¬
pretation. Ary interpretation of the character of the I848 revolution in
France can be gauged in at least tbis one respect: the use made of the avail¬
able evidence a3 to the events which triggered off the revolution.
Popper's sweeping assertion that the historian cannot, in general, go
beyond the interpretations given in the sources available to him roats on
several assumptions which I think are false . It requires that for the most
part there cannot be assorted records on points of importance to such inter¬
pretations as historians propose; and this is just not the case. Often
1. A critical approach is a more general concept than testing, or testing
in principle. See LSD p.44 and of this chapter.
historians stiffer more from a wealth of source material than from a dearth.
Moreover, even if no further sources seem to he available, a historian can
criticize limited sources in terms of general plausibility, some evidence
is too far-fetched to be reliable - this is one of the techniques which
historians use to criticize historical sources which exhibit points of view.
Secondly, Popper's characterization of historical sources in terms of
points of view assumes that all the sources available to the historian take
the form of testimony, and this again is not the case. Historians can make
use of a wide range of documents which are not testimonies, and they can also
use, as sources, a wide range of materials which are not written documents:
examples of sources in the first category are charters, or parish records;
coins or buildings can be sources of the second category, and historians can
draw on auxiliary disciplines for extracting information from sources such
a3 these.
Moreover, there is an error still more fundamental than that of mistak¬
ing the quantity and character of available historical evidence in Popper's
account of the methodological limitations on the historian's use of such
evidence. In the extreme case, which Popper seems to consider paradigmatic
of the historian's lot, the historian has no information beyond what is con¬
tained in a single source, and it is trivially true that he cannot test what
his source contains by bringing additional information to bear. From this
Popper infers that no critical approach ia possible to such a source. Test¬
ing a scientific theory involves bringing additional evidence to bear on the
theory. Since it is clearly the case that the historian cannot teat by this
procedure, in the above case, Popper declares that it is not possible to take
a critical approach to such a source; the historian must take his source as
it is. But the truism that a historian restricted to a single piece of
evidence has no more than one piece of evidence at his disposal, does not
imply that he ia therefore denied a critical approach to his source; for
critical approaches are not restricted to testing, in the manner of scientific
experiments.
Popper says that there are certain criteria by which the adequacy or
acceptability^"of any historical interpretation may be appraised, in terms
of its coherence with the available evidence: whether it accounts for all
the available evidence, without omission and without recourse to ad hoc
hypotheses; and whether it provides a more connected or more coherent
account of this evidence than any other interpretation which satisfies the
preceding standards.^" But Popper maintains that these criteria only allow
the historian to judge the coherence of an interpretation with the available
evidence and no more. According to Popper, the historian has no way of
breaking the circle: his interpretation must cohere with the original inter¬
pretation from which his evidence was presented, a dilemma which is most
striking in, if not exclusive to, the instance where the historian must rely
on a single source.
Popper has argued that the compilation of records of past events pre¬
supposes a criterion for selection from the infinite data which, in any
historical source, is supplied by the informant's point of view. But it
would be naive to suppose that what an informant relates is always consistent
with the point of view that he may wish to convey. There are numerous ways
in which such inconsistencies may arise in historical records. Although an
informant may implement a point of view in the bulk of his account of certain
events, it may be possible to infer from incidental remarks or asides in his
testimony that a more accurate account of these events can be constructed
which gives the lie to the informant's point of view. Thus, an official
account of a riot may assert that the police were provoked by the mob, but
imply that the police fired first. Popper's epistemological argument shows
1. I use various forms of these two words to refer to these concepts below,
in the sense in which Popper understands them.
2. Popper states these criteria negatively, as excluding interpretations not
"of eijuai merit", i.e. not part of the undecidable plurality of interpreta¬
tions:
"...there are always interpretations which are not really in keeping
with the accepted records; secondly, there are some which need a number
of more or less plausible auxiliary hypotheses if they are to escape falsi¬
fication by the records; next, there are some that are unable to connect
a number of facts which another interpretation can connect, and in so far
•explain*." OS, II, 266.
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only that some criteria of selection are necessary to compose accounts of
past events, not that such criteria of selection must be consistently
applied. There is no epistemologioal, logical or methodological reason
why the resultant account must consistently implement any criterion of
selection or point of view, and it is the latter contention which is required
to make good Popper's case that the historian cannot break the vicious circle
of historical evidence compiled from a point of view; Popper's epistemo-
logical argument does not entail his methodological conclusions about the
limitations of historical work.
Indeed, it can almost be elevatei. to a general principle that no one
historical source will contain only evidence which is consistent with a single
point of view on the part of the informant. Indeed, if a source were com¬
pletely consistent with a single point of view with no evident discrepancies,
this might be a prima facie reason for suspecting it to be a forgery, composed
after the fact in order to propagate just this point of view. Thus the
historian's critical use of historical evidence, even of such evidence as is
contained in a single source, can start from the various ways in which any
point of view may be inconsistently or incompletely implemented.
My argument as to how points of view are incompletely or inconsistently
applied in historical sources does not exhaust the resources of historical
criticism, nor would I want to attempt to do so in the confines of this section
of this chapter. But my argument does, I think, undermine Popper's character¬
ization of historical interpretations as untestable and consequently circular
as preconceived in the strong sense. The crucial point in Popper's case is
his contention that the circularity of the historian's interpretations de¬
rives from the characteristics of the sources on which he must rely; that
any interpretation of past records must "fit in with" the interpretations
conveyed by the evidence which the original sources contained. As the circu¬
larity of viewpoint and facts can be broken, in the case of historical sources,
it need not extend to secondary historical work.
Popper's other requirements for acceptable interpretations can also be
modified so as to indicate the ways of critically examining sources: by
appraising the character and quantity of ad hoc hypotheses or interpolations
which a witness introduces in order to account for the evidence that he
presents, from his point of view; and by appraising the degree of organiza¬
tion which his point of view provides for the evidence he preaenta. If
Popper allows that these criteria for adequate interpretations can be applied
to appraising points of view in general, surely they can be applied to apprais¬
ing historical sources in particular. But these latter two techniques are
ancillary to the main task of historical criticism, which is to extract some
indication of what past events or circumstances were actually like, from in¬
accurate or misleading witnesses. This task proceeds by reversing Popper'3
chief contention: on the assumption that the point of view adopted by a
witness will not, as a rule, be consistently implemented. That is, criti¬
cism of historical sources works from the discrepancies between the evidence
presented by a source, and the point of view that its writer wished to convey,
discrepancies which the historian's chronological distance from his informant
can help him to discern.
The weakness in Popper's argument, that historical points of view can
in general neither be tested nor criticized, is that his methodological con¬
clusions about the limitations of historical evidence are not entailed by his
epistensological considerations. That is, the observation that criteria of
selection are prerequisite to knowledge does not imply that smch criteria will
be consistently applied in acquiring knowledge. And only if a point of view
is consistently implemented in a historical source can the vicious circle of
evidence inseparable from an unbeatable point of view arise, and this case is
one where the authenticity of such a source might be questioned, just because
of its consistency.
Popper's recommendation to historians that they should consciously adopt
and implement points of view, in order to make the best of the limitations
under which they must work, cannot be retroactively applied to extant histo¬
rical sources, from which most history in written.
The principles of historical criticism are in no way affected by the
quantity of sources available to the historian, bearing on a given issue,
except that the more sources are available, the vaster the field is for
historical criticism, and the greater the temptation is to scamp the job,
and to treat convergent sources as authorities.
Although Popper maintains that the vast majority of historical inter¬
pretations represent "crystallizations" of "untestable" "points of view" due
to the considerations about historical evidence which have been discussed
above, he admits one class of exceptions to his general rule that a histo¬
rical interpretation based on limited sources must be unbeatable. The
character of a historical interpretation baaed on a single authority may
"take on some semblance to that of a
scientific hypothesis"
"If...we can give to such material an
interpretation which radically deviates
from that adopted by our authority...." 1.
As a case of such a non-circular interpretation, Popper instances his own
"interpretation of Plato's work","* It is clear what is in Popper's mind
5.
heres such "semi-scientific" interpretations deviate from the interpre¬
tation provided by the single source in a way that suggests a nartial ana¬
logy to the falsification of a scientific theory. Popper has been maintain¬
ing that the agreement of a historical interpretation with the available
evidence in no way guarantees the truth of its assertions about the past,
just as repeated verifications of scientific theories cannot establish either
the empirical character or the empirical truth of the theories. Popper's
contention is that no amount of corroborating evidence can establish the
truth of either a scientific theory or an historical interpretation. This
principle seems to do irtoat damage to the status of historical interpretations
which are necessarily based on a limited collection of evidences it would
seem that if the available evidence corroborates such an interpretation, no
more can be said as to the status of such an interpretation. But Popper's
application of this principle to historical interpretations is based on the
misapprehension that such limited evidence can only be used literally, so
i. os, ii, 267. 2. OS, II* 267. 3» My phrase, not Popper's.
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that it can only corroborate any interpretation which takes account of the
available evidence. A critical approach to historical evidence, such as I
sketched, opens an escape from these restrictions.
What gives the exceptional interpretations mentioned above their sembl¬
ance of scientific character, in Popper's eyes, in that they result from an
attempt to overthrow an antecedent interpretation of the same basic evidence,
so that something partially analogous to falsification has taken place.
Popper does not explain how it is possible for a historian, in some exceptional
cases, to overthrow his sole authority's interpretation, when he is in general
confined by the interpretations which his authorities provide. As evidence
that such "seiai-ecientific" interpretations are possible, Popper instances his
interpretation of Plato in The Open Socioty. Popper's use of this example
sesas to assume that the corpus of Plato's works provides a single and unique
authority for Plato's ideas, which is not quite correct as we also have writ¬
ings of Aristotle and Xenophon. Nor is it the case that Popper has over¬
thrown a point of view transmitted in what he takes to be his single authority,
the works of Plato. Rather, what Popper has overthrown is a widespread
interpretation of Plato by later commentators rather than an interpretation,
specifically transmitted in the sources for Plato's ideasi Popper has shown
to be untenable the view, advocated in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, that Plato was an ideological forefather of liberalism.
Popper has been misled by an apparent analogy to his analysis of scienti¬
fic method, into proposing a rule for "semi-scientific" historical interpreta¬
tions that does not work in practice. There are counter-examples which
satisfy Popper's criterion of proposing an interpretation which "radically
diverges" from that of the main authority, without thereby in any way acquir¬
ing a resemblance to scientific hypotheses. One such example occurs in the
historiography of the French revolution. That Pierre Gaxotte used the work
of Albert Hathies and Jean Jaures, republican and .social historians respect¬
ively to argue that the Jacobins were proto-Bolshsviks does not give Gaxotte's
interpretation a semi-scientific character. Gaxotte's divergent use of their
work would not suffice to convince practising historians that his interprets-
l?.\1
tion is more scientific than its antecedents."*"* Rather, historians would
recognise that Gaxotte's interpretation "radically diverges" from those of
Matliiess and Jaures because his political beliefs differ from theirs and
impinge upon his interpretation: G&xotte attempts to draw a parallel be¬
tween the French revolution and certain twentieth century developments,
namely Russian communism, which he views with disfavour, in order to dis¬
credit the origins of French Republicanism. Whether Gaxotte's interpre¬
tation improves on or falls short of those of Mathiez and Jaures depends on
the uses made by the several historians of the evidence available to thera;
and the comparative merits of those Interpretations cannot be determined
simply in terms of whether a subsequent interpretation diverges from a pre¬
ceding interpretation, for the previous interpretation might be superior in
terras of the criteria discussed above.
What goes wrong with Popper's suggested rule for an exception to the
alleged general circularity of historical interpretations is not that the
partial analogy with falsifying scientific theories does not go far enough.
Popper's characterization of historical evidence as limited in ways that make
most interpretations circular, requires that historians can only make literal
use of previously interpreted evidence; in proposing an exception to the
circularity from which Popper alleges that most historical interpretations
suffer, Popper does not say that a historical interpretation may diverge from
the interpretation given by its 3ole source because a critical use has been
made of such a source, although the value of Popper's novel interpretation of
Plato comes from Popper's critical attitude to earlier interpretations of
Plato. Such an admission would ruin Popper's general case for the circular¬
ity of most historical interpretations, if Popper could not explain why such
criticism is not generally possible; but it is the only way to make Popper's
recipe for a non-circular interpretation work, and to exclude such reversals
of authorities as that of GaxtJtte, which are clearly no more scientific than the
historical interpretations which Popper considers circular.
1. R.W. Greenlaw discusses Gaxotte's use of Mathiez's and Jaures' work
in his introduction to The Economic Origins of the French Revolution
(Boston, 1958), xi-xii.
The soundness of historical interpretations of a single source, as of
any interpretation, depends in part on the extent to which critical use is
made of the available evidence. Although Popper professes allegiance to
the critical approach in general, as the primary article of his rationalism,
he does not seem to have allowed, in The Open Society or The Poverty of
Hiatoricism, that historians can use a critical approach in interpreting the
evidence available to them. In these works, Popper's most accessible
analysis of historical methodology, the writ of his critical approach has
been restricted to techniques practicable in the theoretical sciences. In
addition to Popper's rigid application of his doctrine of the unity of sci¬
entific method to historical work, his analysis has suffered from his
assumption that the historian can only make literal use of historical evi¬
dence. Popper's analysis of historical methodology can be explained only
by Popper's lack of first-hand knowledge of historical work, and little second¬
hand knowledge.
Popper's claim that the whole gamut of historical interpretations, from
general to specific, must in most cases be circular or, in other words un-
testable, is based on a sequence of two considerations, which I shall dis¬
tinguish as, respectively, epistemologieal and methodological. The start¬
ing point for Popper's analysis of historical interpretations is epistomo-
logical: a rejection of the classical empiricist theory of the mind as a
blank slate or absorbent sponge, a theory which Popper calls the "bucket
theory of mind". Popper maintains that because it is impossible to appre¬
hend the infinite and overwhelming mass of facts and aspects of facts which
the world contains, knowledge presupposes criteria of selection or points of
view. Scientific theories provide selective criteria for the theoretical
sciences; the historian, confronted by the infinite facts of the past,
organizes his selection thereof by means of a point of view or an inter¬
pretation. Popper argues for the necessity of historical interpretations
on episteraological grounds; he characterizes historical interpretations on
the basis of methodological considerations about the uses of historical evi¬
dence. Popper argues that because no new evidence can be produced, bearing
on a given historical interpretation, historical interpretations can never,
or only rarely, be tested, and for the most part can only be corroborated.
Thus the relationship of a historical interpretation to its corroborating
evidence is a vicious circle: all subsequent interpretations of any item
of historical evidence "must fit in" with the original point of view from
which the evidence was first collected.
Because Popper analyzes historical evidence in terms of its depend¬
ence on points of view, his methodological arguments may appear to derive
straightforwardly from his epistemological arguments; but this is not the
case. That the existence of historical records presupposes witnesses who
had certain points of view that led them to record selections from past
events does not yield the methodological basis for Popper's claim that
historical interpretations are for the most part circular: this claim re¬
quires that such historical records consistently implement the points of
view of the witnesses who composed them. What a source records and what
its writer wished to convey, may, as a matter of fact, diverge. Ho epi¬
stemological reason can be found why a source may only contain evidence
that supports the point of view that its writer wants to transmit. Thus
Popper's epistemological argument does not establish that a source may
only contain evidence corroborating the witness's point of view. There
are a variety of circumstances under which evidence and point of view may
diverge, in a source: for example, a witness may be tinder some misappre¬
hension as to what evidence does in fact support his claim, and this mis¬
apprehension may appear more prominent with the passage of time. Thus
the methodological basis for Popper's claim that historical interpretations
must be circular does not stand up to examination.
Although I have not questioned Popper's epistemological argument that
knowledge presupposes criteria of selection or prior points of view, and
although I have not questioned the applicability of this doctrine to histo¬
riography, I have disputed his methodological contentions about the rela¬
tion of such points of view, in historiography, to the historical evidence
on which they are based. I have argued that the circularity which Popper
attributes to historical interpretations, on the basis of his methodological
considerations, has not been proven. Pop or's argument only applies to one
^ %u>
class of historical evidence, testimonies, and here it does not stand up.
I shall consider Popper's further characterization of historical
interpretations, his doctrine of the plurality of possible interpretations
of any given collection of historical evidence, before examining the appli¬
cability of Popper's epistemological argument to the practice of history:
how we are to construe the requirement that the historian adopt a point of
view, or selective criteria, if he is to compose a connected account of the
past.
V. The Many Histories
The general circularity of historical interpretations has, Popper
thinks, important consequences for their status. Since the adequacy of
historical interpretations can only be appraised in terms of their coherence
with the appropriate limited collection of relevant facts, there is no logi¬
cal reason why there cannot be more than one adequate interpretation of any
given set of facts. Popper argues that historians must abandon the
"naive belief that any definite set of historical
records can...be interpreted in one way only." 1.
"Historians often do not see any other interpretation
which fits the facts as well as theirs does..." 2.
Any individual scientist may have a similar blind spot in favour of
his own theory as the sole possible explanation of a given set of problem-
atic facts, but when several "competing and incompatible" theories have
been proposed to explain such facts, scientists are rarely left in a quand¬
ary, because they have means of deciding between such theories by conduct¬
ing "new cruoial experiments": creating and manipulating situations where
at least one of the competing theories will be falsified.
Thus, Popper argues that if several theoretical explanations, or points
1. OS, II, 266 2. OS, II, 266 5. OS, II, 266.
of view, are possible for a given and limited set of scientific facts,
there is no logical reason why it should not be possible to propose
several adequate interpretations of a given set of historical facts. The
possibility of a plurality of points of view, in historiography as in sci¬
ence, requires that there be a limited set of relevant facts. By extend¬
ing the collection of relevant facts, which is always possible with respect
to testable scientific theories, and never possible, Popper argues, with
regard to historical interpretations, scientists can decide rationally be¬
tween the competing theories.
The possibility of a plurality of points of view, Popper maintains,
is more than theoretical in the practice of history:
"each generation has its own troubles and problems,
and therefore its own interests and its own point
of view." 1.
And Popper maintains that there is no way of deciding, other than arbitra¬
rily, between the various adequate interpretations of any given set of
records. *"*
What, then, are we to make of the welter of interpretations of the
records of the past? Popper maintains that since we cannot decide between
several adequate interpretations of any given collection of evidence, we
must accept these interpretations as representing "crystallisations of
points of view" which are "complementary":
"After all, we study history because we are interested
in it, and perhaps because we wish to learn something
about our own problems." 3'
In finding this rationale for the practice of history, Popper is looking
at the brighter side of the methodological limitations of historiography.
The regulative ideal of scientific method, objectivity, is "inapplicable"
to historiography.^* For a statement to be objective, Popper requires
that intersubjective agreement be possible as to the acceptability of the
1. OS, II, 267.
2. That is after excluding those interpretations which Popper considers
historicist, OS, II, 268-9.
3. 08, II, 267-8. 4. OS, II, 268.
statement; the acceptability of a statement in the theoretical sciences
depends on its testability. By contrast, intersubjective agreement will
not be possible on any one historical interpretation of a given collection
of evidenoe, on Popper's principles, because further adequate and comple¬
mentary interpretations of the same evidence can be formaulated, and there
is no way of deciding, non-arbitrarily, on any one of the plurality of
possible interpretations. Thus the distinguishing characteristic of sci¬
entific method, its objectivity, is unattainable by the resources and
methods available to the historian.
It may be a profound truth about historiography that a multiplicity
of interpretations of past evidence are possible: that history oan always
be rewritten from a different perspective. But the force of Popper's
observations about the multiplicity of possible historical interpretations
is diminished by the serious flaws in the arguments which he employs to
reach these conclusions. Consequently the inter-relations of the various
possible points of view in historiography may be rather different from what
Popper alleges.
It is clear that Popper's argument for the multiplicity of possible
interpretations assumes that historical evidence is limited. The practice
of history cannot be considered objective, because there is no rational way
of arbitrating between the various possible interpretations of any given,
limited, collection of evidence. Against this recurrent assumption of
Popper's, it might be argued that the historican's critical techniques en¬
able him to discover new aspects of extant records, so that historical evi¬
dence is never limited in the required sense.
More specifically against Popper's construction of his case for the
actual multiplicity of historical interpretations, it might be argued that,
in fact, historians who propose alternative interpretations of given subjects
from the past, rarely do work from the same sets of records. The impact
1. Cf. discussion of Popper's criteria for objectivity, aisove, Chapter
Threej p- • iO G -1
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of these considerations may vary at the different ends of the spectrum of
concepts which Popper calls historical interpretations. Consider two
"general interpretations" of history, proposed by a Marxist and a Christian
respectively. They might both work from the same records of civilized
decadence, and each might interpret these records as indicating the inevi¬
table collapse of societies which do not adhere to their respective faiths.
Thus two alternative and adequate general interpretations might be formula¬
ted from the same evidence. S\ich interpretations as these examples might
also be considered extra-historical.
For an example of a plurality of specific interpretations, consider
once again the case of Gaxotte's use of the evidence uncovered by Mathiez
and Jaures. We may suppose that instead of relying on the work done by
these latter historians, Gaxotte had consulted the same collection of records.
The results of their respective labours would then be two sets of alternative
and opposed interpretations, Would historians accept both these interpre¬
tations as equally adequate and complementary? As I have argued earlier,
the conditions for the adequacy of a specific interpretation are rather
different from what Popper suggests. In analyzing the respective merits of
these two interpretations, other historians would consider the uses made by
each historian of the common stock of records: the merits of the competing
specific interpretations would be judged partly in terms of the critical use
made of the relevant evidence.
If the work of any one of these historians were marked by his bias, in
taking dubious evidence at face value, or in misinterpreting evidence to
suit his purposes, such faults would constitute weaknesses in his inter¬
pretation. It is because specific historical interpretations rest on a
critical use of evidence, not a literal adoption of sources as authorities,
that these interpretations can be appraised as arguments, and they represent
something more than "crystallizations of points of view".
In mitigation of my criticism, it may be argued that Popper has touched
on an important point about the practice of history: that although compet¬
ing historical interpretations are open to critical examination, there may
%XM
still be an irreducible plurality of historical interpretations of a given
topic which are neither grossly biased nor incompetent. In this respect,
then, there is no history but only histories. However, I shall argue
that the many histories are not as fragmented as Popper seems to think
because of their relationships with the traditions of historical knowledge.'"*
VI. Several Arguments for the Necessity of Points of View in Historical Work
I have suggested that, although Popper is not unique in maintaining that
historical interpretations, or points of view, are required for the practice
of history, his development of this position differs in important respects
from other views of this genre. In Popper's argument there is an epistemo-
logical and a methodological component; I have argued that although Popper
presents his methodological ideas as a direct application of his epistemo-
logical ideas to historiography, reinforcing his points with contrasts from
his analysis of scientific procedures, these methodological ideas are in no
wise entailed by Popper's epistamology, as can be seen once again by con¬
sidering various other arguments for the necessity of points of view in
history, which proceed rather differently from the necessity of selection.
Popper's more specific characterization of historical points of view on his
methodological basis, as preconceived in a strong sense, is untenable because
the methodological limitations for which Popper argues do not apply to the
practice of history.
Various other arguments for the necessity of points of view in histori¬
ography proceed from the same epistemological basis as Popper does; a
replacement of the classical empiricist doctrine of the bare and absorbent
mind by the claim that selection, and thus criteria for selection, are pre¬
supposed in knowledge, because knowledge cannot reproduce all there is, but
must select from and order infinite materials in order to apprehend something
1. See Section VII below.
of them. In application of this latter doctrine to historiography, it has
been maintained that, as a matter of fact, the historian's criteria for
selection are determined by, respectively, societal, chronological or psy¬
chological factors, in various forms and coubinations.
Societal factors may be claimed more generally to determine all know¬
ledge of social life, in the sociology of knowledge: this doctrine denies
that any individual's knowledge of social life can be independent of the
society to which he belongs.^" * Thus the criteria of selection on which a
historian must rely, in composing any historical account of the past, are
constituted by the society to which he belongs. The criteria of selection
which a historian may adopt are markedly limited by the historian's location
in society; by his social class, in a further specification: no historian,
it is claimed, can view past events from outside the perspective set by his
position in the class structure of society. Thus bourgeois historians
write bourgeois history, and proletarian historians write proletarian
history. * Thi3 theory might run into difficulties if historians whose
social class has been ascertained were to produce historiography appropriate
to a social class other, than that to which they are alleged to belong.
Various forms of this doctrine have enjoyed considerable influence.
Analogous principles may be invoked in support of the claim that the
historian's criteria of selection are formed by his chronological position;^*
thus the perspective from which a historian views the past is alleged to be
set by the concerns of the time in which he lives. As it was claimed that
the historian cannot escape being the spokesman of his social class, so now
the claim is that the historian is necessarily the child of his times.
1. A doctrine which Popper names 'sociologism'. His chief discussion of
the sociology of knowledge (chapter 23, OS) is examined below in Chapter Six,
in connection with Popper's arguments for methodological individualism.
2. What kind of historiography is produced by Mannheim's loophole category,
the 'free-wheeling intellectuals', whose thought, Mannheim claims, is free
from class fetters?
3« A doctrine which Popper names 'historism".
The slogans of this doctrine, which imply that a change of generation trans¬
forms the historian's criteria of selection, are open to obvious objections,
because the sequence of generations is more or less continuous. But if
this position is understood as the claim that the history written during any
one stretch of time, say a decade, will and perhaps must differ from history
written in another such period, and if such differences are ascribed to the
characteristic viewpoints of the historians practising in the respective
periods, this claim is not open to such obvious objections as the statement
that in each generation historians employ different criteria of selection.
It may indeed be the case that the periods for which the respective histo¬
riographies are compared have certain distinctive characteristics, due to
political, economic or social factors: characteristics such as wars,
depressions, booms, anxiety or apathy, which influence the tenor of con¬
temporary historical writing. Under such circumstances, this olaim that
the historian's perspective is shaped by the times in which he lives, may
appear to be something of a truism.
There may be still something more to the idea that a different chrono¬
logical position permits a different and perhaps valuable perspective on the
past, even without the proviso of changing interests and concerns on the
part of historians. Banto's analysis of narrative sentences explains why
this should be so.''"" Narrative sentences have a major part in historical
writing. Such sentences
"refer to at least two time-separated events, and describe
the earlier event...with reference to the latter". 2.
Thus, the statement that the author of The Principia was born in 1642 does
not merely register a birth; it indicates also that the infant born then
later wrote a certain book. The significance of that birth can only be
stated subsequent to the event.
1. Arthur C. Banto, Analytical Philosophy of History, Cambridge University
Press, 1965, chap, viii, pp. 143-182.
2. Banto, p. 159» P» 167*
3. Banto, p. 150 for this example.
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Danto argues that historians characteristically use such descriptions,
and that history continues to be written because any past event may be re-
described at a later times the early history of atomic energy would be
differently described before and after August 9» 1945? or Harold Wilson's
past exercises of his skills as a politician might be differently described
at different times in his career and subsequently. Danto's theory is that
historians characteristically describe an event in terms of its place in one
or more processes.
The possibility of such new descriptions of historical events does not
invalidate the previous descriptions. Succeeding descriptions are, rather,
sup elementary. Each of a chronological sequence of narrative descriptions
is a partial contribution to saying what is significant about the events
described. In narrating the history of atomic energy, for example, it would
be misleading to present the early years solely in the perspective of Hiro¬
shima, and it would be difficult as well to give a fair account of the hopes
men held then, in this perspective; it would also be misleading, as well as
incomplete, to write a history of these years without regard to the sequel.
In writing a history of these early years of atomic energy, a historian might
seek to achieve a contrapuntal effect, through the different chronological
perspectives or processes in which these events can be understood.
The outcome of Danto's analysis is that new and different views of the
past are perenially possible. But his analysis does not provide the cutting
edge of historical relativism. Although the logic of narrative sentences
implies that each generation has the opportunity to write its own history, to
speak loosely in terms of slogans, it does not support the claim that any
such history has only roughly contemporaneous validity. The logic of
narrative sentences gives grounds only for the belief that history has to
be constantly rewritten.
Thus, insofar as a historian's point of view is a matter of chronology,
the history he writes is partial in the sense that it is not a complete
picture of the past - Dante's argument implies that historiography can never
be complete at any one time - but not that it is partial in the sense of
being biased. Danto's argument seeras to roe a sound basis for the pro¬
position that historiography is creative because it is inexhaustible: past
events can be viewed from new points of view. The multiplicity of possible
points of view can then he seen to be suppleraentp.iy: as partial contribu¬
tions to understanding the full significance of past events .
A further suggestion as to the character of the historian's viewpoint
has been put forward: namely, that the societal and chronological factors
discussed above do not fully characterize the historian's viewpoint, because
the personality of the historian has a substantial effect on the criteria of
selection that he adopts, an effect which is distinct from those of societal
or chronological factors. Thus, the revolutionary view of eighteenth century
English history which is now known as Naraierism was not merely a result of
Sir Lewis Namier's unusual social provenance, or of his reaction to the events
of his time; Hamier's personality must also be taken into account in analy¬
zing his viewpoint.'*"* This doctrine might be parodied as reducing historio¬
graphy to personal quirks, but it may be less nonsensically maintained that
the importance of the historian's personality in the picture he gives of the
past is "akin" to the importance of the novelist's personality in his writing,
because
"no one else has quite the same grasp and the saiae
vision of the events to be narrated." 2.
These several theories of the character of the historian's point of view
have two implications: that the historian's criteria for selection are
effectively set by factors over which the historian himself has little control;
and moreover, that the selections resulting from such viewpoints will not be
acceptable at any time, in any social milieu, or by anybody - that such
viewpoints are not universalizable. There is a grain of truth in these
1. On Marnier as a person, see Isaiah Berlin, "LS. Namier", Encounter, No*.1966,
vol. xxvii, no. 9 p.32-45 Berlin disclaims any attempt to evaluate Namier as
a historian.
2. W.H. Walsh, "The limits of Scientific History", Historical Studies, III,
ed. James Hogan (London, 1961), p.54*
theories, in that the work of actual historians is in fact influenced by
societal, chronological or personal factors. But such empirical observa¬
tions do not establish that historians must necessarily submit to any or
all of these several influences.
Rather than attempt to specify the kind of factors alleged to shape or
control the criteria of selection which the historian must adopt in the
practice of history, a somewhat different approach might be taken: a more
general case might be made for the necessity of selective criteria in
historical work. It has been suggested that the statement that the histo¬
rian must select in order to write history is misleadingly elliptic. It
is more accurate to say that the historian selects "in accordance with cri¬
teria of importance" which differ in part from the criteria of importance
employed in scientific selection.1* A scientist may support his judgements
of importance, on which his selection of a topic for inventigation is based,
by reference to the connections of whatever he has selected with other sci¬
entific facts or theories. Not all of the historian'3 judgements of
importance are like those of the scientist. A historian's selection of
events may be guided by the causal connections of these events with other
events; the basis for his selection is, then, the "instrumental importance"
of those events, a basis which i3 comparable to the scientist's criterion for
selection. But a historian's choice of historical subject need not rest
solely on that subject's connections with other aspects of the past. In
addition to such statements as, "the industrial revolution was important on
account of its consequences", a historian may assert the importance of the
French revolution, not just because of its consequences, but because it was
"an event of importance in itself, perhaps as marking a
significant manifestation of the free spirit of man." 2.
Or, to adapt one of Popper's ideas: to write history in terras of the fight
for the open society or with regard to the emphasis put on men's rational
1. Walsh, op. cit. pp. 50-51.
2. ibid., p. 51.
capacities in any age involves more than investigating the influence of
these factors on events? presupposed in these interpretations of history
are judgements as to the intrinsic importance of the factors considered to
be their central subjects.
The presenoe of such judgements of intrinsic importance in historical
work may be effectively concealed by the existence of a consensus among
practising historians;"''" or it may be denied by historians who object to
the implication that such judgements make historiography something other
than scientific. Walshfe claim is that judgements of intrinsic importance
cannot be excised from historiography in the vain hope of making it more
scientific. Historical writing, restricted to description or ascertaining
causal connections - if such historiography were possible - would be dry-as-
dust. Although curiosity about aspects of the past may lead to investiga¬
tions of the instrumental importance of certain events, historical work does
not begin or end with considerations of instrumental importance alone. The
practice of history involves some "assessment" of aspects of the past, and
2.
thus requires judgements of intrinsic importance. * Walsh suggests that no
rationale has been found for the various moral outlooks which foster judge¬
ments of intrinsic importance*
The use which Walsh makes of his distinction between instrumental and
intrinsic importance in analysing the status of our knowledge of the past
can be usefully restated in Popperite terras witnout too much distortion.
Intersubjective agreement can be reached on judgements of instrumental import¬
ance because the basis for such judgements rests on imputing causal connec¬
tions. Thus, the instrumental importance of historioal events can be
objectively appraised. But no such basis for intersubjective agreement on
the intrinsic importance of various factors in history has been found, nor
can such a basis be established. Such judgements derive from the historian's
"values" (Walsh) or his "interests" (Popper), and these are not universali-
1. Walsh asserts that this is largely the case in Britain. 2, Walsh,op.cif.p.
5. Popper's term "interests" is, on its own, ambiguous, the context of
Popper's argument, the "interests" with which historians write history derive
fro m the "troubles and problems" of the generation to which they belong
(OS, II, 267)• "Interests" in Popper's usage may be construed as contemporary
concerns or values.
zable.
In both Walsh's analysis of the limits of scientific history, and
Popper's case for the necessity of points of view in historiography, there
is a common contention which is crucial in each of these arguments; that
judgements of instrumental importance alone are not sufficient to construct
organised accounts of aspects of the past. Implicit or explicit in such
accounts necessarily are judgements of intrinsic importance.
M.G. White's discussion of the "truth-transcendant" dimension of histo¬
rical work, "historical memorability", is a differently worded statement of
vrhat is basically the same idea; that the selection of subjects for histo¬
rical work involves judgements of intrinsic importance, whioh do not seem
to be universalizable. White asserts that
"I know of no rock of historical practice or
usage upon which to rest some definition of
historical memorability. Historians nay in
one generation band together and by fiat
rule out certain kinds of true histories as
nonhistories, but I should doubt that they
could provide any clear notion of memorability
which supposedly flows from the nature of
history as a discipline". 1.
Walsh's suggestion that there seems to be no way of resolving the
variety of judgements of intrinsic importance, and Popper's refusal of the
title of objectivity to historical investigations because of the allegedly
irreducible plurality of possible points of view, and White's contention
about historical memorability as well, all amount to a rejection of Colling-
wood's suggestion that "the idea of history" can in some real if obscure way
2.
guide the historian in his work of selection and construction.
1. M.G. White, "The Logic of Historical Narration", Philosophy and History,
ed. Sidney Hook (N.Y., 1963)» PP* 26-27-
2. E.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History ed. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1946),
pp. 248-50.
VII. The Many Histories and the Traditions of Historical Knowledge
It was once held that the historian's task was to let himself be
absorbed by the past in order that he might subsequently reflect that past.
This older belief has been relegated and replaced by the contemporary ortho¬
doxy, that the writing of history requires that the historian have a point of
view, an orthodoxy supported more by the societal, chronological and psycho¬
logical doctrines mentioned earlier than by the philosophers * analyses of
1.
historical selection discussed above.
Recently a historian has entered his dissent from the prevalent view.
G.R. Elton, in The Practice of History, attacks the belief that the histo¬
rian's choice of a problem for investigation irrevocably processes the evi¬
dence that he brings to bear on the solution of his problem, that the point
of view which the historian implements is preconceived in that
"further questions fare^ themselves
predetermined by the first question asked." 2.
"The evidence is allegedly never in a position
to play freely on the enquiring mind, to
suggest questions which are forced upon
the historian, not forced by him on the
material."
"It is for this reason that some would
deny the possibility of objective history
at all and would claim that there is no
history, only historians." 3-
The position attacked^" resembles that which Popper takes, although it is
not the main issue in the other theories of the historian's point of view
discussed above. In Elton's attack, as in Popper's case for the necessity
1. Recently I heard a historian criticize a new book on the last tsar of
Russia, Nicholas II and his wife Alexandra, (Robert Massie, Nicholas and
Alexandra, London, 1968) because the critic thought the author lacked a
point of view, and also that to write good - or interesting history - a
historian must have a point of view.
2. G.R. Elton, The Practice of History (London, 1967) P» 61. 3* Elton, p.62.
4» Elton is primarily arguing against E.H. Caw's views, expressed in
What is History? (London, 1962)
of points of view in historiography, the ways in which historical evidence
is and can be used are crucial.
Elton admits that
"there possibly are historians who proceed
in this unsatisfactory way"
but that this is not to say that they are good historians.
Elton says that
"One can speak only from personal experience,
and I must say that things do not happen
quite like this." 1.
The "proper - and, as 1 believe, the common - way" is that the historian's
"initial choice" of "main area or study or line of approach" only delimits
the evidence of which he is, in the early stages, the "servant":
"...he will, or should, ask no specific questions
until he has absorbed what it says. At least,
his questions remain general, varied, flexible:
he opens his mind to the evidence both passively
(listening) and actively (asking). The mind
will indeed soon react with questions, but these
are questions suggested by the evidenoe, and
through different men may find different questions
arising from the same evidenoe, the differences
are only to a very limited extent dictated by
themselves. The part they themselves will play
in these differences lies in different responses
to the suggestions put out by the evidence. After
this initial stage, the questions arising will
be pursued specifically, and at this point
the master-servant relationship is reversed. Now
the historian specifically seeks evidence to
answer his questions, and if his selection is
ill-considered or too narrow he may introduce
distortion. The interaction of the material and
the questions asked of it is very intricate and
sophisticated, but it is not true that in the
proper pursuit of his study, the historian's
need to select destroys the independent
existence of history." 2.
Elton's argument is that the kind of initial questions which the historian
asks are too broad and general to determine his results in any way that
1. Elton, p. 62. 2. Elton, pp. 62-63.
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would suit the preoonceived point of view theory.
A concrete example of how a historian selects and handles a topic may
be apposite. Hugh Trevor-Roper'a essay on "The European Witch-Craze of
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries"1' illustrates Elton's contentions
as to the way in which a historian selects. Trevor-Roper's avowed purpose
'is
in writing this essay to correct historical misrepresentations of the temper
/v
of these centuries, which have been anachroniatical1y viewed as part of the
allegedly steady progress of modernity froia the Renaissance to the Enlight¬
enment and beyond, a view which distorts these centuries in the light of
later developments. Thus it was assumed that witchcraft must heve been on
the decline during these centuries, as a corollary of the spread of modernity,
as it was assumed that the force of modernity would dissolve superstition,
an assumption which Trevor-Roper maintains is contradicted by the factst
the flourishing of witchcraft and of associated superstitions and ways of
thougnt antithetic to modern rationalism.
Thus Trevor-Roper is disputing the established view of the instrumental
importance or influence of modernity and rationalism during these centuries.
His essay may also presuppose a judgement as to the intrinsic imoortance of
progress, which differs from that presupposed by the established view of
these centuries. Trevor-Roper'a work may involve, as well, a personal facet
in that he delights in debunking 3acred cows.
Thus the criterion by which Trevor-Roper selects an aspect of the past
for investigation and the way in which he presents his chosen topic are
guided by the aim of correcting an accepted misrepresentation of the past,
according to which the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries take their place
in the roll-call of modernity. That is, we might say that Trevor-Roper is
guided by "the idea of history" in attempting to correct the established
picture of these centuries; and it seems to me that such intentions guide
1. In his collection of essays, Religion, The Reformation and Social
Change (London, 1967), PP« 90 - 192.
historians more generally in their selection of topics for investigation.
We .nay also view Trevor-Roper's approach as illustrating some of Elton's
contentions against the view that the historian's initial question predeter¬
mines his subsequent use of the evidence. Trevor-Roper's initial selection
is generals the history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One
"suggestion" which Trevor-Roper receives from contemporary evidence is that
it conflicts with subsequent historiography of these centuriess these centu¬
ries have been thought to be more modern - more like their sequel - than they
were in actual fact. This false preconception allowed these centuries to be
neatly slotted into a steady progress of modernity from the Renaissance to
the Englightenment, a process in which they constituted the chief inter¬
mediary stage. The effects of this preconception can be seen quite strik¬
ingly in the assumption of historians that witchcraft was - must have been -
on the decline during these centuries. By developing a more accurate
appraisal of the strength and influence of witchcraft during these centuries,
Trevor-Roper intends to contribute to the demolition of a more general rais-
interpx*e tation.
Trevor-Roper's essay thus seems to fit Elton's analysis. It might also
be considered to be a historical interpretation of the type which Popper
believes rares a "semi-scientific" interpretation, or one that "radically
1.
deviates" from established authority. " My contention is that the majority
of historical interpretations are "semi-scientific" in the sense of critically
Aqualification here: Popper, in introducing this concept (discussed above,
~—PP^ "^25^7)» speaks of historical interpretations based on a single source.
Theestablished reading of such a source as oj^ any collection of evidence
depends on, and is perhaps largely determined by, historiographical traditions;
and this established reading is not wholly dependent on its alleged authority,
for influential preconceptions in the secondary sources may affect such a
reading. Thus, what Popper is criticizing is the established view of Plato,
rather than an image of himself whioh Plato sought to disseminate.
4*Vl3('
examining the established view of their subject, and perhaps revising this
picture, " and that those interpretations which are circular in Popper's
sense of reproducing the literal content of their sources are not accept¬
able as history.
One way in which it seems to ine that the sceptical dissolution of
history into historians implementing viewpoints goes wrong is in neglecting
the relation of any individual historical work to the traditions of histo¬
rical knowledge. The points of view which historians implement are rarely
altogether personal, or wholly determined by contemporaneous factors! a
historian's foray into a previously explored field is an attempt to review
and perhaps revise an established picture of the past. The historian's
point of view relates to traditions of historical knowledge, as well as to
interests, values or judgements of intrinsic importance.
Although a historian's results may be shaped by his interests, values,
or judgements of intrinsic importance, his work is not guided merely by the
desire or intention to imprint an image in accordance with these values on
the traditions of historical knowledge. The intention with which historians
work is that of contributing to the idea of history, even though they may
2.
never succeed in realizing this intention. * That is^historians are guided
by the ideal of correcting the established picture of the past in the light
of some ideal of historical knowledge, even though they may never succeed
1. Gf. Popper's "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition," GR. p. 122, where
he says that a "critical attitude" towards a tradition
"may result either in acceptance or in rejection, or perhaps
compromise."
Historians, when they have adequate evidence, take a critical attitude
towards the traditions of historical knowledge, which is very much like
the "critical attitude" that Popper describes in this essay. To be sure,
there is not always sufficient evidence for a historian to accept or
reject an account, as in Greek history where there may be only one source
for important events.
2. Collingwood, loc. oit. says something to this same effect.
£2r.
in realizing this ideal, and even if factors other than this regulative
ideal may appear raore prominent to the critic of their results. The on¬
going attempt to construct a more accurate picture of the past, in accord¬
ance with "the idea of history", would thus seem to provide one fairly
secure criterion for historical raera^orability which guides historical work
and the appraisal of historical work, even if it is not always adhered to or
realized in practice - even though it may not he possible to distil the idea
of history from historians' results .
My summary of Trevor-Roper's intentions in his essay on witchcraft is
apposite in this connection. It is by arguments such as Trevor-Roper puts
forward that a choice of subject is justified to other historians. Whether
this general line of reasoning is applicable is a criterion for the "inter-
subjective acceptability" of a choice of topic for historical investigation.
VIII. Has History any Meaning?
Popper states dramatically in the last chapter of The Open Society
\»n p <
that there is "no such thing" as nlstory. * Under this heading Popper puts
forward at least three contentions. First, that no "concrete history of
mankind" can be written. Second, that the history of power politics is no
substitute for the unrealizable universal history of mankind. Third, that
no meaning can be assigned to the whole of history. How Popper collects
these three contentions under one heading that "history has no meaning", can
be seen by following his arguments in detail.
"a universal history in the sense of a concrete
history of mankind...cannot be written" 2.
because it is logically impossible to include all thet such a history must
cover:
"the history of all men...of all human hopes,
struggles, and sufferings." 3«
1. OS, II, 269-200,chapter 25, sec.iv; the citation is taken from OS,II,270.
2. OS, II, 270 3. OS, II, 270.
From the necessity of selection arise what Popper calls "the many histories",*'
of various subjects and aspects of human life.
Second, what has been taken by "most people"^*to be the history of man¬
kind is nothing of the kinds
"the history of power politics (which) is nothing but the
history of international crime and mass murder"
has been
"elevated into the history of the world." 3»
Popper gives three reasons why this particular one of "the many histories"
has been mistaken for the history of mankind.^* "Power affects ua all",
which is not the case with many of the possible and actual subjects of
histories, such as poetry; "men are inclined to worship power", and this
inclination has been encouraged!
"those in power wanted to be worshipped and could
enforce their wishes. Many historians wrote under
the supervision of the emperors, the generals and
the dictators."
Lastly, Popper lambaste "some apologists for Christianity" who have thought
that "Cod reveals Himself" in "the history of political power":
"that history has meaning; and that its meaning is
the purpose of God." 6.
Popper links these three contentions: that writing "a concrete history
of mankind" is logically impossible; and that the history of political power,
deified by some apologists for Christianity, is no substitute for such a
history. This linkage is part of Popper's dissection of the style of thought
which he attributes to historicisa, but for the purpose of examining the scope
of Popper's critique of history it is worthwhile to consider these three ideas
separately, for the first two at least have implications beyond what Popper
considers to be historicism.
1. 03, II, 270.
3. os, 11, 270
5. os, 11, 271
2. OS, II, 269
4. OS, II, 270-1
6.03, II, 271.
In developing his case that there is no such thing as history, Popper
A
proceeded from the impossibility of writing "a concrete history of mankind"
and the episteraological necessity of selection, to maintaining that tES
""idea^ of objectivity*'" drs "inapplicable" to the practice of history.
Popper's -c^cTunion has been questioned on the grounds that historians make
use of techniques of criticism which meet Popper's standards for objectivity.
If there is "no such thing" as "a concrete history of mankind", historians
can nonetheless work with the regulative idea of contributing to a history
of mankind which can never be completely written; and I think that many
historians view monographic work in this light. I have argued that histo¬
rians possess inter-subjective standards for appraising historical work as
contributing to a complete history of mankind which can never be realized.
Popper criticizes the undue importance attributed to the history of
political power, which has wrongly been taken to represent the history of
mankind. Insofar as Popper's strictures are meant to apply to the prac¬
tice of history, they are outdated. To be sure, historians such as Leopold
von Ranke wrote political history as though it ware universal history, but
this is nowadays considered a narrow conception of historiography by prac¬
tising historians, who write "the many histories" of various subjects and
aspects of human life; the history of art, or printing, or of economic and
social aspects of past events and circumstances. But historiography is not
to be understood quite as nominalistically as Popper contends, for practis¬
ing historians share an idea of history, marked out by critical standards
and the relevance of particular topics to general history, by which they can
appraise the importance of written histories as contributing to the unreali¬
zable "concrete history of mankind".
As for those apologists for Christianity, who have thought that the
infamies narrated in the history of political power manifested the hand of
God, these views are - to make a distinction, the use of which would have
done much to clarify Popper's discussion of history throughout - meta-histo-
ricai speculations.
1. 03, II, 268 cf. above. "^Yc -Wno oK Vlhr^»f>«<!r /»
<*0 -ro ^irxJb
Ovtr\n$< Ol -£*n \\
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Ot>€aa -)D yu^S^hh^t''je ^ 3 \ «-
Thus the various contentions which Popper uses to argue that "history
has no meaning"*' * do not have much impact oh the practice of history.
Popper's concern is with the question of whether the whole of history can
be said to have a meaning, and not with the rather different question of
how historians oan shov: that particular events are meaningful. Popper's
critique of historical interpretations as circular, as the Conventionalists
maintained of scientific theories, assumes that there is little to distinguish
meta-historical speculations from the conjectures of a practising historian,
and it has been argued that, on the contrary, there are considerable differ¬
ences between those two genres.
IX. The Implications of Popper's Later Ideas on History
In subsequent writings Popper has removed the coping-stone of the case
he constructed for the circularity of historical interpretations, a case
which was claimed to show that historiography could not reach objective re¬
sults. It has been argued in the earlier pages of this chapter that Popper
based his case on certain alleged limitations on the use of historical evi¬
dence.
In his later writings Popper has claimed that historians as well as
social scientists can make use of situational logic, and that analysis in
terms of situational logic gives objective results.2* Popper's exegesis
of how it is possible for situational logic to be an objective analysis of
historical actions withdraws the basis from which he argued that historical
interpretations mat in general be circular! namely, the alleged limitations
on the uses of historical evidence.
1. os, ii, 269.
2. Popper, "Historical Explanation," an interview with Michael Tanner,
John Dunn and Alistair Young, Cambridge Opinion 28 (I962) pp. 21-25;
and Popper, "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften", Kfllner Seitschrift
fttr Soziologle, 14(1962), p. 255-248. Cf. above Chapter Three.
Popper maintains that situational logic is objective on two related
counts, firsts
"the characteristic thing about situational logic
is that it is obiective, in the sense that
everything about it is, in principle, objectively
testable. ¥/e can in principle teat whether this
was, or was not, the situation in which the
various people found themselves." 1.
And second, Popper oh&racterizes situational logic as a method of "objective
understanding"; actions are "objectively understood" as "appropriate" in the
given situation, where the situation is taken to include the agent's aims and
2 .
knowledge, as well as the external sitiiation in which he found himself.
For an action to be "objectively understood", Popper means that it is possible
to roach intersubjective agreement on the appropriateness of the action in
the situation.
Popper speaks, in connection with situational logic, of improving such
explanations by finding new evidence:
"...What is important ie the objective reconstruction
of the situation, and this should be testable. For
example, if we find new evidence, then it should be
possible for our reconstructions to be refuted.
Very important in history are those reconstructions
from which we deduce the existence of new evidence,
on the grounds, sajr, that no man would have
acted in sixch and suoh a way without also writing
such and such a letter." 4«
"Above all, however, situational analyses are rational,
open to empirical criticism, and capeble of
improvement. For example, we can find a letter
which shows that the knowledge at Charlemagne's
disposal was quite different from what we had
assumed in our analysis. 5»
1. Popper, KK, p. 21. 2. LSW, p. 246.
3. ibid, p.247. Popper seems to think (p.246-247) that objective under¬
standing is not possible if the analyses of actions are framed in psycho¬
logical terms? this is an extension of his earlier objections to "psycho-
logism" in his discussion of situational logic in chapter 14 of OS.
Cf. above Chapter three for a discussion of this point.
4. HE. p. 21. 5. LSW, p.247.
In The Open Society Popper claimed that the historian was confined, by the
interpretations provided in hie sources because, "as a rule" "no further
facts are available...to tost that or any subsequent theory".*" In his
later discussions of situational logic, Popper thinks of historical evidence
as less limited than he contended in The Open Society; he has come closer
to the actual character and variety of historical evidence.
It might be argued that the conflict I have brought forward is contrived:
that in the case of situational logic, Popper is discussing testable histo-
rical hypotheses, for which he allowed in The Open Society; * and the
example of revising a hypothesis about Gharlemangne might be thought to
support this defence. But the contradiction with which I am concerned does
not stem merely from Popper's withdrawal of his simplifying assumption of
scanty sources. In saying that explanations in terras of situational logic
are "in principle" testable, Popper is -saying something more than just that
it may be possible to find new evidence with a bearing on the validity of the
proposed explanation. If it is to be possible "in principle" to
"test whether this was, or was not the situation in which
the various people found themselves,"
it must be possible to do something more than follow historical sources
literally. Testing whether or not this was indeed the situation in which
people found themselves involves more than citing of conflicting sources as
au thorities. If
"situational analyses are rational, open to empirical
criticism and capable of improvement"
then these virtues of situational logic presuppose the possibility of consider¬
ing the relevant evidence critically.
For Popoer'3 claim that situational logic is objective to make sense, it
must be possible to make a critical use of the available evidence bearing on
the analysis of the situation. And if this is to be possible, the basis of
Popper's case for the circularity of the majority of historical interpretations
has vanished. For then the historian is not confined to a literal use of
his sources, as untestable authorities.
1. OS, II, 26^. 2. OS, II, 266.
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I. Introduction
In the preceding chapters it has been suggested that Popper's ideas
on history and on the related topic of historicism cannot be adequately
explicated in purely philosophical terras because these ideas are shaped
in important respects by the extra-philosophical influence of Popper's
liberalism. The crux of Popper's liberalism, as I shall argue in this
chapter, is his liberalism which will be shown to link the rrultifarious
strands of Popper's thought on social policy and the methods of history
and the social sciences .
Popper's analysis of historical method involves more than a straight¬
forward application of his views on scientific method, because the limita¬
tions that Popper imputes to historical evidence cannot be derived simply
from a comparison with the infinite quantity of evidence available in
principle for testing scientific theory. As I have argued, Popper's case
for these limitations rests on his assumption that historical evidence can
only exceptionally be disengaged from the untestable point of view from
which it is presented.
Although Popper's presentation of historical method and his resulting
conclusions about histories are marked by his ignorance of the actual prac¬
tice of history, there is more to his case than ignorance. Popner's
emphasis on the alleged limitations of historical method is congruent with
his defence of liberalism against the threat of totalitarianism, a defence
which is, after all, the main theme of The Open Society and its Enemies.
At the time when Popper wrote The Poverty of Historicism and The Open
Society, which present his best-known view of history, the Second World War,
fought against Nazi Germany, had roused him to a restatement"''' of the
2.
liberalism or "cause of the open society" * which, then as now, he held to
1. On Popper's critique of historicism as a restatement of liberalism,
see Herbert Marcuse, "The Problem of Historical Laws", Partisan Review
vol. XXVI no. 1 (Winter 1959), PP« 117-13°> especially p. 126.
2. OS, II, 82.
be integral to Western civilization. The Open Society was, as Popper
has written, his war work.^"* What he analyzes as historicism is not only
e.
the idological foundation of Nazi totalitarianism, but also the philosophy
a 2.
of the "intellectual fifth colurin" threatening Western civilization.
The central antithesis on which Popper's critique of historicism is
based is between a mistaken and dangerous hypostetization of social entities,
which he attributes to historicism under the name of holism, and the view
which he defends that social collectives are no more than
"theoretical constructions referring to the
actions and interactions of individuals." 3»
Historieism is based on the thesis that social collectives are supra-indivi¬
dual, a doctrine which is associated with a view of social policy wherein
the right of the individual not to be harmed can be overridden for other
considerations; social policies may be undertaken for reasons relating to
these allegedly supra-individual social collectives; e.g., the defence of
the racial purity of a nation my lead to the elimination of those citizens
thought to be racially impure. The belief that social collectives really
exist as supra-individual entities can have seemingly innocent applications,
and has been seen in the hands of the Nazis to have horrendous applications.
The ultimate ground on which Popper opposes historicism is that its
conception of social policy relates to supra-individual social collectives
and may thus infringe upon the right of the individual not to be harmed.
Popper's critique of historicisra and the implications of holism for social
policy applies to more than the Third Reich. It covers certain kinds of
social and economic planning as well, which Popper thinks contain the seeds
of a totalitarian outlook inimical to the liberal humanitarianism which he
is defending.
1. OS, II, 393 (Addenda I, Pacts, Standards and Truth, sec. 17, "Hegel Again")
"It should not be forgotten that I looked upon my book as my war
effort..."
2. OS, II, 81. 3» HI, 135-6.
The complex body of doctrines which Popper thinks supports this social
theory, he calls historicism. It has been argued above, in chapter four,
that the anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic parts of historicisra are
not logically linked in the sense that the adherent to the anti-natural¬
istic doctrines of hiatoricism is committed to the pro-naturalistic doctrines
of prophecy by means of developmental laws. Nonetheless, the two sets of
doctrines do have a common ground in holism. Although holism will not do
the logical work that Popper's argument for the connection between the anti-
naturalistic and pro-naturalistic parts of historicism requires, nonetheless
it does indicate that both pro-naturalistic and anti-naturalistic historicism
share1'a crucial premise about the constituents of social life which Popper
is concerned to confute.
Although Popper would accept a description of his political views as
liberal in a sense best represented in Britain, he would reject my claim
that his political liberalism shapes his critique of historical method. He
would maintain that his critique rests on methodological and not political
considerations. My argument that Popper's analysis of historical method
goes markedly beyond an application of his analysis of scientific method,
and is affected in this respect by his liberal views, will be substantiated
by an investigation of the ramifications of Popper's individualisms, political,
methodological and ontological, which I shall carry out in the third section
of this chapter, "Popper's Arguments for Methodological Individualism: Methodo¬
logical Individualism in Practice."
It is certainly not original with me to argue that Popper's ideas on
historicism and historical method are affected by his liberalism. Such a
2.
claim has been made previously by Herbert Marcuse. * Marcuse maintains that
1. PH, p.105.
2. Herbert Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," Partisan
Review v. 26 (Winter, 1959)» 117-129; Marcuse's ideas stimulated my own,
although I have not come to quite the same conclusions.
14?
Popper's
"most telling arguments against historicism are
in the last analysis political arguments, and
his own position is in the last analysis a
political position. TLe political dimension
is not merely superinposed upon the methodological;
the latter rather reveo.ls itijbwn political content."
"Popper has...restated some of the philosophical
foundations of classical liberalism; Hayek looms
large in the supporting footnotes, and the critique
of historicism is largely a justification of liberalism
against totalitarianism. Liberalism and totalitarianism
appear as two diametrically opposed systems! opposed
in their economics and politics as well as in their
philosophy."
"...the driving force behind Popper's attack on
historicism...is...in the last analysis a struggle
against history - not spelled with a capital H, but
the empirical course of history. Any attempt to
rescue the values of liberalism and democracy must
account for the emergence of a society that plays
havoc with these values." 1.
Marcuse's argument is both speculative and suggestive. He argues that
2
liberalism and totalitarianism are not "diametrically opposed systems" as
Popper's remedy for historicism requires, but that the workings of liberalism
may give totalitarianism a foothold. The argument is recognizably Marxist,
but it is not for that reason to be disregarded. In the chapter on histo¬
ricism it was noted that Karl Mannheim had earlier defended a similar con¬
tention about liberalism in even stronger terms by an argument whose struct¬
ure parallel/s that of Popper's critique of historicisras according to Mann¬
heim, the weaknesses of a liberal social order foster totalitarianism, and
only a system of large-scale social planning can avert the danger of tota¬
litarianism.
Both cases in this dispute about the relations of liberalism to tota¬
litarianism, Popper's as well as that of Mannheim and Marcuse, involve
1. Marouse, op. cit. p. 122-5, p. 126, p. 129.
2. Marcuse, p. 126.
speculative considerations about the actual historical relations of such
encompassing conceptions as liberalism and totalitarianism. This dispute
seems to go beyond the limit3 which Popper seta for historiography, which
is that the meaning given to past facts depends or, the point of view of the
historian. What is at issue is the significance of and relationship between
certain historical structures, liberal and totalitarian social systems.
Such speculation is not necessarily to be scoffed at, nor is it unrelated to
the significance and communication of the work of professional historians,
even if it is fraught with difficulties.
Marcuse'a argument for Popper's "struggle against...the empirical course
of history" is that Popper does not want to acknowledge the structural or
"holistic" social changes which have invalidated the analysis of society
which Popper defends. Society is no longer organized, Marcuse insists, in
the way that Popper's analysis presupposes;
"Contemporary society is increasingly functioning
as a rational whole which overrides the life of
its parts, progresses through planned waste and
destruction, and advances with the irresistable
force of nature - as if governed by inexorable
laws...The 'holism' which has become reality
must be met by a 'holist' critique of thi3 reality." 1.
Marcuse's critique rests ultimately, as does Popper's analysis of histori-
cism, on extremely general considerations as to the nature of contemporary
society in the face of the threat of totalitarianism.
Marcuse overstates his case for the influence of Popper'3 political
opinions on his methodological ideas on one important point. Marcuse implies
that Popper is a lai3sez-faire liberal: Marcuse's reference to Hayek, when
he says that Popper's purpose in criticizing historicism is to defend classi¬
cal liberalism (cf. the second passage cited above, p.i ) suggests that for
Popper as well as for Hayek, any form of state intervention is "the road to
2#
serfdom". * This implication must be rejected as an overstatement on
1. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 129
2. Although Hayek's views are considerably more subtle than any slogan can
suggest, the association his naUte evokes is with laissez-faire liberalism.
4. XH*\
Marcuse'o part which weakens his case. Popper's beliefs can and should be
distinguished from the extreme laissez-faire views which the phrase "classi¬
cal liberalism" in conjunction with the name of Hayek evokes.^* For Popper
"Liberalism and state-interference are not
opposed to each other. On the contrary, any
kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless
it i3 guaranteed by the state." 2.
Liberalism, as Popper defends it, allows and even requires some state inter¬
vention, in accordance with the criteria of piecemeal social engineering.
Popper reconciles some "state-interference" with liberalism through
attending to the inhumane effects of a laizzez-faire economy which had aroused
the wrath of Marx.^* Under "unrestrained capitalism" or a system of com¬
pletely free enterprise, the "economically strong" have the freedom to "bully"
the"economically weak" and there is no redress or "freedom" for the latter?
complete free enterprise only amounts to freedom for some and oppression for
others.^'* The "paradox of freedom" is that the result of complete freedom
of action is not freedom for all those affected but rather the annulment of
e
freedom. Thus, for the sake of humanitarian principles, as well as to
realize freedom, state intervention is required to counteract the oppressive
6
effects of a laissez-faire system.
1. While Hayek might not reject this statement out of hand, Popper's develop¬
ment of his case for interventionism and piecemeal social engineering goes
rather further in the direction of allowing for "state-interference" than
did Hayek in The Road to Serfdom. Cf. Popper's addition to note 4» chapter
9 (03, II, 285-6) on Hayek's views as expressed in this book and their re¬
lation to what Popper calls piecemeal social engineering.
2. OS, I, iii.
OS, II, 124: "I believe that the injustice and inhumanity of the unre¬
strained 'capitalist system' described by Marx cannot be questioned; but it
can be interpreted in terms of...the paradox of freedom".
4^ 03, II, 124? cf. note 4 to chap. 7» OS, I, 265: " complete freedom only
allows the strong to bully the weak - a more general statement of the 'paradox
of freedom".
5. cf. note 4 to chap. 7» OS I 265.
6. This is what Popper calls the "protectionist theory of the state", OS, I,
111-112.
Xho
Popper's notion of interventionist!, which stems from interpreting the
workings of unrestrained capitalism in terms of the "paradox of freedom",
is meant to be a historical analysis as well as a "liberal theory".^*
The rather abstract historical argument which he presents might be thought
to require more in the way of historical support than Popper provides.
Popper presents his case chiefly by assertion, and without the kind of dis¬
cussion of evidence that historians might think such argument requires;
his historical analysis proceeds at a rather high level. Popper's defence
of his "liberal theory" goes beyond the limits he sets for historiography;
his development of his idea of interventionism involves something of a
speculative interpretation of history, which is lass explicitly acknowledged
2.
than is the case with his "rationalist interpretation" of history.
Popper's argument for interventionism is what W.W. Rostow called his
Stages of Economic Growth: "an alternative to Karl Marx's theory of modern
3.
history". Popper intends interventionism to be a substantial historical
refutation of Marx's prophecy of an inevitable revolutionary collapse of
capitalism. Thus it is meant to complement his logical and methodological
arguments against the very enterprise of historical prophecy. Popper
argued in his methodological critique of historicism that historical pro¬
phecy such as that of Marx is indefensible on logical grounds. His histo¬
rical argument about interventionism is meant to corroborate his logical
analysis of Marx's historical prophecy of the revolutionary and socialist
sequels to unrestrained capitalism.
Marx's prophecy of the inevitable revolutionary overthrow of "unre¬
strained capitalism" presupposed that the "law of increasing misery" apply:
that in search of additional profit, capitalists would increasingly exploit
1. He uses the phrase "a liberal theory" on OS, I, 111; for his argument
as a historical analysis, see the paragraph following.
2. Popper presents the rationalist interpretation of history in note 61 to
chap. 11, OS, II, 305-
3. W.W. Rostow, "The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Conmun1st Manifesto
(Cambridge University Press, paperback edition, i960), p. 2.
the workers, finally beyond the letter's endurance. But Popper argues,
uv>
increasing misery will only occur under restrained capitalism, and the
A
actual misery under historical capitalism was such that men chose not to
allow it to increase to a revolutionary pitch. They chose to resort to
interventionism after seeing the workings of "unlimited economic freedom".'5'*
Interventionism has led to decreasing misery. Thus Popper uses the concept
of intervontionisra to show that the unrestrained capitalism on which Marx
based the historical laws required for his prophecy, did not persists the
initial conditions of unrestrained capitalism, complete freedom of economic
action, were abolished before their effects could, by means of the "law of
increasing misery", lead to a revolutionary end of capitalism, and thus the
revolutionary trend did not persist. Men chose to alter the initial condi¬
tions on which the persistence of the trend depended.
The debates discussed above, about the historical sequel to unrestrained
capitalism and about the historical relations of liberalism and totalitari¬
anism, rest on alternative and incompatible concepts of social analysis. It
seems to me difficult if not impossible to apply Popper's description of
historical interpretations as complementary and not incompatible to such
intentionally antithetical analyses as those of Marx, Mannheim and Marcuse
on one hand, and that of Popper on the other.
Moreover, Popper's defence of his notions of social policy by histori¬
cal argument oversteps the limits he sets for historiography: because he is
not giving history a meaning, but saying that history has a meaning which
accords with his liberal ideas and undermines the Marxist analysis of capi¬
talism.
1. 03, II, 178-9, on which this passage is based, and the citation taken.
f.
II. Social Policy! Piecemeal Engineering
1. Piecemeal and Utopian Social Engineering
Although interventionism remedied the inhumane effects of unrestrained
capitalism, it is nonetheless inherently "dangero'^", according to Popper,
because it "will tend to increase the power of the state". * Hence the
state-interference which is compatible with liberalism must be qualified!
a liberal intcrventionisia, in Popper's eyes, is one where piecemeal methods
safeguard against the dangers of increasing state power.
Popper says at various points that the method of piecemeal social eng¬
ineering is the only rational or practicable method of social reform: it is,
as well, the only method which has "been really successful". '* Popper de¬
lineates the method of piecemeal engineering by means of a series of contrasts
with the objectionable foimof social engineering which he calls Utopian or
holistic. Utopian and piecemeal social engineering are thus correlative
concepts in Popper's thought in a sense which is characteristic of his "crit-
ical approach" to ideas.
Popper sometimes presents the outlook of social engineering in both its
Utopian and its piecemeal forms, as antithetic to radical historicism,^* be¬
cause the latter counsels acquiescence in future developments which may be
prophesied but which no human efforts can affect,'* while social engineering
is based on the premise that social changes can be achieved through human
effort. But the "opposition"^"between historicism and Utopian engine -ring
1. OS, II, 1*0.
2. PH, 69, OS, I, 167, OS, II, 2381 FH, p.60; OS, I, 158.
& '
3. Gf. the passage introducing section III of this chapter, p.|# below.
4. OS, I, 22; PH, 44-45, HH 71 and PH 73? OS, I, 164. Of. OS, I, 157
"The Utopian approach...may seem to be the obvious alternative to an
out-and-out historicism - to a radically historicist approach which
implies that we cannot alter the course of history; at the same time,
it appears to be the necessary complement to a less radical historici3ra
...which permits human interference."
5. PH, 44-45. 6. PH 71.
turns out to be somewhat specious. Although historicism counsels acqui¬
escence in the developmental laws of history, it need not require complete
passivity of historicists.!* According to a "less radical historicism",
it is permissible for a hiotoricist to act so as to promote what the alleged
laws of history will in any case bring about, although he cannot by any means
2.
forestall their effects. * Despite the appeal of Utopian engineering to
people "unaffected by or reacting against historicist prejudice", it is poss¬
ible to combine Utopian engineering with "a less radical historicism...which
permits human interference."'
This combination can occur because these two doctrines share certain
assumptions which are rejected by piecemeal engineering. The Utopian
engineer works with the idea of changing society as a whole, according to
his blueprint; the historicist believes that the workings of the appropriate
historical laws will result in a total transformation of society. By con¬
trast, the piecemeal engineer maintains that social reforms must be based on
4.
experience which allows us to appraise the effects of measures implemented,
which cannot be done if the attempt is made to change society at one fell
swoop. Both the Utopian engineer and the historicigt believe that the
aims by which their social activities are guided "are not a matter of choice,
or of moral decision ; both hold that such aims can be "scientifically dis¬
covered" by analysing "historical tendencies" or the ",needs," of society.^'
Thus the historicist argues that certain changes are inevitable results of
the laws of history, and the Utopian maintains that large-scale planning is
an inescapable consequence of the "direction of the present historical devel¬
opment". '' The piecemeal engineer, and Popper, do not think that there can
be scientific recipes for discovering social aims; such ajms roust be chosen;
1. PH 48-54 and 71. 2. OS, I, 157
3. OS, I, 158; PH 73; OS, I, 157. 4. PH, p.67.
5. The reasons for this contention are discussed below.
6. PH 74-75. 7. PH 75.
they cannot be supplied by any kind of allegedly scientific inquiry.""*
Another thread which links the historicist to the Utopian engineer is
their common dissatisfaction with "tinkering" as a means of social reform
2.
and their desire to adopt more radical measures. " A further point of
agreement which Popper mentions is an application of holismt social experi¬
ments, "if there is such a thing", must be "carried out on a holistic scale",
but
"We are seldom in the position to carry out 'planned
experiments' in the social field...for an account of
the results of 'chance experiments', so far carried
out in this field, we have to turn to history." 3»
The doctrine that there are supra-individual entities or wholes in
society, and the doctrine that social aims depend on the direction of society
and can consequently be discovered by scientific investigation, doctrines
which Popper names respectively holism and historicist moral theory, are
common to historicism and Utopian engineering and are rejected by piecemeal
engineering. They provide the basis for the "strange alliance"^'between
the former two doctriness an alliance wherein social policy is "sweeping"
in the sense of dealing with supra-individual 3oeial wholes, in accordance
with aims that are allegedly scientifically discovered.
1. Popper draws a strict distinction between the choice of such aims and
their implementation by the social technologist (03, chap. 3 sec. iv, 03,
I, 22-24} The purpose of Popper's aharp distinction between the choice
and the implementation of social aims is to allow for the analogy which
he defends between piecemeal social engineering and mechanical engineer¬
ing (see below pJ^^^13Jjt opper'8 figure of the technologist is not with¬
out its its unsavoury connotationss a cog in the Nazi juggernaut such as
Adolf Eichrrann would seem to be a social technologist in Popper's sense
(of. OS, I, 23 "The social engineer or technologist...would perhaps suggest
measures that would make $a police force} a suitable instrument for the
protection of freedom and security, and he might also devise measures by
which it could be turned into a powerful weapon of class rule".) Popper's
model may give a rather misleading picture of the formulation of social
aims, in which investigation is involved as well a3, in the last resort,
choice.
2. PH 74 3. PH 84-85. 4. PH 73
*2£5
Although Popper characterizes Utopian or holistic'* engineering as
attempting' to deal with social wholes or supra-individual social entities,
the scope of holistic engineering, as contrasted with piecemeal engineer¬
ing is nonetheless unclear. What exactly are Popper's objections to
holistic engineering directed against? This question ha3 interested com¬
mentators on Popper. Surely holistic planning must refer to more than
the enterprise of changing a total society, an enterprise which is logi¬
cally impossible to undertake if we follow Popper's argument than any
particular has an infinity of aspects. Such engineering could never get
off the ground, so to speak, for if a society has an infinity of aspects
it is then impossible to act on all these aspects in any finite length of
time. Yet what else can Popper refer to when he inveighs against the
2.
Utopian notion of "a blueprint for a society as a whole".
Popper's criticism of the holistic characteristics of Utopian planning
is not confined to the logical difficulty mentioned above. The notion of
"a blueprint for society as a whole" derives from the attempt to realize an
ideal society, whose features are delineated by siich a blueprint. Those
who formulate such a dream are often "dissatisfied with 'piecemeal tinker¬
ing"'.^* Modifications of the status quo can never match their dream;
for this a new world is needed. Popper describes this attitude as an
"aesthetic enthusiasm" which is radical in the "original sense" of "going
'■
to the root of the matter". But complete reconstruction st? rting from
scratch is impossible:
"the social world must continue to function
during any reconstruction" 6.
1. He seems to use these terms alternately, e.g. PII 6jt
"holistic or Utopian social engineering".
2. OS, I, 159 3. OS, I, 157-8
4« PH, 74. Might there be grounds other than an "understandable"
"aesthetic enthusiasm" (OS, I, 165) for dissatisfaction with '"piecemeal
tinkering'"? Popper does not go into this question to ray satisfaction.
I think (see below^;-i54!i-iijiere are reasons to be critical of what
Popper recommends in the way of "'piecemeal tinkering'".
5. OS, I, 165 and 03, I, 164. 6. OS, I, 167.
Consequently the clean sweep which the Utopian engineer desires is quite
impracticable. An even more important objection than the question of
what happens in the interim is related to Popper's conception of the piece¬
meal method of reform: there can be no guarantee of success in iraplement-
ing the ideal of "a complete reconstruction of our social world". " On
the contrary: mistakes are to be expected, as we neither have nor can have
any experience of such "sweeping changes" as "the reconstruction of society
as a whole.
So far Popper's strictures seem to be directed against Utopian dreams:
against certain statements of principles rather than the actual proposals
for social changes. The kind of planning which Popper thinks the Utopian
*
m
attitude promotes is "large-scale" or centralized planning. to which
Popper raises rather different objections than that of the logical impossi¬
bility of transforming society in every detail, or the lack of an Archi-
4.
medean lever for shifting the social world. A related approach, on
which several commentators have fastened as central to Popper's conception
of holistic engineering, is planning which involves structural changes in
society which Popper considers precipitate. Although Popper says that the
piecemeal approach does not debar structural change in society on principle,
if such changes are achieved gradually, he attributes to holistic plan-
3 6the whole structure of society" * Al¬
though this aim need not involve the logical impossibility of changing
every concrete detail of society within a finite span of time, immediate
changes in the structure of society raise the problem of what is to be
done while the structure of society is in the foundry. Commentators have
thought that Popper's objections to "holistic" structural change have to do
■7
with more than the problem of management in the interim; * the tenor of
Popper's views, some critics suggest, is against all structural change in
1. 05, I, 167.
5. PH 64 and 90
5. Cf. PH 68.
7. e.g. Marcuse, op. cit.
2. OS, I, 167; OS, I, 161, I, 162.
4. os, i, 167
6. OS, I, 163.
I^5~J
society which is not accomplished quite gradually, as in the example he
cites of changing the clas3 structure of society as a result of piecemeal
measures "inspired by...a tendency towards a greater equalization of in¬
comes".'1'* What piecemeal planning permits, then, is structural change over
the long run; the caution of the piecemeal planner prohibits structural
changes attempted in the short run.
A further objectionable attribute of holistic planning to be gleaned
from Popper's presentation is that the success of its measures may require
a transformation of human nature, to make human beings fit for the new
society. * The Utopian's proposals for sweeping social reform often issue
in the demand, not that the new society be made fit for man as he is, but
that man be made fit for the new society. Popper's moral objection to
this outcome is that transforming man is a euphemism for brainwashing and
*
purges. On the methodological aide, Popper argues that the Utopian's
demand that man be made fit for the new society is "an admission of fail¬
ure", a renunciation of all claims to apply "a 'scientific' method" to
social engineerings for objections to Utopian reforms requiring the trans¬
formation of man will be interpreted as indicating the unfitness of the
objector for the new society rather than the unfitness of the new society,
and:
"this, clearly, removes any possibility of testing
the success or failure of the new society." 4.
If the Utopian's proposals require "'the transformation of man'", then they
are unfalsifiable and they cannot be considered to be scientific.
In criticizing Utopian or holistic social engineering Popper rejects
the claim he attributes to the Utopian, that holistic engineering is ana¬
logous to mechanical engineering. Popper contends that, upon examination,
the analogy with mechanical engineering turns in favour of piecemeal methods
1. PH 68 2. PII 69-70- 3. OS, I, 166.




of social engineering. " That a mechanical engineer can plan to construct
quite complicated devices from blueprints does not lend support to the Uto¬
pian's proposal to execute a complete social reconstruction from his blue¬
print. The mechanical engineer is able to plan his whole enterprise in
advance "because he has sufficient experience at his disposal", experience
2#
garnered "by piecemeal methods" which the Utopian engineer's proposals lack.
A series of piecemeal experiments precede the mechanical engineer's compli¬
cated blueprint; the antecedents of this blueprint are to be found in the
experience of constructing simpler devices and adjusting them "by trial and
error".
By contrast to the resources of the mechanical engineer, Popper argues
that
"At present the sociological knowledge necessary
for large-scale engineering is simply non-existent.4.
1. PH 84, PH 9293, Cf. OS, I, 163-4. 2. OS, I, I63.
3. OS, I, I63. Popper adds a further touch to the analogy with mechanical
engineering which he thinks favours piecemeal methods. He suggests that
unintended consequences also occur in mechanical engineering and that "the
task of technology is here also largely to inform us about the unintended
consequences of what we are doing." (a note added to later edits of OS, II,
324, note 11(2) to chap. 14). The example he gives in this connection, of
a bridge becoming "too heavy if we strengthen certain of its components" is
not however an unforseeable consequence, but a consequence of a failure to
consider available evidence. More generally, the unintended consequences
which concern the piecemeal engineer and with which social theory is con¬
cerned, stem from the "uncertainty of the human factor" (see below) accord¬
ing to Popper, and there is nothing really analogous to this in mechanical
engineering. Popper then gives a more general statement of this rather
weak analogy:
"...the analogy goes even further. Our mechanical
inventions do rarely turn out to our original plans."
This generalization might be disputed.
4. OS, I, 162: "We cannot possess such knowledge since we have insufficient
practical experience in this kind of planning, and knowledge of facts must
be based on experience." See below, ppfor Popper's argument that
we can never have the necessary experience for large-scale centralized
planning.
Popper maintains that experience relevant to social reform, analogous to
the backlog of experience which enables a mechanical engineer to construct
a complicated device from a blueprint, must be gained by piecemeal methods:
that is, by piecemeal social experiments, altering "one social institution
at a time". * There are two insuperable drawbacks, Popper thinks, to the
Utopian's proposal of holistic social experiments: to undertake large-
scale enterprises, involving numerous factors, from the start. The Uto¬
pian engineer's enterprise is an experiment only in the sense that its
"outcome is uncertain, but not in the sense in
which this term is used to denote a means of
acquiring knowledge, by comparing the results
obtained with the results expected." ^
The Utopian engineer cannot
"disentangle causes and effects and know
what he is really doing." 2.
"Since so much is done at a time, it is impossible
to say which particular meas\ire is responsible
for any of the results; or rather, if we do
attribute a certain result to a certain measure,
then we can do so only on the basis of some
theoretical knowledge gained previously,
and not from the holistic experiment in question.
This experiment does not help us to attribute
particular results to particular measures; all
we can do is to attribute the 'whole result'
to it..." 3.
Consequently, unpleasant and unforeseen "repercussions" may and are likely
to result from the Utopian's measures, "of a gravity that must endanger the
will to future reforms."^* With piecemeal experiments, both these related
impasses can beavoided: it is possible to identify the results of piecemeal
measures, and to control the scope of such unforeseen and unpleasant reper¬
cussions as may occur.'*
Thus Popper maintains that only by adopting piecemeal methods can a
social engineer undertake enterprises which are analogous to the scientific
1. PH, 85. 2. PH, 67. 3. PH, 88-89.
4. os, i, 163. 5. cf. os, i, 163.
experiments on which the mechanical engineer's blueprints are based: for
"the results obtained" can be compared with "the results expected" only if
it is possible to identify the results of a particular social measure.
Popper has several stock examples of enterprises which he thinks can
be considered to be social experiments, which he mentions in both The
Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society:
"A grocer who opens a new shop is conducting
a social experiment; and even a man who joins
a queue before a theatre gains experimental
technological knowledge which he may utilize
by having his seat reserved next time, which
again is a social experiment. And we should
not forget that only practical experiments have
taught buyers and sellers on the markets the lesson
that prices are liable to be lowered by every
increase of supply, and raised by every increase
of demand.
"Examples of piecemeal experiments on a
somewhat larger scale would be the decision
of a monopolist to change the price of his
product; the introdxiction, whether by a private
or a public insurance company, of a new type
of health or employment insurance; or the
introduction of a new sales tax, or of
a policy to combat trade cycles. All these
experiments are carried out with practical
rather than scientific aims in view....The
situation is very similar to that of physical
engineering and to the pre-scientific methods
by which our technological knowledge in matters
such as the building of ships or the art of
navigation was first acquired." 1.
"The introduction of a new kind of life-insurance
of a new kind of taxation, of a new penal
reform, are all social experiments which have
their repercussions through the whole of society
without remodelling society as a whole. Even
a man who opens a new shop, or who reserves a
ticket for the theatre, is carrying out a kind
of social experiment on a small scale; and all
our knowledge of social conditions is based on
experience gainer] by making experiments of this
kind." 2.
1. PH, 86 2. 08, I, 162.
Popper qualifies the extent to which enterprises such as he cites can be
considered to be analogous to scientific experiments:
"...we possess a very great deal of experimental
knowledge of social life....experience gained by
efforts to achieve some practical aim. It must
be admitted that the knowledge attained in this
way is usually of a pre-scientific kind, and
therefore more like knowledge gained by casual
observation than knowledge gained by carefully
designed scientific experiments; but there is
no reason for denying that the knowledge in
question is based on experiment rather than on
mere observation." 1.
Popper's qualifications seems pretty damning, in the light of the distinction
Popjier drew earlier between the two kinds of predictions, technological and
prophetic, and the engineering and prophetic character of the sciences in
which these kinds of predictions figure:
"The distinction between these two sorts of
prediction roughly coincides with the lesser
or greater importance of the part played by
designed experiment, as opposed to mere
patient observation in the sciences concerned.
The typical experimental sciences are capable
of making technological predictions, while
those employing non-experimental observations
produce prophecies." 2.
But Popper does not think that- the "pre-scientific and scientific experi¬
mental approaches" differ in principle:
"both approaches may be described, fundamentally,
as utilizing the method of trial and error. We
try; that is, we do not merely register an
observation, but make active attempts to solve
some more or less practical and definite problems,
and we make progress if, and only if, we are
prepared to learn from our mistakes: to recognize
our errors and to utilize them critically instead
of persevering in them dogmatically. Though this
analysis may sound trivial, it describes, I believe,
the method of all the empirical sciences." 3«
1. PH 85-6. The underlining is mine, not Popper's.
2. PH, 43« Cf. below, pp. 'for the implications of this weakness
in the experimental basis of piecemeal engineering.
3. PH 87.
Thus Popper argues, perhaps somewhat dubiously, that piecemeal engine -r-
ing is based on experimental knowledge gained by the same principles as
the experimental knowledge on which mechanical engineering is based. On
this point as before, the analogy with mechanical engineering allegedly
favours piecemeal and not Utopian engineering.
Although Popper seems to think that piecemeal methods show up the de¬
fects inherent in many holistic proposals for large-scale planning, even
conscientious resort to the piecemeal approach will not remove all the ob¬
stacles in the way of large-scale planning. "The sociological knowledge
necessary for large-scale engineering" does not exist, * and Popper thinks
in an important sense cannot exist. There are indeterminacies in social
life which cannot be stirraounted by any amount of piecemeal engineering.
While it is possible for a single mechanical engineer to collect all the
relevant information for his task, it is not possible for the social eng-
2.
ineer to do the same, 'for he cannot determine in advance what "the uncer¬
tainty of the human factor" which affects all his plans will lead to.
Hence the possibility of unforseeable consequences can never be eliminated
from social engineering of either sort; and Popper argues that unforeseen
and unpleasant consequences can be successfully alleviated only if piece¬
meal methods of social engineering are adopted.
Popper argue3 that holistic social engineering is impossible, not only
because it is logically impossible to control all aspects of a whole, but
also because "in practice" the characteristic features of social life, un¬
foreseen consequences, due to the "uncertain and wayward" "human factor",
"force upon the holistic engineer the expedient
of piecemeal improvisation". 2.
To compensate for the unpleasant and unexpected results of his plan, which
may endanger its realization, the holistic engineer will be obliged to
"fall back on a somewhat haphazard and clumsy
although arfoitious and ruthless application of
what is essentially a piecemeal method without
its cautious and self-critical character." 5.
1. OS, I, 162 2. PH, 63-9 and PH, 158 5. PH, 68.
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2. Criticisms of Popper's Distinction
Between Holistic and Piecemeal Social Engineering.
Several critics have argued that the contrasts which Popper draws be¬
tween piecemeal and holistic social engineering do not stand up to examina¬
tion: that insofar as the holistic engineer is not a phantasm, there is
little or nothing in the way of a firm distinction between his approach and
that of the piecemeal engineer.
Popper, in defending piecemeal engineering against those radicals "in
the original and literal sense" who find "'social tinkering"' tedious and
ineffective, argues that there are "no limits to the scope of a piecemeal
2. 3.
approach." * The piecemeal engineer may have long-term ends in view:
"a series of piecemeal reforms may be inspired
by one general tendency, for example, a tendency
towards a greater equalisation of incomes. In
this way piecemeal methods may lead to changes
in what is usually called the 'class structure
of society'". 4«
Popper argues for a fundamental distinction between piecemeal and Utopian
engineering, not by attempting "to draw a precise line of demarcation be¬
tween the two methods", but hy characterizing the different attitudes with
which the respective species of engineers pproach social reform. Both the
piecemeal engineer and the Utopian may have the same ends in view, but the
ways in which they seek to implement these ends are markedly different.
The piecemeal planner is "cautious".^* He does not undertake measures
that will not allow him to check and compensate for such unforeseen and un¬
pleasant consequences as may always occur, and he does not allow what may
1. K.g. A. Mardiros, "Can We Plan for Social Progress?", Mind, N.S. v.57
(1948), pp. 341-9> and Hussell Price, "Holistic and Piecemeal Social
Engineering," Political Science, v. 12(i960), 151-7.
2. PH, 68, OS, I, 64. 3. Cf. OS, I, 158 4. FH, 68
5. PH, 68 6. PH, 68.
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seem to be positive benefits of any proposed reform to override the funda¬
mental criterion of not causing harm to the individuals affected. If the
piecemeal planner is not limited as to the scope of the reforms that he can
undertake, he is limited in the speed at which he can accomplish large-
scale reforms, due to these two fundamental considerations. Whereas holistic
planning, according to Popper seeks to make an immediate clean sweep in pur¬
suit of its aims, piecemeal planning must achieve its ends gradually: because,
according to Popper, the fundamental problems for social policy as well as
for social theory, stem from the occurrence of unintended and unforeseeable
1.
consequences, due to the "uncertainty of the human factor". And secondly,
because all social policies must meet the fundamental criterion of negative
utilitarianism, which is that the aim of social reform is to eliminate suffer¬
ing rather than to attempt to distribute happiness: thus no measure is per¬
missible which creates benefits at the expense of causing suffering.
Critics have argued, further, that piecemeal planning nonetheless seems
to merge with holistic planning on a point related to the question of scope.
Popper allows that
"when trying to assess the likely consequences
of some proposed reform, the piecemeal technologist
must do his best to estimate the effects of any
measure upon the 'whole* of society." 2.
Popper's choice of phrase here may be in part a rhetorical prelude to his
argument that the approach of piecemeal planning does differ from that of
holistic engineering. Another statement of the same point qualifies the
sense in which piecemeal planning is holistic. Piecemeal experiments may
"have their repercussions through the whole of
society without remodelling society as a whole." 3«
Thus it seems that however "holistic" the effects of piecemeal engineering
may be throughout society, it is not the "impossible aethod"ir* that Popper
attributes to Utopian engineering: of attempting to encompass everything
about a concrete particular, namely a particular society. Nor, by stipu¬
lation, does it suffer from the practical impossibility that Popper thinks
characterizes holistic engineering: of being so swamped by unforeseen and
1. Of. OS,11,94, and CR,124-5 and CR.342. 2. PH,68. 3. OS, I, 162.
4. PH, 79.
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unpleasant repercussions from its measures that the Utopian engineer is
obliged to fall back upon piecemeal methods.
Popper's statements about the possible holistic effects of piecemeal
measures yield the conclusion that Popper's concept of holism suffers from f*1*"
"fundamental ambiguity" that he attributes to the holists' usage of whole.
According to Popper, the Utopian planner holds the view that a whole society
can be planned in every detail. But no nativity or knowledge can exhaust
all aspects of any totality or concrete particular. Thus all knowledge
about, or activity on, a whole must be selective, and it is consequently
logically impossible to pirn to control a society as a totality. All social
planning nust deal with selected aspects of social life; a total society can¬
not be planned. But Popper also uses holistic planning, by contrast with
piecemeal planning, in a sense that does not involve changing a society in
total: namely to refer to "large-scale planning" which neglects the criteria
which Popper thinks are sine quibus non for all social planning - attention
to unintended consequences, and to the right of individuals not to be harmed
for social considerations.
Popper also oejects, on moral and methodological groxtnds, to the " 'trans¬
formation of man'", which he thinks is involved in Utopian engineering as
2#
represented by Karl Mannheim."* Although Popper derives the Utopian's need
to modify human nature, in order to implement his proposals for reforms,
x
(
from the Utopian's failure to allow for "the uncertainty of the human factor"
around which Popper's piecemeal methods of sooial engineering revolve, it
has been suggested that some of Popper's criteria for suitable piecemeal re¬
forms would have the same implications for such reforms to be realized would
also require that human nature be changed.
A. Mardiros has argued that although Popper might sanction slum clear¬
ance as an instance of piecemeal engineering, if "slum clearance is successful
1. PH, 76-83. 2. Pit, 69-70 and OS, I, 165-66. Cf. p. ft above.
3. PH, 69. Which is also Popper's major criticism of methodological psycho-
logism, in his argument for methodological individualism, discussed below,
p.
2$(r
in its aims" it will involve more than "changing material conditions":
"We also aim at removing child delinquency,
gangsterism, alcoholism, etc; and in changing
the material conditions we aim at changing
the people concerned, and the material
conditions must be planned with these other
changes in mind." 1.
Consequently Mardiros suggests that it would he misplaced for a critic to
object that such a plan for slum clearance cannot be tested because it has
2.
"changed the people and made them fit in with the plan".
Another example, which raay be more apposite to the question of the
admissibility of reforms that require that human nature be changed, is one
that Mardiros cites against Popper's proposal that social problems be tackled
b5'- "individual piecemeal reforms". The nineteenth century abolition of
slavery was "stultified", Mardiros sfQxJuea, "because it was treated as t!ai\3
isolated problem" - the erstwhile slaves were simply set free when "large-
scale" and inter-connected measures were needed:
"It needed no experiments to establish the fact
that what was also required was the education,
technical training and establishment of the
former slaves as free and equal citizens in fact
as well as in law and that this could only be
done as part of a large-scale and many-sided plan." 3«
1. Mardiros, "Can We Plan for Social Progress," Mind NS v. 57(1940)
pp. 343-4.
2. Mardiros1 exposition of this example seams to me rather paternalistic
in tone. Mardiros also considers penal reform in connection with whether
reforms which involve changing human nature must he rejected as unscientific*:
"If we change the character of the penal institiition
this means bringing about a change in the administrators,
in the warders, and in the prisoners, and if there is
no such change there is little point in the reform." (344).
3. Mardiros, p. 342.
2tf
More can be said: to realize the abolition of slavery, a transformation of
human nature is needed, both of the former slave-owners and of the former
slaves, and the additional measures which Mardiros mentions are largely
educational measures directed to this end. More generally, to remove
suffering - the common purpose of social reforms sanctioned by negative
utilitarianism * - due to socially enrooted prejudices about, e.g. race or
sex, may require transformations of human nature in order to be realized.
If Popper's piecemeal methods of reform are to be distinguished from
those which he attributes to the Utopian engineer, with regard to what they
require of human nature, then certain, perhaps rather peculiar distinctions
need to be made as to what transformations of human nature are permissible.
Is it permissible to transform men by piecemeal measures, or by re-education^
out of prejudices which go against humanitarian or egalitarian measures such
as Popper recommends, when these prejudices impede such reforms, even pursued
by piecemeal methods? If there are difficulties in realizing equal rights
in a society, due to racial prejudice, would Popper's contrast between holi¬
stic and piecemeal planning allow for attempts to reduce or eliminate such
prejudice by eduoation - a difficult, but not, I hope, an impossible sugges¬
tion - or would this amount to an impermissible transformation of human
nature?
Thus mora38es have been discovered in Popper's attempt to distinguish
piecemeal from Utopian engineering by attributing a holistic scope, and the
need to mould men to fit its reforms, solely to the latter. Both the concept
of holism, and that of transforming man are ambiguous, and Popper does not
pay sufficient attention to the effects which these ambiguities have on hi3
own principles for acceptable social reforms: the ambiguity of holism is a
fundamental weakness in Popper's characterization of Utopian planning by con¬
trasts with piecemeal engineering; and Popper's failure to see how trans¬
formations of human nature may be required for reforms other than those he
stigmatizes as Utopian suggests he ha3 not thoroughly considered the obstacles
1. On negative utilitarianism, see below, p.
2Cf
to social reform in general and to his own piecemeal methods of reform in
particular.
Objections have al3o been lodged against some of the arguments by
which Popper attempts to show that the analogy with mechanical engineering,
which gives grounds for describing social planning as engineering, favours
piecemeal and not Utopian planning. Richard Rhees has argued that the two
ill-synthesized components of Popper's theory of institutions - norms and
sociological laws of the order of natural laws1' - do not do as much to
support the analogy between mechanical engineering and piecemeal social
engineering as Popper's use of this analogy requires. In particular, Rhees
says that Popper needs to view social institutions as norms or conventions
which depend on us, in order to rebut the rejection of the notion of social
engineering as unsound
"on the ground that the 'engineer' must be subject
to the influence he is trying to control." 2.
However, the resulting analogy between our making normative laws or insti-
*
tutions and making machines is, Rhees observes, "rather thin"
As for the claim that both piecemeal and mechanical engineering employ
"the technological approach" in the sense of being based on experiments,^*
Fopper himself acknowledges some of the limitations of his concept of piece¬
meal social experiments, by admitting that they provide pre-scientific
r
#
rather than scientific knowledge. * Moreover, it is not clear that piece-
1. OS, I, 67-68. 2. Rhees, "Social Engineering, "Mind, U.S. v. 56(1947),
520.
3. Rheas, p. 321. As for Popper's "main view" that social institutions
are instruments, Rhees contends that
"the contrast between the work a machine does and the influence
of a social institution is really greater than the analogy." (p.323)
There is also the difficulty of identifying who are the editorial we, who
use social institutions as instruments to serve our chosen ends.
4. PH, 43 58 Both Richard Rhees (op. cit., p. 329) end Anthony




meal social experiments are in fact technological in the sense in which
Popper uses thi3 term to distinguish between engineering and prophetic
sciences. This distinction turns, as was noted above, on
"the lesser or greater importance of the part
played by designed experiment, as opposed to mere
pHient observation, in the science concerned.
The typical experimental sciences are capable
of making technologioal predictions, while those
employing mainly non-experimental observations
produce prophecies." 1.
The "pre-scientific kind" of knowledge from piecemeal social experiments is
"more like knowledge gained by casual observation
than knowledge gained by carefully designed
scientific experiments" 2.
even though it is
"gained not merely through observation...but
by efforts to achieve some practical aim." J.
The observational character of the knowledge which can be acquired from what
Popper considers social experiments would seem, if we adhere to Popper's
earlier distinction, to limit the extent to which social engineering can be
said to be technologioal. Experimental knowledge of the piecemeal kind
would appear to sanction rule-of-thumb reforms rather than planned reforms?
the limitations of experimental knowledge of social life would seem to im¬
pede social planning from ever becoming fully scientific, and this conclusion
corroborates Popper's view that social engineering must never lose its cau¬
tion, or be more than gradual. Thus the analogy with mechanical engineer¬
ing is limited because Popper's concept of social experiment seems to require
that piecemeal engineering remain at a pre-scientific stages because of the
character of our experimental knowledge of society, caution must substitute
for the engineer's blueprint.
What remains for a distinction between piecemeal and Utopian planning
derives from Popper's moral emphasis on the rights of the individual. The
speed at which piecemeal planning can achieve reforms of whatever scope is
limited by the necessity of attending to unforeseeable repercussions affect-
1. See above, p. 2. FH, 85 5. PH, 05.
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ing the individuals concerned. No plan can incorporate all the reactions
from the individuals whom it affects, because of the inexhaustibility of
concrete particulars such as individuals *» and the consequent impossibility
of taking account of, much less centralizing, everything relevant to the
impact of a measure upon the individuals concerned. Thus the piecemeal
planner is required to proceed at a pace which allows him to repair or
compensate for possible harm to individuals. Hence Popper's view that
social reforms require piecemeal planning is shaped by his individualism,
through his insistence on the likelihood of "unintended consequences" due
to "the uncertainty of the human factor", and through his adherence to the
principle of negative utilitarianism.
Popper calls his fundamental maxim negative utilitariansim: that the
social engineer should "formulate" his "demands negatively" and seek to dirai-
2.
nish suffering. * As a corollary, Popper argues that "the 'higher' values
should...be left to the realm of laissez-faire"; the attempt to promote
*
happiness "seems to be apt to produce a benevolent dictatorship."
Popper's chief argument for the maxim that he calls negative utili¬
tariansim rests on the incommensurability of pain and pleasure: no pleasure
can compensate for, or be balanced against any pain. Thus the standard
utilitarian
1. PH, 77-8; OS, II, 245:
"For it is the particular, the unique and concrete individual, which
cannot be approached by rational methods, and not the abstract universal.
Science can describe general types of landscape, for example, or of man,
but it can never exhaust one single individual landscape, or of one single
man....the unique individual and his unique actions and experiences and
relations to other individuals can never be fully rationalized."
2. On negative utilitarianism; OS, I, 2J5i note 6(2) to chap. 5;
OS, I, 284-5, note 2 to chap. 9; OS, II, 255; OS, II, 257; OS, II, 504,
note 62 to chap. 11; OS, II, 586; "Prediction and Prophecy in the Social
Sciences", OR. p. 545»
5. OS, II, 257; OS, II, 255.
principle1" of promoting general happiness on the whole is sadly incomplete,
for it neglects to consider what might ensue from such measures in the way
of pains for which no pleasure could compensate. The conclusion seems
inescapable that there is an irreparable flaw in social policies concerned
solely with positive benefits. Consequently Popper argues that the funda¬
mental maxim of any social policy must be to foster social welfare by de-
2
creasing suffering as equitably as possible.
"It adds to clarity in the field of ethics if we
formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand
the elimination of suffering rather than promotion
of happiness." J.
The analogy with Popper's "view of scientific methodology"^" is clear:
just as repeated verifications can never establish the soundness of a sci¬
entific theory, so there is no guarantee that increasing positive benefits
will actually add to social welfare. In the one case, the possibility
1. But as H.B. Acton has pointed out ("Negative Utilitarianism," ASSV,
XXXVII (1965)» P* 84)» Popper is not defending a utilitarian theory at all.
On negative utilitarianism, R.N. Smart argues ("Negative Utilitarianism",
Mind, N.S. vol. 67(1958), pp. 542-5) that negative utilitarianism as a
criterion can be shown to yield absurd results in certain extreme but not
impossible oases. J.W.N. Watkin3, "Negative Utilitarianism," ASSV,
XXXVII(1965), 95-H4) argues for negative utilitarianism as part of a wider
moral negativism.
Popper has acknowledged Smart's criticisms in his Addendum (1961) to
The Open Society:
"The maximization of happiness may have been intended
as a criterion. On the other hand I certainly never re¬
commended that we adopt the minimization of misery as a
criterion, although I think it is an improvement on some of
the ideas of utilitarianism. I also suggested that the
reduction of avoidable misery belongs to the agenda of public
policy (which does not mean that any question of public policy
is to be decided by a calculus of minimizing misery) while the
maximization of one's happiness should be left to one's private
endeavour. (I quite agree with those critics of mine who have
shown that if used as a criterion, the minimum misery principle
would have absurd consequences} and I expect that the same may
be said about any other moral criterion}" OS, II, 586.
2. OS, I, 284-5> note 2 to chap. 9. 5» OS, I, 285, note 2 to chap. 9.
4. OS, I, 285, note 2 to chap. 9»
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that a scientific theory may be falsified is overlooked, and in the other,
the possibility that suffering may be increased and not diminished by dis¬
tributing positive benefits is neglected.
Popper also argues, in support of negative utilitarianism, that it is
easier to agree on social evils and on how to remove them, than it is to
agree on social ideals and how to realize them. It is certainly true that
it is easier to locate actual suffering than pie-in-the-sky, but it is not
necessarily the case that it will be easy to persuade representatives of
vested interests to acknowledge suffering which goes against their interests,
nor will it be easy to reach agreement where such vested interests are con¬
cerned on the way to remove suffering. Popper's claim that the fight
against suffering is more likely to gain support than the fight to realize
some ideal is not borne out by historical evidence. In the first half of
the nineteenth century, when Great Britain could with some justice be char¬
acterized as two nations, evidence of the poverty of the labouring population
was considered by many of the well-to-do as evidence of their profligacy.
Thus although reasonable agreement may be possible on the existence of social
suffering, it may not in practice be easy or even possible to reach agreement
about such suffering; it may be extremely difficult, or near impossible to
reach the starting point of social reforms to be implemented under the aegis
of negative utilitarianism. Consequently there would seem to be a consid¬
erable practical difficulty in the way of applying negative utilitarianism
as a maxim in social policy; it may not be as practicable a maxim for
social engineering as Popper assumes. As was noted above,Popper does
not always take sufficient notice of the obstacles in the way of applying
his notions of social reform.
1. p. ^ above
II, J. Piecemeal Engineering and Empirical Social Science.
Popper maintains that the implications of piecemeal planning go beyond
issues of social policy! systematic piecemeal engineering is prerequisite
for empirical social science. Popper rejects the argument, which he attri¬
butes to the sociology of knowledge, that the connection of "social and poli¬
tical knowledge" with practical problems
"creates the methodological difficulties" 1.
of the social sciences. On the contrary, the piecemeal social engineering
which Popper recommends for solving practical problems is also, he claims,
the only solution for the "methodological difficulties" of the social sciences:
"systematic piecemeal engineering will help us
to build up an empirical social technology, arrived
at by the method of trial and error. Only in
this way can we begin to build up an empirical
social science....such a social science hardly
exists 30 far, and...the historical method is
incapable of furthering it much." 2.
Popper rests his case on the analogy he draws between the "technological"
approach of piecemeal planning and the methods of the natural sciences.
Popper has argued that empirical knowledge is synonymous with "the method of
trial and error"? that is, the method of proposing and testing hypotheses;
and Popper maintains that social experiments for testing hypotheses about
social life require piecemeal methods.
It was suggested above that the concept of social experiment which
Popper delineates may be too fragile to support the analogy he wants to draw
between piecemeal engineering and the methods of the natural sciences, via
3.
mechanical engineering. There are, however, other implications of Popper's
choice of basis for an empirical social science, which are relevant to the
argument of this chapter. The precarious basis in social experiments is not
the only attribute of piecemeal engineering which may he earried over to
1. OS, II, 222, conclusion of chapter 23•
2. OS, I, 294, note 8 to chapter 9»
1C.7'1
"an empirical social science" built up by piecemeal engineering.
It was argued above that the distinctive features of piecemeal plan¬
ning derive from Popper's individualism? the maxim of negative utilitari¬
anism as well as the importance which Popper thinks unforeseen consequences,
arising from "the uncertainty of the human factor" have for the approach
which social reform must adopt.It is because Popper's individualism
underlies his advocacy of a piecemeal approach in both social policy and
social science, that his ideas about the methods of the social sciences are
marked by his liberalism. Popper's defence of several variants of indivi¬
dualism which I consider in the next section of this chapter, shapes his
ideas on history in a liberal direction as well. It is because Popper
makes the gratuitous assumption that political individualism and the reject¬
ion of political collectivism require rejecting methodological holism and
supporting methodological individualism, that his political opinions influ¬
ence his methodological ideas and thence, the application of the latter to
historiography.
III. Popper's Arguments for Methodological Individualism;
Methodological Individualism in Practice
Previous chapters have shown that it is often the case that Popper's
positive proposals are best considered as replacements of doctrines that he
criticizes; and conversely, that what he criticizes can be most clearly pre¬
sented by investigating the alternative which he recommends. Popper's posi¬
tive proposals and his critical targets are thu3 often correlative concepts.
Moreover, it is frequently the case that Popper's positive doctrines are the
residue, left after what Popper opposes has been eliminated.
Popper takes the "critical approach" just described in his treatment of
individualisms, political, methodological and ontological. What Popper
I• above.
3^.2-1^
defends as these individualisms emerges from his criticism of the corre¬
sponding doctrines that he attributes to holism. Popper's characteristic
approach, which he calls critical, might also be described as a dialectical
treatment of ideas, as can be seen from his presentation of methodological
individualism.
He first opposes methodological individualism, the view that social
collectives such as states or institutions mist be analysed " in indivi¬
dualistic terms,'*'* to methodological collectivism, the view that such
collectives are "not analysable in terms of individuals, their relations,
2.
and their actions." " Popper then disengages methodological individualism
from psychologism, the view
"that the choice of such an individualistic method
implies the choice of a psychological method." 5«
Methodological individualism, as Popper defends it, is opposed to the
cluster of related doctrines which Popper variously describes as methodo¬
logical collectivism, methodological essentialism, and holism;^* and it is
free frora what Popper calls psychologism. The three terms in Popper's
development of methodological individualism, the opponent of methodological
collectivism, the mistaken individualistic view of methodological psycholo¬
gism and the well-grounded doctrine of methodological individualism, thus
provide a thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
Before examining Popper's several statements of methodological individu¬
alism, and his defence of this view, it will be useful to set out the three
kinds of individualisms and corresponding holisms, and to consider the logi¬
cal relations which hold between these doctrines. Individualism and holism
may each provide an ontology, a methodology, or a political theorys that is,
1SI'*
1. About which a good deal more will be said later, p,
2. OS, II, 323-4; cf. OS, II, 91.
3. OS, II, 91, cf. OS, II, 98 and HI 142.
4. methodological collectivism; OS, II, 91, OS, II, 226 and OS, II, 323-4,
addit. to note 11, chap. 14? methodological essfcntialism, PH, 136; holism
as well as methodological essentialism is implied by the statements, PH, 140.
assertions may be made as to the "ultimate constituents of the social
world"1", or about the standards which adequate social analysis must meet,
or indications may be given of the considerations by which political action
ought to be guided. The crucial point in what follows is the extent to
which the political and ontological doctrines of holism and individualism
are involved in the respective methodological doctrines.
Ontological individualism is the view that no collective social entities
exist, in any sense comparable to that in which human individuals exist; that,
in other words, individual human beings are the only "ultimate constituents
2.
of the social world". " Ontological holism holds that collectives may be
said to exist in a sense equally a3 strong, if not stronger, as that in which
human individuals are said to exist: the "ultimate constituents of the social
world" include more than individual human beings .
Political holiijeqmay be considered a neologism for doctrines previously
known as organic theories of politics, which are linked with organic theories
5
of society. Political holism holds that the political rights of collective
entities, such as states or nations, may override those of individuals; thus,
social policies may justly be guided by the needs of the state or the nation,
even at the expense of many or most of the individuals in the domain of these
entities. Political individualism asserts that, in Popper's words,
"human individuals must be recognized to be the
ultimate concern...of all politics." 4»
1. J.W.H. Watkins, "Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences, BJPS, v. 8
(1957)> P* 106. W.H. Dray, "Holism and Individualism in History and Social
Science", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, IV, 53-58» also makes
use of this phrase, e .g. p. 55*
2. Popper says that terms for social collectives refer, not to "concrete
things" but to theoretical models (PH, 135-6). In a thesis written under
Popper's direction (D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Individuals and Societies: a methodo¬
logical inquiry, Allied Publishers, Calcutta, 1967), the author maintains
that social wholes do exist, but not in the same sense that individual.3 exist.
See below
3. Which Morris Ginsberg describes as "sociological holism", "The Individual
and Society", On the Diversity of Morals, Essays in Sociology and Social
Philosophy, v. l(l956), p. 150. Ontological holism, in other words.
4« 03, I, 288-9, note '] to chapter 9«
w
This passage might he construed in the light of tlv classical political
theory of individualism: that social welfare is best promoted by the un¬
restricted actions of individuals. " But Popper, as his discussion of
interventionism shows, recognizes the weaknesses of this policy. Political
individualism, as Popper defends it, asserts that the individuals in a society
have certain rights which cannot be overridden for the sake of any social
collectives: although a citizen may have certain obligations, such as defend¬
ing his state in wartime, or supporting the government from his taxes, poli¬
tical demands on the citizen cannot infringe upon his right not to be made to
suffer unnecessarily or inequitably.
Methodological individualism lays down certain standards for adequate
social analysis: that social collectives such as nations or states, as well
as institutions such as banks or universities, must be analysed in "indivi¬
dualistic terms"; that what such terms describe must be reduced to the actions
and interactions of individuals. Holism, as a strictly methodological doc¬
trine, is less stringent than methodological individualism in its standards
for adequate social analysis. Methodological holism is sometimes now defend¬
ed as a kind of agnosticism. Methodological holiats
"are most concerned to uphold...the logical
respectability of using holistic collective
concepts and macroscopic laws, if need be....
what they resist is the conclusion a priori that
we can realize the ideal, and the associated
temptation to refuse anything lass." 2.
It is clearly possible to combine methodological holism, as described above,
with both ontological and political individualism. One may hold that the
ultimate constituents of the social world are individuals alone, and that
political action should not be guided by considerations relating to social
collectives at the expense of individuals, without being committed to the view
1. Vhich D.P. Chattopadhyaya calls "ideological individualism", and he says
quit® correctly (p.170) that "there is no necessary connection" between
laissez-faire and methodological individualism.
2. Dray, op. cit., p. 58«
that social analysis must meet the requirements of methodological individua¬
lism. This is in fact the position of some contemporary methodological
holists such as Maurice Mandelbaum, who have formulated their views in de¬
bate with methodological individualists."*
It is also possible to be a methodological individualist without being
committed to political individualism. Hobbes has been suggested in this
connection as an example of a methodological individualist for hie recommend¬
ation of atomistic analysis, and a political holist for his theory of the
2.
Leviathan state.'"*
Thus the logical relations which have been considered between the various
kinds of holisms and individualisms show that methodological individualism
cannot be established solely by considerations to do with either political or
ontological individualism. What appears to be a truism deserves some
emphasis: to establish methodological individualism, if indeed this can be
done, requires methodological considerations; political and ontological
considerations will not suffice.
The critique of holism and associated doctrines is cental in Popper's
attack: on historici3ia, and occupies a commensurate proportion of Popper's
pages on historicism. Popper's defense of methodological individualism,
and more fundamentally, of a political individualism with an admixture of
ontological considerations, is the standpoint from which he criticizes the
holist family of doctrines. Nonetheless, the brevity of Popper's treatment
of the methodological doctrines of individualism seems somewhat at odds with
3«
his claim that he has refuted and replaced the historicist methodology
insofar as this latter methodology involves holism; for one would like
1. Dray, op. cit. p»53«
2. Dray, op. cit. p.33« Of course, Hobbes argues for these two contentions
on quite different grounds.
3. PH, 57ff and FH, 1}6.
to know more than Popper says about the methodological individualism which
"destroys" the doctrines of methodological essfentialism.^*
Popper's presentation of methodological individualism takes what has
been described above as a dialectical form. Popper first presents methodo¬
logical individualism as opposed to methodological collectivism and methodo¬
logical essentialism: opposed, that is, methodological doctrines based on
holism. But what Popper understands by and defends as methodological
individualism does not emerge immediately from the confrontation with
methodological holism, for there is also a psychologist variant of individua¬
lism which Popper thinks untenable on several counts in spite of
"the great merits which paychologism has
acquired by advocating a methodological
individualism and by opposing a methodological
collectivism." 2.
Popper's presentation of the holistic doctrines of collectivism and
methodological essentialism, in opposition to which he proposes methodological
individualism, does not cover all the positions which a methodological holist
may defend and a methodological individualist will reject. In Popper's
usage, collectivism refers to
"a doctrine which emphasizes the significance
of some collective or group, for instance
'the state' (or a certain state; or a nation;
or a class) as against that of the individual." J.
Or even more strongly, collectivism
"emphasizethe significance of some group or
collective - for example - without which the
individual is nothing at all." /}•
1. PH, 156. 2. OS, II, 98. 3. OS, I, 203, note 1 to chapter 1.
4» OS, I, 9. Cf. OS, I, 80 for a characterization of Plato's holism which
Popper thinks "is closely related" to the collectivism characterized in the
passage just citedx
"Only a stable whole, the permanent collective, has reality,
not the passing individuals. It is 'natural' for the
individual to subserve the whole, which is no mere assembly
of individuals, but a 'natural' unit of a higher order."
Popper states quite explicitly that he uses "the term 'individualism'"
"in opposition to collectivism". * Thus
"'methodological individualism*, as opposed to
•methodological collectivism'...insists that the
'behaviour' and the 'actions' of collectives, such
as states or social groups, must be reduced to the
behaviour and to the actions of individuals." 2.
Popper's presentation of collectivism is exaggerated but not exhaustive:
"Hegel and Hegelians are collectivists.
They argue that, since we owe our reason to
'society' - or to a certain Bociety such as
a nation - 'society' is everything and the
individual nothing; or that whatever value
the individual possesses is derived from the
collective, the real carrier of all values.
As opposed to this, the position presented
here does not assume the existence of
collectives; if I say, for example, that we
owe our reason to 'society', then I always
mean that we owe it to certain concrete
individuals - though perhaps to a considerable
number of anonymous individuals - and to our
intellectual intercourse with them.
Therefore, in speaking of a 'social' theory
of reason (or of scientific method) I mean
more precisely that the theory is an
inter-personal one, and never that it is
a collective one." 3.
It is possible to be a holist without subscribing to the extreme view that
the individual owes everything to the collective: a holist may maintain that
both individuals and societal collectives can make irreducible contributions
to the fabric of social life; he is not committed to the view that the only
agents in social life are collectives. Individuals and collectives may thus
be seen as symbiotic; neither depending wholly on the other for their exist-
enoe or their activities, but intimately related and mutually dependent.
Moreover, it is not necessary to commit the logical error which Popper
stigmatizes as holism in The Poverty of Hlatoriciam;if one wishes to up¬
hold methodological holism. One may argue for the logical admissibility of
1. OS, I, 100. 2. OS, II, 91. 3. OS, II, 226. 4. PH» 76-79.
societal concepts or societal laws in social analysis, without being
committed, to the view that such holistic concepts as social analysis may
use include every concrete detail of their referents .
Thus Popper's statements of the methodological holism to which methodo¬
logical individualism is opposed, require some qualifications: for Popper
has not exhausted, nor even adequately described the position of methodo¬
logical holism. Nonetheless, the limited analysis he gives of methodo¬
logical holism is, I think, presupposed in his statements of methodological
individualism*
"...most of the objects of social science, if
not all of them, are abstract objects? they are
theoretical constructions. (Kven 'the war' or 'the
array' are abstract concepts, strange as this may sound
to some. What is concrete is the many who are killed;
of the men and women in uniform, etc.) These objects,
these theoretical constructions used to interpret our
experience, are the result of constructing certain models
(especially of institutions) in order to explain certain
experiences....Very often we are unaware of the fact
that we are operating with hypotheses or theories, and
we therefore mistake our theoretical models for concrete
things....The fact that models are often used in this
way explains - and by so doing destroys - the doctrines
of methodological essentialism....it destroys them
because the task of social theory is to construot and
to analyse our sociological models carefully in
descriptive or nominalist terras, that is to say, in
terms of individuals, of their attitudes, expectations,
relations, etc. - a postulate which may be called
•methodological individualism'". 1.
In a subsequent statement of methodological individualism, added to
later editions of The Open Society, Popper indicates a point of "consider¬
able disagreement" between his and Marx's methodological views, about the
proper way in which unintended consequences, which Popper considers central
to social policy and sociological theory, are to be analysed. Methodo¬
logical collectivism, as represented by Marx, explains unintended conse-
quenoes, which Popper thinks result from actions undertaken by individuals,
in terras of the workings of irreducibly collective constituents of society,
1. PH, 135-6.
such as the "'means of production'" which are
"not analysable in terras of individuals, their
relations, and their actions. As opposed to this,
I hold that institutions (and traditions) must be
analysed in individualistic terms - that is to say,
in terms of the relations of individuals acting in
certain situations, and of the unintended consequences
of their actions." 1.
It is worth noting that Popper has altered his statement of methodological
individualism to include "situations" among the "individualistic terms" of
social analysis. Later defenders of methodological individualism have used
the concept of situation to argue that certain examples, paraposed by methodo¬
logical holists, are not beyond analysis by methodological individualism or
"'situationalisra'". 2.
Methodological individualism does not, in Popper's opinion, require
*
"the adoption of a psychological method" , and the adoption of such a method,
1. OS, II, 323-4, addition to note 11 to chap. 14.
2. For D.P. Chattopadhyaya's defence of situational Individualism, see below,
Although Watkins sometimes seemed in his earlier discussions of methodo¬
logical individualism to fall into psychologi3m ("Ideal Types and Historical
Explanation," BJPS, v. 3> PP» 28-9, 34)» some of his later statements run more
in the vein of situationalism (e.g. "Historical Explanation in the Social
Sciences," BJPS, v. 8): methodological individualism is the principle that:
"the ultimate constituents of the social world are
individual people who act more or less appropriately
in the light of their dispositions and understanding
of their situations." (105-6)
"The explanation (of regularities of social life)
should be in terms of individuals and their situations." 115
Agassi also thinks of Popper's methodological individualism as situa¬
tional logic in effect ("Methodological Individualism", British Journal of
Sociology, v. 11 (I9b0), p. 264).
Situational individualism may be viewed in the light of what Dray (op.
cit. p. 58) says about the rapproachment of methodological individualists
and holists:
"many methodological individualists appear to retreat
under pressure" to "the rauoh weaker demand that an
acceptable explanation employ concepts which can be
attributed to an individual, or jointly to a group
of them."
3. PH, 142: Cf. OS, II, 91. 98.
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in conjunction with individualism, leads to quite mistaken results. In
Popper's opinion, the most important objection against psychologism is
that
"it fails to understand the main task of the
explanatory social sciences." 1.
which is
"the task of analysing the unintended social
repercussions of intentional human action." 2.
But that
"psychologists is forced to operate with
the idea of a psychological origin of society."
7
is also "a decisive argument against it." These two criticisms are
interconnected! the methodological myth of the "psychological origin of
society" results from psychologism's failure to take account of unintended
consequences.
An individualism which requires that "all social phenomena" be reduced
"to psychological phenomena and psychological laws" ^ * will not be able to
account for the way in which social institutions have for the most part
arisen. Popper maintains that the characteristic features of social life
are largely undesigned and result from the unintended consequences of actions
undertaken by individuals?
"only a minority of social institutions are
consciously designed while the vast majority
have just 'grown', as the undesigned
results of human actions ." 5*
Thus an individualism which seeks to explain social institutions in psycho¬
logical terms, by men's motives and intentions alone, will completely mis¬
construe their genesis. Psychologistic explanations of social institutions
must fall back on methodological mythst
"Psychologism is thus forced, whether it
likes it or not, to operate with the idea
°** a beginning of society, and with the idea
of a human nature and a human psychology as
they existed prior to society." 6.
1. OS, II, 94. 2. OS, II, 95. 5. OS, II, 94.
4. OS, II, 93. 5. PH, 65, cf. OS, II, 93. 6. OS, II, 93.
Psychologism requires that purely psychological origins of social
institutions be found;
"that sociology nust in principle be reducible
to social psychology" 1.
2.
and this, Popper thinks amounts to historicism:
"The attempt to reduce the facts of our social
environment forces us into speculations about
origins and developments." 5*
The kind of origins for social institutions which psychologism is committed
to uncover presuppose a completely unreal essences
"the idea of human nature and a human
psychology as they existed prior to society." 4*
An unsympathetic reading of Popper's argument here for the historicist
outcome of psychologism, might suggest that
"the idea of historico-causal development" 5«
or a genetic approach is what Popper objects to as historicism.What
Popper is, I think, objecting to, is not a genetic approach as such -
although he does not see much use in it - but the unrealistic speculations
which the genetic approach of methodological psychologism requires.
In delineating the progress of Popper's methodological individualism,
from its opposition to collectivism through its separation from psychologism,
I have described Popper's presentation of methodological individualism as
dialectical. Popper would, I think, object to this description because of
1. OS, II, 88. 2. OS, II, 92, 98. 3« OS, II, 92
4. OS, II, 93. 5. OS, II, 92.
6. This unsympathetic reading might be supported with such evidence as
Popper's reference to historical method, in the passage on an empirical
social science, cited above, p.2$,; or OS, II, 75 and the argument which
Popper sums up, PH, 34.
"...the doctrine that the social sciences nust adopt
a historical method...the doctrine of historicism."
Popper's position on genetic or developmental approaches is roughly this;
he objects to several misuses of developmental terminology - and he some¬
times phrases his objections rather loosely - and he does not see that the
notion of development might be fruitfully used in the practice of history.
I
the infamous associations that he thinks dialectical logic has with histo-
ricism. He would prefer his own terminology: to describe his presentation
of methodological individualism as illustrating the critical approach.
Each of these descriptions has something to reoommend it. Popper's critical
approach to ideas frequently takes a dialectical form, in that the ideas he
defends emerge from a confrontation with two other sets of doctrines that he
1.
opposes.
To describe Popper's presentation of methodological individualism as
dialectical in form is a more exact specification of the stages by which
methodological individualism emerges, than is the designation of Popper's
approach to the analysis of social collectives as, simply, a critical one.
Nevertheless, Popper's dialectical presentation of methodological indivi¬
dualism, whereby he argues that it eliminates the vitiating defects of both
methodological collectivism and methodological psychologist! for social ana¬
lysis, does not suffice to establish methodological individualism as a
methodology. The positive merits of methodological individualism must be
considered in this connection, as well as its critical uses. Apart from
providing a focus for his criticism of methodological collectivism and
psychologism - and in the case of methodological holism, Popper's criticism
is not based on an accurate representation of the doctrine - Popper's pre¬
sentation of methodological individualism is for the most part limited to
2#
statements of principle, * and more is needed to show that methodological
individualism works as a methodology. If it, is to meet the claims that
Popper makes for it, it must be shown to be applicable and enlightening,
without significant excdption, in the analysis of social life, and since,
in Popper'3 view, historical work makes tacit use of sociological theories,
methodological individ-ualism must be shown to be at least implicit in the
practice of history,
1. The title of Popper's essay, "Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge"(CR)
is a give-away in this connection.
2. E.G. PII, 156, 149. 3. HI, 145.
There are two lines to be considered in examining the case Popper
makes for methodological individualism beyond its critical uses against
collectivism and psychologism. He provides several examples of satis¬
factory individualistic replacements of analyses that he considers collect-
ivist or historicist, and of course mistaken. I shall consider the impli¬
cations of these examples for the general problem, of whether the indivi¬
dualistic analysis that Popper recommends is adequate for the social sciences
and more especially for the practice of history.
Furthermore, in arguing against psychologism in the concluding pages
of The Poverty of Historicism,"'' * Popper amplifies the case he has made for
methodological individualism against methodological collectivism and psycho¬
logism, in a way that brings out just what is at issue in this question of
competing methodologies. Methodological individualism is the
"quite unassailable doctrine that we must try
to understand all collective phenomena as due
to the actions, interactions, aims, hopes, and
thoughts of individual men, and as due to
traditions Granted and preserved by individual
men." 2.
Some of the arguments which Popper brings here against psychologism have
already been considered. The social sciences cannot be based on psychology
of the study of "'human nature'"; Popper has argued elsewhere*'* that we can¬
not study human nature without considering such social institutions as the
family and language. Here he maintains that what we call
"'human nature' varies considerably with tha
social institutions, and its study therefore
presupposes an understanding of these
institutions." 4*
Moreover, psychology cannot account for those
"repercussions which may violate all interests
of the actor, whether conscious or unconscious" 5*
1. PH, 157-8. 2. PH, 157
3. Subsequently in "Me Logik der Sozialwissenschaften" Thesi3 XXIII, p.245«
4. PH, 158. 5. PH, 158.
4^.^
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and such repercussions are at the "root of social theory". * Popper argues
that these unintended consequences stem, aa has previously been noted,' *
from the "uncertain and wayward" "human factor":^*no plan for social action
can predict all the reactions which individuals may have to the implementa¬
tion of its measures.
Popper's argument has been that neither collectivism nor psychologism
can account for the occurrence of unintended consequences due to the "un¬
certain human factor", and that this failure is perhaps the major reason
for the untenability of both these doctrines. Conversely, the unassaila-
bility of methodological individualism consists in its connection with this
principle which Popper thinks no theory of political or social action can
afford to neglect: the possibility of unforeseeable social repercussions
from the actions of individuals.
Popper's argument for methodological individualism thus rests on the
connection of theory and practice: the principles of social policy provide
criteria for deciding whioh of several proposed methods of social analysis
is acceptable. Popper concludes his argument in support of methodological
individualism with a peroration in the tradition of J.S. Mill's On Liberty:
"But is it not possible to control the human factor
ky science - the opposite of whim? No doubt,
biology and psychology can solve, or will soon be
able to solve, the 'problem of transforming man'.
Yet those who attempt to do this are bound
to destroy the objectivity of science, and so science
itself, since these are both based upon free
competition of thought? that is, upon freedom. If
the growth of reason is to continue, and hitman
rationality to survive, then the diversity of
individuals and their opinions, aims and purposes
must never be interfered with (except in extreme
cases where political freedom is endangered). 4*
Ho
1. PH, 158. 2.9" above. 5- PH, 158.
4. PH, 158-9. The parallel here between Popper and Mill is interesting,
in view of Popper's severe criticisms of Mill's views on the methods of the
social sciences (Book VI, System of Logic), as psychologist and holist.
1
It was argued .above that methodological individualism cannot be de¬
rived from either ontological or political individualism, or from their
combination; and that it is logically possible to combine methodological
holism with ontological and political individualism.""" Nonetheless, it
has been suggested by Dray that the ontological arguments that methodo¬
logical individualists use in support of their views, although they do not
entail methodological individualism, make it difficult to believe, either
that there might be irreducible social laws governing "what is constituted
by individual actions and attitudes" or that there might be "societal facts"
2.
not reducible to individualistic terms without remainder. * Popper's
argument in support of methodological individualism, just considered, in
which the individualistic methodology is alleged to be "unassailable"
because of its connection with certain principles that Popper holds govern
political and social action willynilly, is of the same order; while it does
not entail methodological individualism, it does make it "difficult to be¬
lieve" that methodological holism might be correct.
But the fact that suicides are committed by individuals, belonging to
the "uncertain and wayward" "human factor" does not preclude there being
regularities in the rates of these suicides, nor does it put out of court
on logical grounds any attempts to explain these regularities in terms of
social factors such as anomie. Explanation of the regularities in the rates
at which individuals oommit suicide might involve methodological holism in
a sense which is not covered by Popper's characterizations of collectivism
*
and essentialisra. The rates of suicides might be explained by reference
to societal facts not reducible to individualistic terms without remainder,
and Popper, in the argument considered above, has not given logical grounds
for excluding such an explanation.^*
1. pp. above.
2. Dray, op.cit. p.55? "the phrase, "societal fact" is due to Mandelbaum.
5. Cf. pp. above.
4.Cf. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit. p.52-55, for the argument that a high post-war
rate of suicides and divorces is "to be explained locally by the logic of the
situation". Chatopadhyaya proposes this explanation in the course of a cata¬
logue meant to show the untenability of holistic explanations. It is not
clear that there is much to separate an explanation of anomie in terns of a
moderate methodological holism, and in terms of situational logic .
liethodologic&l individualism must, then, be considered on its merits
as a methodological recommendation for the social sciences and for the
practice of history. Popper, as was noted above, gives several examples
of satisfactory individualistic analyses, and one important issue arising
from these examples is the extent to which they can be generalized;
whether methodological individualism can be shown to be adequate for the
purposes of the historian and. the social scientist, and thus to leave no
openings for methodological holism in their disciplines.
Popper offers individualistic analyses of scientific method and of
reason, which he thinks can replace collectivist interpretations deriving
from Hegel. Ha uses his analysis of scientific method to show the limita¬
tions of the sociology of knowledge; a "r-Iarxist doctrine", developed by
llax Scheler and Karl Mannheim, which is a "Hegelian version of Kant's
1 <
theory of knowledge".
To summarize Popper's presentations the sociology of knowledge locates
"science or knowledge as a process in the mind g
or 'consciousness' of the individual scientist""*
on whom social factors impinge in ways that severely limit what the indivi¬
dual thinker can achieve. His thought is so bound up with his social milieu
as not to be valid beyond it. Social factors are thus alleged to be deci¬
sive in making what we call knowledge no more than ideology; an expression
of ideas reflecting the individual thinker's "social habitat".
1. OS, II, 21J. Popper discusses the sociology of knowledge particularly
in chap. 23, OS, though he sometimes alludes to it elsewhere as sociologist!),
e.g. OS, II, 200.
2. OS, II, 217. In "$ie Logik der Sozialwissenschaft n", (pp.239-24°),
Popper criticizes the vogue of social anthropology for exhibiting the
same faults as he had earlier found in the sociology of knowledges
namely, arguing for relativism on the basis of a "naive and mistaken
idea of scientific objectivity" as dependent on the objectivity of
the individual scientist.
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Ao a counter-example to this analysis of knowledge, Popper argues that
no single individual can be said to be impartial or objective in the sense
characteristic of scientific method. Scientific method is to be understood
as the collaboration of individual scientists in the activity of testing and
criticizing proposed theories! a3 a "friendly-hostile cooperation" which is
"socially or institutionally organized." * Scientific objectivity then, is
2
due to "the social aspects...of scientific method".-* Popper's argument
thus turns the tables on the claim made by the sociology of knowledge, that
the social aspects of knowledge make it impossible for knowledge to be ob¬
jective*
"Scientific objectivity can be described as the
inter-subjectivity of scientific method" 3.
Moreover, against collectivism, "the social aspects...of scientific method"
are a matter of collaboration by numerous individuals in the activity of
publicizing and criticizing scientific theories and the institutional form
which this activity takes.And Popper holds that all forms of knowledge
which claim to be objective can and must be apt>raised in terms of this inter¬
personal and individualistic model of scientific method.
The "inter-personal theory" which Popper gives of reason, in opposition
to the collectivist view of Hegel and the Hegelians, is a generalization of
his analysis of scientific methodj
"we owe our reason...to certain concrete
individuals - though perhaps to a considerable
number of anonymous individuals - and to our
intellectual intercourse with them. Therefore,
in speaking of a 'social' theory of reason
(or of scientific method), I mean more precisely
that the theory is an inter-personal one, and
never that it is a collectivist one."
1. OS, II, 217? OS, II, 220. 2. OS, II, 217
3. OS, II, 217. 4. 03, II, 217-6. ^s>0
5. OS, II, 226} of. a longer citation of this passage, P."3? above.
■jfV
An example of individualistic analysis which Popper gives, and which
is more typical of historical work, is Tolstoy's explanation of the War of
1812 in War and Peace: Tolstoy is in
"reaction against a method of writing history
which implicitly accepts the truth of the principle
of leadership; a method which attributes much - too
much, if Tolstoy is right, as he undoubtedly is - to
the great man, the leader. Tolstoy tries to show,
successfully I think, the small influence of the
actions and decisions of Napoleon, Alexander,
Kutuzov, and the other great leaders of 1812, in
the face of what may be called the logic of events.
Tolstoy points out, rightly, the neglected but very
gx*eat importance of the decisions and actions of the
countless unknown individuals who fought the battles,
who burned Moscow, and who invented the partisan method
of fighting." 1.
Can the individualistic method of analysis, illustrated in these
examples, be shown to be adequate for the practice of history and the social
sciences? Popper's analysis of scientific method may be cogent, and his use
of the example from Tolstoy compelling against hero-worship in historiography.
Tolstoy's analysis of the war of 1012 is "rock-bottom", to use J.W.N. Watkin9'
phrase, because he refers to the individuals who actually fought the battles
that constituted the war. In the simplest paradigm of scientific activity,
according to Popper's analysis, several individuals test and criticize each
other's proposed theories, and the "socially or institutionally organized
objectivity of science"'''* can be viewed as embodying this simple model.
1. PH, 148. But Tolstoy is historicist, according to Popper, in that
"he believes that he can see some kind of historical determination in these
events..." Nonetheless, the reaction against histozy written in terms of
hero-worship is, Popper thinks, a sound element in historicisra.
Popper, on the next page (PH, 149) also praises Tolstoy for his
unconscious use of situational logic. This combination of methodological
individualism and situational logic suggests the close relationship for
which I have argued, in this chapter, between methodological individualism
and situational logics that methodological individualism in practice often
works out as a situational approach.
2. OS, II, 220.
Individualistic analyst thus appear to be appropriate in some cases where
the individuals in the explanans are directly involved in the events to be
explained, for then reference to individuals can - sometimes - seem to be
"rock-bottom"; but it is not obvious that this observation can be general¬
ized. There are cases where individuals are directly involved in the
events to be explained, and reference to individuals may not be considered
adequate to explain these events.
One example introduced by Maurice Mandelbaum''" has by now become noto¬
rious for the difficulties it presents for methodological individualists.
The problem is how to explain to a Trobriand Islander why a bank teller
res 'Onds with cash when he is given a properly filled-in withdrawal slip
under certain circumstances. An explanation of these events might begin
by speaking of accounts and balances, and the established procedures by
which money may be withdrawn or deposited. But, the puzzled Trobriand
Islander might inquire, why should the man behind bars give money to the
client who submits a withdrawal slip in accordance with these procedures?
Surely if the client approached the teller with such a slip at a social
gathering, he would not be rewarded with money. The critic of methodo¬
logical individualism then argues that the explanation of the bank teller's
behaviour refers to his role as an employee of a bank, which he fulfils in
a bank during banking hours. To explain what such a role amounts to re¬
quires referring to "societal facts": "facts concerning the forms of
organization present in a society"^'
The claim is that concepts referring to societal facts cannot be
analysed in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals without
remainder. Thus the personnel of a bank may consist of its president,
manager, tellers and accountants, and these individuals make up the bank
because each has a role in its functioning: the role which a bank teller
fulfils cannot be resolved "into statements concerning his behaviour towards
1. "Societal Facts", in Theories of History, ed. P. Gardiner (Free Press,
Glencoe, IJ.I, 1959, 476-488.
2. Mandelbaum, op. cit. p.478-9*
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other individuals". Thus an explanation of a bank in terras of the
2.
individuals who perform banking functions requires "societal concepts".
An explanation of these events acceptable to a Popperite takes some
piec^ing together. It was noted above that Popper, in a later statement
of methodological individualism, includes situations among the individual-
istic terms to which an acceptable explanation may refer. This sugges¬
tion has been amplified a3 "situational individualism" in a thesis written
under Popper's direction: Individuals and Societies: a methodological in¬
quiry, by D.P. Chattopadhyaya., It was suggested above that situational
individualism represents a modification of methodological individualism
which several of its defenders have reached as a result of criticism of
their original proposals. Chattopadhyaya's discussion is the most useful
for explicating situational individualism, because he goes into it at some
length and attempts to show that it can make sense of the problem posed by
Mandelbaum's example. Hence, the following presentation of situational
individualism derives from Popper's ideas only at second hand. It is
however indicative of the outcome of attempting to make good the claim
that methodological individualism can accommodate certain characteristic
problems of history and the social sciences.
Chattopadhyaya argues that methodological individualism incorporates
c
the insights of holism without falling prey to its defects. A methodo¬
logical individualist "does not deny the reality of social wholes" nor
"say that these terms designate some unreal fictions".^* Social wholes
1 •
exist, but in a quite different sense from that in which individuals exist.
"all social wholes exist in the beliefs of individuals and
operate through the meaning-oriented actions of individuals". 8.
1 Mandelbaura,op. cit. p. 480. 2. Mandelbaum, op. cit., p.479480.
3.pp. 20(13% above. 4« Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1967.
5. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p.l, 17» 23.
6. Ibid., p.2, 4. Compare Popper PH, 135-6.
7. Ibid., p.2.
0. Ibid., p.5. However, the existence of society is not "purely subjective".
"It has its objectivity in that all other individuals
believe in the existence of society as I do." (p.5»)
Chattopadhyaya alleges that Hayek forgets this point in his emphasis on the
subjective character of the data of the social sciences.
Social wnoles
"are like quasi-permanent systems of situations"
and
"these situations are essentially human creations".1*
As for the notion of role theory, to which the critic of methodological
individualism may refer, in the example of the bank transactions
"I agree that the actions of individuals are to be
understood in the light of their roles and statuses,"
but
"statuses and roles are situationally determined,
and therefore may be changed by the ideas and
actions of the individuals involved." 2.
Chattopadhyaya may be attacking a straw man in this criticism of role theory:
the contention which methodological individualists uust answer is, not that
roles are iron determinants of individual behaviour, but that an individual's
behaviour can often be explained in terras of a role which the individual ful¬
fils, and that such an explanation cannot be resolved "into statements con¬
cerning" the individual's "behaviour towards other individuals".
Chattopadhyaya argues that the standard which a methodological indivi¬
dualist rust meet is not that of giving an explanation in completely indivi¬
dualistic terras in any particular instance. The context in which Chatto¬
padhyaya propounds this argument is a discussion of Mandelbaum's article,
"Societal Facts", in Which the bank-transaction example occurs:
"At every level of our understanding or explanation
of a social event we are obliged to make use of
some societal facts. But at a different level we
may reduce these societal facts to their individual
components. F/ven at that level one must take note
of some other societal facts, which may be further
analysed individualistically. In explanation of
every social event, we need societal facts, which
may be further analysed individualistically.
If it is claimed that societal facts are
unanalysable or irreducible* then we have to
1. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p.5
2. Ibid., p.7
ns
give up every hope of ascertaining the meaning
of the statements containing societal terms.
And if it is claimed that societal facts are
irreducible in the sense that at no level of
explanation of social event can we totally
dispense with societal facta, there is nothing
to object to; but, at the same time, it has
to be added that societal facts themselves
may be analysed into, and explained by,
individualistic terras at a different level." 1.
The objection of infinite regress is avoided by viewing societal facts as
part of the situation at any given level of explanation, and "there is no
2 •
absolute level of explanation." * Thus methodological individualism, as
situationalism, is more a matter of principle to be satisfied in the last
analysis, than a practice of "rock-bottom" explanation.
Adherence to the principle of methodological individualism in its
situational modification would nonetheless seem to imply that "we have to
give up every hope of ascertaining the meaning of statements containing"
terms such as "'renaissance' or 'the government'" if we accept Dray's
argument that such terms are "logically holistic" in that
"there seems to be no finite list of individual
actions and attitudes that would count as their
exemplifications; yet the problem does not seem
to be one simply of vagueness. Appropriate
exemplifications, furthermore, seem to var,y from
culture to culture without our being able to say
that the relevant terms are ambiguous - which
suggests, perhaps, an evaluative element in
their meanings. Terms within this range of
social description appear to be logically holistic." 5»
But methodological individualism, and its situational variant as well, is,
I shall argue, not so much a semantic as a political principle. The term
'renaissance' might be admissible in historiography so long as it was not
hypostatized as a social whole, even if no fully individualistic analysis
of the term were in sight. Popper might claim that an individualistic
1. Chattopadhyaya, 0£. cit. p.l5« 2. Ibid., p. 51-52, p. 41.
5. Dray, op. cit. p.57*
analysis of 'renaissance' could be produced by constructing an open-ended
model, as it were.
To return to the example discussed abovej a methodological individu¬
alist might propose, as an explanation of the bank transaction in Popperite
terms, that in giving out cash for a valid withdrawal slip, the bank clerk
acted in terms of the logic of his situation as bank olerk; the acceptable
term 'situation' thus replaces the objectionable * term 'role'. The de¬
scription of the bank clerk's situation may include some societal facts,
e.g. about the bank, but the salvation of the methodological individualist
is his belief that any such societal fact mentioned can be
"analysed into, and explained by, individualistic
terms at a different level"
at which further societal facts may be mentioned which themselves may be
subsequently analysed individualistically at still another level. Against
this explanation it might be objected that situation is a euphemism for
societal facts. A Popperite nonetheless finds it preferable and enlighten¬
ing, for reasons whioh I shall attempt to explain.
There are, then, several devices by which Popperites can attempt to
make room for societal facts in individualistic explanations without either
renouncing their principles or becoming holistic in the senses that Popper
specifies. They may view these societal facts as due to the interaction
2.
of numerous or countless anonymous individuals. * Such an analysis may
be more a matter of principle than of practice. Secondly, and I think
1. I.C. Jarvie, The Revolution in Anthropology (London, 1964)5
"As Popper...put it in lectures, sociologists have an interesting idea
with their role theory. But it is a terrible idea for what they don't see
is that although we do have abstract dealings with people it verges on
immorality for us to do so because it amounts to treating people as a means.
While to some extent we cannot escape it in modern society, we ought constantly
to strive to. For sociologists to produce a theory which is interested only
in these abstractions is unpleasant."
2. Goldstein, "The Two Theses of Methodological Individualism" BJPS, v.9,
pp. 9» 11, argues that Watkins uses anonymous individuals and anonymous
dispositions "as a way of avoiding holism".
more important in considering Popper's methodological individualism, they
may view these societal facts as part of the situations in which indivi¬
duals act, and they may lower the sights of methodological individualism
as suggested by Chattopadhyaya, so that it is not necessary to analyse all
terms referring to social collectives individualistically in the course of
any one explanation; some collective terms may be allowed to stand, as de¬
scribing the situations in which individuals act. Terras referring to social
collectives may be used in acceptable individualistic explanations with the
proviso that they can in principle be reduced to individualistic terms.
Thus methodological individualism once again emerges as a principle rather
than a practice of analysis, and the situational formulation of the principle
permits a rapprochement in practice, if not in theory, with moderate methodo¬
logical holists.
Methodological individualism, on this view, need not be unrelentingly
applied in the practice of history, and indeed, it is difficult to see how
it could be so applied without historiography becoming ponderous at best.
Moreover, terms referring to social collectives may be used as long as the
principle of methodological individualism is kept in mind as a safeguard
against hypostatizing these collective terras, with all the heinous conse¬
quences which thi3 practice may have for the political rights of the indivi¬
dual. It is preferable to speak of individuals as acting in situations,
rather then to use terms which have suffered from holistic misuses.
Use of the terminology of situational analysis thus expresses the
commitment of the Popperite methodological individualist to the principle
that social collectives can and must eventually be analysed individualisti¬
cally. Popperite methodological individualism is thus an insistence on
the principle of individualistic analysiss a principle which does not re¬
quire its adherent to give a thoroughgoing individualistic analysis in any
specific explanation, although he may of course do so in some cases. Thus
the development of Popper's doctrine in the hands of his students reflects
the rapprochement between methodological individualists and methodological
#
holists.which Dray detects.
1. Dray, op. cit., p. 58 :vVContemporary methodological individualists and
holists are not really as far apart as they often seem" Cf• ,p.s^above.
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If a thoroughgoing individualistic analysis can be postponed indefi¬
nitely, as this interpretation of methodological individualism would seem
to imply, then, in its bearing on the practice of history, methodological
individualism begins to look quite similar to the outcome of Popper's
analysis of adequate historical explanation in terms of the hypothetico-
deductive model, which he has subsequently described as indicating only
the logical "background" of historical explanation - a feature of histo¬
rical explanations which subsequent discussion has much overdone. With
methodological individualism as with the hypothetico-deductive model of
historical explanation, the outcome of Popper's methodological prescriptions
is situational logic; but this analogy is limited. The reasoning which
Popper uses to support the principle of methodological individualism is
rather different from that of Popper's argument that the logical background
of historical explanation must be in universal laws. In the latter case,
the reasoning derived from Popper's views on scientific method: the logi¬
cal requirements for adequate explanations provide security against attempts
to evade falsification, to which Popper thinks a conventionalist view of
scientific theories is particularly prone; if scientific laws are allowed
to be of less than universal validity, then there are openings for ad hoc
stratagems in the face of falsifying evidence, for such a law can be sal¬
vaged by adding the proviso that it does not apply in cases of the kind that
would otherwise falsify it. By contrast, the principle, if not the thor¬
oughgoing- practice, of methodological individualism must be maintained to
safeguard against political collectivism.
Methodological individualism thus turns out to be a matter of principle,
on which Popper insists because of his commitment to political individualism,
a commitment which I take to be the central constituent of his liberalism.
Although the method .logical doctrines of individualism or holism may be held
independently of the corresponding political doctrines, Popper attempts to
establish intimate connections between his political and his methodological
views. But his political individualism does not, as I have argued, entail
methodological individualism. It is not the case that acceptance of the
maxim that we must do cur utmost to prevent or minimize suffering on the
part of individuals, requires that all explanations of social events be
framed in individualistic terms. The belief that "human individuals must
be recognized to be the ultimate concern...of all politics"*' does not
yield what is required to establish methodological individualism; it is
compatible with the view that there are "societal facts" which cannot be
completely explained in individualistic terms. Suppose such an allegedly
"societal fact" were identified as causing individuals to suffer; it might
also be the case that the removal of the phenomenon promised to cause even
greater suffering, and it would thus be prohibited by the principle of
negative utilitarianism. Thus political individualism as Popper defends
it does not entail methodological individualism.
It was suggested above that Popper's defence of political individual¬
ism was one of the main reasons for his criticism of Historismus through
his criticism of historicism. His presentation of methodological indivi¬
dualism is meant to immunize agRinst empirical associations such as were
made between the methodological ideas of Historisraus, and certain anti-
liberal, because anti-individualist ideas of political theory popular in
Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
IV. The Relevance of Methodological Individualism
The preceding argument has centred on a methodological appraisal of
methodological individualism, and an analysis of its connection with
questions of social policy, and this is to take a narrow view of what Popper
is defending in the name of methodological individualism. It has been
suggested that the implementation of methodological individualism has its
difficulties: apart from the frequent necessity of explaining familiar
social facts in terms of the decisions and actions of countless anonymous
individuals, the avoidance of infinite regress may necessitate referring
1. OS, I, 288-9, note 7 to chapter 9-
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to situations which are said to be ultimately analysable in individualistic
terms, rather than analysing social events in thoroughgoing individualistic
terras. Popper insists that we mist analyse all social collectives as due
to the decisions and actions of individuals, in spite of the aforementioned
difficulties, because otherwise the way is open for individuals to evade
their responsibility for what happens in social life.
An analogy might be drawn between methodological individualism and
Popper's insistence that scientific laws satisfy certain stipulations as the
only safeguard against attempts to evade falsification. Although Popper
insists on certain methodological requirements as the only safeguards against
the eva-sion of falsification with respect to scientific theories, or the
evasion of the moral responsibility of individuals for social events, it can,
I think be argued in both cases that his recommended safeguards do not do the
trick.This can be shown in the case of methodological individualism with
a too timely example: of the explanations given for the assassination of
Robert Kennedy. The standard and superficial analysis refers to the violence
endemic in American society which is canalized in the lack * of control of the
possession of fire-arms. That the political rights of Americans, set forth
in the Constitution, have been interpreted as the right to uncontrolled
possession of firearms, can be explained in terms of American history: the
West was won, amidst a bloodshed not paralleled in the Canadian West, because
each and every settler had the right to a gun to protect himself, his family
and his property from the threat of attack. That the conflicts in American
society have a sanctified outlet in the possession of guns can be ascribed
to the countless anonymous individuals who were active in the conquest of the
West. Thus the explanation of the social conditions which made possible the
assassination of Robert Kennedy meets the standards of methodological indivi¬
dualism. But does it follow from the above explanation that every single
American is individually responsible for the killing of Robert Kennedy? I
4^
o fc
2. Now minimal control.
1. Cf. Chapter Two^for the argument with respect to scientific theories.
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think not. There are numerous individuals who can do little to change
the climate of violence, even though they may do all that is within their
power as individuals. The social institutions fostering violence have
acquired a power of their own which these individuals can do little if any¬
thing to arrest. The institutions of violence exist in America, and if
they can be said to be "manned",1 they are so in ways contrary to the wishes
and efforts of liberals, or men of good hope. The analysis of these social
institutions, in accordance with methodological individualism, does not en¬
tail that all individuals living in America, here and now, are morally re¬
sponsible for what happens in connection with these institutions. The
ethical argument for methodological individualism - that it is the only
security against the evasion of the moral responsibility of individuals for
the character of social life - does not hold.
What, then, does suoh an individualistic analysis add to our under¬
standing of social life? Is it the only alternative to the theism preserved
in historicisra; explaining social events in terms of supra-individual forces
which have a juggernaut effect' Rather I think it can be argued that one
tenable alternative to the postulate of methodological individualism, that
the self-contained individual is the ultimate unit of sooial analysis, is
the view that individuals are constituted by their social relations, as
X
suggested above"" in discussing Popper's classification of Hegel and Marx
as historicists. Social collectives, which Popper says must be recognised
as theoretical constructions, fully analysable in individualistic terms, are
nonetheless familiar facts of social life. What we want to know is how
these social collectives operate here and now, rather than to resolve them
1. Popper's characteristic phrase, e.g. OS, I, 126:
"Institutions are like fortresses. They must bo
well designed and manned."
Cf. PH, 66, where Popper uses almost the same phrases, except for saying
that institutions must be "properly manned."
2. Cf. "XJrediction and Prophecy," CR, p. 346? and also OS, chapter 25»
sec. iv (OS, II, 271-200).
3. Chapt(?r Pour above, section iv.
into the actions, decisions and attitudes of countless anonymous individuals,
which led to the formation of these collectives; the individualistic analy¬
sis may be correct but it is not i*elevant to what we want to understand.
Popper argues that methodological individualism is the only method of
social analysis which gives due recognition to the integrity of the individuals
that the "uncertain" "human factor" is ultimately unfathomable. But Fopper's
insistence that the individual is both self-contained and unfathomable runs
contrary to what we do know about social life. There are familiar facts of
social life which are recognised as collectives and which help to make
individuals what they are, whioh is less unfathomable than Popper contends.
If we assert that individuals are shaped by the climate of violence in America,
then we are saying that individuals may act violently, or be disheartened by
the realization that their whole-hearted efforts to abolish the institutions
of violence are nugatory, because these institutions operate as though they
were something more than a matter of the decisions, actions, and attitudes
of individuals.
But this assertion does not entail the view, which Popper ascribes to
historicism, that individuals are no more than reflexes of collective entities.
Individuals are shaped by their social relations, and any individual is shaped
by his relations to numerous social institutions and consequently cannot be
said to be a reflex of any single social collective. Both individuals and
social collectives must be considered if we are to understand social life,
but this approach is not holistic in the sense of submerging the individual
in any single social "whole" - although individuals are, in this approach,
less self-contained than Popper contends. Popper's reasons for insisting on
this view of the individual have been criticized. The individualistic analy¬
sis which Popper recommends does not entail that individuals are morally re¬
sponsible for whatever happens in the society in which they live, as the
individualistic analysis of the assassination of Robert Kennedy shows; nor
need the view that the individual is shaped by his social relations undermine
the integrity of the individual; and the individualistic analysis which
Popper recommends does not answer all the questions which may reasonably be
raised about social lifet it does riot explain the difficulties in changing
the institutions of violence in America. Such an explanation must refer
both to attributes of individuals, and also to what individuals consider to
be the realities of social life. As W.I. Thomas said,
"'If men define situations as real, they are
real in their consequences,,M 1.
and social collectives are real in at least this sense. Sociological
theory must, I think, attempt to explain how men act in social situations,
wherein social collectives are familiar facts, rather than, as Popper sug¬
gests, attempt to apply ethical postulates which do not take account of
what we know of social life.
1. Cited by Lewis Coser and Bernard Rosenberg in Sociological Theory:
A Book of Readings, 2nd edition (New York, 1964), p. 232.
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